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RE-LEGITIMISING PAINTING IN TASHKENT, UZBEKISTAN AFTER THE 
FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION (1991-2004) 
With the Soviet Union's fall, the overarching Soviet institution, the Union of Artists of 
the USSR, also collapsed. This institution had been solely responsible for the 
production, consumption and circulation of arts, and for regulating subordinate 
Republican Unions of Arts. Each national Union was now independent; later, these too, 
were supplanted by several different institutions and social domains that affected the 
production and consumption of painting in the post-Soviet era. The newly diffuse means 
of validating painting provokes the central questions of this dissertation: what are the 
new criteria for the economic, moral, and social valuation of artists and their work in 
different contexts, and what do these changes tell us about broader social changes in the 
city? 
In order to explore the changed environment in which artists now work, I 
present five ethnographic case-studies of post-Soviet arts in Tashkent (1991-2004) that 
illustrate changing understandings and practices of authority, state legitimisation, labour, 
production and consumption of arts, and gender. Each case study examines an 
institution or social domain that has re-emerged in slightly changed form or content 
after 1991. These five new social 'configurations' are: the independent state's 
commissioning system, the illegal art market conducted in foreign currency, the 
traditional mahalla neighbourhoods of Tashkent, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the 
Besh-Agach mosque. 
With the Union of Artists' authority ended, I examine the process of developing 
legitimisation in each of the emerging social configurations using the insights from 
Weber's typology of authority. I emphasise the importance of arts to legitimise both the 
Soviet and the post-Soviet states. I consider the effect of the commodification of 
paintings on the idea in the Soviet period that an artist was a living embodiment of his 
work's moral, economic and social values - and how in some areas this connection 
between the person of the painter and the value of the product endures in different forms. 
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Glossary 1: Uzbek language 
abr 
aivan 
aksakal 
ambarhona 
buylik 
chachvan 
EskiShakar 
ganch 
hauz 
hidzhat 
hona 
ichkari 
jadids 
katak 
khanatlas 
mahalla 
mehmonhona 
molhona 
Mustakilik 
oshhona 
parandja 
rassom 
sharia 
1) cloudy 
2) an ikat-patterned textile 
veranda 
1) elder (lit. 'white beard ') 
2) in the post-Soviet period, a voluntary representative of the 
committee of elders elected by the mahalla community 
storage space 
greatness 
a veil covering the face 
Old City, the part of Tashkent built prior to Russian conquest in 1865 
carved dry plaster 
water storage 
lavatory 
chamber 
1) the part of a domestic space designated for women; 
2) the women's designated part of the house; in the pre-Soviet past, the 
part of the house barred to all men except relations. 
revolutionary clerics who sided with the communists during the early 
Soviet period 
poultry shed 
satin with ikat pattern 
neighbourhood 
guestroom 
cow shed 
Independence (the stated ideology of the post-Soviet regime in 
Uzbekistan) 
kitchen 
the body cover worn by urban Muslim women 
artist 
Islamic Law 
san 'at 
tandoor 
tashkari 
YuangiShakar 
1) art 
2) title ofan Uzbek arts magazine 
bread-making oven 
in the pre-Soviet period, the part of the house designated for male 
family members 
1) New City 
2) the part of Tashkent built under Russian colonial rule 1965-1917 
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Glossary 2: Russian language 
artel' 
Charepaka e Skripka 
communalka 
osvyatit' 
Avrora 
dacha 
dachi 
Dekorativnoe lsskusstvo 
dom upravlenie 
domovaya kniga 
Dvoryanskoe Gnezdo 
ideinost 
ikonopisets 
ikonostas 
imennaya ikona 
lsskusstvo 
komandirovki 
kooperativ 
Koshelek 
kustar' 
khudozhnik 
khudozhnitsa 
kupola 
Lampochka ll'icha 
narodnost' 
nomenklatura 
the small state enterprise of workers 
'Turtle and Violin' the privately organised cultural events 
by Shelests in Tashkent 
communal apartment 
sanctifying by a priest of artefact which turns the secular into 
religious artefacts 
an arts publishing house named after the Russian naval vessel 
privately owned summer house 
residence of state officials 
'Applied Art', an arts magazine of the Soviet period 
Housing Office 
family registry 
('Gentry Nest'), a housing development for the high 
bureaucracy 
presentation of correct ideology 
icon painter 
iconostasis (the partition between the altar and the praying 
area) 
icon with a namesake saint 
'Art', an arts magazine of the Soviet period 
assignments 
a state-built apartment, bought from the state by an individual 
'The Valet', title of a painting by Elena Lee 
craftsman 
artist (masculine gender) 
artist (feminine gender) 
dome of a church building 
'Lenin's Electric Bulb', the title of a painting by Elena 
Kambina 
accessibility to the people 
high officials 
NovyyGorod 
Novogorodskie 
Ostorozhno Religia 
osvoenie 
partiynost 
Pod Svodom Vechnosti 
Peredvizhniki 
prikhod 
prikhozhane 
proizvedenie iskusstva 
propiska 
rabochiy 
Represii e Vostanie 
Risovyy Rynok 
sovremennik 
the part of Tashkent built under Russian colonial rule 
1965-1917 
Uzbeks who moved from the Old city to the New City or 
crossed from the Uzbek to the Russian inhabited parts of 
Tashkent from 1930 to 1966 (the year of the earthquake) 
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'Careful Religion', title of a post-Soviet arts exhibition in 
Moscow 
conquenng 
party loyalty 
'Under the Vault of Eternity', title of a painting by Bakhodyr 
Jallalov 
'Itinerants', a politicised group of Russian artists in the 
second half of the 19th century 
parish 
parishioners 
masterpiece 
domicile registration 
worker 
Repressions and Uprising', title of a painting by Alikulov 
Rice Market', the part of the city given for building private 
houses on leased land for the Russian working class in 1925 
an exemplifier of the 'contemporary' 
samodeyatel 'nyy khudozhnik 'self-made artist', an amateur artist without a professional 
education 
Samokat 
Sadovoe Koltso 
Staryy Gorod 
Starogorodskie 
spal 'nyy rayon 
'Skateboard', title of a painting by Kulagina 
(,Garden Ring'), the central part of Moscow 
(,Old City'), the part of Tashkent built prior to Russian 
conquest in 1865 
1) the inhabitants of the Old City 
2) natives of Tashkent 
('sleepers districts') people returned after work to sleep in 
their tiny flats in concrete apartment blocks 
Tcentr 
teknicheskoe obrazovanie 
tematicheskie kompozitsii 
Tvorchestvo 
tupik 
Vetshch 
vykrest 
vychesyvat 
vyshee obrazovanie 
vyselennye pereselentsy 
Center, a residential area built mainly for settling high 
bureaucracy and intelligentsia 
13 
the technical education undertaken in the arts college 
thematic compositions, a combination of human images, 
objects and symbols conveying an ideological message to the 
VIewer 
'Creativity', an arts magazine of the Soviet period 
dead-end street 
'The Thing', an arts exhibition in Tashkent 
a Jewish convert to Christianity 
1) combing-out 
2) the 1920-1930 policy of ridding Soviet society of 
undesirable political elements 
high education in the Arts Institute 
forcibly relocated 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. What is this thesis about? 
14 
The Soviet Union had a singular institution for determining the legitimacy and value of 
art. This institution was called the Union of Artists of the USSR, and had associated 
Unions in each Soviet republic. This thesis is about what happened to arts in the former 
Soviet republic of Uzbekistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Union of 
Artists. After the fall of the Union of Artists, a number of institutions and social fields 
emerged to fill the void. Each had its own methods and practices for determining the 
economic, social and moral values of art. These methods were often contradictory, 
creating problems for individuals who had to negotiate different social domains. Some 
practices were borrowed or re-appropriated from the Soviet state, even by apparently 
opposing domains such as the Russian Orthodox Church. 
The specific case study that I use to explore and analyse this fragmentation of 
singular authority into a multiplicity of systems is that of the production and 
consumption of paintings in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. At the core of the 
dissertation are two discussions: first, a discussion of the variety of ways in which 
paintings came to have different values attached to them, and secondly, what the post-
Soviet emergence of competing value systems tells us about the wider disintegration of 
socio-economic unity into a variety of overlapping but distinct social, economic and 
political domains. 
The case of Tashkent is particularly illuminating: clearly linked to the Soviet 
hierarchy that placed Moscow at the center of institutional legitimacy, it also had a quite 
discrete identity as the center of Central Asian education and culture. 
This dissertation therefore starts with a discussion of the validation of painting. At 
this point, it is important to distinguish between the different types of (often related) 
values attached to painting. What this dissertation shows is that first, during the Soviet 
period the various ways of determining the worth of an object were intimately linked; 
secondly, these different determinants often became disengaged from each other after 
1991, so that, for example, the monetary price of a painting no longer necessarily 
reflected its ideologica~ or 'social' message; and thirdly, different institutional and 
social domains practiced different methods of ascertaining the merit of painter and 
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painting. A third sub-theme, the changing ideas of labour, producer and art object, 
therefore also runs through this dissertation. 
Three broad areas of value may be descried. First there is social value, which 
values painting from a religious, ideological and national standpoint (GellI992, 1998). 
Social value establishes painting's position within the framework of society; change in 
the society therefore brings re-evaluation of the value of painting. The second is moral 
value (Pinney 1995), which is based on the perceived capacity of painting to educate 
society and society's capacity to appreciate the intellectual and technical aesthetic of 
painting as an individual endeavor. Moral value gives artists a reason to persevere in 
creating a painting. The third, is economic value (Sullivan 1995; Solkin 1996, 2001), 
which estimates price depending on authorship, artistic style or school, historical period, 
and art market trends. Although market value is the most obvious meaning of valuing of 
painting, nevertheless because of its links to fluctuating money markets and fashions it 
is the most subjective form of valuation. Moreover, since in the Soviet period there was 
no open market for trading paintings, we have to look elsewhere to fmd and understand 
the economic consequences of producing particular kinds of painting. 
All those different values have to have recognition by institutions with the 
authority to distinguish the different types of value of each painting and, by that 
authority, give recognition to the author of a painting (Danto 1964; Dickie 1969, 1974; 
Becker 1982; Bundgaard 1987; Perkins 2000). In the case of the destruction of 
institutions, such as after the fall ofthe Soviet Union, the validation system is destroyed 
together with them. It takes time to replace old institutions with new ones, and it takes 
even more time for those freshly established institutions to gain authority for their 
validation practices. Needless to say, there is a dramatic period in between, after one 
system goes and while another takes shape. What goes on in this period became the 
focus of my research, which is a case study of the disappearance of Soviet forms of 
validating painting and the emergence in Uzbekistan of a number of post-Soviet 
validation systems. 
My argument is that the new validation of post-Soviet painting is based on the fact 
that arts production and consumption is not only without the former monopoly of state 
control, but also is increasingly affected by a whole set of economic and political 
conditions which emerged in the new successor states. As result ofthose conditions, the 
validation process becomes increasingly fractured, because it is now carried out by 
various institutions and private individuals as opposed to just the state. 
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To support my argument, I chose to do my research using a particular case study as an 
example of validating painting in the city of Tashkent, the capital of independent 
Uzbekistan. I chose Uzbekistan for two reasons. First, Uzbekistan had the largest Union 
of Artists in the Central Asian region during the Soviet era. Secondly, before I started 
my fieldwork I had some experience in that country, which I discuss further below. By 
choosing Uzbekistan I aimed to examine how economic and political fragmentation in 
Uzbekistan, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, has been reflected in the division 
of a previously unitary arts sphere from 1991 to 2004. Previously a single institution, 
the Union of Artists of the USSR, had both overseen the production of the state-
commissioned art works and assessed their value in all three senses: social, moral and 
economic!. After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, in all successor states, including 
Uzbekistan, both production and consumption of art fractured into a number of spheres. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts that provide the 
necessary backdrop for subsequent chapters. In the first part, I describe the economic 
and political conditions in independent Uzbekistan, particularly during the time of my 
fieldwork. The second part provides background on the key commissioners and valuers 
of painting in the 1990s: the state, the Russian Orthodox Church, the mahalla 
(neighbourhoods) and private individuals. These effects of these actors and institutions 
on the production and consumption of paintings after 1991 is discussed in Chapter 3-7. 
The fmal part of this introductory chapter outlines the fieldwork I carried out in 
Tashkent. 
1.2. Economic conditions in independent Uzbekistan 
Economic conditions in independent Uzbekistan were defined by the introduction of 
market economy reform based on industrial restructuring and mass privatization 
(Humphrey & Mandel 2002). Arts, like all state enterprises, went through market 
reform. This section examines these two characteristics, industrial restructuring and 
mass privatization, as they, or equivalent processes, apply to the arts. Arguably, the 
1 Art historians (Kometchuk 1982; Darewych 1990;Bown, Taylor, Lodder, Clark,Holz and Sidorov 1993) 
mentioned three institutions: the Union of Artists of the USSR, the Academy of Fine Arts and the 
Cultural Affairs Office. However, the Academy of Fine Arts was an institution responsible for giving 
honours and the Cultural Affairs Office handled the promotion of Soviet arts abroad. Unlike these two 
institutions, the Union of Artists was directly involved with arts appraisal. Moreover, these two 
institutions had little significance in national republics, since there were few members of the Academy 
from national republics and there was very little opportunity to publicise arts from national republics 
abroad. Therefore it is justifiable to discuss the Union of Artists of the USSR as the only institution. 
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fragmentation ofthe state enterprise that was the Union of the Artists of the USSR can 
be likened to a restructuring. Mass privatization can be seen in the increasing 
domestication of arts, characterized by the movement of arts from public to private 
domains. The features of the arts trade during this period reinforced these two 
characteristics, and this assessment demonstrates how the market economy shaped the 
arts field in the post-Soviet period. 
I start with Russian case studies of how the arts fared during the early days of the 
market economy. I do this for three reasons. First, during the Soviet period the arts 
sphere, as with any industry, was highly institutionalised, centralized and 
bureaucratized. Because of the close connection within the arts institution between 
center and periphery I could grasp how the post-Soviet fragmentation of the previously 
united arts world took place. Secondly, market economy reforms began first in Russia, 
in 1992, and were followed afterwards in all successor states. Therefore the first effects 
of the dissolution of state industrialization can be observed in Russia. Thirdly, Russian 
case studies are better known than any other former republic's arts, whether within the 
former Soviet Union or in Western scholarship. Moreover, the Russian case fmdings are 
crucial because the early dissolution of state industrialization in Russia indicated how 
the process might tum out in other post-Soviet states. Yet the pattern of each particular 
country's arts fragmentation combined with restructuring, de~ended on how economic 
reform were actually implemented. 
In the Russian case, the first effects of economic reform in the arts sphere were 
shown in the trade in arts in foreign currency, the fragmentation of the Union of Artists 
of the USSR, and the following rapid domestication of arts in the capital of the Russian 
Federation, Moscow. I will examine three aspects of the market economy's emergence 
in the arts sphere and will show that they are connected but also independent from each 
other. 
I would like to start by examining the trade in arts using foreign currency. It is 
important to investigate this type of trade because it helps to answer the question of 
whether or not there was a unitied market practice prior to 1992. By acknowledging that 
different types of currencies were used, we could actually challenge existing claims 
within the former Soviet Union and abroad that there was no private consumption of art 
under the Soviet state (Bown 1987; Groys 1995). The presence of an art trade operating 
in currencies besides the Soviet rouble suggests that there was a coexistence of both 
private and state orientated practices in the arts sphere, and that those private practices 
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were also controlled and sanctioned by the Soviet state. These unusual facets of the 
Soviet state reveal that trade in Russian or Soviet arts for private individuals never 
ceased under the Soviet state. 
The existence of this art trade in foreign currency is due to the fact that the Soviet 
state sanctioned and controlled the trade in American dollars, and that the Soviet arts 
sphere has always been partly Western-oriented. However, there was an uneasy history 
of the art trade in foreign currency, because the Soviet art trade moved from abroad 
back to Russia during the 1920s and again during the late 1980s. According to Robert 
Chadwell Williams (1980) and Susan Buck-Morss (2000) in their books concerning arts 
and foreign trade conducted by the Soviet state in the period 1920-1940 with the United 
States of America, this art trade existed because of the need for foreign currency to 
sponsor massive industrial projects under Stalin's government. For example, proceeds 
from the sale of a single Raphael from the Hermitage paid for the building of half the 
city of Magnitogorsk. Further, with the coming of the liberalization process under 
Gorbachev, the Perestroika period (1985-1991), the arts trade was permitted within the 
territory of the Soviet Union; in 1989 for the first time, the Western auction house 
Sotheby's opened a branch in Moscow (Kovalev 1995). Those renewed trading 
practices of the late 1980s were only a demonstration of a strengthening of the earlier 
pattern, introduced prior to the Second World War, of orientation towards the Western 
art market and trading in American dollars (Reid 1999; Pyne 2000; Davis Pyne 2001; 
Swanson 2002). The dissolution of the USSR three years later encouraged the art trade 
to operate in American dollars. 
It was recognised by Russian art historians (Morozov 1990; Levshina 1990) that the 
dissolution of Soviet cultural institutions meant the end of the state monopoly on art 
production and consumption, and led to the splintering of the former Soviet arts field 
(Morozov 1991, 1999, 2000). However, art historians did not predict how far and how 
deep that fragmentation would go. By looking at the painful twofold process of 
fragmentation of the Union of Artists of the USSR, I can establish the pattern which 
repeated itself in every Soviet successor state. The first stage of the process was due to 
the dissolution of the USSR, and the second was owing to the emergence of market 
economy reforms. The fall ofthe Union of Artists of the USSR in 1991 was followed by 
a rapid splitting of the Union into 15 national republican Unions. After the completion 
of the first stage, the process continued within each national Union. As one of the 
fifteen new Unions, the Russian Federation branch fell apart into several cultural 
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institutions including the Union of Artists of Russia, represented by 96 regional artists' 
associations, the Moscow Union of Artists and the Union of Graphics. While greater in 
number, the newly emerged cultural institutions were too poor to function under 
reduced state funding. 
The decrease in funding resulted in a massive exodus of Russian artists to the West. 
Many were already in the West, since the 1970s-1990s, and they attempted to become 
incorporated within the Western circuit of artistic production and consumption (Shalin 
1995). Thus economic reform fragmented the Russian arts field not only internally by a 
multiplication of cultural institutions but also externally by reinforcing the division 
between Russian arts abroad and at home (Dyogot 1995, Degot 1998, 2000; Hopkins 
2000)2. 
The domestication of arts was begun by the fragmentation of the post-Soviet 
Russian arts institutions in Russia, most prominently in the capital, Moscow, where 
market practices began in the Soviet period and were further developed in the post-
Soviet period. Nancy Condee and Vladimir Padunov (1995) in their article The ABC of 
Russian Consumer Culture examined the domestication of arts which took place in 
Moscow in 1992-1993 by connecting privatization of domestic property with the 
moving of paintings from public places into new domestic premises. Condee and 
Padunov emphasised that the move of painting flourished in a specific area of Moscow, 
where privatised property was at the highest price. The area which the authors specified 
was the central part of the capital, encircled by Sadovoe Koltso ('Garden Ring'). In the 
19th century, gardens marked the division between bourgeoisie- and proletariat-
inhabited parts of the city of Moscow. In the following Soviet period, Sadovoe Koltso 
was turned into a ring road encircling the central part of the city. The significance of the 
encirclement of Sadovoe Koltso is that the inner area embodies the historical and 
cultural core of Moscow as the capital of the Russian state. The authors suggested that 
possession of property and paintings within Sadovoe Koltso became an expression of a 
claim for a historical past. Paraphrasing Condee and Padunov (1995: 145), the new 
owners of property and paintings claimed that they were connecting different pasts 
within Russian history, continuing the tradition of pre-Soviet merchant capitalist 
patronage of arts called, in Russian, metsentstvo. 
2 I am not going discuss in depth Russian art abroad because Russian art functioning within the Western 
arts institutional system has little to do with my focus of studies. Studying foreign arts within the Western 
arts system should be undertaken separately. 
20 
Contrasting Russian case findings with those of Uzbekistan shows the difference 
between both cases and the uniqueness of the Uzbek case. The new economic reforms 
in Uzbekistan emerged slowly compared with the rest of the successor states, and it 
differed even from neighbouring states in the Central Asian region. In 1995, under the 
leadership ofUzbek president Islam Karimov, the so-called 'gradual economic reform' 
was introduced, defmed by five principles. These principles were: 
1) Priority for economic aspects over political reform 
2) Tight control by the state over economic development 
3) Creation ofa law simplifying economic reform 
4) Protection by the state of the vulnerable 
5) Gradual introduction of economic reforms 
Most authors (Kaizer 1998; Kandiyoti and Mandel 1998; Koroteyeva and Makarova 
1998; Ilkhamov 2001; Rasanayagam 2002) emphasised the before and after difference 
of the new economy, omitting the gradual character of the reform. Unlike in their 
studies, the introduction of 'step-by-step' economic reform became a main aspect of my 
thesis. The fIrst step towards economic reform in Uzbekistan started from 1995 up to 
January 2004, and was characterised by restrictions on the use of foreign currency. 
Martin Spechler (2003), suggested that in practice, the 'gradual economic reform' 
was specifically based on the restricted use of foreign currency. He carefully 
investigated what happened prior to 1995. He acknowledged that the late introduction of 
economic reform might be rooted in the dissolution of the single-currency Soviet ruble 
zone, which resulted in the move of the inflated mass of the old Soviet currency from all 
former Soviet successor states to Uzbekistan. These roubles flooded Uzbekistan because 
there was a differentiation in the times of the introduction of national currencies in 
successor states. Over four years time, as other states adopted their new national 
currencies, the existing black markets moved all the devalued roubles from those 
countries to Uzbekistan. Amassed inflated roubles put the local economy on the verge 
of collapse. Spechler pointed out that at the time, it was highly unlikely that the state 
would further rock the fragile local economy by introducing a convertible national 
currency. In order to solve this critical situation, the state decided to simultaneously 
introduce a local currency, the Som, and restrict the use of foreign currency. The 
restriction on foreign currency meant that only state enterprises could do currency-
convertible transactions whereas private individuals would be penalised for 
participation in foreign currency transactions. Spechler came to the conclusion that the 
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restricted use of foreign currency led to the creation of a parallel market. He estimated 
the volume of black market transactions using American dollars at $458 million 
annually. 
In the art field, the prohibition of foreign currency use by private individuals 
meant outlawing the pre-existing market practice of using foreign currency to buy and 
sell art. Moreover, the presence of two different money markets, the legal one, using 
the Som and the illegal one, using foreign currency, led to difficulties in researching 
economic aspects of the Uzbek arts field since the independence period (1995-2004). 
Researchers were able to assess culture only within the legitimate system using the 
official currency (Kholmatova 1997; Doi 1997, 2002; Abdurakhimov 1998; Shodiev 
1999; Bell 1999; Adams 2000(a), 2000(b)) because this was the only system that was 
clearly visible. As a result, much of the research either lacked a study of non-state 
market practices or underestimated the consequences of decreased funding to the arts 
institutions. In the two following sections, on political conditions and arts institutions, I 
will highlight how reduced funding affected arts within the state-controlled field. 
1.3. Political conditions in independent Uzbekistan 
This section examines the emergence of a new ideology after the dissolution of the 
USSR, and its application to the cultural field in Uzbekistan. This section continues the 
previous section's argument that there was not a simple transfer of the Soviet culture to 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan. By investigating the volume and the content of the state-
controlled culture, I demonstrate that post-Soviet Uzbek culture serves not to reinforce 
the notion of statehood but to strengthen the current political regime. 
The fragmentation of the USSR created new political conditions which dramatically 
changed the realm of ideology after 1991 (Khazanov 1995). Political conditions in the 
new states brought first an ideological vacuum, and then a rapid invention of new 
ideologies to fill that vacuum. Uzbekistan was among those new states, which attempted 
to fill an ideological vacuum with a completely new ideology. 
The new ideology was called 'Mustakilik'('Independence'). Beneath this broad 
ideology lay another concept, the revival of 'buylik' ('greatness' in Uzbek). In 1990, 
when this 'Independence ideology' was introduced, no researchers, Western or local, 
could give a clear defmition of the vague term. With the dissolution of the USSR in 
1991, researchers came to the conclusion that Mustakilik is not an ideology in a pure 
sense but is rather a combination of ideological concepts taken together for a 
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reaffirmation of the state (Yalcin 2002). Since the previous state was promoted by 
Soviet culture within a Soviet ideological framework, it was assumed that the new state 
of Uzbekistan would stick to the promotion of an ideology of statehood elaborated by 
old Soviet culture. Although in both cases Soviet culture was defmed by an intersection 
of politics and arts, it did not necessarily mean that the central power in Moscow would 
directly affect a republic's culture. Therefore, Soviet Uzbekistan's culture lacked direct 
experience in dealing with state power. 
I suggest that Uzbekistan presented a special case within Soviet cultural studies. 
Despite Uzbekistan's inheritance of the highly institutionalised Soviet culture, there was 
a significant difference between mainstream Russian Soviet and republican Soviet 
cultures. Although in both cases Soviet culture was defined by an intersection of politics 
and arts, it did not necessarily mean that the central power in Moscow would directly 
affect a republic's culture. Therefore, Soviet Uzbekistan culture lacked direct 
experience in dealing with state power. 
Western scholarship played down the specificity of culture under the Soviet period, 
and there was confusion over how to study and portray culture in Uzbekistan (Carrere 
d'Encausse 1980, 1982; Bacon 1980). Western scholarship was marked by a very 
selective approach to the case of culture during the Soviet period. Soviet culture was 
represented by an institutionalised Russian Soviet high culture, as opposed to 
traditional, often religious-oriented, popular culture. Moreover, some researchers 
believed that at the start of the Soviet period, there was a violent a replacement of one 
culture by the other: of the traditional culture by the Soviet (Shahrani 1993). But, the 
value of this approach was questioned with the emergence of Uzbekistan as an 
independent state after 1991 (Roy 1995), when Russian Soviet institutionalised high 
culture became involved in the creative process of introducing new symbols of the new 
state such as the anthem, flag, coat of arms and new national holidays (Adams 1999; 
Doi 2002). 
James Bell (1999) immersed himself in the cultural study of Uzbekistan. He located 
Soviet culture within the city of Tashkent by mapping the Soviet sculptural monuments 
built into the capital's landscape. He demonstrated that the post-Soviet culture became 
reduced to a few street blocks in the Central part of the Soviet-built section of Tashkent. 
Bell examined the significance of those spatial patterns within the ideological 
framework of the new statehood, by demonstrating that even in such limited presence, 
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culture still matters. However, what was missing from his discussion were the 
questions, for whom were these cultural projects important and who was behind them? 
Andrew March (2002, 2003) pointed out that those projects were important for the 
regime of president Karimov. He connected the Mustakilik ideology with cultural 
projects by exploring the new ideology in all its complexity. In order to analyse this, he 
reviewed the whole body of primary sources written by Karimov and his 'court 
ideologists', which were published during the Independence period. March brought 
forward the issue of 'court ideologists.' As we remember, the Soviet period had very 
few ideologists whose names were spelt out and whose deeds were accounted for. From 
March's article it remained unclear who these 'court ideologists' were. But their 
importance in the new regime is obvious, as is their power over cultural institutions. It is 
still unclear if they are a single group of people, or differing groups of people chosen at 
random each time from specialists in different fields of political science, gathered 
together for short-term projects reflecting the current needs of the regime. Are these 
groups more important as individuals than the formal institutions? By introducing these 
'court ideologists', March did not touch on cultural institutions; he was more interested 
in how ideology was propagated than in how state arts commissions were selected, 
monitored, evaluated and delivered. (These aspects will be discussed in Chapter 3) 
To understand these political conditions as they apply to the arts, it is necessary to 
examine how local Uzbek arts institutions compared to mainstream Soviet arts 
institutions from a historical perspective, and to examine what happened with an arts 
institution responsible for validation of painting during Independence period. I will 
address those questions in the following sections which examine the main 
commissioners and consumers of paintings in Tashkent. 
1.4. From the Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic to the 
Academy of Fine Arts of Uzbekistan 
In this section I am going to assess the Soviet arts institution that was primarily 
responsible for the validation of paintings and artists during the Soviet period: the 
Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. I have to start with the Russian 
case study because what happened in the main Russian Union of Artists determined the 
fate of the dependent associations in other Soviet Republics. For this reason I will start 
by considering the Russian Union of Artists before moving on to the Uzbek Union of 
Artists in the Soviet period and the forms it took later. I will also approach the Uzbek 
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case from a third direction, that of the theory of socialist realism and its practical 
application through arts education and membership of artists in the arts institution. This 
discussion will explain how the arts institution in Uzbekistan dissolved, and how the 
official remnants of the institution evolved into the less influential Academy of Fine 
Arts of Uzbekistan. 
My assessment of the socialist realism movement is necessitated by three factors. 
First of all, socialist realism had a place of paramount importance in the Soviet era. 
Secondly, it was, and still remains, the main educational tool in the arts field. Thirdly, 
socialist realism has relevance to Uzbekistan case studies, because Soviet U zbek art 
functioned only within the state institutional framework, and this style is still taught in 
U zbek arts education institutions. 
Without exception, the immense amount of literary sources covering Soviet art, 
regardless of institutional affiliations, Western or Russian, conflates the history of 
institutions and the theory of socialist realism (Golomshtok 1990; Darewych 1990; 
Bown and Taylor 1993; Chang, Falchikov, McDougall and McPherson 1996; Bown 
1992; 1998; Prokhorov 1995; Groys 1995; Tupitsyn 1994, 1998; Lahusen and 
Dobrenko 1997; Balina, Condee and Dobrenko 1999). It is widely recognised by all 
these authors that socialist realism as a theory was borrowed from the literary sources of 
the Russian writer Maxim Gorky, implemented by Andrei Zhdanov (1896-1948) during 
Stalin's regime (1928-1953) (Zhdanov 2000 [1934] : 409). In addition to the underlying 
theory of socialist realism the style of socialist realism was guided by three principles: 
partiynost, or party loyalty; narodnost, or accessibility to the people; and ideynost, 
presentation of correct ideology.3 
The application of socialist realism theory was curtailed by the death of Stalin in 
1953. The denunciation of the cult of personality by the XX Congress of the Communist 
Party in 1957 directly affected the arts field. This was followed by the XIII Congress of 
Artists in Tbilisi in 1958, which condemned the 'falsehood of Stalinist-era arts' and 
revised the Stalinist version of the socialist realism theory (Salimov 1982 : 89; 
3 Darewych (1990:66) adds a fourth principle, which was missed by most of art historians: 'klassovost' 
or 'classness'. She emphasised the importance of klassovost, because 'it reflects the moral -political 
unity of the people building Communism under the guidance of the Communist Party. As Soviet society 
is monolithic the "narodnosf' and "klassovosf" of Soviet art coincide and find expression in the 
"partiinost'" of art.' I mention Darewych, here as I show in the following paragraphs that the 
significance and application of some of these principles varied during different decades of the Soviet 
regime. For more on the principles of Socialist Realism, see the Central Committee of the All- Union 
Communist Party 'Decree on the Reconstruction of Literary and Artistic Organisations' , 1932 (2000 : 
400). 
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Akhmedova 1999, 2000(a), 2000(b)). Meanwhile, the Union of Artists of the USSR 
continued to function from 1932 up to 1991. 
However, inertia within the educational system preserved socialist realism as the 
educational basis for teaching arts. Socialist realism continued to be taught even during 
the late Soviet period. In the post-Soviet era, socialist realist art proved to be the most 
commercially valued by both Western and local markets (Bown 1991; Reid 1999; Pyne 
2000; Davis Pyne 2001; Swanson 2001). As a result of such strong commercial 
viability, the socialist realist style of painting continued to thrive as the most widely 
taught style in post-Soviet art schools. The style'S versatility helped it to lose its 
shameful political birthmarks and to be preserved within the educational system of all 
post-Soviet countries. Moreover, the style was reclaimed by the new art commissioners, 
both private and institutional (see Church section). 
The decline of the theory of socialist realism within the Union of Artists arts (1958-
1991) brought to light the importance of the institution itself. Matthew Cullerne Bown 
devoted two of his books (1987 and 1998) to the history of the institution. Bown 
described the Union of Artists as a voluntary organisation, providing its members with 
state commissions and responsible for delivering those commissions (1987). The 
institution was also subdivided into 15 associated Unions representing the 15 Soviet 
republics. In his second book he extended his studies to the 15 national Unions (1998). 
However, Bown played down specification of the republican arts institutions within the 
Union of Artists of the USSR. Bown's omission o flo cal specifications on a republican 
level resulted in unexplained differences between earlier and later years in the 
institutional validation practices in non-Russian Unions. Following an analysis of 
particular Unions such as the Uzbek one, Bown did not clarify some major issues 
between the earlier and later periods: what happened to Russian artists who worked in 
the socialist realist style in the 1930s; why there was a coexistence of the styles of 
socialist realism and miniature painting in the 1980s; and what brought the replacement 
of Russian artists by Uzbek artists as the leading force within the local Union during the 
same decade. The unexplained replacement of the styles, and the related changes in 
ethnic representation within one of the Unions, also questioned the variable assessment 
of artistic practices within different Unions. 
Such questions about why the validation practices in Russia and in non-Russian 
republics differed from each other, and when the differences became apparent, can be 
clarified by an analysis of the institutional practice through which socialist realism was 
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disseminated in particular Unions. Examination of the art theory on a practical level can 
be done through dynamics of the history of education and membership in the Unions. 
Studying each of the Unions can be based on local sources of the Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods. 
Uzbekistan has the biggest share of all literary sources concerning arts compared 
with the other Central Asian states. By 'local sources' I mean Russian publications 
commissioned on behalf of the Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
through Russian art magazines such as Isskusstvo, Tvorchestvo, and Dekorativnoe 
Isskusstvo, (Art, Creativity, and Decorative Art); the art publishers Avrora and Sovetskiy 
Khudozhnik or (Aurora and Soviet Artist): and Uzbek publications released during the 
Soviet and independence periods. Local art historians (Pugachenkova 1957; Taktash 
1978, 1981, 1985; Myunts 1988; Rempel 1992;) of various ethnic origin4 emphasised 
that their institution was different from the Russian Union because it had two goals 
rather than one. The fIrst was to establish validation practices according to the 
guidelines of socialist realism. This goal was the same in the Russian Union. But the 
second goal of the Uzbek Union was to provide representation for a titular nation of 
artists and art historians - a pressing issue for all the Central Asian republics. The term 
'titular nation', coined in the Soviet era, refers to the ethnic group after which a republic 
was named: for example, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan (Connor 1986). As the ethnic group 
representing the national Soviet republic, this particular group had advantageous 
conditions for education and social promotion compared to the other groups residing in 
the same republic. 
Art historians have claimed that the emergence of the Union of Artists in Tashkent 
took place at a difficult historical time (1934-1938), and that the application of socialist 
realism theory weakened the newborn institution because of the destruction of the small 
artistic community during these decisive years (Kovtun, Lebedeva and Babanazarova 
1989). The difficulties of these formative four years were indeed aggravated by the 
handover of Tashkent from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan as a result of the land 
delimitation in Central Asia and further by the great purges, a massive wave of political 
repression. The smallness of the artistic groups was another strong point. According to 
information I gathered from art historians, who were members of different republican 
4 Researchers in Tashkent are of multi ethnic origin, reflecting Tashkent's multiethnic population (see 
Fieldwork, Domestication subsection). However, there is a difference between the older and younger 
generations of art historians. Older art specialists had education and professional experience in Russia 
whereas researchers who are younger than 30 mainly have experience in NGO's set up by the West. 
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Unions, concerning membership numbers in the earlier period of the Unions, the total 
number of members did not exceed 20 per Central Asian branch before the 1950s. Art 
historians came to the conclusion that the bigger Unions coped better than the smaller 
ones with the onslaught of socialist realism. This makes the fate of the Uzbekistan 
Union understandable. The Union was represented by a tiny number of European-
descended painters whose style, social origin, and educational background (Tsarist or 
Western European), could hardly be qualified as politically correct by the party officials 
within the local Union itself (Krukovskaya 1932; Golender 2001; Nikiforov 1967). 
Unfortunately, institutional critique led to further punitive actions by the state 
(Krukovskaya 1951; Sheverdin 1957; Lebedeva, Kovtun and Babananarova 1989). No 
artist went unscarred by the vychesyvat, or combing-out (Rempel 1991). One example 
was a Hungarian artist Lasio Mesarosh, who was imprisoned for alleged pan-Turkic 
sympathies because he painted human images of the local nomads. This political 
correcting of artists made the institution incapable of functioning until the situation was 
improved by the arrival of Russian evacuees, researchers and artists, who salvaged the 
Union of Artists of Uzbekistan during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) (Myasina 
1973). 
S. Krukovskaya wrote her fIrst two books (1932, 1951) concerning early Soviet 
period painting in Uzbekistan. These books were never published and were only kept in 
the Arts Institute library. Here she suggested that the providing of titular nation 
specialists in Uzbekistan was hindered by the total absence of Uzbek specialists. She 
pointed out that the local Union was not meant to be directly concerned with 
educational and research purposes, but instead with the selection of specialists for the 
arts fIeld. Moreover, she was uncertain when a local artistic intelligentsia and arts 
education institutions would be established. Nonetheless, an arts history section was 
added to the Arts Institute in 1943, helped by the Russian evacuees (Rakhmatullaeva 
1999: 6). Massive funding to educate the national intelligentsia took place only in the 
second half of the 1950s (Sovetskaya Intellegentsia Uzbekistana 1979; Selnick 1984). 
Because of that, it took far longer to build up arts education institutions. Soviet arts 
education functioned in a two-tiered system. There were two levels: the technical or 
tekhnicheskoe, undertaken in the arts college; and the high or vysshee, in the Arts 
Institute. The art colleges in the cities Samarkand, Tashkent and Bukhara were 
established between the 1930s and the 1950s (Rakhmatulaeva 1999) whereas the 
department of painting at the educational Arts Institute was opened only in 1963 
28 
(Myunts 1976). Thus, the titular nation specialists technically skilled in the style of 
socialist realism only appeared by the 1970s-1980s, when the validity of socialist 
realism was being widely questioned (Taktash 1985). 
The 1970s-1995 improvement and enlargement of the institution changed its ethnic 
balance. The branch increased to 100 members, 60 of whom were painters. The branch 
became multiethnic, represented by two major groups of artists: Russian or Russian-
speaking, and Uzbek. The changes in ethnic representation coincided with the decline of 
the theory of socialist realism. The combination of both allowed Uzbek artists to choose 
selectively the best principles of socialist realism. Uzbek artists omitted the first 
principle,partiynost, in favour of the two others, narodnost and ideynost. Application of 
these principles can be seen in how validation of artistic creativity has changed from the 
early to the late Soviet periods. 
If we look closer at local arts we shall see that at the beginning of the establishment 
of the institution, there was Russian high art in a Russian part of Tashkent produced by 
Russian artists in the non-Russian republic of Uzbekistan (see Fieldwork subsection on 
Domestication of Arts in Tashkent, 1.8.2.). The institution developed within the 
parameters of the Russian part of the city during the Soviet period. The growth of the 
number of Uzbek artists coincided with the increase of the commissions and the 
expansion of the Russian section of Tashkent. Their commissions were linked to the 
construction and decoration of public buildings and complexes such as underground 
stations, terminals, hospitals, factories, public monuments and cultural institutions such 
as theatre, concert halls, and many others, all located in the Russian part of the city. 
Furthermore, the bigger the Russian part of Tashkent became the more Uzbek artists 
became members of the Union of Artists. By the end of the Soviet era, the Russian style 
of painting still remained in the Russian part of the city, but was increasingly 
represented in Uzbekistan by Uzbek artists. 
The expansion of Uzbek artists in the Russian section of Tashkent dramatically 
changed the validation of artistic practice. Unlike the earlier period (1938-1953), which 
defmed the status and reputation of an artist depending on the political correctness of 
the artist and his product, the later period (1970-1995) introduced validation depending 
directly on the impact of the commission on the urban environment and the accessibility 
of the project to city residents. The increase in public-works commissions made artists 
known and appreciated not only within the institution but also in the general urban 
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population. Institutional validation followed the Soviet slogan 'Arts for the People' 
which in turn broadened moral and social validation of artistic creativity in Tashkent. 
After the eventual dissolution of the Union of Artists of the USSR in 1992, the 
Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was left in a condition of 
disarray. There were no resources to run the institution on the previous scale after the 
economic reform of 1995 (see Economic Conditions, 1.2.), and in 1997 the new state 
made a decision on behalf of the artists. Bya decree from Uzbek president Karimov, the 
Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic became the Academy of Fine 
Arts of Uzbekistan. Three San 'at articles (Iskusstvo Novogo Uzbekistana, Art of New 
Uzbekistan 1999; Akhmedova 2001: 29 and 'Navrikon Uzbekiston' 2002: 22) state that 
the reformed institution was able to preserve what had been painstakingly built during 
the Soviet period: an institutionalised arts education system. The articles explain that the 
responsibilities of the new Academy included taking direct charge over education and 
research. The new institution consolidated all arts educational institutions, both 
'technical' and 'high', and incorporated the research institute responsible for quarterly 
publication of the arts magazine San 'at. The articles further claimed that the success of 
the institution was based on the preservation of the two-tier educational system without 
connecting education to membership structure. 
Rakhim Akhmedov, the former head of the Union of Artists (1960-1985) and the 
founder of high arts education in Uzbekistan, argued against San 'at's claims. He 
pointed out to me that the new membership policies lowered the educational standards 
for entrance. He believed that the resulting degraded membership would continue to 
affect the institution. Akhmedov's argument had a strong point. Membership during the 
period 1997-2004 rocketed up to 11 times that of late Soviet period (1970-1995), 
bringing the total to 1100 members. One indication of lower entrance standards was the 
condition in which records of membership were kept. I found that the newer records of 
members were hand written on scraps of paper. The records consisted of only first and 
family names, without such details such as gender, date of birth, education and address. 
My artist friends told me that the records' conditions had not improved even by 2004. 
The Academy's historians defended their lack of interest in record-keeping. According 
to them, there were three main reasons. Artists' affiliation by creative sections is largely 
artificial, they claimed, since artists often do not work according their educational 
specialisation; artists often move in and out of Uzbekistan and care less about their 
affiliation with the institution; and they often do not have a permanent home address. 
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San'at publications from this period (1999-2004) demonstrate that structurally, 
membership changed as well. These publications contradicted the 1970s-1990s 
stereotypical characteristics of an Uzbekistan artist. Members of the Union of Artists 
were male, well in their forties and predominantly Uzbeks. To become a member meant 
studying for 14 years and struggling for years to get into the institution. Indeed, in 1986, 
I did not meet a single surviving female painter: all the members were men, whose age 
varied from 40 to 60 years old. San 'at had several articles concerning artists in their 
late twenties ('New Names' introduces readers to the Artists Zaur Mansurov and 
Abdujabbor Nazilov. 2002: 30) and the emergence offemale painters (Iskusstvo Novogo 
Uzbekistana. Art of the New Uzbekistan, 1999:45; Tashpulatova 2001: 44; Gyu12003: 
34). Guided by those articles, I found the following information. The younger age of 
artists was due to the harsh economic conditions, which forced painters to begin 
exhibiting and selling their works before completing the two-tier education. These 
artists either could not afford to complete their formal education, or started to work 
immediately after the completion of the Arts College in order to survive. For them to 
establish themselves as painters was more important than to be fully educated or to be 
officially registered as artists. The real-world validation of their practice already took 
place before they become members of the Academy of Fine Arts. 
The emergence of female artists is more complex, because there were two groups of 
these artists: the older, Soviet-educated women, and the younger ones educated in the 
Independence period. Most of the Soviet-era female artists were known because of their 
family connections in artistic circles. Many were the daughters of artists or were 
married to artists. Therefore, within the arts field there was a highly gendered 
perception of them as mothers, wives, mistresses and daughters of male artists, despite 
most of them having a full two-tier arts education equal to that of their male family 
members. They could not achieve membership in the Union of Artists, but their 
membership in the new Academy facilitated their creative practice during the 
Independence period. Unlike them, the younger female artists had no family 
connections in the arts field. These women were known for their own creative practice, 
managing their exhibitions even before they joined the Academy. Although compared 
to their older female colleagues, younger painters did not have a very good arts 
education - they finished only arts college or graduated from non-arts-specific 
educational institutions such as the Pedagogical Institute with specialisation in graphics. 
These age and gender aspects need to be studied because they are actively changing the 
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institutional validation practices of the art field in Uzbekistan. I will examine these 
aspects in Chapters 2 and 4. 
Although the arts institution escaped fragmentation, it lost its main function, which 
was the validation of artists and arts. The current members are validated by the other 
institutions and private individuals, which I will discuss in the following section. These 
post-Soviet institutions responsible for the valuing of painting and artists will be 
introduced in three sections: the Russian Orthodox Church, the mahalla, and private 
individuals. 
1.5. The Russian Orthodox Church 
I begin with the Russian Orthodox Church, which has become the biggest commissioner 
of arts in post-Soviet states. This new prominence in the arts scene came as a result of 
the Church's attempts to fill the ideological vacuum created by the demise of the USSR 
(Carrere d'Encausse 1995; Lewis 2000). The rise of the Church introduced a new type 
of validation of arts in a largely secular society. 
From the beginning I would like to clarify why I am dealing with the Christian 
Church instead of Islam. There are two major reasons. First, Islamic religious 
institutions traditionally commissioned architectural projects, not paintings. Secondly, 
none of the religious boards responsible for Islamic worship in the post-Soviet states 
provided clear guidance concerning architectural projects. Such negligence resulted 
mosques being indistinguishable from churches with the only difference being a 
crescent instead of a cross at the top of the building'S crowning dome. Despite the 
Orthodox Church's 13-century-Iong history of arts patronage, its role as patron of the 
arts has not been sufficiently studied. Regardless of historical era or academic 
affiliation, Western or Russian, Tsarist and Soviet, researchers played down the 
Church's role in arts validation. Research concerning religious painting, or on religious 
themes in secular painting, analysed changes in historical trends, emphasised 
specifications of the national or regional schools and occasionally touched on 
authorship (Blankoff 1963; Alpatov 1974; Lazarev 1976, 1980; Lazarev and Pobedova 
1977; Briusova 1995; Obolensky 2000 [1971]; Tarasov 2002). The Church's 
participation was seldom mentioned apart from stating when a project was 
commissioned or when it failed to be completed (Sarabianov 1981). Furthermore, the 
absence of an assessment of the Church validation practices in the past does not help in 
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the contemporary situation, in which the old institution has been thrown back into the 
irreversibly changed arts scene. 
Few art historians expected the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), after becoming 
the biggest commissioner in the arts field, to extend its power even further in the field of 
secular arts. In the same way as the state controlled the validation process in the Soviet 
arts world, the Church now validates all art containing spiritual connotations, regardless 
of whether it was intended for secular or religious purposes. 
The Church showed an example of its validation process of arts in January 2003, 
after the opening of a controversial exhibition entitled 'Ostorozhno Religia' or 'Careful 
Religion', at the Sakharov Centre in Moscow (Myers 2005). The exhibition included 
works such as a sculpture of a church building made out of vodka bottles, reflecting the 
right granted by the state for the church to produce and sell vodka on an unlicensed 
basis, and many other no less provocative works. The exhibition was vandalised by 
Orthodox Christian believers from a nearby parish, who then filed a legal suit against 
the centre on the grounds of 'inciting religious hatred and promoting indecent images'. 
The suit was settled in 2005. The director and the curator were given prison sentences, 
later replaced by fines equivalent to $3,600 each. Those art objects which survived the 
assault were returned to the artists instead of being destroyed. The lengthy legal process 
divided Russian society into two camps, supporting either the artists or the Church. 
The ROC accused the Sakharov Centre of blasphemy and ridiculing the Church. So 
what does 'blasphemy' mean for the arts field and what are the wider implications of 
this legal process? Prior to 1917, any art objects containing religious symbols or 
dealing with religious themes, and not falling within rigid guidelines set by the Synod, 
would be recognised as blasphemous. Blasphemy was a criminal offence, and a person 
accused could receive capital punishment. But after 72 years under an atheist state, 
religion went through a process of domestication which made blasphemy the norm 
rather than the exception. Various scholars (Dragadze 1995; Akhmed 1995) explained 
the consequences of domestication caused by the impossibility of conducting religious 
institutional practice during the Soviet period: the notion of the religious canon was 
diluted, and there arose quite unexpected responses to religious practice. Weeding out 
non-canonical interpretation of religious practices became a focus of the Church in the 
post-Soviet period, and makes its efforts increasingly militant. The failure of the 
Sakharov Centre to win the legal battle means that the Church is ready to go so far as to 
erase the separation between the state and religion in order to achieve a return to the 
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purity of the faith. This highly charged confrontation between the arts field and the 
Russian Orthodox Church still makes the Russian case relevant to Uzbekistan. 
Fragmentation of the Church did not touch Uzbekistan. Unlike the Slavic successor 
states, where Orthodox dioceses were separate from the main Russian Office, the 
Church structure remained intact in the Central Asian region. Moreover, Uzbekistan 
remained the host of the Central Asian region dioceses of the Church. The Tashkent 
office completely depends on its head office in the Russian city of Sergiev Pasad. In 
other words, what is relevant for spiritual affairs for Russia has significance for 
Uzbekistan. 
However, the ROC in Uzbekistan represents the head office of the Central Asian 
dioceses and therefore has to be fully accountable for its actions in the state in 
Uzbekistan and in the other independent states in Central Asia. The Church is in a very 
vulnerable position, because it does not have the same moral authority over Uzbek 
officials as it has enjoyed in Russia. The Uzbek authorities' policy in general might be 
described as cautious towards any religion. The modest position occupied by the ROC 
in Tashkent might be a reason for the merely chilly, rather than atrocious, relationship 
between artists and the Church. 
Nonetheless, the Uzbekistan case study has its own specific focus in relation to the 
Church. This was due to the Church's validation of how religious Russian identity was 
expressed in the arts. In the shrinking Russian culture in urban Uzbekistan, the Russian 
population clung to the ROC. For them, the Church is the embodiment of Russian 
cultural and spiritual life, which is expressed through annual visits to the Russian 
cemetery and celebration of Easter in Tashkent's three churches. This communal 
devotion defmes the ethnic Russian community from the other so-called 'Russian-
speaking' communities in the urban Tashkent environment. Under the Russian-speaking 
category fall various ethnic groups such as Koreans or Ashkenazi Jews, neither of 
whom follow the Orthodox Christian faith. Artists' devotion to this religious Russian 
identity was tested through severe validation practices installed by the Church. If an 
artist or his work was not accepted, the Church could reject sanctifYing an artefact for a 
sale or even bar the artist from holy communion. The complexity of the validation 
process by the Church in Tashkent's Trinity Church Convent will be examined in my 
chapter concerning Christian themes. 
In the Uzbek case Christian culture is more important than Muslim culture in the 
arts education and production process. For example, Uzbek miniature painting was 
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based on the Orthodox Christian painting tradition. I devote a chapter to discussion of 
miniature painting's origin in Russian lacquer icon painting. Despite the closeness to the 
Russian tradition, miniature painting was validated by Tashkent's mahalla to which I 
will turn in the following section. 
1.6. Mahalla 
The word mahalla from the Arabic, means a neighbourhood with a single mosque 
(Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985). In the Uzbek case, all authors defined Uzbekistan's 
mahalla neighbourhoods as local institutions which perform institutional policies 
concerning the residents of the neighbourhoods (Abramzon 1998; Rasuli 2000; Geiss 
2001). 
However, unlike the above-mentioned authors, who studied mahalla neighbourhood 
quarter as a purely Uzbek institution, I have a rather different view of mahalla districts. 
These authors discussed the institutional policies without a full assessment of the means 
by which the mahalla implemented them. My analysis of pre-Soviet literary sources, 
supported by my own fieldwork, indicated that those powers were acquired by mahalla 
only in the 1980s and were strongly reinforced after the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1995. My argument is that those recent acquisitions of new administrative 
responsibilities by mahalla make this institution more powerful as well as uniquely 
Uzbek, contradicting the previous claim that mahalla survived intact through the 
colonial and Soviet periods. 
I mentioned in the previous section on economic conditions that the mahalla began 
to emerge as a key factor affecting the arts field after 1995, when domestic property 
privatisation was followed by domestication of painting. I emphasise the importance of 
the emergence of the mahalla institution because previously, Soviet culture was studied 
from its position in Russian or Soviet-built Tashkent. The extension of mahalla 
institutions all over the city of Tashkent defies studying Russian and Soviet culture in 
the Russian built city and effectively clashes together two different cultures: Russian 
high culture and Uzbek popular religious culture. Inevitably, validation of painting and 
artistic practices irreversibly changes under the influence of the mahalla. However, to 
make clearer how these neighbourhood quarters could actually influence validation 
practices, I shall start by tracing the revival of the mahalla over the last 25-30 years. 
This historical retrospective will contribute to an understanding what kind of 
mechanisms the mahalla use to influence the arts field. As a local institution, the 
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mahalla has a complex history which shaped its meanings. I stress that mahalla are not 
only a geographic neighbourhoods but also communities, administrations and groups of 
people. Such variability in the meaning of the term shows that the mahalla was itself 
changed over time. In order to support my argument I will assess Tashkent's mahalla 
history. 
Prior to the Soviet period, Tashkent's mahalla were urban neighbourhood quarters 
which had a representative of the religious institution within its geographical area. Each 
mahalla had an elected group of influential residents responsible for delivering taxation 
to the city administration, maintaining social order within the neighbourhood and 
supporting the disadvantaged inhabitants of their neighbourhood through almsgiving. In 
the 19th century, there was an Indian neighbourhood where merchants from India 
resided, and there was a Sephardic Jewish neighbourhood with its own synagogue. As 
we can see, Tashkent's mahalla neighbourhood quarters represented communities 
which were subdivided along religious, ethnic, occupational and social lines (Nilsen 
1988). Those communities existed in neighbourhoods which had a distinctive 
architectural character. The neighbourhoods were built into a maze of winding, narrow 
dead-end streets, which united into wider streets, which came finally to a large open 
cross road street lined with shops. Depending on the size of the neighbourhood and the 
number of the residents in each mahalla, mahalla neighbourhoods either shared or had 
their own cemeteries. Because of the lack of social mobility in pre-Soviet Tashkent, the 
life of an individual was bound from birth to death within the same community. Despite 
the enormous social, political and economic changes which took place over the last 150 
years, the people from those neighbourhoods had a strong sense of community. The 
demolition projects of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, which were intended to 
improve facilities for residents, destroyed much of the pre-Russian part of Tashkent. 
The old mahalla neighbourhoods, which were not considered of architectural 
significance for the city, fell under this improvement scheme. Their residents were 
resettled to state-owned tower blocks in suburbs of Tashkent. What survive of those 
communities in their old neighbourhoods is squeezed into a mere 4 square kilometers. 
The revival of mahalla neighbourhoods took place in the 1970s-1980s with the 
increase in private housing (see Fieldwork subsection on arts domestication in 
Tashkent). According to Entsyclopedia Tashkenta or the Encyclopedia of Tashkent 
(1983: 194), 'mahalla' was defmed as a privately owned domestic residence within 
neighbourhood quarters with voluntary administrative functions such as solving 
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neighbourhood and family disputes. The Encyclopedia indicates that in the 1980s 
Tashkent contained 301 mahalla neighbourhoods, which were subdivided in two types. 
The first were located in an ethnically homogenous private housing area from the 
Tsarist period, whereas the second were multi-ethnic suburbs developed under a private 
housing scheme as part of the city's regeneration project after the 1966 earthquake 
(discussions will be continued in the section concerning fieldwork). 
In the independence period, the mahalla went through further development, 
characterised by an increase of their functions. The mahalla appropriated functions 
formerly carried out by Soviet administrative institutions such as the Dam Uprav/enie, 
or Housing Office. The Housing Office dealt with various domicile-related affairs 
including property transactions, permission for rebuilding dwellings, collecting 
payments for water, electricity and gas from residents, and delivery of pensions and 
benefit payments for the children of unemployed parents. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, mahalla neighbourhoods within the whole city undertook these functions. The 
mahalla turned from voluntary to state-funded institutions - with considerable local 
administrative functions and authority. 
By 2004 the whole of Tashkent became subdivided into mahalla neighbourhoods, 
including the Russian-built section of the Tsarist and Soviet periods. It was not always a 
success story: there were difficult cases, such as the installment of mahalla institutions 
within the recently privatised Soviet tower blocks, and in the old Tsarist-era, Russian-
populated parts of the city. In those parts of the city, mahalla neighbourhoods do not 
mould residents into a community but remain a collection of individuals who reluctantly 
have to deal with this new type of city administration. 
Despite the shortcomings of rapid mahalla administration installment in post-Soviet 
Tashkent, some contemporary ideologists hailed the mahalla neighbourhood quarter as 
an ideal Uzbek community model (Askarov 2003: 16). From Askarov's perspective 
there was no other mahalla neighbourhood quarter apart from the ethnically U zbek 
ones, which retained their original purity from any outside influences. With his and 
others' tireless efforts to promote a new ideological concept, the year 2003 was 
proclaimed by the government as the 'year of the mahalla'. Moreover, with their help 
the history of the mahalla has been reinvented. It is now portrayed as an institution that 
vigorously resisted the Soviet regime and was able to reemeq~e in the following post-
Soviet period in a pristine, unchanged condition. In this reinvented anti-Soviet version 
of mahalla history, anything that came during the Soviet period provokes a cautious 
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reaction. Painting was a great pride of Soviet culture, one that needed to find a way to 
reestablish itself in mahalla-administered Tashkent. 
Mahalla neighbourhoods could easily destroy contemporary artistic practice 
because everybody lives or works in the city's mahalla neighbourhoods. As institutions, 
mahalla can employ repressive measures. They can exert moral authority, 
administrative pressure or physical force to settle scores with 'undesirable' inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood. Mechanisms of influence vary from one mahalla to another. One 
common technique is reporting to the National Security Service (SNB) the alleged 
promotion of anti-state ideas by artists. Some of my respondents went through 
interrogations after being denounced by their local mahalla. Another method is 
providing information to the Tax Collection Office concerning the selling or buying of 
paintings in foreign currency, a crime which can lead to lengthy prison terms for the 
participants. Or it could be simple bullying of women by the council of elders, or 
aksakals (Mandel 2002: 290-291). Many of my respondents, especially single women 
artists, complained that mahalla neighbourhoods vilified them with accusations ranging 
from indecency to perversion as I describe in Chapter 6. 
But most significantly, the mahalla could devalue the Soviet-introduced art of 
painting, which contradicts to the origin of the institution originating in its immortal 
past. This is done by discouraging young Uzbek residents of the neighbourhoods from 
becoming artists. Uzbek mahalla neighbourhoods in the Tsarist and Soviet sections of 
Tashkent, where community spirit is at its strongest, often exert their pressure on the 
families of aspiring artists. Mahalla can easily convince those families that the artistic 
profession has no moral or social value within the mahalla neighbourhood, and most 
importantly that the painter's profession, owing to its lengthy two-tier education, does 
not bring immediate economic benefits to the family. This pressure by mahalla 
institution will be assessed in Chapter 3. 
Both state and non-state controlled arts, in order to exist, have to be recognised 
according to the mahalla neighbourhood's lofty self image as the 'ideal neighbourhood 
quarter'. Since those characteristics of an ideal mahalla neighbourhood quarter are not 
explicitly written only through time will we be able to find out what they actually are. 
While the domestication of painting and the rise of mahalla go together, these two 
unlikely spheres, arts and mahalla, have to find communication between each other. 
The failure of artists, art dealers and their clientele in coping with this institution could 
mean a slow death for painting in the city of Tashkent. 
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It became one of the most challenging parts of my thesis to find how and when 
positive validation of painting could take place in mahalla-run Tashkent? What artistic 
creativity, and what kind of genres of painting, might be acceptable from a mahalla 
perspective? This will be an ongoing theme through all the chapters of my thesis. 
1. 7. Private commissioners 
Uzbekistan lacked a history of painting acquisitions by private individuals who were 
outside the boundaries of artistic society. As previously mentioned, studies of arts 
consumption were undermined by foreign currency restrictions in place from 1995 to 
2004. Hopefully the 2004 legalisation of foreign currency use will dramatically change 
arts trade studies in Uzbekistan. But since it is outside the time frame of my thesis, I 
could only rely on artists' classification of arts buyers. 
Artists defmed their buyers according to income, occupation, ability to avoid 
taxation and willingness to engage in the risky usage of foreign currency. As I 
mentioned in the earlier section on economics, conducting private transactions in 
foreign currency brought the risk of a prison term. Artists divided their clientele into 
three types. 
First were those who had a regulated income taxed at the time of receiving it, such 
as high state officials. Officially at least, these bureaucrats did not have access to 
foreign currency. Second were foreigners who were neither taxed nor restricted in the 
use of foreign currency. The third were various types of business people whose income 
and taxation was difficult for the state to catch up with, and whose often shady lives 
allowed them to become familiar with illegal foreign currency transactions. 
Out of those three categories, the bureaucracy was considered the worst from a 
commercial point of view because of their shortage of foreign currency. Also, the 
bureaucrats lived mainly in state residences instead of privatised apartments, and were 
often reluctant to publicise their extra income by spending on expensive painting. 
Foreigners were regarded as a better target. They did not jeopardise their position by 
parting with their foreign currency. But the number of art-buying foreigners was small. 
Most worked for various foreign organisations and a few companies, and to have access 
to them there was a need to learn the English language. 
Shady businessmen were the preferred category of buyers. Businessmen were not 
cautious about purchasing paintings, and artists told me that there was an absence of 
humiliating haggling over the price of their paintings when dealing with these buyers. 
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The trade with private clientele brought far more serious concerns than artists 
expected after the 1998 market crash in Russia. The fall of the Russian money market 
affected pricing of former Soviet painting in Tashkent. The low prices paid by 
foreigners, prices which often fell below the actual cost of the materials used in 
production of a painting, led to the main question, 'What is the market value?' Artists 
realised the profound difference in how both parties, artists and foreign buyers, value 
painting. Slowly it became apparent to artists that their painting possessed not just 
monetary value but other values as well. Previously, artists said, they had never paid 
attention to this range of values such as social and moral values. But these became the 
values most appreciated by them in the wake of the market collapse. From that period 
on, artists' main stimulus became to build up the social and moral value of painting 
through private commissions, which provided artists with affirmation and recognition of 
their importance. 
1.8.1.Fieldwork 
The fieldwork section is subdivided into three subsections. The fIrst discusses the city 
of Tashkent as the site of my fieldwork research. The second subsection draws attention 
to various difficulties it was necessary to overcome in order to conduct the fieldwork. 
Because of certain constraints, some fieldwork methods were impossible to carry out. 
The third subsection concerns the chosen methodology with regard to the emergence of 
the complex post-Soviet systems of arts production, consumption and circulation, as 
well as the multi-sited fieldwork within Tashkent. The fourth subsection directly 
discusses how the methods varied depending on the different configurations of the 
post-Soviet arts field. 
1.8.2.Fieldwork: Tashkent as research site 
In this subsection I assess the city of Tashkent as the site of my fieldwork study on the 
domestication of painting. The move of painting from public to domestic sites requires a 
clarification of the types of public spaces and domestic premises involved. In the 
opening section of this chapter, I explained that during the Soviet period, public spaces 
in Tashkent were associated with the Russian presence, because titular national arts 
were concentrated in the Russian parts of the city, colonial and Soviet. Titular national 
arts were Western in medium and existed in a Western-style institutional framework. 
Educational and professional establishments and exhibiting spaces such as museums 
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and galleries were located within the Russian part ofthe city. Further, I stated that after 
the emergence of the independent Uzbek state, Soviet public spaces associated with the 
Russian presence shrank to just a few streets. Domestic spaces were absorbed by 
mahalla neighbourhoods, regardless of their pre-Independence origin. The change of 
public and domestic spaces from Russian to Uzbek necessitates an assessment of the 
capital's history in relation to various patterns of domestic residences. After a 
classification of the domestic dwellings of the late Soviet period, I explain where 
exactly the move toward domestication took place in Tashkent within the first phase of 
Uzbekistan's gradual economic reform (1995-2004). 
Unlike other capitals, which came to prominence as a result of the fall of the USSR 
and acquiring statehood, Tashkent stood out long before independence was proclaimed 
in 1991 (see Maps 1, 2 and 3, pp.41-43). Tashkent was not just a capital of one of the 
national republics in the USSR; it was the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union, after 
Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. The city had a higher status than any of the capitals of 
the neighbouring republics. The city's population was 3,000,000 inhabitants, and with 
suburbs and small townships included, 5,000,000. This figure dwarfed the entire 
populations of neighbouring republics such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. As a result of high population density, the city incorporated several types 
of urban settlements. Such urban complexity required a more complex transportation 
network, and working ahead of its time in urban planning through the general 
architectural schemes of 1924, 1940, 1959 and 1968. Finally, to connect all those parts 
of the city an underground system was built in 1973. By 1990 the area of Tashkent had 
already reached 400 square kilometers. 
Tashkent was also different from any of the neighbouring capitals in the Central 
Asian region. First of all Tashkent, which means 'stony city' or 'cut grass' in Uzbek, 
has 2000 years of history (Kadyrov 1983). Secondly, Tashkent did not develop out of a 
Russian military station or railway link, like the neighbouring capitals Ashgabat, 
Bishkek or Astana and Alma-Ata did (Koroteyeva and Perepelkin 1990). Those cities 
began as Russian cities, which initially incorporated other ethnic groups in the Tsarist, 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Despite all those historical changes, these Central Asian 
capitals retained their early Russian features combined with later Soviet characteristics 
such as city planning grids. Unlike them, Tashkent only joined the Russian part of the 
city to the existing city after 1865. Thirdly, Tashkent's population included over 46% 
titular nation representation, much higher than other Central Asian capitals (Arutunyan 
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1996). Therefore the city contained different types of residences implying different 
lifestyles. 
1. Map of the USSR 
2. Map of Uzbekistan: regional boundaries 
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3. Map of Tashkent: district divisions 
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The core of Tashkent was made up of two cities: in Uzbek Eski Shakar and Yuangi 
Shakar, in Russian Novyy Gorod and Staryy Gorod, and in English the Old City and the 
New City. The Old City refers to the part of the city that predated Russian colonization 
and was predominantly occupied by a Muslim and Uzbek population, whereas the New 
City was for the Russian, European, Christian population (see Fig.l, p.4S). The 
surviving Russian houses are whitewashed one-story buildings with large windows, 
covered with pointed high roofs and with flowerbeds in front. The Uzbek houses are 
two stories due to land shortage, built from mud bricks, covered with a flat roof, with no 
outside windows (see Fig.2, p.46) The Old City houses always had an inner courtyard 
containing a pool and vineyard. The two Cities preserved their ethnic homogeneity until 
the Independence period, and the division between the City inhabitants survives to this 
day.5 
The Great Earthquake of 1966 affected the city in three ways. First of all the 
earthquake dramatically reduced the part of the city built under the Stalinist period. In 
Tashkent mainly public buildings of that period were preserved after the earthquake, 
and those surviving buildings were overshadowed by later Soviet architecture. This 
creates a deceiving impression of the Tsarist period being immediately replaced by the 
late Socialist period. Secondly, there were no traces left ofthe movement of the Uzbek 
population from the Old City to the New City, which was owing to their upgrade in 
status from an ethnic minority to representatives of a titular nation in 1924. Before 
1930, Tashkent was a city in Kazakhstan inhabited by two ethnic minorities, Russians 
and Uzbeks residing in two different parts of the city within the republic where the 
majority were Kazakhs. After 1930, Uzbeks became upgraded to titular nation status, 
which resulted in their crossing the ethnic divisions within the city. Those who could 
relocate themselves were mostly bureaucrats and professionals.6 The capital from then 
time developed following the big regeneration scheme of 1968, which included projects 
5 The Old City remains Uzbek, and what was not demolished is becoming highly valued by Uzbeks. The 
wealthier residents have clustered there since the ISh century, because in the midst of the mahallas were 
located the main mosques and the main cemetery for religious figures. On the edges of the 
neighbourhoods are the main cultural attractions the Uzbek theatre of Drama called after Mukimi and 
nearby is the one of the oldest markets, the Chor-Suu, where Uzbek locals findjobs. 
6 Native Tashkenty Uzbeks themselves identified themselves in two groups, on Starogodskie (inhabitants 
of the Old City) and Novogorodskie (from the New City). As my Tashkenty Uzbek respondents explained 
to me, being Novogorodskie meant for Uzbeks not only moving to the Russian part of the City but 
following Russian ways oflife; accepting mixed gender socializing, recognising women's equal right to 
education, permitting children to have leisure activities), wearing Russian clothing and eating Russian 
food. Because of their embrace of Russian culture, the Uzbek Novogorodskie starkly stood out of the rest 
ofUzbeks between 1930 and 1966, as do their descendants in the independent period. 
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aiming 20-30 years ahead. The outcomes of that scheme made the city stratified on 
social rather than on ethnic terms. Parts of the city were created for privileged 
bureaucracy and top intelligentsia. 
Fig.l Tyazakovka, New City, 1999. 
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Fig.2 Khadra mahalla, Old City, 1999. 
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Fig.3 The Sergey Lee suburb, 1999. Sergey Lee epitomised the Soviet suburbs known 
as spa['nyy rayon (sleepers' districts), where people returned after work to sleep in tiny 
flats in concrete apartment blocks. During the Soviet period, this was the only district of 
Tashkent lacking privately owned housing, which made it the poorest district in the 
independent period. 
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Fig.4 Club Khimik, a chemical industry workers' club, Chirchik, 2001. Chirchik is a 
typical example of Stalinist-period city planning. 
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No capital in Central Asia had such a huge area just for settling high bureaucracy 
and privileged intelligentsia. In other cities there were a few city blocks and some 
summer residencies called dachi, carefully tucked away outside the capital. In Tashkent 
there were 25 areas, each large enough to cover one postcode. These areas were called 
Centers or Tcentr. The Centers were built by Russian builders from Moscow as a gift to 
the citizens of Tashkent. The domestic residences in Centers were tidy multifloored 
brick houses with boxy rooms inside. The best of the Centers was Dvoryanskoe Gnezdo 
('Gentry Nest'), built for high bureaucracy in 1968. These officials lived in the Gentry 
Nest and in the state dachi, which were located in the central part of Tashkent.? The 
lifestyle of the privileged in Tashkent was always highly urban, convenient, exposed for 
observation but utterly uninspiring. 
The better off lived in private houses in mahallas neighbourhoods and apartment 
blocks called kooperativ, built on leased land. Private housing was evenly dispersed 
within six districts of the city. Acquiring this type of dwelling required some resources. 
It was highly regarded by Tashkenties, regardless of their ethnic origin. Private housing 
development schemes encouraged the creation of new mahalla neighbourhoods (see 
section on mahalla). Those 1970-1980s mahallas were cheerful multiethnic 
neighbourhoods with running water, electricity, gas and phones. Residence in the 
mahalla signified affluence, safety and a community spirit. Kooperativ apartments 
were less valued and much smaller than houses. 
Depressing concrete tower blocks, under complete state ownership, were located in 
the suburbs. Those suburbs have a rather nondescript Soviet look without any pretense 
to deep history or cultural presence. The epitome of those sad suburbs is the Sergey Lee 
district (see Fig.3, p. 47). The Sergey Lee district grew up on top of the former penal 
settlement. According the local legend, in the 1930s forcefully relocated Koreans were 
left on the plains where Kazakh nomads had previously tended cattle. The district was 
named after one of those Koreans. However, as soon as Koreans were cleared of the 
7 Dachi for state officials in Tashkent are not stand-alone summer houses, as in Russia, but are residential 
complexes with attached services such as canteens, laundries, swimming pool and sports complexes. 
Russian officials' dachi were always built outside of Moscow and Leningrad, but Uzbek dachi are in the 
midst of the city. 
8 I have to explain why I presumed that the population in the newer mahallas was better off financially. 
People who built private housing needed the material resources to do so. This wealth can be connected to 
the fuct that the population in these mahallas was better educated, and as a result of that had more 
opportunities to get higher-paying jobs. My data on schoolchildren from the Chilanzar suburb mahallas 
demonstrated that the parents of those children were indeed well educated and occupied respectable jobs. 
All the futhers, and two-thirds of the mothers, had completed higher education. Both parents working full 
time, and a smaller number of children, indicated that the fumilies were better off. 
50 
accusation of treason which had led to the relocation, they made all efforts to move out 
of the district. The contemporary Sergey Lee district is the most multiethnic of suburbs. 
The district earned notorious fame amongst Tashkenties for poverty, crime and the drug 
trade. 
Compared to the Sergey Lee district, Chirchik town is situated much closer to the 
city of Tashkent. Chirchik was built in the early Soviet period as a part of Stalinist 
industrial scheme (1932-1936). Stalinist architecture and urban planning, which 
Tashkent now lacks, can be seen in Chirchik (see FigA, pA8). Those Stalinist-era 
architectural ensembles include leafy streets with big squares, sculptured fountains, 
buildings with classic porticos and columns and massive bridges over the rivers. 
Ironically, domestic residencies built for Russian industrial specialists under Stalin were 
far better than the flats in Gentry Nest, owing to their spaciousness and airiness. With 
the later exodus of the Russian population, the city was left in a time warp of a vanished 
era. 
Tashkent lost its importance within the Central Asian region after the proclamation 
of independence. It became just a capital of one of former Soviet successor state. 
Uzbekistan's economic reforms brought privatization of property and the ascendance of 
a new social group, the New Rich (a term applied to those people enriched after the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the introduction of the market economy). The price value of 
property became dependent on the area in which it was situated. The market value of 
property in the Independence period fell within the same social stratifications of the 
Soviet period. However, this housing market did not provide luxury accommodation: as 
previously mentioned, high state officials lived in small, boxy 1970s flats. The growth 
of the wealth of the New Rich required the building of luxury accommodation. The 
question arose: where was it possible to build this type of accommodation? 
There was a land shortage caused by the high population density of the megalopolis. 
Additionally, there were the 1999 antiterrorist measures, which included checkpoints 
surrounding Tashkent which inspected any vehicle moving in and out of the capital. The 
problem of dealing with checkpoints discouraged potential house buyers from investing 
in property outside of Tashkent. The city could not grow outwards, which meant it 
would have to grow inwards. Russian emigration out of Uzbekistan continued to empty 
the housing sector of the New City. Because ofthat, the New City became the only area 
in Tashkent where the New Rich could move. The New City, administered by mahalIa, 
became a setting where the domestication of painting in Tashkent would take place 
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under the decisive intervention of artists, art traders, private commissioners and 
mahalla. The implications ofthis domestication will be explored in Chapter 5. 
1.8.3. Fieldwork: constraints 
In the above section I mentioned some of the difficulties which locals endured, and I too 
experienced many of those constraints in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan had, and still has, an 
extremely authoritarian regime which uses intimidation, torture and imprisonment of its 
political opponents. Because of the repressive atmosphere, most Tashkenties are 
hesitant to discuss the current cultural, social or political conditions. During the time of 
my fieldwork, the Uzbek arts field was dangerous for all involved, whether in the state 
or non-state controlled sectors. The nature of my research involved the discussion of 
sensitive political issues such as the use of arts for the legitimization of the regime. In 
addition, with my focus on market validation, collecting data became difficult due to the 
foreign currency restrictions. Proven holding of foreign currency by a private individual 
brought a prison sentence of up to seven years. Following ASA ethics guidelines, I have 
not used any type of information, visual or printed, in my dissertation which could 
identify or harm any of my respondents. 
The Uzbek government's antiterrorist measures dramatically affected my fieldwork 
in the country. These measures were a response to the February 1999 attack in central 
Tashkent (Rashid 2000, 2002; Zanka 2000, 2004).9 In this attack, simultaneous 
bombing killed 13 people and damaged several buildings. Among those buildings was 
one which was important for my research, the Historical Museum (this wili be discussed 
in Chapter 3). The government's security measures were further toughened after the 
winter 2000 attack in the suburbs of Tashkent, and again with alerts brought by 
American advancement in the Middle East after the 9/11 attack in New York. Life had 
to be adjusted around the antiterrorist measures, which brought restrictions on 
9 The rise of domestic terrorism is viewed from different angles in Uzbekistan. From one angle, Rashid 
(2000, 2002) pointed at the two main religious political movements: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
and the Party of Islamic Liberation, both seeking to overthrow secular Central Asian states and replace 
them with religious state governed by sharia (Islamic law). Rashid continued that the current Karimov 
regime used the suppression of these political movements, as part of the 'fight against global terrorism', 
for its own gain to crush any domestic dissent. From the other view, Zanka (2000, 2004) explained the 
breeding grounds of terrorism through the growth of youth rebellion, owing to the high percentage of 
unemployed and socially disaffected young men, and general public opposition to the monolithic Uzbek 
political system. These two authors, by explaining terrorism as a response to a repressive regime and 
economic hardships, miss that there are few Muslim-majority states who successfully harness their 
Islamic religious parties, and those, such as Turkey, are not blameless in their chosen methods. 
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movements within the country,t° the perimeter of the city and within the part of the city 
where I intended to carry out fieldwork. 
On top of that, the mahalla administrations provided information concerning 
residents' arrival, socializing and departures to the local police station and other state 
institutions. This practice led to difficulties for me: after one interview, the painter with 
whom I had met was interrogated at the National Security Office headquarters. The 
artist blamed me, although our meeting concerned his origin (from Kyrgyzstan) and was 
essentially an innocent discussion of the differences in teaching painting between Art 
colleges in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The artist was traumatised by the experience 
and I realised I would have to restrict my interviews and conversations as far as possible 
to public settings. 
Under the antiterrorist measures, Tashkent was surrounded with checkpoints, at 
night there were patrols, and in the daytime the center of the city and spaces like the 
underground system were flooded with police. City life becomes absolutely 
dysfunctional for the three months prior to the major public holidays, Nawruz (22 
March) and Independence Day (29 August). The two large areas in the central part of 
the city where the state holiday celebrations took place became inaccessible without a 
special pass. For my research it meant that access to the University Library, the research 
Arts Institute, the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan and the Besh Agach Mosque 
(which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 7) were inaccessible for a considerable part 
of the year. People had to carry at all times identification documents stating their 
residence and papers stating their present employment. l1 Being caught without the 
proper documents would lead to indefmite detention at a police station. 
The active police presence in Tashkent limited my use of audio recording and 
photography. The large number of police deployed in the city led to casual abuse by 
policemen towards ordinary citizens. Humiliating searches were the rule rather than the 
exception. It was absolutely forbidden to photograph any public architectural complexes 
in Tashkent. Any police discovery of my camera led to the destruction of the film 
10 The restriction on free movement in Uzbekistan forbids stayjng in any place more than three days 
without registration at a local police station. 
11 The police were particularly suspicious of unemployed men, who were often suspected of having 
dissatisfaction with the regime. For male painters, it was of paramount importance to have some kind of 
papers stating that they were currently working professionally. For one of the artists whom I discuss in 
Chapter 5, a Tajik refugee named Umarov, a written statement signed by an art dealer and gallery owner 
was the only thing saving him from deportation. 
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inside. By luck, I managed to never be caught with my tape recorder, but I still used less 
recording than I would have preferred, with only 25 tapes in total. Nonetheless, the 
main problem was getting my visual materials and tape-recorded interviews out of the 
country after each of my stays in Uzbekistan. I eventually managed to use diplomatic 
contacts for taking abroad my written, photographic and recorded materials. From here I 
move to how I conducted my research. 
1.8.4.1. Fieldwork: methods 
My research concerns the replacement of the singular Soviet institutionalised art world 
by multiple post-Soviet configurations. I prefer to use term configurations to cover a 
number of social domains that are quite different in terms of organisation and effect on 
painters. Some are institutions, some are social contexts. Some are independent, and 
others borrow symbols and practices from one another. I will use this term to cover 
different domains for the sake of convenience while recognising and exploring the 
differences in the ethnographic Chapters 3-7. The five configurations I will examine 
are: 
1) the remnants of the state commission system; 
2) the illegal art market; 
3) the mahalla; 
4) the Russian Orthodox Church 
5) the Besh Agach Mosque site, where miniature painters worked. 
These multiple configurations required application of different methods. Since each of 
these post-Soviet configurations differed from each other in size, context and content, I 
discuss the methods applied in each case separately. Before going in depth in each case, 
I have to acknowledge why I have excluded two subjects from my thesis: street art and 
Uzbek arts in the West. This exclusion was necessary in order to keep my 
argumentation cohesive. Without doubting that study of these two areas would add to an 
understanding ofUzbek arts, they do not necessarily help us to understand the process 
of break-up undergone by Soviet institutionalised arts. 
Additionally, my personal involvement with the Soviet art world through my own 
professional experience, and the family ties which allowed me to visit post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, require some clarification. 
From the beginning of this chapter I stated that my interest in arts owed to my art 
history background. Some of my previous research as an art historian will be used here 
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from an anthropological perspective in order to test aspects of change and continuity in 
the Uzbek art field. I started my research in 1985, while in Moscow completing my 
master's degree in arts history. I continued research as a curator in the painting 
department of the Frunze (now Bishkek) Fine Arts Museum in Kyrgyzstan, carrying out 
research in museums in Central Asian republics from 1986 to 1991. From 1991 to 1994, 
I was only able to work in Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Soviet institutionalised 
art world. 
My use of family connections helped my introduction to fieldwork in Tashkent.12 
Other women researchers (Adams 1999; Doi 2002) have pointed out that researchers 
coming to Uzbekistan had to be aware that while they classify their respondents, their 
respondents at the same time define and treat them according to their professional 
affiliations, ethnic, social and racial background, gender and age. I must take into 
account issues like my own mixed ethnic background (Kyrgyz/Japanese), my family's 
religious background (Buddhist, Christian and Muslim), my family's professional 
affiliations with various Soviet and world cultural institutions, and my upbringing in 
three cities (Moscow, Frunze and Kamakura). Without these factors, it would have been 
unlikely that I would get a foothold in some of the post-Soviet arts configurations. For 
example, in the field of state-controlled arts, I was accepted as the stepdaughter of the 
honorary head of the Cultural Association of Central Asian Writers and Poets; in the 
Russian Orthodox Church, I was accepted due to my father's Japanese Christian 
background; and so on. 
My fieldwork was also dependent on the use of traditional methods such as long 
observation and participation. In addition, in my fieldwork I applied the triangulation 
method, discussed by Pauline Luong in her studies of high bureaucracy in Kazakhstan 
(2002). She applied the principle of triangulation, which was based on interviewing 
officials and later weighing the validity of their responses through written sources and 
comparisons with interviews from the other respondents. In the same way I triangulated 
my methods on the case study of the state commission discussed in Chapter 3, by first 
interviewing artists involved directly in the commission, secondly comparing my 
interviewees' information to published sources in Soviet and post-Soviet publications in 
Uzbekistan and the West, and thirdly reassessing the previous data with another set of 
interviewees, the museum administration and some of the commissioners. 
12 My stepfather, father, mother and other relations involved in cultural fields (literature, arts, film and 
academia) attempted to help me begin my work in Uzbekistan. 
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Interviewing methods varied depended on the characteristics of each configuration 
and each site. Successful interviewing has been described by Nicky Gregson and Louise 
Crewe (2003: 215), who studied second-hand consumption in England. Both 
researchers assessed different stages of interviewing: recording of interviews, 
transcription of those interviews, comparison of those transcriptions with close 
observation of the interview location, and fmaIIy the incorporation of the interviewing 
materials with the other field notes. I was in a different situation because I needed to 
introduce myself to many people who, for reasons previously mentioned, were reluctant 
to cooperate with me. In order not to intimidate prospective respondents, I always 
proposed a short questionnaire with simple questions. If the situation proved promising 
and trust had been established, I went ahead to more complex and structured 
questionnaires, after which I moved on to in-depth interviewing. However, there were 
many interviews in which I did not earn the subject's trust, so they were not continued. I 
wrote field notes after each interview, regardless of its length or effectiveness. Writing 
in private, not in front of the interviewee, was better because for in-depth interviews it 
was important to keep the subject relaxed. Because I was asking questions on topics like 
market value, business practices, and state patronage - issues potentially damaging for 
respondents - it was more reassuring for them that their interviews were not recorded 
although they were all aware of the purpose of the interviews. 
After conducting an interview, I compared it with published sources and to other 
interviews. Owing to the specifics of research in the arts field, I added visual materials 
such as photography, when possible. Photographs are an important part of arts research. 
Normally a photo of a painting in the body of a thesis includes the measurement, 
technique and present location; this information is included because it connoted to the 
changing the nature of the display of paintings from public to domestic spheres. 
Due to the constraints mentioned above, I relied largely on my respondents to 
provide me with photos of their works. Accepting artists' generosity meant I had to 
meet several conditions. It was not always possible for them to give me exact 
measurements of their paintings. There could also be uncertainty about the location of a 
work after its sale to a foreigner or through a private dealer. Therefore, mentioning the 
size of the work and its current location will be done only in cases when they are 
definite, such as the frescoes in the Historical Museum, whereas a canvas sold to a 
tourist in a gallery will be identified only by authorship, technique and title. 
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Internet sources proved useful in my case studies, because many artists attempted to 
publicise their works on websites. Although the validity of Internet sources is often 
called into question, nevertheless these sources proved useful to me in tracking artists 
after I left Uzbekistan. Websites in post-Soviet states are mainly state-sponsored and 
often censored. As result of such state control, artists' activities on websites brought 
them neither immediate sale of their works nor any increased recognition beyond 
Uzbekistan. But their websites helped me to see my data in progression long after I had 
concluded my fieldwork. 
1.8.4.2. Fieldwork: Methods selected in post-Soviet configurations 
1) The remnants of the state controlled arts sector: As I pointed out above, my 
introduction to the state arts sector was aided by family connections. I was provided 
with an introduction to the institution's current head, Tursunali Kuziev, and its former 
heads, Rakhim Akhmedov and Bakhodyr lallalov. But none of these men were capable 
of knowing all 1100 members of the Academy of Fine Arts. 
The institution's archives faced an uncertain future because of the Uzbek state's 
intention to change the alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin, and the process of discarding 
Soviet-period documentation in Cyrillic had already begun. The bulk of my work 
involving published and non-published materials of the Soviet period was done in the 
Arts Institute library. 
Much of my fieldwork took place in exhibition sites. There are three reasons why 
exhibition premises became important after the first phase of economic reforms (1995-
2004). 
First, during this period, an artist's specialisation became defmed by hislher 
participation in exhibitions, rather than by educational qualification or affiliation with 
the Academy of Fine Arts. In independent Uzbekistan, artists' educational qualification 
and membership in the arts institution did not necessarily imply their actual profession. 
During the Soviet period, an artist was educated as, registered as and worked as, for 
example, a painter. In the independent period, an artist could be educated as a drawing 
teacher, be affiliated with the institution's graphic design section, and work as a painter. 
Therefore exhibitions, rather than official records in the Academy of Fine Arts, became 
a clear marker of artistic specialisation. Secondly, many illicit commercial deals took 
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place between buyers and artists during exhibitions of their works. Any artists who 
wished to survive financially had to take part in the exhibition circuit year-round. 
Thirdly, Tashkent has a large number of locations where exhibitions could take 
place. Although the cultural status of those exhibition sites do vary enormously from 
theatres, embassies, churches down to private medical centers, nonetheless their 
quantity allows artists to be free in choosing what they want to show. The more 
traditional trading premises are the established arts studios and galleries. Art historians 
mentioned the use of art studios during the Soviet period as places where art buyers and 
artists met, and where artists were able to compete for the attention of the wealthy and 
influential people of Tashkent. 
Exhibition premises provided me with open access to the artists who were members 
of the Academy of Fine Arts of Uzbekistan. Under the period 1997-2004 there were 
1100 members of the Academy of Fine Arts of Uzbekistan, representing all artists 
regardless of specialisation or residence in any city of Uzbekistan or abroad. I needed to 
sift through these members to identify the painters who actually lived and worked in 
Tashkent. In order to do so I used a simple questionnaire. As result of that I was able to 
identify 358 painters and 84 miniature painting painters; out of the 452 total were 91 
female painters. The painters' age varied from 23 to 80 years old. Only 60 painters 
belonged to the Soviet generation, being over 50 years old (see Tables 1 and 2, p.58). 
These statistics show that the majority of painters were either educated or became 
professional during the independence period. 
For selecting themes in painting, I applied close observation and interviewing of 
artists in exhibition premises. Being present every week at up to five exhibitions, in 
various places in the city of Tashkent, allowed me to select themes during the whole 
stay in Tashkent. Art historians and artists themselves validated those themes as 
interesting ones. All artists working in the selected theme were interviewed in depth. In 
my fmal stage, I was led by the artist's capacity to defme what kind of values his/her 
creative work consists of; the skill to convince the art buyer to purchase art in a selected 
theme; the ability to mediate personal valuation with the existing validation practices of 
different institutions; and the ability to keep in touch after leaving Tashkent. 
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Table N.l. Ethnic composite of 452 male artists in Tashkent under respective period (1998-2004) 
Nationality Numbers 
Uzbeks 149 
Slavonic extraction 172 
Uighurs 52 
Tajiks 18 
Koreans 32 
Armenians 3 
Tatars 2 
Mixed origin 24 
Table N.2. Ethnic composite of91 women artists in Tashkent under respective period (1998-2004) 
Nationality Numbers 
Uzbeks 9 
Russians 45 
Tatars 5 
Tajiks 3 
Kazakhs 2 
Koreans 18 
Mixed origin 9 
2) The illegal art market: In the non-state illegal art market I continued my 
interviewing, observation and participation methods, supported by photography. Art 
historians focused on arts studios because they were convenient for meeting artists and 
buyers, and because artists could demonstrate the incorporation of paintings in interiors 
(Reid 1999). However, limiting their research to the art studios meant studying only 
Soviet-period artists, who were aged from 50 to 80 and who traded their works abroad 
or with foreigners. Therefore, I mainly assessed art galleries. 
Galleries were either private or joint ventures (the galleries will be discussed in the 
Chapters 4 and 5). There, I conducted in-depth interviews with art dealers and staff. 
Seven art dealers - six women and one man - whose ages ranged from late 30s to mid 
40s ran the entire art trade in Tashkent. The art dealers helped me arrange interviews 
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with art buyers in their business offices, or on some occasions in their galleries. The 
gallery trade in Tashkent is a very competitive business and relies on a small number of 
buyers, access to whom is scrupulously guarded by artists and art dealers. It brought up 
on my behalf ethical issues such as ensuring anonymity in relation to the art buyers and 
art dealers. This was an issue for two reasons: first, the foreign currency prohibition, 
and second, the competition between art dealers over their relatively small art-buying 
clientele. I could not identify by name 15 art buyers whom I interviewed, whose ages 
varied between 30s and early 50s. 
3) The mahalla: The mahalla as an institution become difficult to tackle in 
Tashkent between 1999 and 2001. On the one hand, the entire city falls into the hands 
of mahalla, but on the other hand no mahalla has a specific organisational body 
responsible for arts. There was no authority on mahalla in the arts field and there was 
no single mahalla noted for its art appreciation. 
I started by interviewing artists who were residents of the already established pre-
Soviet and Soviet mahalla neighbourhoods and they provided me with their firsthand 
experience. I interviewed in depth 35 artists of both genders and various ethnic origins. 
Artists preferred to discuss how and why the mahalla rated them as members of the 
community and inhabitants of their neighbourhood. They were pleased to tell me why a 
buyer from the mahalla bought a work from them. However, they would not identify 
their clients from their mahalla neighbourhood. They also flatly rejected my requests to 
accompany them to their mahalla neighbourhoods. Artists' assessments revealed their 
perception ofmahalla, but not what the mahallas thought about arts and about them. To 
understand the impact of the mahalla I needed to find out what the inhabitants of 
different types of mahalla neighbourhoods such as the Old City and the suburbs, 
thought about arts. 
Finally a friend of my parents, a literary critic, took me into the Sebzar mahalla and 
also suggested I visit two schools located in the Chilanzar district, which contains 1970s 
mahalla neighbourhoods. However, the Sebzar mahalla was included by the city 
administration in the demolition area, so by my second visit to Tashkent there was 
nothing left of Sebzar apart from a pile of rubble. Nevertheless, working in Sebzar 
helped me to understand the perception of the arts by the mahalla inhabitants in relation 
to various aspects concerning interior contents and artifacts validation. In addition the 
research carried out in the school helped me to learn what teenagers (ages 15-17) 
thought about calendars with models dressed up in Uzbek ikat, discussed in Chapter 4. 
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4) The Russian Orthodox Church: The Russian Orthodox Church had its own 
views on how participation and observation should be carried out. Inside Church 
premises, it meant following and observing the religious rituals of Orthodox 
Christianity. Under the atheist Soviet state, art historians doing research in Christian art 
were required to have a knowledge of art history, proficiency in the Old Russian 
language used in Church services and an understanding of the Orthodox Christian faith. 
In the post-Soviet period, the requirements for conducting research by art historians 
increased. And now, the Church has the right to reject a researcher who would disagree 
with its requirements. 
I went to the convent of the Holy Trinity Church near the Rice Market in the New 
City because it was undergoing a reconstruction process that required the 
commissioning of artists. Permission to carry out research required an agreement with 
the Mother Superior, asking for a blessing from the priests, being attired properly for 
religious services (headscarf, no make-up and no trousers), weekly attendance of the 
six-hour service weekly, fasting, confessing regularly to one ofthe priests and keeping 
him aware of what I was doing outside my research. All aspects concerning my research 
will be continued in the chapter devoted to Christian themes in painting. Interviewing 
priests and nuns enhanced my understanding of the complex relationship between artists 
and the Church, and the validation practices of both religious painting and secular 
painting involving Christian themes. I interviewed seven nuns, four priests and 21 
artists working with Christian themes. 
5) The Besh Agach mosque site: Finally, the mosque in Besh Agach was not a 
functioning religious institution but a trading place for miniature painting artists. There 
was no manager, just a group of artists supporting each other, when I went numerous 
times during both my stays (this subject will be continued in Chapter 7). Participation 
and observation were invaluable in the Besh Agach mosque case, allowing me to 
understand the differences between the trades in oil painting and miniature painting. For 
example, in the case of oil painting, through participation I learned the role of art 
dealers in legalising arts for export. But with miniature painting, smuggling was simple 
due to the small size of the art objects. My in-depth interviews at the site did not reveal 
such aspects of the trade as participation and observation did. 
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1.9. Thesis: scope 
After the introductory chapter, the main body of this thesis is divided into six chapters. 
One chapter grounds the thesis within anthropological literature, and the following five 
are based on ethnography. 
Chapter 2 connects anthropological literature to my case study, and focuses on how 
the 'authority' of arts validation was established after the dissolution of the Union of 
Artists of the USSR, through application of Weber's empirical studies on domination. 
The core of each ethnographic chapter is based on analysis of two to seven artists' 
creative practice. I examine how the various institutions, private individuals, art dealers 
and fellow artists assessed the examined artists and their works, and I also account for 
the artists' own perceptions of how their creative practice was appraised. 
Chapter 3 introduces the state commission system in independent Uzbekistan. This 
chapter demonstrates how the advisors to President Islam Karimov changed the 
commission system, and also how the educational system and the mahalla expectations 
influenced artists' wish to continue working for the state. Chapter 4 turns to the parallel 
non-state art market involving trade in illegal foreign currency, a market in which 
women art dealers and artists came to ascendance. This chapter acknowledges the 
complexity of gender aspects in Uzbek arts. Chapter 5 continues from Chapter 4, 
moving from the foreign-buyers art market to the local-buyers market. In this chapter I 
assess the influence of the mahalla over domestication of painting in Tashkent. Chapter 
6 also deals with the local art market, but it concerns the special case of religious arts, 
and contains an exploration of the Russian Orthodox Church's sanctification of 
artworks. Chapters 6 and 7 are closely linked together because they both deal with 
religious themes, and art validation by the Russian Orthodox Church and the mahalla. 
Chapter 7 concerns the Uzbek tradition of miniature painting as practiced by a group of 
artists in the Besh Agach mosque. 
These six chapters will give an understanding of how, under the first step of 
Uzbekistan's gradual market reform and the emergence of the Mustakilik ideology, the 
new arts institution the Academy of Fine Arts of Uzbekistan was decreased in its 
capacity to valuate artists and their works. It will also demonstrate how post-Soviet 
configurations such as the mahalla, the Russian Orthodox Church, and various groups 
of artists and individual art dealers were able to do so. 
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1.10. Language Policy 
Russian has been transliterated from Cyrillic to Latin letters according to Library of 
Congress conventions. However, in the cases of citations, I have followed the version 
proposed by the authors: for example, in the case of Figes and Kolonitskii (1999: 6), 
rabochii instead of rabochiy. I have also tried to follow original name spellings, which 
can become altered over time or depending on the place of publication; for example, 
Dyogot and Degot. I could not always use the same transliteration for Uzbek as for 
Russian, because the Uzbek language uses three systems of transliteration: French, 
English and Latin-alphabet Uzbek. French is used by the Foreign Office whereas 
English is for trade and other purposes. The independent state of Uzbekistan intended to 
replace Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet by 2002. However, this version of transliteration 
is not yet clarified and is used in a confusing manner; for example, the phoneme sh is 
transliterated as x. Therefore very often in different Uzbek publications in foreign 
languages, the same name, geographical location or term has different spellings 
depending on the organisation that sponsored the publication. An example of such 
variation is the Uzbek word for traditional urban neighborhoods, variously transliterated 
as 'makhallya', 'mahallah' and 'mahalla'. Without discussing which one of them is 
most accurate, I preferred to use the version most common in current publications: 
mahalla. I use Library of Congress transliteration in the majority of Uzbek cases, apart 
from in open citations, in which I follow the version used in the original publication. 
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Chapter 2 
Key Themes: Art World, Legitimacy, Labour and Gender 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter concerns the theories and themes upon which my thesis is built and to 
which it can contribute. In Chapter 1, I laid out the subject of my enquiry: contemporary 
Uzbek painting created between 1991 and 2004. In the previous chapter I explained that 
there was a change in Uzbek arts from the Soviet to the post-Soviet periods which was 
characterised by the break-down and subsequent fragmentation of the Union of Artists 
of the USSR, which had been solely responsible for production, circulation and 
consumption of arts. In addition it included the whole social universe for arts specialists 
such as art historians, artists and curators. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Union 
of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was renamed the Academy of Fine 
Arts of Uzbekistan, but the new post-Soviet institution was cut off from the state 
commission system, losing both its authority and its resources. In the place of this 
singular arts institution there emerged several post-Soviet configurations which carried 
out, and extended, the former institution's functions. As described in Chapter 1, these 
post-Soviet configurations include the remnants of the state commission system; the 
illegal art market; the Russian Orthodox Church; the mahalla; and the Besh-Agach 
mosque site, home of miniature-painters. 
Some of those post-Soviet configurations emerged after the dissolution of the 
Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Others, such as the Church and 
mahalla, had a much longer history. The mahalla, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, 
is disproportionately larger and more complex than the other configurations. The 
mahalla, as an institution, contained many overlapping and often contradictory 
components and characteristics. As administrative bodies, the mahalla worked in 
concert with the state, providing assistance to residents, but also carrying out 
surveillance of the regime's opponents. The mahalla elders, as elected representatives 
of the community, voluntarily helped the mahalla administration to channel state aid to 
the community. The mahalla residents themselves were of various ethnic backgrounds, 
residing in Uzbek-style residential neighbourhoods all over the city, including the 
Russian colonial and Soviet-built sections of Tashkent. 
64 
Tashkent's mahalla institutions were a complex maze of intertwining bodies, 
components, and interests. The administrative mahalla and the more traditional 
mahallas did not always cover the same area: the administrative ones are larger but are 
regulated by the number of households, and the more traditional ones predate the 
establishment of city administration. The state regime used the mahalla to carry out its 
interests through the influence of the mahalla administration and its elected 
representatives; the community mobilised its efforts against social diversification under 
the new system; and residents competed to succeed under the market economy instead 
of being forced into post-Soviet mass poverty. This intricate mosaic of competing 
interests formed a complex social field in which artists, art dealers and art buyers 
became involved through their professional activities and their daily life as mahalla 
residents. 
In this chapter, I introduce five themes through their relation to Uzbek arts: 
1) The 'art world' 
2) Authority 
3) Legitimisation through display 
4) The changes in the nature of production and consumption of artworks 
5) Gender 
I begin with a discussion of the application of the term 'art world', which leads to an 
examination of why 'authority' is needed for an arts institution to function. From there I 
move on to an analysis of the idea of 'authority', applying Weber's concepts of 'ideal 
types' of authority to the production and circulation of arts in the different 
configurations of the post-Soviet Uzbek arts field. After an assessment of how and why 
the different configurations claimed their authority, I explore how the state claimed 
legitimacy through public arts display during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. 
The fourth section concerns changes in the nature of arts production and consumption 
through a reassessment of Marxist concepts of alienation of labour, and of how the 
emergence of the market economy led to commodification of artistic labour and arts. 
Additionally in this section, I emphasise that under socialism, labour had been essential 
to ideas of social personhood. The fifth and final section is devoted to gender in relation 
to the arts since, in the post-Soviet context, arts have moved from state/public to 
private/domestic/family spheres. The role of gender in post-Soviet, non-state spheres 
challenges the Soviet gendered perceptions of labour division which had led to male 
domination of arts. Revealing the gendered perceptions of what constitutes men's and 
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women's work in post-Soviet arts, with the resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the mahalla, highlights the question: does turning art objects into consumer goods 
alienate labour from its producer? 
The Soviet state's use of 'culture', particularly material culture, in identifying 
ethnic groups and creating new ethnic policies has been acknowledged by many 
Western authors (Allworth 1973; Connor 1986; Smith 1986; Gellner 1980, 1988). The 
emergence of the new post-Soviet states renewed an interest in culture (Akbarzadeh 
1996; Holmes 1997; Sengupta 1997, 2000; Sorkin 2000). With the post-Soviet rise in 
status from national republics to independent states, arts suddenly came to prominence 
because of their role in creating the new states' symbolism (Gleason 1997; Roy 1998). 
Suddenly a plethora of national symbols became visible: newly independent 
Uzbekistan, like other post-Soviet republics, was flooded with new flags, monuments, 
dances, celebration of national holidays and others (Adams 1999,2000; Bell 1999; Doi 
1997, 2002). Earlier anthropological and cultural studies emphasised that Soviet arts 
and Soviet institutions had varying aesthetics. (Kettering 1995; Swanson 2002). Further 
acknowledgement of different aesthetics within Soviet arts coexisting during the Soviet 
was revealed in post-Soviet arts case studies; for example, the post-Soviet public 
monuments in Moscow by the Georgian artist Zurab Tsereteli (Grant 2001; Groys 
2003). Those new case studies urged a reassessment of arts within state-controlled 
spheres, taking into account Soviet influences in the post-Soviet context. 
Trends in postsocialist consumption led to a reassessment of such key issues 
within social anthropology as family and kinship relationships, communities, networks 
and gender (Humphrey 1995; Perrotta 1995; Lancauscas 2002; Watts 2002). 
Postsocialist consumption involved the acquisition of newly available goods of high 
economic and status value within post-Soviet society. Arts objects, instead of being for 
exclusive state-run consumption, became 'goods' available for private consumption. 
Arts were 'privatisised' and turned into highly contentious luxury items available to 
very few in the post-Soviet period, instead of to all of society as during the Soviet 
period. Acquisition of luxury goods is one defming characteristic of a new social group 
which emerged in the post-Soviet states: the New Rich. Pierre Bourdieu defined 'class' 
according to different social groups' access to material culture such as arts, architecture 
and theatre (1984). With regard to that, the New Rich as a social group appeared in a 
very short time after the fall of the Soviet Union, and their often ostentatious acquisition 
of luxury goods affected their nuclear family and kinship relationships, as well as their 
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communities. The acquisition of any goods of high economic and status value was 
bound to provoke reactions ranging from envy and contempt, to open threats to ruin this 
new social group (Humphrey 2002). The strong feelings of the rest of society towards 
New Rich consumption provoked the action of local institutions' network systems, 
together with communities, either to suppress or facilitate the production, consumption 
and circulation of luxury items (Kandiyoti & Azimova 2004). In addition, consumption 
shaped gendered responses and gendered perceptions while also revealing 'class'. 
Women, according to anthropologists (Kay 1997; Kemp 2005), could be on either side, 
either wholeheartedly embracing new opportunities or fighting against new consumerist 
trends depending on their position in the new society. Men were increasingly judged on 
their capacities to provide those desirable goods (Shreeves 2002). In other words, 
private arts consumption not only tells a very different story from state-controlled arts 
consumption, but also leads to a discovery of art's influence beyond the framework of 
arts institutions so that relations express and in turn shape a range of consumption to 
production of social meaning. 
So what makes contemporary Uzbek painting an interesting case for studying 
from an arts anthropology perspective? The anthropology of arts stems from studies of 
arts in 'non-Western' societies, usually involving tribes or tribal people (Forge 1973; 
Layton 1981; Coote and Shelton 1992; Coote 1992). The theoretical groundwork for 
studies of 'non-Western' societies became based upon the study of the style and the 
meaning of indigenous arts (Morphy 1994; Thomas 2002:5) created by Australian 
aborigines and by professional artists inspired by the images, symbols and colour palette 
of those tribal arts. 
This choice of studying arts from non-Western societies as the subject of art 
anthropology derives from Nelson Graburn's claim (1974: 6) that indigenous arts done 
in Western mediums and disseminated by Western-style institutions in non-Western 
locations would become 'assimilated' by extreme Western cultural domination. 
Graburn's claim was disputed by Nicholas Thomas as 'untenable' (1997: 264). Thomas 
demonstrated, in a number of his works (1997, 1999) devoted to contemporary 
Australian and New Zealand arts, his concerns with the term 'professional arts'. He 
stressed that the Westernlnon-Western distinction is confusing since there are native 
artists educated in Western institutions and trained to work in Western mediums, and 
there are non-native artists inspired by the imagery and concepts of native arts. Both 
types of arts, as Thomas emphasised, are institutionalised locally through market and 
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exhibiting activities. He further proposes a comparison of national and global art 
markets, leading to the possibility of discovering more about how the context of arts 
changes depending on the move of artworks from one market to the other. This is 
especially pertinent to the Uzbek case, as Uzbek arts do not have direct access to the 
West, and Western influences are readjusted locally. 
However, the terms 'non-Western', 'indigenous' and 'aboriginal', and 'tourist' 
and 'ethno' arts, playa significant role in the ways anthropologists conceptualise their 
theoretical approach. I begin with a detmition of Uzbek arts. Uzbek arts are done in 
Western mediums, are promoted within Western-style arts institutions but exist in a 
non-Western 10cation.13 So, in this case, what are 'Uzbek arts' from an arts 
anthropology viewpoint? If they are not 'indigenous' but 'titular nation', how are they 
defined in terms of meaning and style? Here I cite the main reasons why titular nation 
arts could be difficult to study from the well-trodden path of preservation of 
'authenticity' in indigenous arts, the possibilities of Western cultural domination 
through relationships between local and global art markets, and the validation of art 
objects and artists (Clifford 1988; Steiner 1993). 
First, we cannot study Uzbek arts as non-Western 'indigenous' arts. Uzbek arts 
are 'titular nation' Western arts, existing in a sophisticated Western arts institutional 
framework with Western arts education, Western-style professional associations, 
publication houses, galleries and museums. The term 'indigenous' implies that there 
were indigenous people prior to the arrival of the European population. Titular nation 
arts are the arts of the ethnic group given preferential treatment by the Soviet state for 
territorial and cultural integrity (Connor 1986; Allworth 1973). Because titular nation 
arts were legally controlled by the state, it was up to the state to decide who would be 
the producers of such arts. As I will show in Chapters 3, 4 and 7, the preference for 
producers' ethnicity can vary depending on the historical context. Producers could be of 
European descent such as Slavs, titular nation representatives (ethnic Uzbeks), come 
13 My terming ofUzbek arts as 'Western' arts in the characteristics of medium and institutional framework 
is due to two factors. First, Uzbek arts had been considered 'Russian' prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Soviet arts perceived Russian arts politically, highlighting as predecessors of socialist realism an artistic 
group called the Peredvizhniki, or itinerants. Itinerants made their arts accessible to broad sways of 
Russian society by showing traveling exhibitions with socio-political themes. Secondly, Russian arts in 
tum were introduced as Western secular arts in the 18th century. As Michalski (1998: 123) and Mojenok 
(2003: 9) pointed out, the Russian fine arts institutional framework, with its educational and patronage 
system, emulated the 17th century French fine arts establishments introduced by Charles Le Brun under 
the rule of Louis XIV. Owing to these factors, Uzbek arts can be defined as 'Russian' or as 'Western' arts. 
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from non-titular nation ethnic groups like Kazakhs in Uzbekistan, or displaced ethnic 
minorities such as Koreans or Greeks. 
Aesthetics, in the case of 'indigenous' arts, means preservation of authenticity 
regardless of the presence of settlers or other external influences (Morphy 1995 ; 
Thomas 1999). The aesthetics of titular nation arts became based not upon how these 
aesthetics are 'authentic', but upon how successful selective borrowing from a broad 
range of sources was arranged within state-controlled institutions to champion the cause 
of the titular nation. As I will demonstrate in Chapters 3 and 7, there was a diverse 
variety of sources: Hellenic, Russian Orthodox Christian, Russian classical, Medieval 
Islamic, Turkic nomadic and so on. The purpose of the selection is the ultimate show of 
aesthetics, symbolising the power of the state (Michalski 1998; Clark 1997). But what 
will become of such titular nation aesthetics when they are released from rigid state 
control? I attempt to answer this question in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Secondly, although Uzbek arts were Western in medium and in institutional 
characteristics, they were never affected by Western cultural domination. Uzbek arts are 
a volatile part of the international art market. I use the word volatile because there are 
many local and global reasons why Uzbek arts come in and out of global trade. The 
relationships between the local and global art markets are complex. The reasons for 
such complications include the foreign currency restrictions (1995-2004) which 
diminished the freedom of movement of goods in and out of the country, the global 
economic crisis of 1998, the local resurgence of militant Islam after 1999, and the threat 
of global terrorism since 2001. Yet, as I will show in Chapters 4 and 7, globalisation 
had various ways of affecting local arts production and consumption but could not 
overwhelm, or even define, local art markets. 
Thirdly, we cannot make a direct anthropological comparison between Western 
and post-socialist Uzbek institutionalised arts aesthetics, because in order to do so 
accurately, both arts institutions would have to be in stable condition. The Uzbek Soviet 
arts institutional framework collapsed in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet state, and the 
Soviet institutions then fragmented and dissolved during (1991-2004) as I explore in 
Chapters 3 and 4. It is highly debatable whether any of the current post-Soviet 
configurations, in their present condition and considering some of their non-arts origins, 
can be included in any serious theoretical debate as representatives of local aesthetics. I 
will show that in the Uzbek case, the presence of strong local non-arts institutions such 
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as the Russian Orthodox Church and the mahalla define the place of arts within local 
society. 
2.2. Art worlds 
In this opening section I discuss how the post-Soviet fragmentation of Uzbek arts 
applies to the term 'art world'. 
The term 'art world' was coined by Arthur Danto (1964). Danto's ideas were 
extended into the sociological field by George Dickie (1969, 1974). Dickie defined an 
'art world' as a group of specialists including art dealers, artists, collectors and critics. 
These experts, according to Dickie, qualify through consensus whether an object can be 
defined and circulated as a work of art. Howard Becker (1982) further extended 
Dickie's ideas by exploring social organisational analysis. Becker argued that among 
the wide variety of experts involved in an 'art world', some are more entitled to speak 
on behalf of others (1982: 48). Becker pointed out that this entitlement is due to the 
institutional authority which provides the weight behind specialists' concepts. 
The anthropologists Fred Myers (1994) and Christopher B. Steiner (1993) 
applied studies of 'art worlds' to explore the validity of the Western institutional 
determining criteria for non-Western arts. As Myers and Steiner explained, Western art 
experts' definition of 'good' art was not always accepted as valid by local art dealers 
and artists involved in African and Australian aboriginal arts. The theoretical discourse 
was further revitalised through exploration of the legitimisation of authority among 
several groups within the same institutional framework or between two institutions in 
non-Western case studies. 
Helle Bundgaard (1998) discussed claims of authority within the same 
institutional framework, using the case study of Indian patta chitra painting. Buungard 
pointed out the existing hierarchical institutional framework, positioning various Indian 
arts within those hierarchies which are affrrmed by literati Indian art historians. The 
established hierarchies put pressure on village producers to be framed within those 
hierarchical perceptions, and to choose different tactics. For example, to claim 
recognition of their belonging within the higher levels of the Indian art hierarchy, 
village artists include Sanskrit text in their works, without knowledge of Sanskrit. 
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Morgan Perkins (2002) assessed claims of authority by different institutional 
systems. 14 Perkins acknowledged competition between Western and Chinese 
institutional systems over authority on Chinese arts, and showed the contradictions in 
those theories caused by the existence within Chinese arts of a division between 
mainstream Chinese arts and the arts of hundreds of Chinese ethnic minorities (2002: 
185). The same Chinese art historians who argued against the West's inequalities when 
viewing Chinese arts applied the same hierarchy to the arts of their own nation's ethnic 
minorities. 
Without going in depth into various anthropological case studies, I stress that 
that those studies were undertaken when the relevant institutions were in stable 
condition, and never when the institutions collapsed. The Soviet art world's single 
authority was represented by the Union of Artists of the USSR. This institution's 
authority was widely recognised by Soviet and Western arts specialists alike. The fall of 
the Soviet state precipitated the collapse of all Soviet institutions, including the Union 
of Artists. So what happens with defining arts criteria if an institution such as the Union 
of Artists, serving as an umbrella for arts specialists, collapses and splits into many 
fragments lacking clear authority? 
After the Union of Artists of the USSR split into 15 national Unions, each was 
supposed to carry on in the same way as before, managing production, consumption and 
circulation of arts and validating artistic practices. However, the associated Unions 
themselves were dissolved. What emerged after the fall of the Union of Artists of the 
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic includes the remnants of the state commission system; 
the illegal art market, with its various groups; the Russian Orthodox Church; the 
mahalla; and the Besh-Agach mosque site, home of miniature-painters. 
Each of these post-Soviet configurations attempts to act as a separate entity with 
its own model of production, consumption and circulation, setting its own criteria for 
circulating art objects and artists. Moreover, some of these post-Soviet configurations 
overlap, causing artists, dealers and buyers difficulties in manoeuvring between 
different criteria and types of validation. Further, rather than seeking recognition, the 
majority of these post-Soviet configurations prefer to remain in obscurity for safety 
reasons. There is no single way of how authority is established within each of the post-
Soviet configurations, nor do any of the configurations engage in debates over claiming 
14 I use the term 'systems' here because Western cmmtries have various arts institutions within them, so 
the term 'institutional systems' is more justifiable than simply 'institutions'. 
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authority over the others. So at present, there is no hierarchical structure between the 
post-Soviet configurations, and the likelihood of such a structure appearing is remote. 
Thus the term 'art world' cannot be applied to the post-Soviet Uzbek case for two 
reasons. First, the Soviet notion of the validity of arts institutional authority did not 
transfer to all those post-Soviet configurations. Second, two of the institutions involved 
in the validation of artists and circulation of art, the Orthodox Church and the mahalIa, 
can not be classified as 'arts institutions'. 
Professional artists and art historians in Uzbekistan were accustomed to 
claiming authority on behalf of a single institution, the Union of Artists, which they 
represented and which in the recent past had provided them with much-needed 
authority. But because of the institutional collapse and fragmentation, those 
professionals suddenly lost their authority. Surely it is not within my rights to deprive 
these professionals (among whom I should be counted as a former art historian) from 
their rightful belonging in the 'art world' just because that world happened to fragment. 
However, I cannot apply the above-mentioned researchers' defmitions of 'art world'. 
My use of the term in other sections does not pretend to indicate any recognised 
authority behind those professionals, but simply indicates their occupation. 
The post-Soviet situation elucidates a case in which the notion of recognised 
authority in the 'art world' was taken for granted. The question of 'how authority is 
made' arises because any group of people or institution, in order to exist and function, 
has to have authority over its own members. Why and how authority is established 
within groups or institutions was proposed by Weber, whose concepts I will apply to the 
Uzbek case study. 
2.3.1. Weber: Authority 
Weber's ideas on authority attempt to explain why groups of people accept domination 
as being legitimate. Weber specifies three 'ideal types' of authority: legal, traditional 
and charismatic. He clarifies that these ideal types are not necessarily 'pure' types, as 
they can have 'combined characteristics'. Application of Weber's three types of 
authority is crucial to my case study for two reasons. 
The first is due to the replacement of single state institutions discussed by 
Gemot Grabher and David Stark (1998: 54); in the post-socialist period, one socialist 
institution was replaced by many institutions, both state and non-state, whose economic 
and social efficiency was unproven. In the case of Soviet arts, a single Union of Artists 
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was replaced by many configurations, representing varIOUS institutions, bodies and 
groups. A paramount issue for all these configurations was their ability to earn the 
authority needed in order to function. However, their ways of ciaiming authority varied. 
I study how and why authority was established through the moral, social and economic 
valuing of artefacts and their producers within each of those fragments. An assessment 
of each fragment's valuing criteria enables me to elucidate the common features and the 
differences between each of these fragments. 
The second reason concerns 'combined characteristics'. Two of the institutions 
which will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 predate the Soviet state: the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the mahalla. Looking backwards in time, the Soviet period can 
seem homogeneous. But I stress the need for precision regarding periods, especially in 
discussions about these two institutions. The Soviet state was neither consistent nor 
straightforward in dealing with these institutions. Approaching these two institutions is 
difficult because their existence was precarious during the period 1922-1970, and only 
during the last decade have they been fully legalised and socially accepted. In the newly 
independent post-Soviet states, they enjoyed a remarkable resurgence: the ROC gained 
influence in both the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan, and the mahalla became fully 
integrated into the Uzbek state's administrative structure. Weber's notion of combined 
characteristics is useful here: these two institutions were unable to shake off Soviet state 
influences, and were bound to possess 'combined characteristics' (the Soviet state and 
the ROC, or the Soviet state and the mahalla). To demonstrate how and why those 
'combined characteristics' emerged, I go back to the early years ofthe Soviet state. The 
Union of Artists achieved some of its authority by borrowing practices from the Church 
(1917-1922), but later the Church borrowed from the Union of Artists (1932-1985). An 
acknowledgement of this back-and-forth borrowing of symbols, practices and arts 
valuing techniques in the Soviet era is helpful for demonstrating why this type of 
borrowing occurred in the post-Soviet period, when the independent state's commission 
system borrowed from its Soviet predecessor the ways how symbols of state power 
were conceptualised. 
In the following three subsections, I relate Weber's three 'ideal types' to the 
ways authority was established in each case, and how it affected the validation of 
artworks and artists in Uzbekistan. In the Uzbek case, some of the social and cultural 
worlds reflect each other (Church and state, for example), while others have inimical 
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values. As well as discussing the 'pure types', I also assess the 'combined 
characteristics' . 
2.3.2. Legal-rational authority 
Reinhard Bendix (1962) wrote of Weber's 'legal type' of authority: 'In Weber's terms a 
system of legal domination exists only where the rules of a legal order are implemented 
and obeyed in the belief that they are legitimate because they conform with the statutes 
of a government that monopolises their enactment and the legitimate use of physical 
force.' (Bendix 1962: 390; Weber 131). Igor Shaitanov (1995), in the chapter devoted 
to the Soviet cultural institution the Union of Writers, characterised the Union in the 
later decades of the Soviet state as an institution bound to the 'collective contract,.15 By 
'collective contract', Shaitanov referred to the writers' affiliations with organisations 
providing guaranteed facilities for creative work. He emphasised that the 'collective 
contract' system made the atmosphere in Soviet cultural institutions 'relaxed'. 
Shaitanov (1995: 49) depicted social behaviour under the contract system: 'Those in 
power pretended that they could fully trust the writers, who gratefully returned the 
pretence, claiming absolute sincerity. And both parties were aware of the rules which 
had to be observed and the appearances which were to be kept up.' Writers' recognition 
of and obedience to the state institutional rules typified Weber's 'ideal type' of legal 
authority. Although Shaitanov was discussing Soviet literary circles, in Chapters 3 and 
4, I find that his ideas are applicable to the world of fille arts. 
The Weberian characteristics (qualifications, recognition and promotion) of the 
legal system also applied to the contract system in Soviet arts. The requirements to be a 
Union member included completion of two-tier education. Recognition was done 
through election of membership: being elected meant being recognised as part of the 
Soviet art world. Promotion was done through the election of an artistic bureaucracy 
based upon its technical merits as members of the Arts Council. The bureaucratic 
system provided a framework in which artists voluntarily participated. Artists accepted 
that, depending on the quantity and type of their completed commissions, their social 
position would be established and their pensions would be calculated. 
That contract system was also used to enable particular ethnic groups, as 
representatives of their 'titular nation', to rise to the top of the institutional system in 
15 Shaitanov defined the 'later decades' as the years starting from Brezhnev's rule. 
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Soviet republics. The contract system enabled titular nation artists to control the 
associated Unions in their national republics. This control was exerted through the 
education system. The two-tier educational system was introduced in Uzbekistan by 
artists ofthe titular nation such as Rakhim Akhmedov (see Chapters I and 4) in order 
to facilitate access for fellow ethnic members of the titular nation. By controlling the 
education through which artistic skills were formed, it was easy for ethnic Uzbeks to 
dominate membership in the Union of Artists, and subsequently in the Arts Council. 
The emergence oftitular nation artists helped to forge a unique Uzbek cultural identity, 
which would be revealed in arts starting in the 1980s and continue through the fIrst 
decade of the post-Soviet period. 
The dominance of titular nation artists caused other ethnic groups to be 
marginalised. SignifIcant artists of non-titular nation ethnicity rarely emerged in local 
Unions after the 1960s. This was especially true for the many displaced minorities who 
had been relocated by Stalin to Central Asia. As examples, I will discuss Yarmis 
Salpinkidi, an ethnic Greek, in Chapter 5 and Vladimir Ann, an ethnic Korean, in 
Chapter 7. Salpinkidi got through the fIrst tier of arts education but never managed to 
get through the second tier, and was able only to gain a degree in restoration. And even 
to graduate with this trainee degree, Salpinkidi needed to travel to Russia. Ann 
graduated from both tiers, but in Russia, not Uzbekistan. 
By indicating the difficulties in the Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet 
Republic for artists who belonged to the displaced minorities, I am not in any way 
implying that the Uzbek Union was the only one which held selective ethnic policies. 
On the contrary, all fIfteen associated Unions built their membership around the 
dominance of their own titular nation artists. In every republic, there were marginalised 
ethnic groups and representatives of those ethnic groups had very different views of the 
institution. I also point out that far from being scapegoats, ethnic minorities were often 
able to contribute to the forging of national arts. For example, Ann introduced miniature 
painting in Uzbekistan during the Gorbachev period. 
Returning to the idea of 'combined characteristics', I note that from 1917 to 
1932, the young Soviet state had no singular institution to champion visual propaganda. 
In the early Soviet period, there emerged various art organisations, arts educational 
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institutions, magazines and competing artistic groupS.16 As many researchers in Russian 
cultural studies, both from the West and Russia (Bown and Taylor 1993; Lane 1981; 
Figes and Kolonitskii 1999) emphasised, in the early stages of the Soviet Union, the 
state borrowed recognisable symbols from previous institutions such as the Orthodox 
Church. Amongst those diverse symbols were flags, emblems, songs, rituals, language 
and others. Researchers stressed that those symbols were used because they were 
recognisable by the whole population, despite the change of context. Furthermore those 
symbols, and the growth of new cultural institutions, helped to legitimise the new Soviet 
state. With time, standardised rules according to which Soviet cultural institutions 
functioned were established. 
2.3.3. Charismatic authority 
According to Weber, the charismatic type of authority is installed by the unique 
qualities of self-imposed leaders, often emerging at times of crisis. Bendix, in relation to 
Weber's defmition, wrote: 'The power of command may be exercised by a leader -
whether he is a prophet, hero, or demagogue - who can prove that he possesses 
charisma by virtue of magical powers, revelations, heroism or other extraordinary gifts. 
The persons who obey such a leader are disciples or followers who believe in his 
extraordinary qualities rather than stipulated rules or in the dignity of a position 
sanctified by tradition.' (Bendix 1962: 295). This is relevant for my case study because 
for seven years following the collapse of the Soviet art world's institutional framework, 
there was no single arts institution in existence. When the Academy of Fine Arts finally 
emerged, it was cut off from the state's arts commissions by the President's advisers. 
Uzbek arts representatives needed to mobilise to act independently without institutional 
support. 
The crisis in the Uzbek art field began with the fall ofthe Union of the Artists of 
the USSR in 1991, and was fuelled by the newly independent state's foreign currency 
ban, the global economic crisis of 1998, and the growth of global terrorism combined 
with the local rise of militant Islam since 200 1. Arts experts were unable to deal capably 
16 Margarita Tupitsyn (1999) mentioned some early Soviet educational institutions such as VKhUTEMAS 
(Higher State Artistic-Technical Workshops) and INKHUK (the Institute of Artistic Culture), artistic 
groups as OBMOKhU (the brothers Stenberg, Medunetsky, Ioganson, and others) and UNOVIS 
(Senkin, Klutsis, Ermolaeva and others by Malevich and Lissitsky). There were also various artistic 
organizations such as Proletkult. 
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with the crisis, because as soon as they learned to cope with one set of problems another 
set of unexpected problems arose. 
Male titular nation artists were unable to stand up to these multiple challenges 
because they were used to working under the very stable conditions of the Union of 
Artists of the USSR. Uzbek artists gave up their positions to new leaders. So who 
emerged to fill their places? This is going to be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Those 
leaders came from groups which had been marginalised during the Soviet period. As I 
previously mentioned, there existed ethnic minorities which had been sidelined by 
U zbek and Russian artists. In addition, there were arts experts who were marginalised 
owing to their gender (I will discuss gender aspects in section 2.6 of this chapter). These 
two marginalised groups possessed very different skills from those of Uzbek male 
artists. Here I assess one of the two marginal groups, ethnic minorities who clustered 
around charismatic figures. 
Returning to Salpinkidi, an ethnic Greek, what did he do when the Soviet arts 
institution collapsed? He built up a group of young disciples who, like him, were not 
educated in the two-tier system. They were of various ethnic backgrounds and many 
were women. He taught his disciples how to promote themselves without reliance on 
state support, since he himself was always the last person to receive help from the state 
arts system. Salpinkidi always tried earning on the side, which during the Perestroika 
period meant selling works to foreigners. His group's practices were different from 
those ofUzbek artists of the same generation. They were unlike the Uzbek artists who 
studied for 12 to 14 years to fmd out there was no state commission awaiting them, and 
slowly vanished from the surface of the arts field by becoming petty traders or quitting 
arts altogether. The members of Salpinkidi's group, though poorly educated, were able 
to sell their works and launch self-sponsored exhibits during the same 12 to 14 years. 
However, the main problem of charismatic authority is one of succession: in the 
Soviet case, charismatic leaders could not transfer their charisma because that charisma 
had to be 'routinised' by bureaucracy. In the case of Lenin, there was a whole state 
apparatus employed in the routinisation of the leader's charisma with the help of many 
state institutions, including the Union of Artists. This routinisation of Lenin's charisma 
began with the building of his mausoleum in Red Square, with guards and queues of 
citizens making pilgrimages to view his embalmed body. This was followed by the 
construction of Lenin Museums all over the Soviet Union, the erection of Lenin 
monuments in every town, and the naming of cities' most prominent streets and squares 
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after Lenin. The visualisation of Lenin's importance was an important artistic task, and I 
discuss the Lenin Museum further in section 2.6.2 and in Chapter 3. 
Sa1pinkidi, lacking this type of structure to support his charisma, was unable to 
successfully keep up his self-promotion. The duration of his leadership was limited by 
the instalment of foreign currency restrictions. His group only could succeed with 
foreigners wishing to buy their works using inflated foreign currency. I am going to 
show that the business relationships between artists and foreign buyers were further 
corroded by the economic crisis of 1998, which led to the exit of "Soviet arts' from the 
Western art market. Salpinkidi's disciples, finally feeling the growing irrelevance of his 
ideas, were forced to adapt to other "ideal types', represented by the state, the church 
and the mahalla. My study ofthe Salpinkidi group ended at a time when the group was 
on the brink of splitting. 
2.3.4. Traditional authority 
According to Weber, traditional authority is based on the legitimacy of a beliefthat "has 
always existed'. Bendix points out that "commands are legitimate in the sense that they 
are in accord with custom, but they possess the prerogative of free personal decision, so 
that conformity with custom and personal arbitrariness are both characteristic of such 
rule. The persons subject to the commands of the master are followers or subjects in the 
literal sense - they obey out of personal loyalty to the master or a pious regard for his 
time-honoured status' (Bendix 1962: 295). In other words, the relationships between 
superiors and followers are 'fatherly', and neither bound to "rules' as in the legal type 
nor in the belief in the charismatic capacities of self-imposed leaders. 
In the Uzbek case, there are three institutions which can be said to exert the 
traditional type of authority: the state, the Russian Orthodox Church and the mahalla. 
All these institutions existed by virtue of tradition and history. In the post-Soviet period, 
notions ofUzbek statehood were shaped by previous ideas ofthe Soviet state (Allworth 
1967, 1989, 1990, 1994; Carrere d'Encausse 1980, 1982, 1993; Roy 1998). The term 
'mahalla', with its Arabic origin, signifies the spread of Islam in Central Asia 
(Eickelman 1993, 1998). The ascendance of the Russian Orthodox Church is strongly 
connected to the recognition of the Russian state in the early medieval period and the 
later expansion of the Russian empire in Central Asia. So how does traditional authority 
affect the validation of artists and their work? Here I give three examples which will be 
further discussed in Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7. 
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In Chapter 3, I discuss the independent Uzbek state's commission system, which 
typifies the traditional authority exerted by the state. The commissioners are appointed 
by President Islam Karimov's advisers, and are made up of bureaucrats, various 
scholars of social and political science and clerics of both the Russian Orthodox and 
Sunni Muslim creeds. In Chapter 3, I examine their role in overseeing the creation of 
the state's new ideological showpiece, the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan. The 
museum's exhibits were to include examples of painting, but none of the commissioners 
had any awareness of Soviet arts theoretical concepts. Moreover, none of them were 
familiar with the rules according to which artists and their works were validated in the 
legal/contract system. Weber defined 'patriarchal authority' as particularly based on 
personalised relationships. Validation of all five artists' projects became dependent on 
the artists' capacities to 'personalise' relationships with their commissioners. One of the 
artists, Alisher Alikulov, defmed these relationships as 'negotiation'. He negotiated over 
a proposed image of Tamerlane by suggesting a younger, more energetic portrayal of 
the ruler than historical sources suggested (historically, Tamerlane lived to his late 
seventies and had significant physical disabilities). This type of negotiation would have 
been unlikely under the Soviet legal/contract system or under charismatic leadership. 
The Soviet Arts Council commissioners would have been acquainted with the routinised 
aesthetics associated with iconic images of rulers: physical might, military prowess 
showed by a horse and armour, flags, emblems and many others. Under charismatic 
leadership everybody would accept the visionary interpretation of the image. 
The other two institutions, the Church and the mahalia, have set patterns of 
relationships between superiors and followers similar to the state. The relationships 
between commissioned artists and the Church are not based upon aesthetics of the arts. 
The relationships are 'fatherly', built upon the clerics' acceptance of the artist as an 
individual believer from a parish, and not as a secular professional. The mahalla view 
artists primarily as community members and not as state employees or professionals. 
Acceptance of artists by these institutions is based on how they 'negotiate' their way 
through the institutions' systems. 
To some extent these negotiations should not be seen as something entirely alien 
to either the former atheists returning to the bosom of the Church or to non-Uzbek 
residents of the mahalla. Both institutions have 'combined' characteristics, owing to 
their previously precarious situations: the Church was illegal between 1922 and 1942, 
and the mahalla were not officially recognized until the 1970s. Such fragility made 
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these two institutions, in order to strengthen themselves, borrow some practices from 
the state. In the following paragraphs I focus more on the Church than the mahalla, 
because the mahalla as a non-Russian institution had less influence on public spheres 
during the Soviet period. 
It is useful to note Vadim Volkov's (2002) work concermng violent 
entrepreneurship in Russian capitalism, in which he notes that the Russian criminal 
underworld has borrowed structural characteristics from state institutions. One example 
he provides is that of membership rules in the criminal underworld (2002: 59). A 
candidate has to be recommended by three well-established criminals. (An 'established 
criminal' is one whose entire professional life was focused on crime or being 
imprisoned). Mikhail Heller (1988) specified that the same membership rule was 
required by the Communist Party. Volkov's example demonstrates that the criminal 
underworld borrowed practices from the state. 
This trinitarian principle was also applied to all Soviet cultural institutions, 
including the Union of Artists (I discuss this in Chapter 3). The same rule was applied 
not only to each member of the Union but also to his/her art projects. The Arts Council 
could not approve a project unless it had at least three Council superiors monitoring it. 
Without these three signatures it was impossible to complete a project. By applying this 
trinitarian principle, the Soviet institution did not separate an artist from his product. An 
artwork approved by the Arts Council became an embodiment of the artists' purity of 
ideological belief, class consciousness and ethnicity.17 
Oleg Kharkhordin (1999) gave clues that there was massive borrowing of 
Russian Orthodox Church practices by the Soviet state. Kharkhordin draws parallels 
between Church confession and the Soviet practice of self-criticism. But in Chapter 6, I 
emphasise that the borrowing went not only one way, from Church to State, but also 
went from State to Church. After the ROC was legalised during the Second World War, 
and the first commissions for re-consecrating church buildings were being given, the 
Church's criteria for hiring artists mirrored those of the state sector. By assessing Alexei 
Rassol's commissioning by the local diocese, I trace how such back and forth 
borrowing affected the validation of artists and their works in Soviet and post-Soviet 
17 In Soviet studies it is widely recognised that ethnicities were shaped by Soviet ethnographers who 
classified all Soviet people according to their material culture (Sengupta 1997, 2000). However, there 
were also studies by Soviet physical anthropologists such as Oshanin (1964) whom I mention in Chapter 
3 who classified the physical characteristics supposedly possessed by each ethnic group: height, 
complexion, nasal bridge, cranial characteristics, shape of eyes and many others. Such findings were 
important because Uzbeks were classified as the Ferghana-European race. 
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periods. By stressing the ROC's borrowing practices, I attempt as other researchers 
have done in Russia and the West, such as Alexander Verkhovsky (2004) and Zoe Knox 
(2005), to connect these practices to the ROC's attempt to push society towards a more 
fundamentalist way of life. 
In the next section I discuss legitimisation through display. The context of the 
display of art is very important in the Soviet case. Soviet art was public art, intended 
mainly for public display, and there is a need here to clarify the significance and 
intentions of such display. 
2.4. Legitimisation through display 
Art historians in Russia and the West (Makhmudov 1975; Bazazyants 1975; Shostko 
1977; Azizova 1977; Taktash 1978; Babadzhanova and Valiulina 1978; Lakovskaya 
1981; Kahakimov 1983; Podkladkin 1983; Khashimova 1983; Kuskov 1983; Repnikova 
1987; Golomshtok 1990; Groys 1992, 1995; Bown and Taylor 1993; Bown 1987, 1991, 
1992, 1998; Yushkova 1994; Clark 1997; Michalski 1998; Gerchuk 2000; Kettering 
2000) defmed the purpose of display in the Soviet Union as a legitimisation of the 
Soviet state emphasising the public context of the display. Soviet citizens did not need 
to visit art galleries or museums to view art. In fact, it was practically unavoidable. 
Citizens faced art everywhere: in the streets and squares; on public transport such as 
undergrounds, train terminals, and airports; and at work, because even factories were 
often decorated with Soviet arts. Ubiquitous public art was a way for the Soviet state to 
strengthen citizens' belief in its legitimacy. 
The fall of different state regimes has always been accompanied by the removal 
of their public monuments, acts which provide a symbolic gesture of the change. 
Removal of public monuments occurred during the French and Russian revolutions and 
during the fall of the Soviet Union. In all cases, the construction of new public 
monuments was expected to speedily affirm the new regime's power. 
Bruce Grant (2001) and Boris Groys (2003) assessed Zurab Tsereteli's 
controversial post-Soviet public art projects in Russia, projects which the researchers 
found difficult to decipher. Groys and Grant recognised that Tsereteli's capacity to form 
aesthetics was different from what had previously observed in mainstream Soviet arts. , 
The researchers attempted to discover what made this artist stand out from his fellow 
artists. Grant scrutinised Tsereteli's family background, his wife's inheritance from 
France, the artist's friendship with Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and many other 
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interesting details. But Grant misses that Tsereteli's network connections came from the 
Soviet period. On top of that, Tsereteli came from the titular nation arts institution of the 
Republic of Georgia, which taught artists to forge national identity. In mainstream 
Soviet arts, represented by Moscow and Leningrad, such capacities were not promoted. 
But in the post-Soviet world, Tsereteli rose within the arts hierarchies because of these 
skills. Unlike many Russian artists, Tsereteli, as a representative of titular nation arts, 
was able to forge Russian national identity in post-Soviet state controlled arts as he 
previously did on behalf of the Georgian Soviet Republic. Public art projects like 
Tsereteli's in post-Soviet Moscow had already been seen in all fifteen capitals during 
the last decades of the Soviet state. So what does the re-establishing of public display in 
the post-Soviet context mean in the former Soviet republics? 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan, an example 
which demonstrates not only how authority over the circulation of artworks was used, 
but also how the public display of art was used to legitimise the state in both the Soviet 
and post-Soviet periods. The case is beneficial for this comparison because the museum 
building was built during the Soviet period as a memorial to Lenin, and in the post-
Soviet period was remade into the History Museum. In the Soviet case, the Lenin 
Museum had more clarity of purpose, with the existence of the state based upon 
ideology. The new museum's purpose was less clear, with the state associated not with 
ideology but with the present regime personified by its head of state. The eminence of 
President Islam Karimov was one issue which caused the postponing of the opening of 
the museum from 1991 until 2004. During those 13 years, the museum administration 
and commissioners agonised over whether Karimov's image should grace the staircase, 
or if his image should be removed due to the unstable political ciimate. As the 
legitimacy of Karimov's regime has decreased, detracting from the legitimacy of the 
state as a whole, the artistic conceptualisation of this legitimacy have become a heavy 
task. 
From here, I move to a discussion of the production and consumption of arts. 
This order of assessment allows an understanding of what happens with arts validation 
as it moves from public to private spheres. 
2.5. Production and consumption 
Reassessment of the Soviet patterns of arts production and consumption is necessary 
because it reveals the continuity and changes in post-Soviet arts. In this section I 
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connect art historians' assessments of Soviet arts to this chapter's previous subsections, 
concerning the creation of authority within the Soviet legaVcontract system in the Union 
of Artists and the role of the display in the legitimisation of the state. I then move on to 
post-Soviet arts production and consumption. 
Art history is based upon establishing the aesthetic worth of artefacts 
(Westermaan 2005). As the discipline focuses on aesthetics, it is rarely extends to 
assessments of institutional involvement in the formation of aesthetics through the 
process of production, circulation and consumption. However, all art historians 
(Western and Russian) unilaterally recognised that Soviet arts had one state system for 
the production, circulation and consumption of arts (Groys 1992, 1995; Golomstock 
1990; Dyogot 1995; Degot 2002; Bown 1992, 1998; Bown, Taylor, Lodder, Clark, 
Holz, Sidorov 1993; Swanson 2002; Kovalev 1995; Efremov 1995; Tupitsyn 1994, 
1995, 1998, 1999; Lahusen & Dobrenko. 1997; Balina, Condee, and Dobrenko 1999). 
Authors agree on the significance of the Soviet Union's single art institution, and 
perceived the institution's weight through the ideologised aesthetics of Soviet arts. 
Because of the ideologised nature of the institution, Soviet aesthetics were the main 
focus of arts history studies. 
But researchers assumed that since everything was done within and by the 
singular institution, the validation of artists and their works was a matter of secondary 
importance. With the dissolution of the institution, new issues arise: what kind of 
institutional mechanisms were used to help materialisation of those Soviet aesthetics 
through production, circulation and consumption? Without a reassessment of Soviet 
institutional practices, it is impossible to approach the post-Soviet configurations. 
So here I approach, from an anthropological perspective, this rather neglected 
area of Soviet arts studies. By connecting the economic theories of Classical Marxism, 
and their interpretation by successive Soviet leaders, to the application of those theories 
on institutional practices, I demonstrate the influence of economic concepts on the 
valuing of artefacts. 
I intend to show, using Ken Morrison's commentary, that the validation of 
Soviet artists and their works was entrenched in Marxist theories. Marx, in his various 
works, focused on the alienability of labour from its producer, through division of 
labour, as the basis ofhuman alienation and of the class-divided capitalist society. Marx 
perceived a complex series of alienations: alienation from the product, alienation from 
productive activity, alienation from species, and alienation from fellow humans. Marx 
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begins with alienation from product, which under feudal society led to producers' 
incapacity to identify their selves with their produce. Marx viewed labour as a moral 
extension of personhood. The alienation of the labourer from productive activity broke 
the 'connection human beings have to themselves', which led to the labourer's 
incapacity to self-realisation (Morisson 1995: 95). Alienation from species, according to 
Marx, was turning human conscious life into mere physical existence. Finally, Marx 
attributed alienation from fellow human beings to one class becoming the recipients of 
products of labour - capitalists. Morisson commented on Marx's conclusion: 
'If alienation can be described as the loss of the ability of laborers to realise themselves, 
objectification is the realisation of labor in that it refers to the capacity of human beings 
positively to 'duplicate' themselves in the world they create. 1his duplication in society through 
labor is the realisation of human aims. It is through this that human beings can 'contemplate' 
themselves 'in the world they have created.' By thus producing things, an individual necessarily 
becomes an object for others within structure of social relations. In this sense, the value oflabor 
resides in the subjects' ability to produce values for others and, in this respect, confirm 
themselves. What is important is that social connection is between individuals - between human 
beings - not things or commodities. For Marx then, objectification is necessary if individuals are 
to humanize nature, to transform it into an expression having human qualities. In this respect, 
objectification is not synonymous with alienation in that it is possible realisation of labouring 
activity. By making the distinction between alienation and objectification, Marx grasped the 
historical character of labor and argued that the end of alienation will emancipate the species by 
rehumanizing labor. For Marx, the true 'object of labour is the objectification of the workers' 
species life. Hence in 'tearing away the object of their production,' alienated labor 'tears human 
being from their species liie.'" (Morisson 1995: 97-98) 
The Soviet system aimed to achieve the opposite of capitalism by freeing the labourer 
from exploitation. Under the Soviet state, art objects, according to Christina Kiaer's 
(2005) definition, became 'nobody's possessions', embodying the new socialist way of 
life. From my point of view, Soviet art was more than just 'nobody's possession'; 
mediated by the state, arts became everybody's possession by allowing every member 
of society to collectively approve the creative labourer, who self-consciously identit1ed 
himself with his produce.18 Soviet artistic practices made artworks, as products of the 
labour of artists, unalienable from their producers. Soviet artists and art objects are 
inseparable from each other. To support this claim, I go through the economic, moral 
and social valuing ofthe Soviet hierarchy of genres in Chapter 3. The pricing assessed 
by Yun Savitskiy (1973) clearly states why and how the genre hierarchy determined an 
18 I use the male pronoun here because Soviet arts were largely male-dominated. 
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artwork's value based on economic expense, labour spent, and skill required, as well as 
the social impact of the product. Why is the etude at the bottom of the price list? An 
etude could be created using any materials which made its cost low. An etude does not 
require having a 'fmish' as any other genre would require, so skills acquired through a 
two-tier education was not necessary. And an etude does not necessarily contain 
ideological content. On the other end of the genre hierarchy is the thematic 
composition. 19 Thematic compositions require the best materials, as well as 
sophisticated skills like knowledge of ideological concepts, anatomy, perspective, 
colours, and architecture, which were taught at the second tier only. Thematic 
compositions needed to be approved and supervised by the Arts Council. After their 
completion, thematic compositions were supposed to fulfil their social function, gracing 
public buildings such as railway stations, factories, theatres and many others. Artists 
working in thematic compositions enjoyed the highest social status and most lucrative 
salaries and pension packages. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I assess how labour was valued in the Soviet institution. 
Marxist principles were applied to all Soviet industries, including arts. One of the 
Marxist rules applied to all Soviet industry was the idea of 'quantity over quality'. In 
the 1920s, Stalin in his many of public speeches outlined his economic policies based 
upon his interpretation of Marxist-Leninist economic concepts (Stalin 1976: 431). 
Stalin's five-year plans were aimed towards speeding up production to freed the country 
from backwardness. Although Stalin's notions of speeding-up became outdated in the 
later decades of the Soviet state, the notion of contributing to the state's effort persisted. 
In the case of thematic compositions, economic worth was calculated by square 
meters. Larger-sized thematic compositions were worth more. None of the thematic 
compositions I analyse in Chapter 3 measured less than one square meter. From the time 
of the introduction of the first thematic composition by Boris Benkov in 1940, sizes of 
thematic compositions steadily increased. Benkov's thematic composition was nearly 
two and a half by four meters, while Bakhodyr Jallalov's post-Soviet work was ten by 
eight meters. Benkov produced only one thematic composition whereas Jallalov had to 
work continuously in the genre. Over twenty years of his professional career, during 
both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, he completed ten thematic compositions. As 
time went on, the thematic composition moved from being a rarity in the early Soviet 
19 Thematic compositions, or tematicheskie kompozitsii in Russian, are a combination of human images, 
objects and symbols conveying an ideological message to the viewer. 
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period to a convenient genre for formulating ideological agendas in the late Soviet and 
early post-Soviet periods. 
In the section relating to art historians in Chapter 4, I detail the amount of time, 
effort and research needed for publishing art historians' works, regardless of quality. I 
conclude that standards of 'quantity' were set so high for Soviet art historians that they 
were practically unachievable. Those who managed to achieve the required amount of 
publications could only do so towards the end of their working careers. Overall, such 
validation practices resulted in small numbers of art historians in the Union and their 
incapacity to be elected and influence Arts Council decisions. 
Under the state system, supply and demand were balanced. It was up to the state 
institution to decide how many works had to be commissioned. With the dissolution of 
the Union of Artists, supply and demand collapsed simultaneously. What survived was 
in a greatly reduced form, and circulation was no longer controlled by Union arts 
experts. Within the many new non-state configurations, supply and demand had to be 
recreated by the artists and art historians themselves, often acting as art dealers. This 
move from Soviet to post-Soviet production and consumption leads to the question of 
whether, through consumption, artworks become separated from their producers. 
In the following Chapters 4-7, one of the most important questions of this thesis 
arises: how to calculate the price of artistic labour, and would this estimation result in 
the separation of the work from its producer? The issues in those chapters were not 
decided only by male artists but by women of various arts specialisations. Women art 
dealers took control of the illegal art trade. Additionally, they helped to move arts from 
public to domestic spaces. The changing emphasis of gendered values necessitates a 
discussion of gender issues. 
2.6.1. Gender 
In this section, I discuss how in the fluidity and ambiguity of post-Soviet social 
formations, gender roles and relations were equally questioned in all spheres of life, 
including the arts field. The working practices in the fractured post-Soviet art world 
defined what arts specialists could or could not do according to gendered perceptions. 
To make explicit why and how gender matters in post-Soviet arts, I begin with art 
historians' assessments, because their works highlight the difficulty of discussing 
gender from a purely aesthetic perspective in Soviet arts. Art historians attempt to move 
from aesthetics to institutional practices (Baigell & Baigell 2001; Reid 1998; Simpson 
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1998) while underestimating gender conceptions and gendered divisions of labour 
within Soviet institutionalised practices. After an art historical assessment, a brief 
anthropological introduction serves as the bridge leading to post-socialist studies 
concerning gender. By fmishing this section with regional anthropological literature, I 
draw out the importance of the case of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 
2.6.2. Gender from an art history perspective 
I begin with an art history assessment of other gender studies, leading to an 
anthropological study of gender in relation to post-socialist and regional case studies. 
Acknowledging the disparities between art historians' representation of gender and my 
own fieldwork research, I sketch out in this subsection three themes which I will 
explore with regard to the gender issue in the Soviet art field: 
1) Painting genres were gendered. 
2) There was unequal access to the artistic 'means of production' (education, studios, 
and lucrative and high-status commissions). 
3) Gendered preconceptions exercised by the Union of Artists put immense pressure on 
both male and female artists. 
Before a discussion of gender in arts, I have to explain how current gender studies in 
post-Soviet countries were conducted by local researchers. These studies mostly 
focused on NGO programmes and current sociological projects, and did not extend to 
exploring gender in the arts field. Because of the absence of gender studies within the 
arts field during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods by local researchers, all gender 
assessment of Soviet and post-Soviet arts was carried out by Western arts researchers. 
These Western researchers (Baigell & Baigell 2001; Reid 1998; Simpson 1998) 
followed feminist art historians (Pollock & Parker 1981; Miller 1986; Deepwell 1995; 
Perry 1999) who assessed women artists' creative practices, emphasising women's 
gendered inequality within male-dominated arts institutional frameworks. Further, these 
gender studies in the arts field mainly concerned Russian arts without acknowledging 
the specifics of the various associated Unions from other Soviet Republics. Since there 
were no other sources concerning gender in Soviet arts, I concentrate on the Russian 
case studies which have relevance for my regional ethnography. 
For a closer look at how painting genres were gendered, I point out that all 
authors (Baigell & Baigell 2001; Reid 1998; Simpson 1998) acknowledged women's 
marginal presence in the Soviet arts institutional framework, owing to the hierarchy of 
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genres in painting. They stated that the hierarchy of genres forced women into less 
socially recognised, and technically less skilled, genres such as still lives and portraits 
(these were typically regarded as 'women's genres'). Extending the fmding of the 
aforementioned authors, I focus on the most valued genre within the Soviet painting 
hierarchy, the thematic composition, which was unavailable to women artists. By 
discussing in detail this genre as a mainly male domain, in Chapter 3, on the case of the 
Museum of the History of Uzbekistan (previously Tashkent's Lenin Museum), I explore 
the combination of manual, mental and physical skills believed to be required from 
artists working in the thematic composition genre. By examining the production of 
thematic compositions through education and commissioning, I point out what 
prevented women from working in the genre. Through this assessment I come to my 
second point, that women artists experienced unequal access to the 'means of 
production'. They were inhibited by educational restrictions, limiting their access to 
learning thematic compositions and further within the art institutional framework in 
their access to the art studios and to any serious state commissions. Coming to the third 
point, I explain why the arts institution pressured women artists to remain occupied with 
their family responsibilities more than their creative careers. All these points 
demonstrate why women painters were dissuaded from working in thematic 
compositions by the educational and arts institutions, owing to the existing 
preconception that the genre was unsuitable for women. In addition, titular nation arts 
institutions such as the Uzbek Union placed more emphasis on gender issues than their 
Russian counterpart. 
The second reason which prevented women from working in thematic 
compositions relates to education. In Chapter 3, on the example of the state 
commissions for the Museum of History of Uzbekistan, I will illustrate that the idea of 
biological difference of women from men was used by male artists to prevent female 
painters from entering the two-tier system of education for painters, satisfying the 
requirements for membership in the Union of Artists and advancing themselves within 
the Arts Council. The creation of a large-scale thematic composition did require an 
incredible amount of physical stamina, including lifting heavy loads to high scaffolds, 
working in dirty and unhealthy conditions. Male artists believed that such requirements 
could affect women's reproductive capacities. Of the artists involved in the creation of 
Tashkent's Lenin Museum, there was not a single woman. 
88 
My third point is that commissions of thematic compositions required 
'komandirovki', or being sent for assignments for long periods away from home. Again, 
Tashkent's Lenin Museum provides a good example: artists were sent to Tashkent from 
Moscow and other cities for four years to complete the whole project. The Lenin 
Museum commissions demonstrated that the arts institution did not discourage men 
from spending years away from their families to complete important state commissions. 
But the same institution put immense social pressure on women to remain with their 
families and not take on long-term assignments away from home. The Lenin Museum 
commissions typified the Soviet arts institution's attitudes towards women, whom they 
saw primarily as child bearers with the social functions of raising children and nurturing 
their families. 
Further, I stress here that in the case of the titular nation arts educational 
institutions, women had no chance of being accepted to the second tier. As I noted in 
the section on legal authority, and will discuss further in Chapters 3 and 4, access to the 
Arts Institute was granted only to male titular nation artists. Women, if they wanted to 
be artists, went to study to Russia (in Chapter 5 I give the example of Lola Babayeva, 
who studied at the Cineaste Institute in Moscow) or graduated from non-painting 
departments in Uzbekistan (in Chapter 6 I discuss Olga Kharitonova, who graduated 
from the graphic design department of the Arts Institute). The Soviet-period careers of 
these educated and capable professional women highlighted that it was not the skills 
that determined the value of their works, but their gender. Being women meant that 
within the titular national art field there was no place for them; by 1991, there was not a 
single women artist among the members of the Union of Artists of the Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic. 
Because Western authors (Reid 1998; Simpson 1998; Baigell & Baigell 2001) 
largely ignored how gender was socially constructed within the Soviet arts institutional 
framework, they found it difficult to come to terms with post-Soviet deconstruction of 
gendered perceptions. This deconstruction was a result of the combined fall of the 
Soviet state and the ensuing fragmentation of its institutions. In Pat Simpson's (2004) 
move from Soviet to post-Soviet research on Russian arts, her focus on gendered 
inequalities of Soviet women shifted to the position of men in post-Soviet Russian 
culture. Simpson advises more attention be paid to Russian cultural specificities to 
understand men's fall from grace, instead of connecting the men's current position to 
the fragmentation of the Union of Artists. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, male 
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domination of arts was destroyed with the collapse of the institutional framework, as the 
state lost its authority to keep Soviet concepts of male and female work in the art field. 
From here I move from art history to anthropology. 
2.6.3. Gender in relation to anthropological literature 
I begin with Frances Pine's (2002(a)) historical assessment of gender theory, for three 
reasons. First, because the fall of the state arts institution, the Union of Artists of the 
USSR, resulted in the end of male domination of post-Soviet arts. Secondly, the 
uncertainty of men's position in the arts field necessitated a reassessment of the 1970s-
1980s feminists' and anthropologists' views of women's positions, in relation to post-
Soviet women artists and art dealers. Thirdly, because of the significance of the post-
Soviet domestication of arts: the move of post-Soviet arts from 'public' spaces to 
'private' spaces was unique because it was handled by women. There was no existing 
case of the study of this process of domestication of painting undertaken by women. 
Pine (2002(a)) provided a summary of gender theory in which she described the 
shifts and debates in the field over time (Rosaldo 1974; Whitehead 1980; Strathem 
1987; Collier and Yanagisako 1987). For example, during the 1970s and 1980s 
structuralists were replaced by poststructuralists, who led a shift away from emphasis on 
nature and culture towards emphasis on the roles of women and men. According to 
Pine, feminist and anthropological theories of the 1980s attempted to explain issues of 
women's inequality through an understanding of how the position of women is 
dependent on the division between public and domestic spheres. Starting in the 1990s, 
Pine stressed, the focus of many gender studies shifted from women to men. Gender 
studies became broadened because it became apparent that formations of the concepts of 
male/female were shaped by social and cultural constraints within the context of social 
and cultural changes. I now tum to aspects of gender theory in relation to the case of 
post-Soviet Uzbek arts. 
As Sarah Ashwin showed in her book Gender, State, Society in Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia (2000), after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the social position of 
men became threatened. As a result of the collapse of the state-run public and social-
oriented spheres of life, men lost their self-esteem along with their jobs. Men went 
downhill, struggling with the new changes, while women, previously employed in less 
prestigious jobs, achieved higher salaries and social status because of new opportunities 
in the emerging capitalist economy. Coincidentally, the shift in gender studies coincided 
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with this shift in gender roles. Ashwin's fmdings are relevant to Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in 
relation to arts because of the changing gender composition of the post-Soviet Uzbek 
arts field. Post-Soviet arts followed the same pattern as other spheres of the fallen 
Soviet state. Soviet male domination of arts became distorted by the fragmentation of 
the arts institutional framework, as the newly emerged post-Soviet art domains had no 
authority to apply Soviet concepts of male and female work in the art field. I 
demonstrate, through the Uzbek arts case in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, that there were, in 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan, 60 Soviet-educated and professionally established male 
painters, all of whom became lost without their Soviet institutional framework. The 
social world of the male artists collapsed, dragging down also all criteria of how Soviet 
arts had been validated. Men's professional perceptions, of what they could do in arts 
better than women, also collapsed. 
The post-Soviet Uzbek arts case became interesting because masculinity was 
tied to reproduction of public spheres, hierarchies of work and values of public-oriented 
genres of painting. The shift from social hierarchy to market demand was marked by the 
devaluation of men's skills and the rise of women to the centre stage of post-Soviet arts, 
at least in the non-state sector. The rise of women in the post-Soviet Tashkent arts field 
leads me to the 1970s-1980s gender studies by feminists and anthropologists (Rosaldo 
1974; Whitehead 1980; Collier and Yanagisako 1987), which helped me to understand 
13 years of the post-Soviet Uzbek arts field. As Harriet Whitehead (1980) suggested, 
close study of the establishment of male-run public domains enables a better exploration 
of how those public domains affect the private domains in which women and men exist. 
Post-Soviet and post-socialist ethnographic case studies revealed that women's 
marginal economic position made it easier for them to integrate within new non-state 
economic sectors (Pine 1996, 1998, 2002 (b); Bridger 1996). The art field provides an 
example: women specialists rose to the top of the non-state art sector. I explore this in 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5, comparing two different sets of art specialists and 
generations. I demonstrate what made women underachievers under the Soviet state (see 
the above section 2.6.2), and what kind of Soviet-Ieamed skills propelled then in the 
post-Soviet state. Using the examples of the art dealers Natalya Musina and Negora 
Akhmedova, who were educated and worked in the Soviet art world, I show that women 
had to be computer literate and foreign language fluent in order to exist even within the 
margins of the competitive Soviet art world. But in the post-Soviet context, these two 
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skills proved invaluable for women like Musina and Akhmedova, allowing them to 
excel in the non-state art market. 
In Chapter 4, I also discuss how the emergence of women in the arts field not 
only affected gender roles, but also brought about a restructuring of the importance of 
painting genres. Women art dealers turned the genre hierarchy upside down along with 
the gender hierarchy: for example, female art dealers circulated male Uzbek painters' 
still lives, something that would have been unheard of in the Soviet period. Such new 
developments in post-Soviet Uzbek arts made me to turn to Marilyn Strathern's (1988) 
argument that Western concepts of 'oppression' were not applicable in Hagen, New 
Guinea. Strathern emphasised that Hagenese men and women did not attach Western 
distinctions to labour divisions, and as result of that women were not put in 'oppressive' 
situations. In the post-Soviet Uzbek case, I stress that such Western concepts were 
similarly inapplicable. Post-Soviet male artists became involved in genres such as the 
still life, which had been considered 'unmanly' during the Soviet period. Post-Soviet 
men's still lives were typically small in size, rarely exceeding one square meter, and did 
not involve the physical stamina required by large-scale thematic compositions. The 
new popularity of still lives also made redundant the Soviet men's capacity to work 
with political symbolism in their art. Unlike their Soviet-educated predecessors, newly 
emerging post-Soviet painters held no negative feelings regarding their work in 
'unmanly' genres; nor did women art dealers gain any sense of liberation by doing the 
'male' job of validating arts. 
Thirdly, domestication of post-Soviet painting became a task for women with 
the breakdown of the public/private divide. Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate the 
domestication process came in gradual stages. The first stage took place between 1991 
and 1999, while painting was being marketed to foreign buyers. The characteristics of 
domesticated painting were promoted by women art dealers and women artists: the 
small size of the works made for easier transportation and legal export. But these 
paintings were moving into foreign buyers' homes, and were not intended for display in 
local Uzbek homes. The second stage took place during the period 1999-2004, and 
revealed the difficulty of moving post-Soviet painting to post-Soviet private domestic 
spaces. The second stage revealed that women faced the historical outcomes of the 
Soviet and post-Soviet state policies shaping domestic private spaces. Women (art 
dealers and artists) moved in 'private' spaces shaped by family and kinship 
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relationships, and those family and kinship relationships were in turn affected by the 
new market economy. 
From here I have to reapply the fIndings of Jane Collier and Sylvia Yanagisako 
(1987) who suggested an extension of female dependence on the division between 
private/public, within a historical context and attached to the cultural meaning of 
women connected to private and men to public spaces. Yanagisako (1987) emphasised 
that the meanings of gender, kinship, family and state were not static but dependent on 
historical context and expressed though symbolic metaphors. Without an assessment of 
Soviet and post-Soviet gender and regional specifIcs, I would be unable to approach the 
gender influence in post-Soviet domestication ofUzbek painting. From here I move to a 
discussion of gender from the perspective of post-socialist and local regional studies. 
2.6.4. Gender within postsocialist studies 
Jane McDermid and Anna Hillyar (1999) in their work concerning female Bolsheviks 
and workers in 1917, highlighted the influence of female revolutionaries in shaping the 
Soviet state's policies towards women. McDermid and Hillyar pointed out that there 
were many women who actively participated in the revolutionary movement, including 
Lenin's family, his wife and his sisters (Krupskaia, UI'ianova and UI'ianova-Elizarova), 
his close friends (Armand) and his fellow comrades (Kollontai, Reisner, Tzetkin). 
Despite the differences in the women's social backgrounds (working class, 
intelligentsia, gentry) and the ways they contributed to the revolutionary movement and 
the later establishment of Soviet institutions (through working for youth organisations, 
publication houses and educational institutions), all of them expressed similar views on 
how women's position in the new society had to be changed. 
Female Bolsheviks viewed the position of women in the patriarchal family as a 
symbol of general political tyranny. They stressed that women's position should be 
changed under the new state in a number of ways, aiming for economic, sexual and 
political equality with men. They believed that capitalist separation of labour from 
labourer occurred not only in the workplace but also in the home. They stressed that by 
achieving liberation at home, and by moving into the socialist workforce, women would 
be free from alienation from their labour and would gain a new social personhood. 
As time went on, new social policies were applied by the Soviet state. As 
Stephen Kotkin (1994, 1997) indicated, in the 1930s women continued to work at home 
as well as at their jobs. Because of that, as Katherine Verdery pointed out, women still 
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had to cope with balancing their public and domestic spheres (1994: 232) and struggle 
with a 'double burden' under the socialist state. The idea of the 'double burden' leads 
gender studies in two directions. One concerns how this 'double burden' continued for 
the 72 years of the Soviet state (Bridger 1987, 1992; Rai, Pilkington and Phizacklea 
1992). The second emphasises that gender conceptions were fluid and tended to change 
from one regime to another: for example, the ideas changed from the Stalin period to the 
Brezhnev and the Gorbachev periods (Bacon and SandIe 2002; Bridger 1992). The 
second is also connected to post-Soviet ethnographic works such as 'Post-Soviet 
Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia', edited by Mary Buckley (1997). Buckley 
stresses that Soviet women were pressed into the work market because of the aspects of 
status, whereas in the post-Soviet context they would voluntarily stay at home if there 
were no financial pressure to engage in the market economy. Rebecca Kay (1997) 
attempts to define how the 'ideals' of femininity were expressed through the use of 
make-up, exploring what allows women to conceptualise themselves as women while 
working under the markedly 'unwomanly' conditions of the competitive, and often 
dangerous, emerging market economy. 
Post-Soviet and post-socialist ethnographic case studies revealed that women's 
marginal economic position made it easier for them to integrate within new non-state 
economic sectors (Pine 1996, 1998, 2002(b); Bridger 1996, 1998). The post-Soviet 
Uzbek art field provides an example, which I pointed out in section 2.6.3: women rose 
to the top of the non-state art sector as art dealers and artists. The new generation of 
artists, represented by the painters Inna Kulagina, Elena Lee and Elena Kambina from 
the Salpinkidi group (mentioned above in the section concerning authority), tended to 
learn the same skills as the Soviet generation of women art historians had - foreign 
languages and computer literacy. I explore this in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, comparing 
two different sets of art specialists, how women artists questioned the validity of the 
women art dealers' combined Soviet and Western trading practices. 
Women artists also brought forward the issue of price-setting. During the Soviet 
period, prices were fixed because there was a single institution managing everything 
from the provision of necessary materials to offering commissions. Rebelling against 
post-Soviet women art dealers' practice of keeping every Soviet-generation male artists' 
works at a fixed price, women artists set their own prices based on the cost of materials 
used and on their own interpretation of the value of their labour. Women artists and 
dealers demonstrated through their working practices that gendered conceptions of the 
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Soviet period were unsustainable without the Soviet institution to uphold them. Women, 
regardless of specialisation or generation, brought forward another question: should the 
products of their labour (art objects) become separated from their producers? On top of 
that, women pushed forward the necessity of the introduction of new hierarchies and 
interpretations of 'value' in its broad sense: economic, moral and social. Those ideas 
were heavily influenced by regional characteristics, which from my point of view sets 
the Uzbek case aside from generalised post-socialist cases. 
2.6.5. Gender specificities with regional post-Soviet studies 
Central Asian case studies, as researchers (Carrere d'Encausse & Stuart 1966; Roy 
1994, 2000; Eickelman 1998) have pointed out, stand out within socialist and post-
socialist studies, which are based on Marxism, and Middle Eastern studies, which focus 
on Islam. The study of gender in the Central Asian region is complicated by the 
competition between Marxism-Leninism and Islam. During the Soviet period the focus 
on gender became a lens through which to explore Soviet rule in Central Asia. 
Therefore, the Stalinist period was assessed through modernisation of titular nation 
women's lives by various Soviet state policies such as 'freeing women from bondage', 
eradication of illiteracy and ending polygamy (Massel 1974). In later periods from 
Brezhnev's rule onwards, researchers inquired how various social groups of titular 
nation women, from urban professionals to rural collective farmers, coped with the 
move from the domestic environment to the public sphere (Lubin 1982, 1984). And in 
the independent era, those gendered perceptions :further broadened. There was an 
attempt to consider post-Socialist changes on one hand, and on the other hand to 
indicate the connection between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (Akiner 1996, 1997, 
2002; Doi 1997; Keller 1998, 2005; Tadjbakch 1998; Kandiyoti 1991, 1996, 1998, 
2000,2002; Saks 1995; Bridger 1998). 
Rosamund Shreeves (2002) pointed out, in the case of post-Soviet Kazakh 
farming where there was not a single woman farmer, that shrinkage of 'public' state-
controlled spheres combined with the increase of 'private' spheres led to the near-
invisibility of women. Shreeves showed that women had to deal with men 'sitting at 
home' with the loss of work in the state sector, which was detrimental for men's 
perceptions of themselves as men. Women's view was that despite their own 
contribution as a fuming workforce, they had to allow men to feel their significance in 
dealings outside the family domain such as keeping social networks, arranging 
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transactions in the local market and conducting farming issues requiring legal 
representation. 
How do the clearly marked communal, ethnic and religious divisions in large 
cities such as Tashkent affect the economic survival strategies of men and women? 
What happens to women from various artistic professions (artists, art dealers and art 
historians) and of various ethnicities (Russians, Koreans and Uzbeks) and religious 
backgrounds (Muslims, Christians) when they have to propel themselves in 
domestically run businesses (women artists and art dealers very often work from home) 
and at the same time clearly manifest their traditional suitability as bearers of children 
and nurturers of families? 
First, I will show that women's self-representation in the familiar roles of family 
supporters and nurturers could be a coping strategy to deal with the resurgence of 
fundamentalism in traditionalist institutions such as the mahalla and the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Those institutions were always regarded as closely tied to ethnicity. 
For example, Uzbek women were studied through their position within the mahalla 
community (Kandiyoti and Azimova 2004; Lubin 1984), while the ROC was studied 
only in relation to Slavs (Verkhovsky 2002; Knox 2005). My Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
indicate that the resurgence of these institutions significantly changed what women and 
men had to do in order to gain social, economic and moral inclusion. These chapters 
will demonstrate that in the case of men, the requirements differed in each institution, 
whereas for women the requirements were generally the same, being related to their 
reproductive and family capacities and not to their skills. 
Second, women's rise to prominence in the post-Soviet arts field reveals that 
those institutions involved in arts circulation, the Church and the mahalla, did not 
separate labour from its producer. For example, I discuss the icons sanctified by the 
priest Vladimir Lapyn in the Holy Trinity Church. For this priest, it is important not 
only that the icon act as a transmitter connecting the believer to God during prayer, but 
that it is done according to the religious cannon. Further, the icon has to embody all the 
moral virtues of the icon-painter, a well-behaved and devout parishioner. Without the 
inseparability of artefact and producer, the artefact would be valued solely on aesthetics 
and commercial market price. The resurgence of institutional involvement in circulation 
of arts demonstrates why Soviet practices could have continuity in such unexpected 
configurations of the former Soviet art world. 
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In the following five chapters, I present ethnographic case studies of each of the 
social configurations I have selected which affected the production and consumption of 
post-Soviet Uzbek arts. My assessments will be based on the theory discussed in this 
chapter, as I explore the themes set out here. I will begin with a discussion of the state 
commission system, emphasising the significance of Soviet institutional validation of 
arts in all the post-Soviet configurations I analyse. Understanding the Soviet practices 
helps to accept that there was not an abrupt end with the fall of the Soviet state, but 
rather a continuity of Soviet practices, which remained as the criteria from which 
specialists involved in production, circulation and consumption perceived arts. 
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Chapter 3 
The Decline of State Arts in Uzbekistan (1991-2004) 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I examine the way state-commissioned arts, Soviet and post-Soviet, were and 
are valued. Specifically, I focus on the Soviet system's 'hierarchy of genres' by which 
paintings were classified and valued. Exploring the reasons why and how painting was 
valued, I explain the Marxist theory of value of labour as it was applied to Soviet arts. 
According to this theory, the genre of thematic compositions held the highest place as the 
most labour-intensive of all the recognised artistic genres. Thematic compositions, or 
tematicheskie kompozitsii in Russian, are a combination of human images, objects and 
symbols conveying an ideological message to the viewer. Of all the genres taught and 
practised during both periods, thematic compositions were the most highly regarded in 
terms of aesthetics, skill, and the recompense accorded to the painter. 
In the next chapter I expand this reasoning, showing that and explaining why the 
whole system of the arts field, together with arts education and the arts institutional 
framework, which was built upon this genre hierarchy system, developed into a rigid 
monolith consisting exclusively ofUzbek men. In Chapter 4, I will examine an alternative 
art world, one not sanctioned by the state. I will introduce how Uzbekistan's art field, both 
state-controlled and illegal, changed with the emergence of women. The differences 
between the two markets, state and non-state, require me to ask: who defines the value of 
painting and what were the reasons behind their valuing practices? 
My argument in Chapter 3 is that interwoven with the Soviet economy were moral 
values that influenced painting production and consumption, whereas in the post-Soviet 
state commission system, those Soviet moral values became eroded by the combination of 
various contradicting ideologies used to value painting. 
To demonstrate this overall erosion of Soviet values, I assess the valuing of 
thematic compositions under the Karimov regime in independent Uzbekistan. My choice of 
thematic compositions was due to the mct that the state commissioned only three paintings 
for the Historical Museum between 1991 and 2004, and all three of those paintings were 
done in the genre of thematic compositions. Since the thematic composition was the only 
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genre selected by the state for conveying its ideological message, it is necessary to explain 
what made this genre so special, what happened to the state-commissioned paintings and 
how the completion of those thematic compositions affected the artists' perception of state 
valuation of painting. 
To show the differences between Soviet and post-Soviet painting valuation, I start 
with a look at why, how, when and by whom this particular genre was valued during the 
Soviet period. This comparison helps us to understand that although Karimov's regime 
used thematic compositions as a part of ideological propaganda, their valuing of this genre 
of painting had nothing to do with Marxist theory of labour but with a mixture of 
ideological trends such as Mustakilik, Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam. 
To illustrate the complexity of state art commissions under the Karimov regime I 
introduce the story of the transformation of Tashkent's Lenin Museum into the Museum of 
the History of Uzbekistan. An analysis of this conversion indicates the reasons for returning 
to the use of thematic compositions within the museum building during the period 1991 to 
2004. After explaining the function of thematic compositions within public buildings, I 
give a detailed examination of each of those three paintings separately by looking at how 
each commission was conducted by the painter. Following this, an assessment of the 
delivery of the commissions by the different administrative bodies (the advisors to the 
President, the Arts Council and the Museum administration) clarifies how valuing thematic 
compositions changed from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period. Chapter 3 will conclude 
with an exploration of how post-Soviet validation of painting by the joint bodies of the state 
commission affected artists' standing and their perception of the moral, social and 
economic valuing of painting. 
3.1.2. Why the Soviet state valued different genres of painting 
I start with the introduction of the first thematic composition in Uzbekistan, Proclamation 
of the Creation of UzSSR by the painter Pavel Benkov (1938). Benkov's thematic 
composition itself, and the valuation of the painting by art historians, serves as a bridge 
linking all the following sections devoted to Soviet and post-Soviet forms of valuation. 
With this painting, I explore why analyses of the worth of Soviet painting were based on 
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Marxist labour theory, which shaped the hierarchy of genres with thematic compositions at 
the top. 
The genre hierarchy indicates first of all how the two-tiered arts 
educational system was structured. Students were taught in increments, learning technical 
skills in gradual stages combined with ideological advancement. This two-tier 
education resulted in artists capable of marrying ideological content with technical 
efficiency. Further, this teaching shows how a flawless capacity to produce durable 
thematic compositions took fourteen years of tireless effort in the local arts 
and educational institutions. The idea of durability was considered important in the Soviet 
context, because making a durable painting demonstrated an artist's ability to use 
quality materials to create a so-called 'proizvedenie iskusstva " or 'masterpiece'. 
Soviet generation painters defined the term 'masterpiece' as a successful combination of 
aesthetic and conceptual ideas inseparable from technical finish. In other words, the 
painters stressed that a work with a good expression of ideas, but failing in technical ability, 
could not be called a masterpiece. According to them, technical finish was a supreme goal 
of a painter. The medium of oil painting IS based on layering 
one coat of paint on top of another, and if chemically one of the pigment's components in 
the layer is aggressive to its neighbouring layers, the surface of the badly finished painting 
over time would crack, fade m colour, flake or even bubble. This 
emphasis on durability signified the hope for a lasting influence of the ideological message 
brought to the world by the 'masterpiece', and the strength of communist ideology. The 
two-tier arts education system, which led to an art field dominated by Uzbek males, was 
designed around the hierarchy of genres and this pursuit of durable perfection. 
Next I will discuss the period of the time when the first thematic composition 
Proclamation of the Creation of UzSSR, (measuring 254x392 cm), was created by the 
painter Pavel Benkov (Fig. 5, p.1 00).20 Benkov kept this painting for participation in the 
20 There are two titles, Proclamation of the Creation of UzSSR and Acceptance of the Constitution, which are 
both misleading because national delimitation was announced in 1924 and the constitution was introduced in 
1936. The actual event depicted, Kalinin's verification of the national delimitation in Central Asia, took place 
in 1925. It is difficuh to guess what was original Benkov's project and what was his final decision over the 
title. For reasons of consistency, I prefer to use the first title. 
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Fig.5 Pavel Benkov's 1938 painting Proclamation of the Creation of UzSSR, (254 x 392 
em, oil on canvas). Its current location is unknown. Photo from The History of Uzbekistan. 
(1957) 
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first exhibition organised by the newly established Union of Artists in 1940. At that time, 
the institution had to demonstrate its members' capability of enacting their lessons in Soviet 
art after the memorably painful first congress of the Union of Artists of Uzbekistan in 1938. 
The first congress demanded that all artists either serve the new agenda of service to the 
Soviet state, or be banned from the arts field with ensuing political exile. For Union 
members, participation in the 1940 exhibition was compulsory. They were to be tested for 
their political loyalty. The requirement for participation in the exhibition was a creation of 
a contemporary theme, which conveyed an understandable visualised ideological message. 
During the Stalinist period, two ways of presenting contemporary themes were 
established: by narrative and by allegory, with a strong inclusion of Soviet iconography 
(prokhorov 1995; Reid 1998). Narrative meant following the 'truthful' historical reality 
behind the produced work whereas allegory was based on Soviet iconography, which 
searched for a 'cultural and political identity in which the nation collectively could believe' 
(Holz 1993: 74). Wolfgang Holz claims that allegory in Socialist painting was used for 
propaganda, which he summarised under five headings: 'illusion of progress', 'carnival of 
red colour', creation of 'socialist' and 'realist' icons, and 'dream theatre'. Unlike narrative, 
which gave a straightforward message, allegory was an entirely imagined reconstruction of 
a scene or historical event, which had to encompass a broad variety of ideological 
messages. 
In his painting, Benkov portrayed the celebration in a theatrical fashion, presented 
as the realisation of a 'dream' by all participants - an allegoric interpretation (Lane 1981; 
Guldin & Southall 1993). To create a reenactment of the historical event, Benkov 
composed an entirely imagined theatrical scene, which allowed him to show his skill in 
depicting staged scenery populated by highly elated characters, both real and fictionaL21 To 
better stage different themes within one space, Benkov divided his composition from top to 
bottom in three parts in the following order. On the top was placed the main group of high-
ranking officials together with Mikhail Kalinin and Youldash Akhundbabayev sitting 
behind the presidium. The backdrop for these high officials was theatrical curtains with 
symbols of the Soviet state such as a bust of Lenin, red flags, hanging slogans and various 
21 Benkov, who had traveled to Bukhara in 1928, knew that Bukhara had no European-style theatre at the 
time, having been a theocratic Islamic state up to 1920. 
102 
other emblems. In the middle part of the composition was placed the delegate standing at 
center stage, pointing his right hand towards the presidium, where Kalinin and 
Akhundbabayev sit, and displaying with his left hand the new flag of Soviet Uzbekistan. In 
the lower part was painted a densely packed crowd of seated deputies, both men and 
women, dressed in national costumes. 
There are three possible reasons Benkov chose allegory instead ofnarrative. 
First and most importantly, Soviet arts institutions valued allegory higher then 
narrative. Allegory was an elaborate conceptualisation of the ideological message, not so 
much the result of an artist's capacity to oscillate within current ideological guidelines but 
an attempt to actually shape the guidelines themselves (Saidova 1974; Umetaileva 1984). 
At that time, all artists were under pressure to do their best to survive; Benkov improved his 
political credentials by producing the highest-valued genre of painting. 
Secondly, allegory helped Benkov to delineate a politically convenient 
interpretation ofUzbek history. Kalinin's visit involved a celebration of the event by local 
deputies, which allowed Benkov to portray a straightforward transmission of power to the 
representatives of the new titular nation ofUzbeks (see Chapter 1, p.27) and to avoid the 
controversies of the recent early Soviet past such as the quick downfall of the short-lived 
Bukharan, Khorezmian, and Kokhan Soviet Republics, the elimination of rebellious non-
Communist fuctions within the local political scene, and the elevation of one ethnic group 
at the expense of another (Uzbeks over Tajiks) (Akbarzadeh 1996; Folz 1996; Djalili, Grare 
and Akiner 1998).22 
Thirdly, the choice of allegory allowed Benkov to step from a simple depiction of 
the event to exploring a wide range of issues in which every element of the composition 
was selected through its symbolic importance in the creation of a single masterpiece 
(Morozov 1989: 175). To glorify the solemnity of the emergence of the new republic by 
demonstrating the unity with the Soviet state, represented by top ranked Soviet officials, 
Russian and Uzbek, and the people of Uzbekistan, Benkov carefully selected only those 
elements which could enhance movement towards a utopian future. Electrical light 
indicates enlightenment; the maximum use of the colour red shows the radiance of Soviet 
22 See (Akbarzadeh 1996; Folz 1996; Djalili, Grare and Akiner 1998) on Tajik and Uzbek interethnic 
relationships under the Soviet state. 
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power, immersing the whole theatrical space with people dressed and sitting amongst 
objects coloured in different shades of red; national costume indicates the new Soviet titular 
nation, Uzbeks; and images of Uzbek women with uncovered heads signifies the stated 
Soviet policy of freeing Muslim women from bondage (Aminova 1977; Umarov 1981; 
Kettering 1998; Widdis 2003). I will not decipher each element of Benkov's painting in 
depth because I want to stress that Soviet painting valuation was based less on how a 
painting looked than on how it was created, something I will discuss in later paragraphs of 
this section. My assessment is done merely to convince a reader that producing a thematic 
composition was a complex undertaking which required time, skill and intensive labour. 
After presenting Proclamation ojthe Creation ojUzSSR, Benkov lived another nine 
years, dying in 1949. During this time his position within the Union of Artists radically 
changed from being a politically questionable artist to the most recognised artist from 
Uzbekistan. Benkov quickly attained the highest honours in Soviet arts, including being 
elected as a full member of the Academy of Fine Arts of the USSR. Having performed once 
well in the most accepted genre, he was left :free to work in less acceptable genres for the 
rest of his life and he was never pestered for his leanings toward the unacceptable (under 
the Stalinist period) style of Impressionism. After his death, the arts college in Tashkent 
was named after him and he was hailed as the founder of the Uzbek school of painting for 
the whole duration of the Soviet period. 
Art historians' assessment of institutional policies of the 1940 exhibition and the 
validation of the top genre in painting was postponed due to several reasons, including the 
onset of the Second World War, the XXth Congress of the Communist Party which was 
highly critical of Stalinism, the building up of the Arts research institute and establishment 
of local arts educational institutions capable of providing the Union of Artists of 
Uzbekistan with Uzbek painters. This postponement later allowed art historians to see more 
clearly why there was a need to venerate the hierarchy of genres with thematic 
compositions on top. The art historians Marinella Myunts and Boris Nikiforov, doing 
contract work for the local Academia, wrote not as influential participants in the exhibition 
but as outside observers of the event. The importance of this painting by Benkov was such 
that it occupied alone a considerable part of the chapter of the first book concerning the 
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history of arts in Soviet Uzbekistan by Myunts (1957) and one of the first monographs 
highlighting artists from Uzbekistan, on Benkov's life, by Nikiforov (1967). 
Nikiforov and Myunts disagreed over Benkov's work's merit. But their discussion 
was not acknowledgement of a career made successful by creating politically correct 
painting under very rough institutional conditions, but a debate over what makes a painting 
worthy. The main argument arose over whether Benkov's thematic composition was 
finished or unfinished. The whole discussion was about the merit of the work: was it, as 
Myunts claimed, a true thematic composition? Or was it still merely a study? 
The question of 'finish' of painting again reflected the Soviet hierarchy of genres. In 
the hierarchy, the top genre was occupied by thematic composition whereas the bottom was 
the sketch or etude. To understand this method of valuing painting, we have to highlight 
how the worth of a painting was established. According to Marxist theory, the value of any 
product, including art, was measured according to the amount of work undertaken to 
produce it. This rule, when applied to painting, was reflected in the hierarchy of genres. 
Each painting was assessed through a calculation of how long the artist worked on it, how 
skillful he was and how he was able to use his tools and materials in order to produce 
durable masterpieces. It is important to understand that the Union of Artists of the USSR 
was set up to monitor, conduct and value state-commissioned art works, including painting. 
Its rules were disseminated through guiding sourcebooks used for inner circulation in the 
Union of Artists. 
3.1.3. How, when, and by whom painting was valued in Uzbekistan 
After explaining why art historians elevated thematic compositions within the hierarchy of 
genres, I focus on how, when and by whom the valuing of these thematic compositions in 
Uzbekistan was done. I combine an analysis of an influential 1973 book by Yun Savitskiy, 
who was a specialist on economic and managerial institutional practices, with my 
experiences as a curator, art history teacher at the art college and researcher during the 
period 1985-1992) in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and as a fieldwork researcher in post-
Soviet Uzbekistan (1999-2001). This examination intends to show that from the 1970s 
onward, the valuing of paintings based on the principles of genre hierarchy led to the local 
arts field becoming dominated by Uzbek male artists. 
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Yun Savitskiy (1973) in his sourcebook, which was called 'Organizatsiya e Oplata 
Truda Khudozhnikov' or 'Management and Payment of Artists Works' gave economic 
valuations for different genres of painting. Savitskiy produced a table, which introduced the 
hierarchy of genres according to price which connoted how much was paid by the state to a 
painter. As previously mentioned, at the top of the hierarchy were thematic compositions 
and at the bottom were sketches or etudes. Savitskiy's price range started from the cheapest 
etude up to the most expensive thematic composition. Savitskiy explained that price 
depended on the complexity of the genre, the required intensity of labour for production, 
and the manual dexterity needed to complete the painting. 
Table 3: Savitskiy gave the price in roubles of different genres. 
Thematic compositions--------------------------------------1 000-5000 
Group portrait-------------------------------------------------1000-3500 
Portrait----------------------------------------------------------600-1800 
Landscape-------------------------------------------------------500-1500 
Stilllife---------------------------------------------------------200-750 
Interior-----------------------------------------------------------250-750 
Etude-------------------------------------------------------------150-400 
Savitskiy's table classified the unfinished painting or study as the lowest genre. He makes 
several interesting points such as the definition of a finished work, complexity of 
composition and ideological purposefulness. Savitskiy's ideas are close to those of Richard 
R. Brettell (2000) who, in his book concerning impressionists, clarified how to distinguish 
a sketch from a finished painting. Since impressionist paintings often appear to have been 
done quickly, Brettell's goal was to define what makes the works 'finished' despite their 
appearance of visual spontaneity. The use of Brettell's definitions of unfinished surface 
could be justifiable in the case of Soviet painting. Brettell's main point is that a sketch was 
usually directly started on the surface of the canvas without any preparations undertaken in 
advance. Very often the sketch was finished in one sitting; therefore, some of the surface of 
the canvas would be left without a single layer of paint. The sketch was supposed to lead to 
more complex works in future. All these factors indicated that a sketch required practically 
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no preparatory work, quick production and less intellectual effort compared to a finished 
painting. The sketch was the least labour-intensive genre, requiring less time and skill. In 
addition, it could be done on various materials starting from a scrap of paper up to piece of 
unstretched canvas, making it often more perishable than a finished painting. Given these 
factors, it was not surprising that the etude ranked lowest in the hierarchy of genres. 
Contrary to the etude, the thematic composition demanded a painter be technically 
proficient in all genres such as interior, landscape, still life and group portrait. To produce 
thematic compositions, artists needed to study varying disciplines such as anatomy, 
perspective, and art history, combined with many years of practical exercises, and to learn 
theories of colour and applicability of pigments in order to produce a durable painting. 
Those skills could not be acquired in a short time, and they had to be formally taught in 
educational institutions (Swanson 2002). This education was split into two tiers: Arts 
College and Arts Institute. Only half of the Arts College's four-year course covered oil 
painting, and introduced students to only the very basics of the medium of painting with 
limited knowledge of how to work in even the easiest of genres. Arts Institute education 
was where students were taught in-depth theory, practice and skill in mastering each of the 
genres in stages. In fact, the graduation project for students of the Arts Institute was the 
presentation of a large scale thematic composition painting. The effectiveness of the two-
tier education had to be demonstrated by this project. The ability to create a thematic 
composition was a mark of being fit to be a painter. 
So for artists, technical ability provided ways to fulfill their moral duty as Soviet 
citizens, serving the state by visualising ideological propaganda based on the hierarchy of 
genres. The ideological propaganda was managed by the state institution, the Union of 
Artists, which in tum assessed the moral and economic values of artistic labour to advance 
the artist's career. In order to implement combined validation of painting and painters, the 
Union of Artists appointed the Art Council, which oversaw the state commission system. 
Further, Savitskiy (1973: 77-79) defined how a state commission should be 
conducted. He outlined the Arts Council's structure, procedures and responsibilities. The 
head of the Arts Council was personally responsible for the correctness of the ideological 
content of the commission, the economic cost of production and the estimation of a 
financial honorarium for the artist. The Arts Council was obliged to keep the same three 
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members on the Council until the project was finalised. In case of the absence of more than 
one member for any reason, the Council could not proceed. The positive conclusion of the 
project, in the case of a grand project required no less than two thirds of the Arts Council to 
vote whereas for a smaller project all three members had to come to a unanimous decision. 
The special role for the Arts Council was to oversee thematic compositions within 
architectural complexes. The artist would sign a contract for a monthly salary payment for 
the entire duration of the project. After the completion of the project, the artist earned his 
honorarium. The honorarium for a finished project was calculated depending on the size of 
finished work. The larger the painting, the higher the price of the finished work. The price 
of one square meter of painting varied from the equivalent of two monthly salaries up to 20 
monthly salaries. The artist's pension was later calculated based on the number of 
commissions undertaken during his membership in the Union of Artists. Overall, by the end 
of the Soviet era, this institutional valuing of painting formed artists' perceptions of their 
own creativity as defined by moral, economic and social valuing of their labour. 
3.1.4. Why painting was produced and valued by Uzbek male artists 
In this section I explain why valuing according to genre hierarchy in Uzbekistan led to an 
arts field dominated by Uzbek males. The reason for the emergence of the Uzbek male 
hegemony was rooted in the rigid selection of students for the two-tier arts educational 
system, which affected artists' chances of membership in the Union of Artists and their 
further advancement through the ranks of the Arts Council. 
In my own memory of the Uzbek arts education system, teaching staff in both the 
College and the Institute, regardless of their gender and ethnicity, regarded women as 
physically unfit to be painters. The teachers' reasoning was based on the professional 
requirements for being a painter, specifically the production of thematic compositions. 
From the 1970s onwards, thematic compositions were incorporated into large architectural 
complexes and indeed demanded enormous physical stamina from a painter. It was a job 
which, according to the teachers, would hinder women's reproductive functions. Among 
the job requirements cited were climbing scaffoldings, lifting heavy boxes with paints, and 
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working in cold, dirty building sites.23 Therefore, within the arts educational system, 
women would be only allowed to get through the first tier, the Arts College, because there 
they were taught technically easier (and therefore less valued) genres. Inevitably women 
would be stopped from entering the second tier, the Arts Institute. Their 'physical 
inferiority' barred them from completion of the two-tier education, thus preventing them 
from entering the Union of Artists. Women were therefore invisible in the Uzbek arts field. 
In the building of a national school of painting, preferential treatment was given to 
Uzbeks as representatives of the titular nation. There was a shortage of places for students 
The Arts Institute's painting department had only ten placements, out of which half were 
allocated for students from the other Central Asian republics and the other half for 
Uzbeks.24 It was not sutprising that with creation of the two-tier system in 1962, all 
professional artists entering the Union of Artists of Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic were 
male and Uzbek. Ifmembers of the local Union were mainly Uzbek males, it is logical that 
the Arts Council administering the state commission system would consist ofUzbek males 
who would perpetuate this hegemony. 
In the following section, by introducing the background of the Museum of the 
History of Uzbekistan, I will show that the return of thematic compositions in the post-
Soviet period became possible because of their capacity to visualize and promote new 
ideological concepts for viewers. This explains why the new post-Soviet state commission 
system's re-creation and re-addressing of Soviet interpretations of the past required a new 
interpretation of thematic compositions. 
23 Teachers were quite explicit in showing their concern regarding this type of work's perceived effects on the 
health of women painters, but they conveniently closed their eyes to another, more real health risk to their 
female students during the educational period. All Soviet educational institutions required students to make 
compulsory annual trips to do agricultural work on collective farms. In the Central Asian case, this meant 
extremely difficult harvesting work on cotton plantations. Regardless of the gender of students, the daily 
picking quota was 60 kg of cotton. In most cases, female students' body weight was far below the weight of 
cotton which they were required to pick and to lift in bags. Apart from lifting heavy loads of cotton, female 
students were physically exposed to severely polluted agricultural sites (a result of the unmeasured use of 
chemicals to boost cotton harvests). Because of this, one can see that in arts education, women's physical 
weakness was more a convenient excuse for preventing women to propel themselves in challenging 
professional occupations, rather than an actual source of concern regarding their health in physically 
strenuous work. 
24 After graduation those students from the other republics would return home and not remain in Uzbekistan. 
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3.2.1. The Museum of the History of Uzbekistan 
One aspect of the new Mustakilik ideology was a revival of the deeper past, which meant a 
rejection of the immediate past (associated with the Russian-connected, Tsarist and Soviet 
periods). It began with the replacement of the old Soviet monuments and institutions by 
new ones, which were packaged as a part of a new ideological discourse. The epitome of 
such state projects became the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan. Its task was to 
obliterate the Russian past of the new state, as well as to destroy the ideological imprints of 
Marxism-Leninism. To achieve this goal, the former Lenin museum was chosen to be 
transformed into a new historical museum. This overt political statement overlooked the 
insuitability of the Lenin Museum building for such an important political project. 
3.2.2. The Tashkent Lenin museum 
The Lenin Museum opened in 1970 to celebrate the 100-year anniversary of Vladimir 
Lenin's birth (Mosidova 1979). Every major Soviet city or capital of a national republic 
was required to have a Lenin museum. Tashkent's large Lenin museum was a mark of the 
status and importance of the city. The Lenin museum faithfully reproduced Russian 
museum displays of all 20 of Lenin's rooms, with their contents. Among those contents 
were a reproduction of Lenin's coat with bullet holes (Sadykova 1975: 195-196). The 
Museum's veneration of Lenin's life and his mass-produced relics hardly brought any 
intellectual value to Tashkent. All Lenin museums were required to conduct research into 
Lenin's life and writing, but the Tashkent museum failed to do so because its director was 
an accountant appointed for his political connections rather then his scholarly pursuits. 
However, this particular Lenin museum was specially acclaimed for its artistic merit 
in the book devoted to the best projects of the Soviet arts and crafts of the 1970s (Sovetskoe 
Dekorativnoe-Isskusstvo [1945-1975J 1989). The museum's creation took four years and 
the best Soviet architects, sculptor, artists and craftsmen were invited to contribute. Two 
prominent Russian architects, E. Rozanov and V. Shestopalov designed the project. The 
museum was a white cube shape, consisting of two floors. The core of the building had a 
central staircase with a statue of Lenin in front of a mosaic devoted to the establishment of 
Soviet power in Uzbekistan. The acclaimed Russian sculptor 1. Tomskii, who specialized in 
erecting Lenin statues all over the USSR, created the six-meter tall statue. The eight by ten 
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meters mosaic, depicting the multiethnic revolutionaries of Uzbekistan, was made by the 
artists V. Zamkov and V. lonin. Two of the best Uzbek craftsmen, M. Usmanov and K. 
Haidarov, decorated the interior of the building. They worked in carving dry plaster (ganch 
in Uzbek) and wood. The Lenin Museum was incoIporated into the city's existing 
architectural ensemble of the Concert Hall, the Theatre of Ballet and Opera, the Hotel 
Tashkent and others. 
Transforming the Lenin Museum into the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan was 
a daunting task. To begin the process, there was a massive clearance of all artemcs 
regardless of their historical or artistic merit. The statue of Lenin was removed. The mosaic 
was taken down and plastered over. All that remained were the Uzbek craftsmen's plaster 
carvings on the ceiling, leaving below an empty shell which urgently needed to be filled. 70 
other museums were required to share their collections to help to build up the displays in 
the new museum. Based on the wealth of those artefacts collected from allover Uzbekistan, 
the museum was to present a new version of national history: that of the independent nation 
state of Uzbekistan. 
It was never questioned how the building layout would affect the narration of 
history. The two-floor division brought a new display which became divided into two parts. 
The first floor covered history from the Stone Age until Russian colonisation, and the 
second floor included Russian Tsarist colonial history followed immediately by the 
independent period - completely skipping over the Soviet period. These two floors were 
massive open spaces which had been arranged to facilitate the :faithful reproduction of the 
20 Lenin rooms and nothing else. Since each floor was a single enormous space, historical 
periods became very mixed up, which provoked agonising decisions in the Arts Council 
over each of the artefacs' placement. There were political and cultural problems as well. 
For example, some clerics objected to a display about the Stone Age that made reference to 
evolution. Owing to the uncertainty towards some historical periods, white boards were 
placed separating viewers from the unwanted parts of the display in every floor. These 
massive boards detracted attention from the main display, and the overall impression of the 
new museum exhibition was one of chaos. 
With increasing discontent over the content of the museum by all decision-making 
bodies (which will be discussed in section 3.5) and artists, it became necessary to redefine 
111 
the whole concept of the exhibition. To this end, the President's advisers decided to return 
to the use of thematic compositions. As in the Soviet period, new post-Soviet compositions 
were not there for merely decorative purposes: they were supposed to clarify what the 
displays could not achieve and to simplify a visual explanation of the nation-state' s history 
according to the ideology of 'Independence'. The thematic compositions had to provide 
cohesiveness to the narration of the glorious history of Uzbekistan. Each of the 
compositions had a precise goal depending on its location. The first, a fresco located on the 
wall of the staircase, was supposed to introduce visitors to the glory of the ancient state of 
Uzbekistan. The other two, stretched oil paintings on the first and second floors, were to 
emphasise important events of the ensuing historical periods, from the medieval and Tsarist 
periods to independence. An understanding of the complexity of the interpretation of 
Uzbekistan's history and nation building in the Museum of History could be helped by an 
assessment of commissions of paintings for the museum, which I am going to look at in the 
two following sections. In those sections I examine what kind of thematic compositions 
were proposed by the artists Bakhodyr Jallalov25 and Alisher Alikulov. 
3.3. Bakbodyr Jallalov 
In 1993, Bakhodyr Jallalov was commissioned to create a very conspICUOUS fresco, 
measuring eight by ten meters, for the central stairs of the Museum of the History of 
. Uzbekistan (Fig.6, p.112). Jallalov's fresco was supposed to fill the empty space previously 
occupied by the Soviet-era mosaic by Zamkov and Ionin. By time Jallalov was ready to 
start his commission, there was a blank wall and a hole in the floor left after the removal of 
Lenin's statue. (The hole was later covered with a large concrete circle containing artificial 
plants.) Jallalov intended to show the most glorious moments in Uzbek history united in a 
single fresco entitled Under the Vault of Eternity. Unintentionally, he followed principles 
laid out by Benkov: incorporation of iconography based on state symbols, and composition 
25 Jallalov, during the fudependence period, started signing his name as Jalol. Under Soviet rule, all citizens 
were supposed to have a family name, which was not the case prior to the Soviet period for Muslims, who 
were known either by the name of their clan, tribe or location in addition to their fIrst names. The Russian 
ending' -ov' is patronymic, and these names given ti Central Asians were their fITSt names turned into a 
patronymic. However, under the current nationalistic mood, there has been a return to original names. With 
Russian-style patronymic endings cut from family names. Jallalov was inconsistent about this, however: 
depending on circumstances, he either used the Russified Jallalov or his ancestral Muslim name Jalol. For 
consistency, I use Jallalov throughout this thesis. 
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Fig.6 Bakhodyr lallalov's mural titled Under the Vault of Eternity (8000 x 10000 em), for 
the central staircase of the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan (1993-2001). Photo taken 
by myselfin 2001. 
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Fig.7 Under the Vault of Eternity (detail). President Karimov's portrait was changed after 
2001. la1lalov covered both hands in the same way as the media covers undesirable images, 
with small dots. Photo taken by myself in 2001. 
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divided into three parts. The composition develops from floor up to ceiling. The lowest 
level represents the great medieval past of the Timurid period - the rider Tamerlane looks 
down on the fruitful results of his own rule and on his descendants?6 In the middle is the 
contemporary Independence period, with a huge portrait of President Karimov placed 
between medieval Islamic architecture and Hellenistic monuments of the pre-Islamic 
period. Behind the President is the Uzbekistan coat of arms, with branches of cotton and 
wheat wrapped in the flag's tricolor bands (blue, symbolizing water resources; white, for 
cotton; and green, representing Islamic heritage). On the highest level of the fresco are the 
celestial signs of the twelve months, symbolising an auspicious future for the independent 
state of Uzbekistan. 
Under the Vault of Eternity was a quintessential thematic composition, one which 
emphasised new post-Soviet ideology by stressing the continuity of Uzbekistan's state from 
Tamerlane to Karimov. History progressed immediately from the glorious medieval past 
directly to the jubilant independent present. It is not surprising that a link is made between 
Tamerlane and Karimov, but the images that keep them together are somewhat confusing. 
Jallalov has placed an open Koran between the medieval and contemporary heads ofstate?7 
The fresco was painted in 1995 when all Central Asian states were experiencing religious 
freedom and had high expectations of future economic prosperity. By 2001, the situation 
had changed; a terrorist campaign by religious extremists had begun in 1999 and an 
economic slowdown was taking place. Back in 1995, though, it was possible to represent 
the President in a royal pose, pointing one hand towards the Koran and in the other holding 
a golden globe as a symbol of power. The globe has two hidden meanings: one points to 
the replacement of the statue of Lenin in the main square of Tashkent by a globe (Bell 
1999) and the second refers to the replacement of Marxism-Leninism by the new national 
ideology of Independence, as the globe shows only one country: Uzbekistan. But in 2001 
Uzbekistan, it was unsuitable to demonstrate religious fervour, to assert geopolitical and 
26 The Timurid period lasted from the 14th to 16th centuries. The period was named after the founder of the 
dynasty, Timur, or as he was known in Europe, Tamerlane. Tamerlane was born in 1336 in the village Khodja 
Elgar, which was located in the territory of contemporary Uzbekistan. He died in 1405 and was buried in 
Samarkand. During his lifetime Tamerlane made the city of Samarkand the capital of his empire, which 
included much of modem-day Central Asia, the Caucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Northern India. 
27 The 9th century Koran of Osman, depicted in the fresco, was the holy book for Central Asian Muslims; the 
Koran was annexed at the time of the Russian colonial conquest and returned after 1992 by the Russian 
Federation. 
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ideological superiority or even to claim political stability. As a result of this change in the 
political scene, the fresco was promptly changed in a number of ways. 
In 2001, Jallalov immediately covered both hands of the President in the same way 
as the media covers undesirable images, with small dots (Fig.7, p.I13). Those dots, joked 
another artist Vladimir Shevtsov, who participated in creating the museum's exhibition, 
would not hide 'either that abrupt movement towards and from religion of the state, or great 
expectations to be noticed on the geographical map,.28 For me, what was noticeable in that 
fresco in 2001 was not the sense of shame of using Islam as a political tool (the religion, 
once regarded as the pillar of traditional Uzbek society, had become marginalised by 
religious extremists opposed to Karimov's rule), but the attempt to forget the Russian 
presence established during the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. 
By 2002, improved relations between Russia and Uzbekistan led to further 
problems with the content of the fresco. With the new turn in foreign affairs between the 
two states, the Museum could no longer keep the fresco on display without any reference to 
a Russian presence in Uzbekistan's past. The museum received an unusual order from the 
President's advisers to remove lallalov's work The Museum administration could not 
simply destroy the fresco and leave a colossal empty space above the central stairs, but 
could only replace one fresco with another. The administration attempted to find an artist 
who would volunteer to cover up Jallalov's fresco. However, nobody agreed to do such a 
commission out of principle: artists were unwilling to destroy a fellow artist's work So the 
administration had no choice other than to approach J allalov himself An agreement was 
reached, and Jallalov's fresco was painted over. 
The same year, Akmaldjan Ikramdjanov (b.1952) was commissioned to fill the 
blank space left after Jallalov painted over his fresco. Ikramdjanov proposed a project 
which was promptly accepted by all interested parties, the advisors of the President, the 
Arts Council and the Museum administration. However, Ikramdjanov was highly reluctant 
to complete his own commission alone, because he was not confident that his work would 
not be destroyed as Jallalov's was. In order to go ahead it became necessary to invite 
another artist, and Azod Khabibulin (b. 1957) agreed to finish Ikramdjanov's project. 
Finally a merely decorative tableau emerged. It was divided into three levels representing 
28 Vladimir Shevtsov, interview 12 August 2001. 
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Uzbekistan's landscape - the lowest line portrayed flowering tulips, in the middle were 
apricot blossoms and on the top level were mountains under a blue sky. Despite the work's 
lack of either political or aesthetic value, the Museum administration was satisfied. The 
administration was hopeful that this work would last longer than its predecessor, but if it 
too had to be destroyed, at least it would be a work of questionable merit. 
3.4. AIisher AIikulov 
Alisher Alikulov was commissioned to produce a fresco concerning the Medieval period on 
the first floor of the museum. Alikulov proposed a three-part composition concerning the 
Timurid period, named 'Timur' and measuring six by ten meters. Viewers could see the 
composition itself on the wall, as well as a reproduced architectural plan of the famous 
square of Regis tan in the city of Sam ark and, built under Tamerlane's rule and declared by 
UNESCO a site of world heritage. This viewing of the painting and the square was meant 
to enhance the connotation of the ruler's contribution to contemporary Uzbekistan (Fig. 8, 
p.118). 
In his first project Alikulov proposed the following themes: the left side of the 
composition would show wars and the results of those wars, namely the securing of East-
West trade routes; in the middle was the rider Tamerlane surrounded by flags; and on the 
right side Alikulov intended to place the entire dynasty of the Timurids. The Arts Council, 
which represented high government officials, bank managers, writers, historians, clerics of 
both Orthodox Christian and Sunni Muslim creeds, found portraying only the Timurid 
family unacceptable and requested that Alikulov include some scholars, artists and poets as 
well. Furthermore, the historians from the Arts Council did not accept the appearance of the 
founder of the dynasty. Alikulov followed what they indicated, but he convinced them that 
he could not portray the victorious rider as a seventy-year-old man, lame and with a 
crippled right arm. So the Arts Council, after much debate, agreed that Tamerlane be 
rejuvenated to his early fifties. Alikulov told me, 'I am not happy that my Tamerlane looks 
as if he is a weak man: he cannot lead an army. 1 wished to follow Gerasimov's 
reconstruction of the Tamerlane portrait. ,29 
29 Alisher Alikulov, interview, 21 July2001. 
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Alikulov was left in an awkward situation because of the post-Soviet reinvention of 
Tamerlane (Fig. 9, p.119). Alikulov's comment reflected the logical contradiction in the 
'Independence' ideology. The whole bulwark of this ideology was based on two claims. 
First, that the predecessor to the modem state was the Timurid empire, and the second that 
Tamerlane, founder of the Timurid Empire, was a figurehead ofUzbekness. These claims 
led to the assumption that the contemporary nation of Uzbeks have the same ethnic and 
racial type as Tamerlane. However, true history is less straightforward and cannot fall 
neatly within a contemporary ideological framework. There emerged a preoccupation with 
determining a correct racial type for the Uzbek nation by the ideologists, who exercised 
their pressure on artists to visualise the 'correct' look of the Uzbek race. 
The main problem was that, despite the veneration of Tamerlane and his descendants 
by the official ideology, the warrior was also resented because of his ethnic origin. In 1941, 
the Timurids' bodies were exhumed by anthropologists and, based on the analysis of the 
skeletal remains, their appearance was described, reconstructed and published in 1964 
(Oshanin 1964). Biological and anthropological research revealed that Tamerlane had the 
features of a Mongol, which he actually was by ethnic origin (his ancestors were Mongols 
from the Barlas clan, who converted to Islam.) The Russian anthropologists showed that the 
Timurids were of a Mongol racial type rather than the pure version of an Uzbek defined as 
the Ferghana-European race. To the regret of a generation of Uzbek scholars, even the 
skulls ofTamerlane's son Shakrukh and his two grandchildren, including the famous 
astronomer Ulukbek, showed various degrees of Mongol descent. Contemporary ideology 
could not accept the real appearance of Tamerlane as anything other than a pure Uzbek of 
the Ferghana-European race, so existing sculptural portraiture of Tamerlane based on 
anthropological reconstruction by Mikhail Gerasimov was discarded. The new Tamerlane 
image was borrowed from the artist Nabiev's version, which was created for the celebration 
of the Tamerlane jubilee in 1996. To reintroduce to the population the ideologically 
corrected image of Tamerlane, all artists were requested to copy the Nabiev version of 
Tamerlane's face. Previously, Soviet ideology had never exercised power over physical 
appearance in Uzbek images - the commissioned art historians could point to attributes like 
costume, but restrictions on the appearance ofUzbeks were never applied to Uzbek images. 
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Fig.8 Alisher Alikulov's Timur (Tamerlane), (600 x 1000 cm, oil on canvas). Photo taken 
by myselfin 2001 . 
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Fig.9 Timur (detail). Alikulov was forced to negotiate with his commissioners concerning 
T amerlane' s physical appearance. Photo taken by myself in 2001. 
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Fig.l0 Alisher Alikulov, Pepressii e Vosstanie (Repressions and Uprisings) (detail). The 
image of the woman with children reveals Soviet aesthetics of how Uzbek women should 
be portrayed. Photo taken by myselfin 2001. 
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Fig.11 Alisher Alikulov and Represii e Vostanie (500 x 700 cm, oil on stretched canvas). 
A column placed directly in front of his painting makes the central part of the composition, 
with the Uzbek woman, invisible. Photo taken by myself in 2001. 
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The painting on the second floor concerned 19th and 20th-century Uzbek history, and 
contemporary Uzbek history starting from the time of Russian colonisation_ Alikulov 
named this fresco Repressions and Uprising or Represii e Vostanie, and it measured five by 
seven meters_30 Alikulov produced a three-part composition: on the right side, the figures of 
rebels of the Tsarist Russian period, with the dates of important historical uprisings; in the 
middle, a poor Uzbek woman with two children, left without support due to the persecution 
of the males in her family; and on the left-hand side Jadids, or Young Bukharans (Sengupta 
1997: 406; Khalid 2000: 379), who supported the Russian 'civilizing mission' but were 
executed during the Stalinist purges of 1937. Alikulov radically departed from the Soviet 
interpretation of the Russian-dominated period of Uzbekistan's history. Benkov's version 
of the beginning of Uzbekistan was devoted to the expectation of a brighter future under 
Soviet rule, whereas Alikulov's version stressed how difficult in fact it was to achieve it 
However, according to Alikulov himsel( the main problem was with the creation of 
the image of the central woman. Alikulov told me, 'I am not happy with her. I could not 
make a pretty happy face, but I could not also make her how she should look. So what I 
was able to do was to make her a bit dishevelled and cover her head with a SCarr.,31 His 
creation of an Uzbek woman from the past required him to take into consideration 
various Soviet-period aesthetics concerning Uzbek women. Pre-Soviet and very early 
Soviet period Uzbek women traditionally followed Muslim prohibitions on covering their 
bodies, making their faces and bodies invisible to male outsiders (Harris 1996). At that 
time, Uzbek women covered themselves with horse-hair veils called parandja, covering the 
front of the face, and on top of that they wore a robe called the khalat which covered their 
whole bodies. In historical actuality, the scarf on an Uzbek woman's head replaced the veil 
only after the mid-1940s. The replacement of the veil with the scarfin Soviet society took 
twenty years and was regarded as a great achievement, an example of the stated Soviet 
policy of 'freeing Muslim women from bondage' (MasseI1974; Keller 1998; 2005). This 
new freedom revealed the faces and bodies of Uzbek women to viewers, regardless of 
gender. It also brought in painting three aesthetics concerning images of Uzbek women. 
30 Ilkhomova (2002: 35) in her article concerning this Alikulov's thematic composition, provides another title 
'National Revolt and Movement ofDjadids' . Changing of titles often occurs over time, as we can see with 
Benkov's thematic composition. 
31 Alisher Alikulov, interview, 21 July200L 
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The first was the use of women's imagery as an exemplifier of the 'contemporary', or in 
Russian sovremennik, representing a continuous social and cultural change within Uzbek 
society (Lakovskaya 1977: 46; Kettering 1998; Gorshunova 2001).32 Uzbek women were 
portrayed battling with illiteracy, gaining their places within the seats of the Soviet 
government and replacing men in the fields and factories of Uzbekistan. This type of 
'contemporary' image flourished in Uzbekistan during the whole Soviet period. The second 
aesthetic came out immediately after the end of Stalinist period and still graced post-Soviet 
exhibitions (Myunts 1976: 15; 'Ang Ulu, Ang Aziz', The Oldest and the Dearest 1999: 16; 
Jurayeva 2001: 26).33 This type cultivated the image of idealised Uzbek women embodying 
infallible family values, expressed through such archetypes as the young mother holding a 
baby boy in her hands, the happily subservient daughter-in-law, the obedient wife and most 
popular of all, the wise matriarch. Those domestic portraits typically portrayed women 
within the courtyards of mahalla neighbourhoods, wearing traditional clothing. The third 
aesthetic emerged in the Gorbachev period as result of awakening nationalism (Khakimov 
1999: 17).34 This particular type was inherited from traditional Uzbek poetry and the 
medieval miniatures of the Timurid period, reintroducing poeticised images of nubile 
ethereal beauties (Taktash 1978: 11).35 Uzbek painters portrayed their beauties as dancing, 
singing, playing musical instruments and simply daydreaming in their palatial gardens or 
interiors. This hedonistic imagery equally contradicted the notion of valuing social input 
32 Lakovskaya devoted a 1977 article to the solo exhibition in the same year by the U zbek painter B. Babayev, 
who was known for his 'contemporary' images: for example, a dairymaid working with modem equipment. 
Kettering (1998) explored the creation of porcelain figurines ofUzbeks in Russia using various materials such 
as photos and written sources of the 1920s and 1930s. She especially devoted a considerable part of her 
research to U zbek female images. 
33Myunts (1976) and Jurayeva (2001) assessed Uzbek women images by Rakhim Akhmedov, which he 
introduced during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. 'Ang DIu, Ang Aziz', translated from Uzbek as 'The 
Oldest and the Dearest' was the title of a 1999 exhibition in the Central Exhibiting Hall by the newly 
established Academy of Fine Arts. This in an unnamed San'at article from the same year hailed, among other 
important post-Soviet themes, portraits of aged Uzbek matrons wearing headscarves and traditional clothing. 
34 Khakimov (1999) in his article, written for Jallalov's catalogue, implied what were the reasons behind signs 
of nationalism in Uzbek painting. Khakimov's claims correspond with the fmdings ofWestem anthropologists 
such as Kandiyoti (1991), Carrere d'Encausse (1993), Roy (1994, 1998), and Adams (1998). During the 
1980s, the Cotton Affair or Rashidov Affair took place. This was a political investigation by Moscow officials 
of certain Uzbek officials' economic misdeeds. ill the end, over 2000 Uzbek officials were sentenced, and 
there was widespread vilification by the Soviet media of the Uzbek elite, leading in turn to Uzbek resentment. 
Uzbek painters began turning to the pre-Soviet and pre-Russian past, which was epitomised for them by 
Timurid period. 
35 ill a 1978 article, Taktash explored those late 1970s images ofUzbek Timurid beauties. He stressed that 
they was an attempt to aestheticise the pre-Soviet past using female images. 
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by bettering through education and labour of the early Soviet period (Kettering 1998) as 
well as promoting the rise of women's status in the later Soviet period (Kandiyoti 1991, 
2000; llkhamov 2001).36 But despite their hedonistic surroundings, the women in these 
paintings had prim expressions, demure and dignified poses, and always wore modest 
clothing (Western or traditional), covering legs and arms and not showing cleavage. Uzbek 
painters never showed Uzbek women nude, badly dressed, expressing emotional distress, or 
showing physical exhaustion and malnutrition. 
Alikulov had to consider the religious prohibitions of the era he was portraying, but 
he was still tied to these aesthetics of the Soviet period (Fig. 10, p.120). Obviously he was 
not able to depict a more realistic sufferer under a heavy veil, hiding her face from 
outsiders, nor he could go against Soviet aesthetics by showing a women demented from 
suffering. Alikulov had to compromise: he put a scarf on the head of the woman to make 
his heroine look like an Uzbek woman from the early Soviet period, who had been through 
the traumatic process of 'freeing from bondage'. Her further suffering from the Soviet 
regime's destruction of her traditional life was shown by no more than pieces of her 
dishevelled locks protruding under her headscarf Alikulov was upset because he could not 
portray a real situation with a real sufferer, and his choice of the image was guided by the 
existing aesthetics of how Uzbek women had to be presented. 
The placement of Repressions and Uprisings gave a different impression from what 
the artist aimed to produce. Alikulov did not take into account a column which was 
standing directly in front of his painting (Fig.11, p.121). That column blocked the view of 
the central figure of the woman, and what the viewer could see is actually a two-part 
composition. Viewed from the front, the visible composition consisted of the suppression 
of the rebels by the Tsarist colonial administration and the elimination of the Jadids by the 
Soviet state. As result of this spatial mistake, the whole content turned from dark, but 
hopeful, to a tragic interpretation of Uzbekistan's history. If in the intended interpretation 
of contemporary Uzbek history the image of the woman provided some solace in hope for 
the future, here was a bare reality of consistent failure, suppression and endless struggle of 
daily reality. 
36 Kandiyoti (1991, 2000, 2004) and Ilkhamov (1998) emphasised the importance of the women's position 
within her family and in a broader social framework depending on her fertility and her age increase. 
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Alikulov's and Jallalov's works demonstrated that there was a change in 
interpretation of the thematic composition. Instead of looking ahead to a utopian future, 
thematic compositions retreated into examinations of the past. The Russian presence in that 
past was highly contested, with interpretations ranging from complete omission (as in the 
case of the staircase fresco) to debate over the benefits of the Soviet period (in the case of 
the second floor painting by Alikulov). Nevertheless, the compositional structure was the 
same as that in Benkov's influential painting: the division of the surface of the painting into 
three parts was still there. Even the use of iconography represented by state emblems, 
placement within composition of the various images of the founders of the state and colour-
coded symbols remained unchanged. It was also assumed that Uzbek physical 
characteristics, including the height of the nasal bridge, the size of the eyes, and duskiness 
of complexion had to be as popularised for educational purposes as details of Uzbek 
national costume such as stripes and skull caps. Thus the principles on which thematic 
compositions were rebuilt were the same as they had been during Soviet period. 
So, in this case, the next question is if the basic principles of Soviet iconography 
changed only superficially, does this mean the Soviet system of valuing painting was 
preserved? The conducting of state commissions in the new Independence era had become 
a long and winding process, with persistent correcting and redoing of thematic 
compositions. This suggests the procedure of valuing had also changed. In the following 
section, I will address how valuing thematic compositions by the independent state 
commission system changed paintings' moral, economic and social values. 
3.5. How and by whom post-Soviet state commissions were valued 
The President's advisors, the Arts Council and the museum administration monitored the 
state commissions for the museum (I cite the three bodies in order of influence). The 
president's advisors gave the order and hired various specialists for the Arts Council. These 
Arts Council members represented a broad range of specialists such as clerics of both the 
Muslim and Orthodox Christian creeds, scholars representing socio-political disciplines, 
bank managers, bureaucrats and so on. But excluded from the Arts Council were artists and 
art historians. The museum administration remained the same as it had been during Soviet 
period. Those three bodies had different responsibilities - the advisors gave a commission 
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and intervened rarely but decisively, the Arts Council was responsible for implementation 
of the new ideology, censorship, and determining the political correctness of each work put 
on display, and finally the administration was responsible for covering the financial cost of 
production. That triumvirate was supposed to approve and oversee the creation of thematic 
compositions. It was not surprising that there were only males in that triumvirate: clerics in 
both Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam can be only be males, the advisers to the 
President and scholars were males, and even if there were a few women in the museum 
administration their opinions were considered unimportant because of their insignificant 
employment positions. If there was a similarity between Soviet and post-Soviet period 
valuing in so far as the valuers were and continued to be men, there were dramatic 
differences in the ethnicity, religion and ideology of the participants. This, combined with 
the division of responsibilities over the commission, management, appraisal and the 
economic reward, made the whole delivery of an art commission extremely painful and 
protracted. 
The President's advisors were in charge of the prolonged reconstruction of the 
museum (1991-2004). Their interference with projects was rare, but when made was 
decisive. In the case of Jallalov's commission, they nullified a completed work of the Arts 
Council, museum administration and an artist. Their action demonstrated that any work 
could be obliterated if the vector of state policy changed. The destruction of Under the 
Vault of Eternity owed to the rise of militant Islamic groups and radical changes in the 
direction of the Mustakilik ideology by Karimov's regime. This precedent of the futility of 
labour undermined many artists' morale. Ikramdjanov and Khabibulin became cautious in 
claiming authorship of the staircase composition. They did as little as possible to produce 
state commissions because they realized that the new validation system destroyed an 
important criterion of artistic labour: durability. As I stressed at the beginning of this 
chapter, durability was an important part of the Soviet definition of a 'masterpiece'. A 
masterpiece was supposed to symbolize the indestructibility of the regime that 
commissioned it. Any uncertainty in the long life of an artwork, caused by the flux of 
different ideologies, made artists less motivated to produce works in a genre which required 
intensive labour, time and technical skill. This is another important reason why the more 
complex thematic composition was replaced by a simple landscape, and why that particular 
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landscape was of a poor technical finish. Replacement of the top genre by the less valued 
genre revealed a dramatic difference in overseeing state commissions between Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods. 
From the very beginning there emerged a difference between the Soviet and post-
Soviet state commission. The post-Soviet state commission was represented by three 
separate sets of beliefs: the secular Mustakilik ideology and two religions, Islam and 
Orthodox Christianity. Those three ideologies had no common ground in valuing painting 
and therefore there was only one option, a group discussion over the content of the thematic 
composition. During Arts Council meetings it became apparent that the bearers of those 
three ideologies cared more about their own agendas than in speeding the project's end. 
Protracted ideological competition culminated in ad hoc decision-making over the final 
acceptance of the commission, which undermined artists' understanding of the rules of 
what they could and could not do. One example was Alikulov's successful attempt to 
rejuvenate Tamerlane, a rejection of the previously-approved Nabiev image ofTamerlane. 
By allowing Alikulov to go against an earlier decision, the Arts Council contradicted itself 
Such inconsistencies in interpretation of thematic compositions led to artists' assumption 
that a work's iconography became dependent on negotiation skills rather than ideological 
expression. 
The museum administration was in a complex situation because it needed to deal 
with the economic issues of each commission. The administration was not aware of the 
Union of Artists' economic practices, nor were they able to introduce a comparable scheme 
of payment. It is possible to blame the administration for an absence of initiative because 
the whole museum experienced delays in salaries payment up to nearly a half a year. 
Artists, as museum employees, were forced to wait several months for a contract payment. 
Even if they received a lump sum of money, gigantic compared to any state employee, the 
artists' honoraria were immediately devalued by the ongoing inflation and were swallowed 
by end-of-year taxation. Unlike in the Soviet period, when payment for state commissions 
was given to artists after taxes, in the independent period artists were taxed at the end of the 
year. With inflation up to 20% and taxation equal to that on private entrepreneurs, over 
85% for each commission, artists had an unpleasant surprise. They discovered that their 
work for the state, instead of giving them benefits, actually put them in financial debt to the 
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state. Post-Soviet economic valuing of their painting led to financial difficulties for artists, 
and the absence of certainty that they would receive a good pension for the future. 
Thus post-Soviet state commissions were characterised by a complete lack of 
Soviet-period painting valuation. Each of the three bodies involved made their own 
contribution towards shattering artists' confidence in the expertise of state specialists. With 
the uncertainty over outcomes of the management, ambiguity over the validation of their 
paintings and negative financial pricing of their artistic labour, artists inevitably had some 
reflections, which I examine in my concluding section. 
3.6. The fate of artists 
Four Uzbek painters, Bakhodyr lallalov (b.1949), Akmaldjan Ikramdjanov (b.1952), Azod 
Khabibulin (b.1959) and Alisher Alikulov (b.1963) were commissioned to create the three 
thematic compositions for the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan. Because two artists, 
Khabibulin and Ikramdjanov, had a minimal involvement with the state commission, I am 
going to focus only on the responses of the artists who were most strongly affected by the 
events. I interviewed in depth lallalov and Alikulov many times during my stay in Tashkent 
(1999-2001). In the case of lallalov, we had been acquainted since 1987, so it was 
interesting to compare longer-term changes in his perception of artistic creativity in 
connection to state commissions. 
Bakhodyr lallalov had a significant career under the Soviet period, and was the last 
head of the local Union of Artists. lallalov represents the generation that came about in the 
1980s. His own interests were turned towards creative, ambitious projects that coincided 
with a massive building programme of the 1960s-1980s requiring decoration of theatres, 
concert halls, and educational institutions. State commissions were lallalov's opportunity to 
represent his generation ofUzbek artists, whose perception of thematic compositions differ 
from the older generation. He was the first Uzbek artist to inco1porate themes concerning 
the Timurid period, which claimed Uzbekistan's brilliant medieval historical heritage. Out 
of his 11 grand projects, nearly all are devoted to glorifying the Timurids' cultural 
contributions. Moreover, eight of those projects were major landmarks of Tashkent's urban 
landscape such as the Bakhor Concert Hall and the Turkiston Government Palace. 
lallalov's Soviet-era work paved the way for the contemporary Independence-period 
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ideology, with its emphasis on revival of the past. Therefore it was a rather unexpected tum 
for Jallalov that he could not find his place within the Mustakilik ideology. Jallalov's 
candidacy for the vacant place of head of the Fine Arts Academy failed, as the Chamber of 
Ministers preferred the less eminent, but more studious, artist Tursunali Kuziev. This 
appointment signified to Jallalov that the state promotes artists not for their skill but due to 
their connections. 
According to comments by his fellow artists, Jallalov's creative career as an artist 
declined after his humiliating experience working for the Historical Museum. But Jallalov 
decided that he could still mould Uzbek art, if not from a bureaucratic chair or through 
channeling his efforts in an exhausting state commission system, then from gaining 
influence over art through a collection policy. He started his new career as consultant for 
the National Bank of Uzbekistan (NED) where, together with 12 bank managers, he 
collected oil paintings of independent Uzbekistan. Jallalov, according to all my 
respondents, has to handle the collection of oil painting for people who have no 
understanding or knowledge of art at all, and he does so with great success. 
During one of our last meetings in the summer of 200 1, J allalov happily showed me 
five published volumes of collected oil paintings and told me that the bank's collection has 
reached over 700 canvases. The collection, however, has not been shown to the general 
public. Instead, it was partly exhibited for a celebration of the first decade of Independence 
in the Central Exhibition Hall of the Academy of Arts in 2001. (The collection found its 
own place in 2005, after the time of my stay in Tashkent.) Jallalov's interest is solely in the 
quality of the artistic work, and never in what geme is represented or what lies behind the 
canvas. He applied to the collection the Soviet criterion of painting, regarding manual 
dexterity, intensive labour and durability of the work, without employing the rigid Soviet 
geme hierarchy. For him, a well-done painting meant a good finished surface covered with 
thick solid layers of paint. 
Unlike Jallalov, Alisher Alikulov belonged to the generation of artists whose 
education was formed under the post-Soviet era. The whole meaning of becoming of an 
artist changed for Uzbeks during that period. An aspiring Uzbek artist of previous Soviet 
generations would have been less hesitant to become a student in an arts institution, 
because that education would have been free; after graduation, thanks to the state 
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commission system, he could secure his artistic career with membership in the Union of 
Artists. The new generation, whose education fell in between the Soviet and Independence 
periods, experienced the decrease in state commissions. Akhmedov's fears were correct: 
that the Academy of Fine Arts system, with its lengthy period of study from secondary to 
technical, and from technical to higher institutes, would work against Uzbek students (see 
Chapter I, section, p.30). Those who entered the arts institutions immediately after 
independence suffered a complete shock when they encountered a further degradation of 
teaching staff, due to the endless difficulties caused by small salaries and an undefined 
teaching policy. Very few graduates managed to work according to their professional 
education. Alikulov confinned to me that out of ten graduates from his Arts Institute class, 
only he was able to pursue a professional artistic career. 
Alikulov stressed that for him as for many young Uzbek artists, a main obstacle was 
his family background, which was a traditional Uzbek family from a mahalla (Mirkhasilov 
1978, 1979; Tokhtakhodjaeva 1997).37 His village, with the capital's growth, developed 
into a remote Tashkent suburb. Alikulov's parents' generation was brought up after the 
Great Patriotic War; they were educated at university and they expected the best for their 
male child, who was expected to follow in their footsteps. Alikulov's parents wanted a 
professional career for their son, a career that would give him a chance to support his own 
family and themselves when they became old (Tashbaev and Savurov 1989: 23; Terrnirov 
1995).38 Alikulov has very strong family ties, and despite the improvement of his financial 
situation, he continued to reside with his parents and siblings when he could easily have 
moved from his parents' house. While Alikulov struggled in the arts, his parents had to 
struggle with their own prejudice against the artistic profession and their fears that their son 
might not succeed. Their son's ultimate success brought them a sense of relief for his future 
and for their own position in the tight-knit community of the mahalla neighbourhood. 
Alikulov decided to specialise in 'state art', not because it would give him an easier 
life, but because he sincerely wished to present his perception of his country's past. He 
37 Mirkhasilov (1978, 1979) and Tokhtakhodjaeva (1997) give the stereotypical characteristics of an Uzbek 
family: a big patriarchal family with a large number of children, dependent and subordinate women, residing 
in a privately owned house in a village or in a mahalla neighbourhood. 
38 Tashbaev and Savurov (1989) and Temirov (1995) emphasised that, in Uzbek fumilies, children were 
brought up assuming that their duty was to work and to take care of their aged parents. 
131 
conceded that ideology should be channeled by the state in arts, but what surprised him that 
there was no valuing of artists' labour by the state. He gave himself as an example, telling 
me how he established himself in the military genre: 
I love the military genre, so I went to all the military institutions and asked them if would they like to 
have something depicting the Timurid period. They had no decoration in their buildings, so they 
agreed uneasily. But after I brought my huge canvases, two meters by five meters, depicting cavalry 
battles, they were overwhelmed. They have got exactly what they needed: the historical and military 
genre that would remind them of our glorious Uzbek past. Can you imagine that now they have 
established a tradition of taking photos of foreign military guests standing before my huge canvas? 
They even proposed giving me an officer's rank, but I explained that I would be useless as a military 
man.
39 
He stressed that because of inventing his version of the military genre, he found his niche 
long before he was commissioned to do thematic compositions for the Historical Museum. 
But his work experience for the museum was different from what he did for the Military 
Office.40 Working for the Military Office was hugely beneficial for Alikulov because it 
made him known in official circles: he was given a medal for his creative contribution for 
the state in 2002 and he was respected in his mahalla (Ilkhamova 2002: 34). Moreover, 
Alikulov's financial dealings with the Military Office were encouraging: payment was 
swift and the artist did not lose money by working for the state organization. But his work 
for the direct state commission in the museum was a disappointment because he hoped not 
so much to have an economic gain but to be valued as an artist. Instead, he found himself 
battling the Arts Council until the very end of his commission, and by that time he faced 
economic devaluation of his labour by the museum administration. Alikulov expressed his 
opinion of the state commission system: 'Where do we have to look for recognition?' 
Both artists, Jallalov and Alikulov, attempted to define their creative practice within 
the state system. They tried to remain within the legal parameters of state employment, by 
working for the banking system or for governmental institutions. For them, being an artist 
still meant remaining within highly official formal surroundings, because it led to social 
recognition within a broader society not limited by the arts field. This type of validation 
39 Alisher Alikulov, interview, 15 May2000. 
40 Alikulov's unintentional specialisation in the military genre made him a favourite of the most important 
ministry in Uzbekistan, the Military Office. Independent Uzbekistan has the largest and the best-equipped 
army in the Central Asian region, counting 100,000 solders. With the preservation of the Soviet two-year 
compulsory military service, every male in Uzbekistan goes through Military Office records. 
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was achievable in the Soviet period by working on highly conspicuous commissions within 
the urban setting of the capital, whereas in the post-Soviet period the artists had only one 
state commission. The completion of thematic compositions for the Museum of the History 
of Uzbekistan did not provide lallalov and Alikulov with the expected appraisal of their 
paintings. Jallalov and Alikulov had to face the crude reality that only the Soviet 
institutional framework provided the creative opportunities to fuel their artistic careers, 
whereas in the post-Soviet world their social standing and creative practice became 
completely separated. Achieving stability as employees of the state brought them anguish 
as artists who could not comprehend the value of their artistic labour. 
Thus post-Soviet state commissions raise the question: how does the current regime 
value its chosen genres? In the beginning, the presence of thematic compositions in the 
Historical Museum indicated that Russian-style painting had survived and even was 
capable of new interpretations reflecting changing ideological trends. However, the 
management of the commissions by the joint commissioners demonstrated that valuing of 
painting was in a deep crisis. Furthermore, the economic devaluation of labour for 
production of what was previously considered the most sophisticated genre of painting 
made artists question their perception of how their works were valued. In the next chapter, 
I will develop further aspects of how valuing of painting was carried out in the parallel non-
state sector after independence. 
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Chapter 4 
The Illegal Art Market: Shaping the Circulation of Arts in Tashkent 
(1991-1999) 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 progresses from Chapter 3, continuing an exploration of changes in valuing 
painting from the Soviet to the post-Soviet periods. Chapter 3 examined Soviet validation 
of painting based on the genre hierarchy, and what happened with those Soviet values 
under the state-controlled art market (1991-2004). As I showed in Chapter 3, during the 
Soviet period a hierarchy of genres was established based on the Marxist theory of value of 
labour, favouring those paintings that demonstrated considerable skill and labour. As has 
often been observed (Humphrey 1983), the Soviet economy was intertwined with ideas of 
morality and collective sociality. Those ideas were crystallised in the genre of thematic 
compositions. Thematic compositions were highly didactic, reinforcing ideological 
messages about society combining within their production and consumption a complex web 
of moral, social and monetary values. The pursuit of this highly regarded specialisation in 
thematic compositions reinforced the gender hierarchy for artists: only men were deemed 
physically capable of producing and overseeing such demanding works. To some extent, 
the privileged position of thematic compositions continued after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, not least because the new regime was also looking for vehicles through which 
new ideologies and messages about the new society's moral values could be transmitted. 
The Karimov regime's commissioning system for paintings, and its associated valuing 
system, demonstrated that the mutually reinforcing composite of Soviet values became 
disengaged and altered. Nevertheless, the post-Soviet state commission system remained 
male dominated.41 
41 As I discussed in Chapter 3, the main difference in state commissions of the two periods was that the Soviet 
system was characterised by Russian or Uzbek male artists, whereas the post-Soviet system was far more 
complex, with highly multiethnic, multi-religious and multi-professional (but still male) representation. Post-
Soviet valuers of painting were male because commissioners were represented by professions which were 
predominantly male in Uzbekistan, such as business and bureaucracy, or exclusively male, such as clerics in 
Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The diversity of the commissioners made ethnicity less important than in the 
Soviet period. 
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Chapter 4 concerns a far more radical change in the valuation of painting, looking at 
the non-state controlled Uzbek art market (1991-1999). Here I examine how art was 
produced and consumed in the non-state controlled market, which brought to the 
foreground key issues such as who produced paintings, what genres of paintings were 
valued, by whom paintings were valued and who bought paintings. Examining these 
questions needs to take into account the fact that the whole artistic community changed 
during this period. What those post-Soviet artists sold was very different from what was 
produced for the state, and the trade was conducted illegally because of the prohibition on 
private trade using foreign currency. The paintings' themes revealed fundamental changes 
in the social structure of Uzbekistan. 
An entirely different community of artists emerged in Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet 
period. Uzbek male painters, graduates of the two-tier arts education system with highly 
specialised skills, were no longer the sole representatives of the nation's art world. 
Membership in the Academy of Fine Arts of Uzbekistan, the post-Soviet arts institution, 
increased 11 times as membership became accessible to aU citizens of Uzbekistan 
regardless of their completion of arts education, ethnic origin or gender. These new 
members introduced non-Uzbek and female artists to the art field (see Tables 1-2, p.58). 
What these post-Soviet painters could produce and sell was very different from what was 
produced for the state earlier in the Soviet period and for the current Karimov's regime. 
The etude became a best-selling genre in the non-state art market with the 
emergence of women artists, indicating the difference between state and non-state 
controlled production of painting.42 As previously discussed, under the Soviet genre 
hierarchy the etude was considered the lowest genre. Thematic compositions, the highest 
genre, were ideological in content, durable, labour intensive, high in cost of materials used 
for production and huge in size, whereas etudes were apolitical in content, less permanent, 
faster and cheaper to produce and small in size. The etude fundamentally contravened 
42 I stress that post-Soviet etudes were produced by men and women alike. My data based on interviewing and 
observation of over 452 artists of gender, all ethnic backgrounds and all generations indicated that everybody 
needed to sell paintings and therefore produced etudes. However, because of women painters' position as 
newcomers to the post-Soviet art field, their etude production became associated in the arts field in a 
pejorative sense, implying women's inferiority in skill and education. To show why everybody had to produce 
etudes, I provide the example of the women from the Yannis Salpinkidi art studio. Further, I demonstrate that 
women were capable of reviving the local art field by bringing social criticism into creative practices, an 
ability which men of the Soviet and post-Soviet generation lacked. 
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Soviet values: moral, economic, and social. Quickness of production and absence of 
technical finish devalued the meaning of the 'moral superiority' previously associated with 
more educated, skilled male artists. This seemed to contradict the Soviet idea of a 
painting's 'worthiness', dissuading artists from creating a solid piece of workmanship 
which should last centuries hanging in a museum or public building. The imperfect finish 
of the surface of painting was not associated with the notion of beauty, because there was 
no institution requiring artists to follow such aesthetics of 'beauty'. This upside-down 
reversal of the hierarchy of genres plainly showed that Soviet valuing of painting, based on 
a cohesive interconnection of economic, moral and social values, had become altered by 
post-Soviet practices. Changing Soviet values through post-Soviet practices begs such 
questions as what happened with each of those disconnected Soviet values? Do some of 
those three values become more important then the rest in the post-Soviet period - for 
example, does economic value become more important than social and moral values? Does 
separation of those Soviet values from each other keep their content the same, or does their 
meaning become different as a result of post-Soviet practices? 
Those post-Soviet practices in the non-state art market became restricted by the 
foreign currency prohibitions of the 1995 economic reform (see Chapter 1, p.21).The non-
state art market became closely linked to the parallel market in illegal foreign currencies, 
which shaped consumption practices. This new private consumption of painting was 
limited to those buyers who could engage freely in transactions of American dollars 
without fear of being imprisoned for eight years. Those buyers at that time were a minute 
circle offoreigners, represented by diplomats, bureaucrats from various world organisations 
and by businessmen. Foreign buyers, usually stationed in Uzbekistan for a limited time, 
were concerned primarily with the practical problems of taking a purchased painting out of 
the country, rather than considering the display of their possession either in the host country 
or back home.43 Painting as a part of internationalised art trade begs the question, how did 
this export-oriented art trade affect the local art world? 
Art dealers, who were willing to engage in risky illegal economic practices, who 
estimated the price value of paintings and who arranged trade between artists and buyers, 
43 According to my informants, artists and art dealers, foreign residents had a limited stay of less than five 
years. Due to their relatively short stays, it took time for them to become interested in local arts, and in fact 
trade contacts usually took p lace just before their departure from Uzbekistan. 
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did not come directly from the state commission system of the Soviet period and therefore 
were not exclusively Uzbek male artists. Many art dealers were women who came from the 
ranks of the arts specialists of academia and the publishing houses, and were different types 
of specialists compared to the Uzbek male painters. In the Soviet period, those women were 
excluded from valuing painting as art historians but, ironically, their foreign language and 
computer literacy skills suited them better in the changed market. Do such trade 
requirements help to invent new valuing of painting or not? 
Chapter 4 indicates the growing importance of gender over ethnicity in the art field, 
because ethnicity no longer blocked to entrance to the arts institution and because ethnicity 
did not bring advancement in either the state controlled or non-state arts markets. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that women art dealers' and painters' professionalism in the non-state market 
was influenced by their gender, not their ethnicity. Yet Chapter 4 does not focus directly on 
gender in arts, for two reasons. First, the Soviet art field had no institutional framework for 
studying women's creative practice (Baigell & Baigell 2001).44 In Uzbekistan's case, as I 
mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 3, the local art world was a totally male-
dominated field. Since there were no ways for women to gain a foothold in educational and 
institutional arts domains in Soviet Uzbekistan, there were neither women's practices in 
existence nor any discussion of gender roles affecting the local art world.45 Secondly, those 
post-Soviet women artists and art dealers whom I studied simply happened to be female; 
they were not women who interpreted women's creativity culturally and biologically.46 Yet 
44 Baigell & Baigell (2001: 8) argued that discussion of women's roles was limited to word endings. All 
artists used the masculine word for artist, khudozhnik, to describe themselves, since the feminine form of the 
word, khudozhnitsa, carried pejorative connotations. It implied superficiality, that women painted 
decoratively or made decorative objects, and worst of all, that they created 'women's pictures', meaning 
'sentimental, sweet pictures vapid in content'. Baigell & Baigell's finding cemented earlier fmdings which 
were written by Reid (1998) and Simpson (1998) who researched earlier Soviet period Russian women artists' 
creative practices. 
45 During the Soviet period, most women painters were Russian graduates of the two-tier educational system 
who came from Russia to Uzbekistan; Soviet period publications mentioned only two Russian women, 
Kovalevskaya and Kashina, who lived in Uzbekistan in 1930s-1960s. Local women, irrespective ofethnicity, 
needed to go to Russia to become painters because access to the second tier was denied locally. In the whole 
Central Asian region there was only one case of a female Kyrgyz painter, Sadykova, who went to Russia 
specifically in order to fmish two-tier arts education and who succeeded in her endeavour. The reason for that 
was, as Baigell & Baigell (2001: 47) pointed out, that Russian arts institutions' painting departments were in 
favour of accepting only male students. Therefore, the whole Soviet arts educational system gave very limited 
possibilities for women, something which further narrowed their access to the Union of Artists and the Arts 
Council. 
46 Gender aspects in the Western art field had always been studied through practices of women artists, 
curators and art dealers, whose practices clearly manifested a gender difference in production, consumption 
137 
women's appearance in the art field provoked gender-associated questions such as what 
women could do and what men could do in arts. Therefore in what follows, I briefly discuss 
Soviet and post-Soviet sources relevant to the art world's changing perceptions of gender 
roles. 
The perception of gender roles never remained in a static condition in Soviet and 
post-Soviet women's studies. Soviet period studies dramatically shifted from expecting 
women to be in the vanguard of social change in early period associated with Stalin (Reid 
1998; Simpson 1998; McDermid and Hil1yar 1999) to women's return to more traditional 
family roles in the late period associated with Brezhnev (Bridger 1987, 1992). Post-Soviet 
studies assessed women's roles through the dramatic shake-ups of society such as the full of 
the USSR, ethnic conflicts, the emergence of the market economy, economic migration, 
poverty and consumption issues (Bridger 1996, 1998; Pilkington 1997, 1998; Buckley 
1997; Ashwin 2000). Within Soviet and post-Soviet women's studies were interwoven 
regional studies of Central Asia, which were mainly focused on the titular nation women, 
for example Uzbek women in the Uzbek SSR and independent Uzbekistan (Akiner 1997; 
Megoran 1999). The role of titular nation women was presented by Western and local 
researchers either as beneficiaries of the Soviet state's emancipation policies eradicating 
'bondage' and illiteracy, and providing women with access to the state welfare system 
(MasseI1974; Aminova 1977; Keller 1998,2005), or as bearers of ethnic identity heading 
protests against Soviet anti-religious policies (Kandiyoti 1991, 2000). The following period 
brought the aforementioned economic hardships for titular-nation women and all women in 
Uzbekistan, worsening their living conditions with the loss of Soviet achievements and the 
revival of traditional Islamic ways of life. All these perceptions of gender roles are 
inevitably reflected in the art world, making equally relevant the findings provided by 
Soviet and post-Soviet women's studies, regardless of Russian or regional focus. 
For a better exploration of how the principles of valuing painting were contested 
through the practices of women art dealers and by women artists during the period 1991-
1999, I divide Chapter 4 into two parts. The first part starts with an explanation of who the 
female art dealers were. I go on to assess why and how women art sellers organised the art 
and interpretation of works of arts (parker and Pollock 1981; Deepwe1l1995, 1998, Seriff1996; King 1999 
and Perry 1999). 
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trade of Uzbek male artists, marketing them as 'Russian artists' for foreign buyers from 
1991 to 1998. In the second part, I introduce the post-Soviet generation of women artists 
by explaining what made their educational experiences different from those of Soviet-era 
male artists, and how their education directed their trading and creative practices. Then I 
examine the reasons why those women artists conducted their trade with foreigners, and 
why women artists brought non-ideological themes in painting after 1998. I conclude the 
chapter with an assessment of how the interaction between women artists and women 
dealers forced the latter group to conceptualize new valuing principles addressed to ethnic 
Uzbeks after 1999. Those new valuing practices during the period 2000-2004 will be 
studied in Chapter 5. 
4.1.2. Why women sellers took charge ofthe local foreign-oriented market 
My interviews with male artists who were members of the Union of Artists and with art 
dealers, observation of art exhibition and trading sites in Uzbekistan (1999-2001) and 
following Uzbek artists' exhibitions in the West (2001-2004), enabled me to find that 
women had taken control of the non-state Tashkent arts field. Six out of the seven people 
who controlled the whole illegal art market in post-Soviet Tashkent were women. This 
unusual situation provokes two questions: why art historians had not influenced valuing 
practices by the Soviet Arts Council, and why there was a sudden rise of women sellers 
after 1991. These questions shed light on why from the Soviet to post-Soviet periods, the 
significance of belonging to the titular nation never played as significant a role for women 
as it did for male painters in both the state-controlled and non-state controlled market. 
To answer these questions, I clarify what the position of art specialists was in the 
Union of Artists through membership policies, demonstrating that the draconian rules set 
for arts critics' membership made their numbers in the Union so small, and women art 
critics in particular nonexistent in the Union. After that I tum to an assessment of those 
seven people running the local art market, indicating their age group and Soviet-period 
educational and work experiences. I then focus on two of the six women, and through an 
analysis of those two women's working and trading practices, I explain why women came 
to control the local art trade. My choice of those two women comes from three reasons. The 
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first reason is due to ethical considerations. It was necessary for me to assure my 
respondents that neither their information nor disclosure of their identities would lead to 
unforeseen damaging consequences to their physical, economic and emotional wellbeing. It 
was impossible to preserve anonymity in the minute Tashkent art business world which 
comprised of only seven people in total; thus, even I had tried to anonymise informants it 
would have been obvious who I was talking about. I therefore decided that I could not 
disclose names unless the respondents agreed, and those two women allowed me to reveal 
their identities. Secondly, those two women dealers appear in following chapters owing to 
their importance in Tashkent arts field, and I find it is better to introduce them now. 
So, why were art historians so invisible in the valuing practices conducted by the 
Soviet Arts Council? Boris Groys (1995: 159) pointed at two important characteristics 
concerning the Soviet art field, which shed some light on the position of art historians 
within the Union of Artists and effectively in the Arts Council. The first was that Soviet 
arts production was similar to the other Soviet industries in that it applied the same 
principle of valuing quantity over quality. Art historians' selection for membership was 
based on the quantity of their publications rather than quality of their research. The second 
characteristic was that the art field had certain specialisations which had less 'status' than 
others: for example, curators. Curators were art historians trained to oversee museum 
collections. Groys explained that curatorial positions were less influential compared to 
artists, because artists enjoyed greater access to influential high party bureaucracy, 
something curators never had. Further, I am going to discuss Groys's findings on how those 
two characteristics became decisive in restricting art historians' influence in arts valuing, 
and placing women art historians on the margins of the state arts system. A thorough 
description of the entrance requirements is necessary to demonstrate that entrance 
conditions demanded a mammoth amount of production of sources of the Soviet arts. 
Quality at the time of publication was rarely either important or good. 
Art historians and critics stood very little chance of becoming members of the 
Union of Artists. The membership requirement for art historians was that a candidate had to 
demonstrate their contribution to the arts field either as arts researchers or art critics. A 
candidate researcher needed to have produced extensive scholarly research, including a 
minimum of three books on Soviet art history addressing such issues as artists' biographies, 
140 
iconographic studies, information on the rise of specific genres during various decades in 
different Soviet republican schools of painting and technical aspects of painting concerning 
structure of pigments, layers of paint and types of brushstrokes. A candidate art critic was 
supposed to demonstrate an active engagement in assessment of exhibitions and to promote 
interest in new names and themes in painting, which should be represented by at least 20 
published articles in the leading arts magazines such as Art, Creativity and Decorative Arts 
(lskusstvo, Tvorchestvo and Dekorativno-Prikladnoe lskusstvo.) Needless to say, the 
fulfillment of such requirements was extremely difficult. The creation of an art history 
book, from writing to publishing, took between five and ten years. And amassing such a 
large number of published articles was particularly time-consuming because the leading art 
magazines had set quotas of one article per year for non-members from associated Unions. 
F or the same person from the same Union to publish 20 articles was thus a rare 
achievement. 
The average membership age in the arts historians' section was the mid-50s, and 
membership was usually granted as recognition of a lifetime's work. Women's earlier 
retirement age, 55, made it futile for women to strive for membership because it was likely 
that they would retire before they could achieve membership. Male art historians' 
retirement age was 60, and as members of the Union of Artists of Uzbekistan had very little 
time to make their mark on the work of the Arts Council. The Uzbek Union of Artists had 
very few art historians, regardless of gender, who managed to achieve membership during 
the Soviet period. Those who survived to the post-Soviet period had already reached their 
80s, and were unwilling to risk being incarcerated for eight years for illegal foreign 
currency transactions, which for most would mean finishing the rest of their life in jail. In 
their place came a much younger generation of arts specialists who were more daring than 
their older colleagues. 
All post-Soviet women art dealers were between 30 and 40 years old at the time of 
my fieldwork. The women's ages require me to assess what was their occupational position 
before and after full of the Soviet institutional system, their ethnic identity and their fumily 
position. During the Soviet period, women's positions were peripheral in the arts field, 
reflecting gendered occupations. Susan Bridger (1987) pointed out that typical Soviet 
women's occupations in the labour market as a whole tended to be less prestigious, low-
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paying jobs. The arts field was no exception: women art historians tended to work in the 
publishing business as a part of editorial boards, or as researchers in the Arts Institute. 
Women rarely got respected curatorial positions, which Groys (1995) discussed, not to 
mention well paid and influential positions as members of the Union of Artists or Arts 
Council. 
However, women's less influential jobs did not necessarily mean that among 
women there was no variation in access to employment. Gail Lapidus (1978: 228) and 
Nancy Lubin (1982, 1984) argued that access to occupations among various ethnic groups 
in Soviet Central Asia was not even. Both researchers pointed out that Slavic women 
tended to occupy better positions compared to women of titular nations, such as Uzbek or 
Turkmen women. Yet, art historian positions were considered so 'low' in every aspect that 
there was no great competition for the jobs of curators, critics and historians between 
various ethnic groups. As an example, during my own experience as a woman and as a 
curator in Kyrgyzstan, my salary in fact was 10% less than that of a cleaner in the same 
museum. The absence of competition for this type of job made women art historians' ethnic 
representation very broad in Central Asia. Art historians in Uzbekistan belonged to three 
ethnic groups: Uzbek, Slavic or Russian, and Korean.47 
Despite their bottom-level institutional positions, all these women came to the arts 
field from families with strong connections in the cultural, bureaucratic and arts 
institutional frameworks. With the emergence of the market economy, most of the old elite 
rapidly became the new elite as the high bureaucracy carried out privatisation (Eyal, 
Szelenyi and Townsley 1998; Luong 2002; Hann 2002). Network connections allowed 
descendants of the old elite to move easily into newly privatisised business. Apart from 
inherited network connections, women also had learned skills, which ironically they had 
owing to their lower-status positions during the earlier Soviet period. 
Women art historians, owing to their junior position, acquired two important skills 
during the 1980s. Those skills, which male artists were never required to have, made male 
47 In regional studies, the usage of the term Russian or Slavic was applied in relation to the European settlers 
coming from Russia to Central Asia I will discuss the ethnic Koreans' history more closely in the following 
chapters concerning Christian art themes. 
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artists handicapped compared to women art historians with the 1995 introduction of market 
refonns. In the 1980s, art historian positions required additional skills apart from 
knowledge of art history, skills which became indispensable assets for them in the 1990s. 
Those skills were computer literacy and the knowledge of foreign languages. At that time 
the Soviet Academia introduced the compulsory requirement to be computer literate (Heller 
1988). Young specialists went to learn those new skills in order to secure their positions. 
Another requirement for young specialists was a proven certificate of foreign language 
proficiency. Art specialists overwhelmingly tended to learn French, traditionally the 
language of arts education in Russian institutions. Knowing a foreign language entitled 
them to a salary increase of up to 15%, so ill-paid Soviet art specialists were highly 
motivated to pass language exams.48 The post-Soviet institutional breakdown and 
transfonnation of the Union into the Academy gave advantages to few arts specialists, and 
those who profited were those who had language and computer skills. I will now move on 
to two main characters of the local art field in order to illustrate the above points. 
Natalya Musina, born in 1952, is a daughter of a prominent choreographer who 
founded an Uzbek national dance school. Musina went straight from an arts publication 
house to studying arts marketing at a course in Paris sponsored by the European Union. On 
the year-long course she learned how the Western art market operates and how to benefit 
from NGO projects. After returning from France, she became employed by the 
Businesswomen Association (I shall continue in detail Musina's work m the 
Businesswomen Association in Chapter 5). Later in 2001, she opened her own gallery, 
Karavan. She was a leading curator who organised important exhibitions before the 
opening of the Academy of Fine Arts. She remains a predominant fundraiser for all non-
governmental exhibitions in Tashkent. She also curates all major Uzbek trading exhibitions 
abroad. My cooperation with Musina continued in Uzbekistan and while she was attached 
to trading exhibitions in France in 2002, England in 2003 and Belgium in 2004. 
48 Overall, Tashkent had a strong tradition of studying foreign languages and was the only place apart from 
Moscow where facilities for teaching and learning European and non~European languages existed. 
Multilingual arts specialists in Central Asia were based solely in Tashkent. Certain specialists, for example 
those who specialized in medieval arts, knew to up to four foreign languages. 
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Negora Akhmedova was born in 1960. Akhmedova is a daughter of two 
distinguished representatives of the Uzbek cultural elite: her father is the fonner head of the 
Union of Artists, Rakhirn Akhmedov, and her mother was a prominent musicologist. 
During my fieldwork in Tashkent she was finishing her doctorate, which required her to 
regularly attend various international conferences concerning contemporary arts abroad and 
presenting papers concerning Soviet arts, publishing her articles in foreign magazines and 
working on her upcoming book concerning contemporary painting in Central Asia. With 
the opening of the Academy of Fine Arts in 1997, she was promoted to the position of 
organizer of the biennial Central Asian regional exhibition, which included artists from 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. She also combined her work as the head of the 
department of contemporary arts in the Arts Institute with a position on editorial board of 
the art magazine San 'at. 
Women's foreign language skills and computer literacy paved the way for them to 
rise to the top of the private market. With new support from both government and NGOs 
for women's issues, women were able to use their skills to move to well paid jobs and 
privileged treatment. Their skills also enabled them to navigate the complexities of the 
illegal economy, which required dealing with foreigners and bureaucracy for smoothing the 
trade in paintings. The Uzbek art world's lack of direct contact with the Western market 
necessitated women's capacity to create a local foreigners-oriented trade. 
One factor that contributed to the rise of women in post-Soviet art field was was a 
continuation of the Soviet support for women in Uzbekistan by new organisations. In the 
Independence period, women found that there were new opportunities available to them in 
both the state and non-state sectors. As we can see from the examples of Musina and 
Akhmedova, women had the support of governmental institutions as well as foreign non-
governmental organisations devoted to women's issues. For example, the Academy of Fine 
Arts facilitated an increase in female membership and the Soros Foundation sponsored 
various NGOs run by women. Women were given priority over their male colleagues in 
studying abroad and participating in arts conferences in Western institutions. But although 
this support widened their horizons and their ability to understand arts from a Western 
perspective, their new knowledge did not provide them with financial security. Being in the 
position of breadwinners in their fumilies, women needed to turn this knowledge into a 
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clear financial asset. They were able to do this through practical application of their newly-
learned skills in the illegal market economy. 
Another factor was the emergence of the black market in art, which helped women 
propel themselves to the head of the foreign-buyer art market buyer and to keep the local 
art market oriented towards foreigners. The circle of foreigners in Tashkent was extremely 
small. Women played a vital role in the transaction process. Their role was to work within 
the law by solving legal problems of the trade: for example, making an illegally purchased 
piece into a 'clean' one for export. As mentioned before, this trade was illegal because it 
was conducted in foreign currency. Foreign buyers alone could legally use foreign 
currency, and nobody would prevent them from buying whatever painting they wished to 
acquire, but they could still not leave the country with their newly acquired painting. If a 
foreigner wanted to take a painting home, he or she had to legalise the work's status. 
Changing the legal status of paintings for foreigners in Uzbekistan primarily involves 
dealing with complicated paperwork, including approval by the Cultural Office, final 
payment to the Tax Office and dealing with Customs in the Tashkent International 
Airp 49 ort. 
The Cultural Office initially determines whether a painting will leave the country. 
The Cultural Office estimates a bill for the Tax Office, and produces various necessary 
paperwork. The paperwork amounts to a statement that the painting in question is 
'culturally unimportant' for the state of Uzbekistan and can pass Customs in Tashkent 
International Airport. The tax bill comes out to 40% of the estimated price of the painting. 
These procedures are farcical because the Cultural Office always gives artefacts of 
supposedly low cultural value astronomical price values. 
Michael Brown (2003) emphasised that such morally motivated attempts to protect 
'cultural property' aimed to protect cultural patrimony from Western consumerism in non-
Western societies or states. Brown's reference to protection of cultural properties from 
Western consumerism was supported by the director of the :famous regional Uzbekistan 
49 This situation involving the export of arts remains the same today. 
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Nukus collection,50 Marinika Babanazarova. In an interview which I conducted in her 
office in 1999, Babananazarova stated: 
'The best works never leave national borders. Even loaning Uzbek paintings to Western collections 
was always an extremely difficult and protracted affair because the Uzbekistan Cultural Office, to 
protect treasures, sets a very high insurance rate for artefacts. Some paintings were estimated at $8 
million. I found it incredibly irritating that with the fall of the Soviet Union various Western 
adventurers swarmed in, believing that we would sell some of our treasures. ,51 
The Cultural Office set up the morally motivated protectionist policy that nothing of any 
real cultural, historical or economic value could ever leave the country of its origin. The 
Cultural Office set a special date limit to allow the preservation of Uzbek heritage, which 
for unknown reasons was defined by the year 1970. Everything produced before 1970 
became automatically 'culturally important', and anything produced after that date could 
legally be considered 'culturally unimportant'. In fact, the date division facilitates the 
export of contemporary paintings by making them potentially 'culturally unimportant'. But 
in the case of works produced after 1970, the determination of potential cultural importance 
is done on an individual basis by a special department within the Cultural Office. Therefore 
the same state officials who set the rules are needed to engage in elaborate tricks to make 
an artefact 'culturally unimportant' and exportable. 
While in Uzbekistan in 2000, I took the initiative to become a participant in these 
procedures involving the removal of a painting from the country. I painted a couple of 
flower still lifes and brought them to the Cultural Office for inspection. The price was 
estimated at a staggering $600, and when I inquired why it was so high, the officials 
recommended I bring in an art historian who could negotiate with them the cost of the tax 
bill. I infomed the Cultural Office officials that I am an art historian mysel£: educated in a 
Russian university and qualified to negotiate the price. I argued that I am not a professional 
artist and therefore I am quite capable of producing a 'culturally unimportant' artefact, 
50 See on Nukus arts collection Kovtun, Babanazarova, Gazieva (1989) and Gazieva (1991). 
51 Marinika Babanazarova, interview, 17th April 1999. Babanazarova is a director 0 f the N ukus State Museum, 
located in Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in Uzbekistan. This museum's collection of early Soviet art 
of the 1920s-1930s was assembled by Savitsky from the 1960s to the early 1980s. This is the best collection 
of Russian arts in state ownership, ironically located outside Russia Babanazarova's statement concerning 
insurance prices is not an exaggeration; to the contrary, the market value of some paintings easily exceeds 
tens of millions of dollars. Russian arts from the early 20th century are a hot commodity in the Western art 
market. 
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especially with the use of inferior materials such as cardboard. After extensive discussion, 
the Tax Office bill fell down to $125. This situation indicates that in normal circumstances, 
it was necessary for foreigners to have a backup, a role filled by the art dealers. To 
negotiate a reasonable cost for the bill for the Tax Office required a very assertive 
negotiator, who could protect the interests of buyers and artists by disputing with 
bureaucracy in the legal issues of cultural property after 1991 including such aspects as the 
period when the work was done, style, genre, medium, and authorship. 
Overwhelmingly, foreign buyers had no understanding of the pitfalls of local law 
concerning cultural property whereas artists knew and loathed those tedious bureaucratic 
procedures. Neither foreigners nor artists wished to deal with bureaucracy alone, so it was 
necessary for the dealers have to have skills in navigating the bureaucratic corridors of the 
Cultural Office and Tax Office. Either artists or art buyers paid dealers a commission of 
between 15% and 50% of the purchase price for dealing with bureaucratic procedures. 
Women dealers created for themselves a new professional niche within the illegal market 
economy: artists, buyers and the Cultural Office all needed their skills to legalize artefacts 
by determining their cultural unimportance. 
The last factor was the lack of direct contact with the Western art market. Despite 
this, there were still foreign buyers interested in acquiring paintings according to Western 
market perspectives. Women dealers advanced themselves because they knew foreign 
languages, they had access to high-level social events at which they could meet potential 
foreign buyers, and because they knew how to market local paintings from a Western 
perspective. Socialising at cultural events involving embassies, the Academy of Fine Arts, 
theatre, classical music and ballet performances are expensive and only accessible to those 
with high social connections. An average male artist would not have access to such events 
or could not participate owing to a heavy workload. In other words, the absence of direct 
contact with the Western art market did not mean that local art market developed without 
criteria or prices set by the Western market. But both parties, artists and dealers, knew that 
it was impossible to blandly copy Western art market practices on the local level. There 
was a need to match the pre-existing Soviet valuation of art, but without the Soviet 
institutional framework, to Western market valuation of 'Soviet painting'. In the next 
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section I will show how post-Soviet painting was conceptualized from a Western art market 
perspective. 
4.1.3. Implications of economic valuing of painting by women sellers 
After the collapse of the USSR, the Western perception of Soviet painting was that there 
was only Russian art: art in Russia by Russians artists (Bown, Taylor, Lodder, Clark, Holz 
and Sidorov 1993; Bown 1998; Swanson 2002). During the period 1991 to 1998, Russian 
art functioned under the rules set by the Western market, which was based on economic 
valuing. Russian sellers always aimed at Western art buyers. Russian art dealers worked 
mainly with artists whose works' economic value in foreign currency was unchanged from 
the late Perestroika period until 1998. In the post-Soviet period, Russian dealers became 
interested in stressing the value of an unbroken Russian painting tradition which allowed 
those art dealers to completely ignore how the economic valuation of painting was 
established through trading, marketing and exhibiting practices during each historical 
period, and to forget about current Russian art market conditions. Under such uncertain 
conditions, women art dealers in Tashkent marketed local painting as Russian painting of 
the Soviet period. They selected artists who established themselves during the existence of 
the Union of Artists and defined post-Soviet male artists regardless of their ethnicity as 
'Russian artists'. This practice by art dealers ignored any artist who came to the art field 
after 1991. 
According to my data carried out among artists, art dealers emphasised life stories 
aimed at making Uzbek artists seem convincingly 'Russian'. The factors involved in this 
process could be defined by the following, cited in order of importance: 
1. What type of arts education did the artist receive? 
2. Who were the artist's teachers? 
3. Were any of the artist's works during the Soviet period published ill Soviet arts 
magazines? 
4. Did the artist receive any official honours during the Soviet period? 
5. Which of the state museums acquired the artist's works, and how? 
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6. Did any important foreign art collectors or prominent people acquire the paintings of the 
marketed artist? 
7. Does the artist have a contract with a foreign art gallery in the West? 
To make artists 'Russian', women dealers stressed the two-tier education, publication in 
Soviet art magazines and commissioning by foreign galleries. Continuing, I will analyze in 
detail why art dealers chose those criteria, and what were the outcomes of implementing 
those criteria. 
The main requirement for a sale was the professional credentials of the artist, the 
most important being his two-tier education. Most of members of the Union of Artists 
graduated from the local Arts College and the local Arts Institute. The Arts College and 
Arts Institute were local representatives of Russian arts education. Artists became 
mechanically 'Russian' graduates because Uzbekistan before 1991 was part of the USSR, 
which was considered the heir to the Russian empire. Therefore artists' Russian education 
made artists 'Russian' regardless of their ethnic origin unless they were graduates after the 
fall of the USSR. 
The publications, purchases by museums and honours received by artist within the 
Union of Artists of the USSR demonstrated Soviet institutional validation. The Western art 
market specialising in Russian Soviet arts was based on Soviet institutional validation. To 
sell these male artists' paintings, art dealers needed to tell the story of their achievements, 
supported by articles in all three Soviet art magazines and proof of purchases by the main 
Soviet collections such as the Tretyakov Gallery. This institutional validation justified 
artists' right to be considered part of Russian arts. A particular artist's contracts with and 
sales to foreign nationals added even more incentive for Western buyers to purchase his 
paintings. These contracts showed the artist's economic validation by the Western art 
market. 
Marketing based on those three criteria - education, publications and contracts with 
Western galleries - was successful in one respect: the women art dealers saved the Uzbek 
Soviet circle of artists from complete destruction as a result of the new paucity of state 
commissions and prohibitions on foreign currency. Such success was possible because 
there was a very limited number of art buyers and artists, who during the vogue in Russian 
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painting at the time were able to follow a rigid price-setting policy. Art dealers put the same 
price tag on any painting by a 'Russian painter' to keep prices stable. Dealers conducted 
this policy because they feared art buyers could start decreasing prices of painting in 
Tashkent by shopping around, and because art dealers were reluctant to spoil their 
relationships with painters if some artists were paid higher than others. 
Tagged with the same price, artists felt that they lost their individuality. As the 
prominent Soviet-generation artist Medat Kagarov said to me, 
'Am 1 a good artist? Before, 1 knew that 1 was special whereas now 1 do not know that. What makes 
an artist special is his personality which is revealed through his work, style and context. And what 
can 1 aspire to now ifwe are just the same eggs in one basket?' 52 
Kagarov's comments implied that the same artists who produced masterpieces in the Soviet 
period were left helpless and disoriented without their Soviet institution. They became mere 
producers of 'culturally unimportant' paintings and with that there lurked an uncertainty in 
their own artistic credentials. Paradoxically, being economically valued as artists meant 
becoming devalued morally and socially. 
This new system based solely on selling prices altered the Soviet principles of 
valuing painting, which were based on morality of labour (supported by the hierarchy of 
genres) and not on simple price tags. Standardised pricing of paintings regardless of genre 
made insignificant the moral values which signified for artists both their technical skill and 
affirmation of their duty to the state. Artists complained to me that pricing of the finished 
painting regardless of the complexity of genre was detrimental to their aspirations to 
achieve mastership in specific genres. Social values for artists were formerly determined 
through arts institutional validation, whereas now there was no social valuing because 
artists had no possibility of being officially recognized by any arts institutions, Western, 
Russian or local. 
The uncertainties of Akhmedov, the former head of the Union of Artists, echoed 
those of other artists: 
'I think 1 was the frrst professional Uzbek artist, and now with me Uzbek national art is fmished. 
However, now 1 cannot be a Russian artist because 1 am Uzbek. But equally 1 cannot claim that 1 am 
an Uzbek artist ifnone of my works are bought by Uzbeks. Foreigners buy my works, but it would 
52 Medat Kagarov, interview, 13 August 2000. 
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be even more stupid to say that I am a Western artist. Yet I want to be an artist. But my being an 
artist used to stand for something good and worthwhile. Now, I am ashamed to face my former 
pupils. They abandoned their artistic professions by becoming ordinary market petty traders because 
they could not cope with the changes. They still look at me as a teacher. They think that their 
beloved teacher has done well despite all odds. What can I say to them? I tried hard to build up an 
Uzbek school of painting for Uzbek people and what? The very same Uzbek people revered by 
traditional mahalla ways oflife do not need us as they needed us before.,53 
There was a widespread feeling that with the loss of moral and social valuation of their 
painting, Soviet-trained artists were losing their professional identity as well as their raison 
d'etre. 
The 1998 Russian money market crash devalued the Russian economy by 300% 
(Gustafson 1999), and led to Russian arts falling out of fashion in the Western art market 
due to a dramatic decrease in the economic values of former Soviet painting. 54 This sudden 
deflation of the Russian art market made the practice of marketing based on Soviet life 
stories useless. Women art sellers could not sell the works of 'Russian artists', but there 
now appeared unknown young women painters who were able to sell their paintings in 
American dollars. 
Those young women represented a completely new set of artists who had nothing 
common with the 'Russian artists', and what they sold were etudes (Fig.12, p.151). Their 
capacity to sell their unfinished and raw sketches for practically the same price as finished 
paintings by Soviet male artists turned upside-down the marketing strategies of women art 
specialists. Such a strong shakeup of the new art market made Tashkent's art sellers 
question their valuing strategies. 
53 Rakhim Akhmedov, interviewed 9 September 2001. 
54 The Russian art world fell into a deep crisis as the result of the economic crisis of 1998. But a full recovery 
had taken place by 2005, in the form of massive exhibitions abroad such as a Russian arts exhibition in the 
Guggenheim Museum in the USA, a Russian arts exhibition in the Musee D'Orsay in France, Russian arts in 
the Tate in Britain and a Russian cultural season in the cities of Belgium. 
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Fig. 12.Inna Kulagina, etude, (oil on canvas,1998). Photo was given to me by Kulagina. 
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After ignoring for years the growing number of post-Soviet artists, women art 
sellers came face to face with women artists who did not fit the stereotypical definition of 
Soviet artists. Here I cite the differences: 
1) Women were of working class origin.55 
2) Women were of multi ethnic background. 
3) Women were very young, with an average age in the mid twenties. 
4) Women had no two-tier education. 
5) They worked in the etude genre. 
6) They had the capacity to conceptualise an exhibition's context without official ideology, 
either Marxist or Mustakilik, but with fully potent social critiques of the post-Soviet state. 
In the second part of Chapter 4, I will assess the creative and trading practices of those 
young women. 
4.2.1. The art studio ofYannis Salpinkidi 
I now move to the second part of Chapter 4, in which I examine the emergence of women 
artists. From my participation and observation of encounters between artists and their 
clientele, I show that post-Soviet artists could have entirely different educational and work 
experience from Soviet period artists, which determined their valuing of painting. The 
meaning and context of each of those values (moral, social and economic) became different 
for the post-Soviet artists compared to the Soviet artists. 
My own introduction to the new generation of artists started with a Salpinkidi 
group, or Salpinkidi art studio, soiree in February 2000. The soiree was organaised by 
Turtle and Violin. Turtle and Violin, or Cherepakha e Skripka, was a venture by Vitaliy 
Shelest and his wife Marina, who hosted parties with classical music, poetry and arts for 
55 Soviet artists came from all segments of Soviet society: there were descendants of Russian clergy, which 
remained a separate class during the Tsarist and Socialist periods; seasonal hired workers without specific 
working qualifications; collective farms workers; single housewives; orphans and so on. But belonging to the 
intelligentsia foremost was defined by educational qualifications and not by birth. In case of post-Soviet 
women, because they never graduated second tier of arts education they remained in fact working class or 
even worse if they had no professional arts educational qualifications: they were considered amateurs. There 
was no more insulting term than 'samodeyatel 'ny'y khudozhnik', translated from Russian as 'self-made artist', 
in the professional art world. This term connoted an amateur aping professional artists' creative practice. 
Those amateurs were never permitted to participate in the same exhibitions with professional artists. 
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rich locals and foreigners in Tashkent. Musina was particularly uncomplimentary about the 
Shelests, intimating that the couple was spying on foreigners and rich Tashkenties for the 
government. Musina's implication may have had a degree of truth, because she reasoned 
that the authorities would never allow the Shelests to arrange such a mix of locals and 
foreigners in private premises unless they were somehow involved. 
The Shelest mansion was located in the area of Darkhan, the former heartland of 
Tashkent's colonial administrators. From the outside, the building was a typical dwelling of 
Russian colonial administrators, a tall one-story building with carved wooden window 
shutters, but the interior was quite unusual. The mansion had no furniture, and its interior 
walls had huge square holes that allowed everything from any comer of the building to be 
seen and heard. (This layout could be seen as further evidence of Mus ina's spy theory). The 
guests walked in silence from one room to another, sipping wine, listening to classical 
music and intently looking at the paintings. The walls in the mansion were covered with 
paintings from top to bottom. It was a random collection, diverse in genre, style, size and 
technical finish. After several hours passed, a more formal gathering was announced. 
Everybody assembled in the largest room, guests, musicians, artists and hosts. The artist 
Yannis Salpinkidi, the head of the art-studio, was pushed by the artists into the middle of 
the circle for his speech, which he quickly delivered before sneaking back into the crowd. 
In his speech Salpinkidi said that he was glad that his pupils fared far better than he did, 
and he congratulated every of his students for overcoming unforeseen difficulties, which 
his generation had not experienced. 
During this lengthy soiree, the artist Vladimir Kim introduced me to the Salpinkidi 
group among whom were three young women artists: Inna Kulagina, Elena Lee and Elena 
Kambina. (Kim had got me my invitation to the Shelests'.) As result of this soiree, the 
Salpinkidi group managed to find sponsors who provided them with funding, which was 
invested in the publishing catalogue (2001) Yannis Salpinkidi and his School.56 This 
catalogue provided brief information concerning each of Salpinkidi' s 21 students. Yannis 
Salpinkidi and his School indicated that nine of his students now continue their artistic 
56 The catalogue Yannis Salpinkidi and his School was published on voluntary sponsorship. However, the 
identity of the sponsors was omitted from the catalogue, as was mention of the Shelests' provision of the 
exhibiting space and their help in meeting sponsors with Salpinkidi group. Such secrecy in arts funding by 
private individuals reflects the secrecy behind arts production in the non-state controlled art market under 
foreign currency prohibition. 
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pursuits abroad in the United States, and only 12 students remained in Uzbekistan. Out of 
these 12, 4 were men and 8 were women. The catalogue information demonstrated that 
from now on, women's numbers were steadily outgrowing men's because of the 
appearance of non-conventional arts education. My further study of the Salpinkidi group 
assesses the head of the group, Yannis Salpinkidi himself, and his group's educational 
practices. 
4.2.2. Salpinkidi studio: the teacher 
In this section, I explore the Yannis Salpinkidi art studio as an example of how educational 
experiences became shaped by the requirements of the new non-state controlled art field. 
To find out more I highlight such aspects as how the studios changed the educational 
priorities of young artists in Tashkent, and what type of artists led them. 
Tashkent has several studios led by Soviet generation artists who work with young 
artists. 57 The appearance of these groups reflected the crisis in arts education, the tough 
economic situation and the absence of generous state commissions in the post-Soviet 
period. Arts education was plagued with a falling quality in teaching standards in general, 
and an increasingly non-committal attitude by leading tutors in particular. The tight 
economic situation did not allow students to complete a time-consuming two-tier 
education. This combination of factors brought to the surface teachers whose experience 
was not of that of conventional Soviet-generation artists, and who were unable to pass on to 
their students Soviet values or Soviet skills. 
I start by discussing what kinds of values and skills Yannis Salpinkidi could or 
would teach his students, and the reasons behind his decision to organize his own studio. 
This discussion is necessary because Soviet values could be cultivated only by artists who 
had gone through the complex educational and institutional system, and without those 
57 According to the writer Erofeev (1995), Moscow and Leningrad in the 1960s were heaving with art studios 
which artists created in their domestic premises. Within those studios, artists disseminated different 
ideological and aesthetic trends which were unknown in the state-controlled art world. Those various art 
studios made up an unofficial arts world. It is likely that those infonnal art studios were inspirational for such 
artists as Salpinkidi. However, it is unlikely that Salpinkidi himself could have been accepted as a disciple of 
one of those Russian art studios. His professional qualifications as a drawing teacher and a graduate of the 
course in restoration of painting would have barred him from being accepted as an equal in those highly elitist 
studios. 
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artists those skills could not be transmitted from the Soviet generation of artists to the post-
Soviet generation. Studios like Salpinkidi's were led by artists who never fit into the Soviet 
arts system and who were unable to accept those Soviet values and skills. Thus those artists 
were less interested in cultivating those values and skills in their younger followers, 
signifying the schism between the Soviet and post-Soviet generations. 
Yannis Salpinkidi was born in 1944 in Georgia, but is an ethnic Greek. 58 Salpinkidi 
became a member of the Union of Artists in 1979 (Tulanova 2004). He achieved the 
modest vocation of a drawing teacher in the Pedagogical Institute, but that institution was 
aimed at producing schoolteachers, not artists. Despite his obscure standing as an artist and 
as a teacher, he somehow managed to start running an art studio. 
One can see that Salpinkidi was not a conventional member of the Union of Artists, 
most obviously because he was neither ethnically Uzbek nor Russian.59 A typical Uzbek 
male artist worked on state-commissioned thematic compositions, and devoted the rest of 
his spare time to teaching in the Arts College or at the Arts Institute. An Uzbek male artist 
taught students the Marxist economic value of artistic labour, emphasising the importance 
of moral values oflabour as service to the state, constant improvement of students' skill at 
all levels, and above all to take seriously the opinions of the painters section of the Union of 
Artists. 
Salpinkidi was not educated in conventional Soviet arts institutions, and he could 
not teach in depth difficult genres of painting as Uzbek artists did. Moreover, Salpinkidi 
never managed to do any thematic compositions during the Soviet period, which meant that 
he was not considered as skilled as his Uzbek counterparts. He was also a highly non-
committal member of the Union of Artists, because he did painting for his own pleasure 
and not for perceived duty to the state. Such a position signified a disregard for the artistic 
establishment, a disregard that was returned when the Union's painters section defined 
Salpinkidi as a mediocre artist and teacher. 
58 Greeks were one of many ethnic groups accused of collective treason and forcibly resettled by Stalin to the 
Central Asian region. 
59 The local Union of Artists was always written about from the perspective of either Uzbek or Russian artists. 
And for artists of other minority ethnic groups, it was quite difficult too fit in to many aspects of the art world: 
exhibiting, socialising, promoting and so on. Here I gave the example of how Salpinkidi, a Greek, could have 
an entirely different way of conceiving the meaning of artistic ideals and how he would pass those ideals on to 
his pupils as compared to an U zbek artist. I am not discussing here why he would not be a typical ethnic 
Russian, because Russian artists were not occupying leading positions from the 1950s onwards in Uzbekistan. 
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Obviously what Salpinlcidi would teach his students was different from what Uzbek 
artists used to cherish. Salpinlcidi was able convince his students to consider their 
individual welfure above anything. He thought that moral value for an artist should be 
hislher capacity to continue artistic creativity by selling works, without consideration for 
the artistic community's judgments on such ardent individualism. Salpinkidi instilled to his 
disciples that selling paintings must take priority over acquiring new technical skills. 
In the post-Soviet period, Salpinkidi began teaching students in his studio free of 
charge. Salpinkidi understood that in the new era, many young artists would need support 
in finding what to do after graduation. Salpinlcidi's ideas found a fertile ground because art 
students faced insecure futures after graduation and had no illusions about the possibility of 
state support. 
Salpinkidi's students' artistic careers began not by exhibiting their own work, but 
from selling other artists' works. The complex process necessary to exhibit their own 
artistic works was such: sell others' works; after receiving some amount of money, invest 
in your own work; sell a completed work; use that money to display more of your works. 
Because it involved all these steps, the production of a single painting was heavily 
dependent on the artists' income through selling. Such a process demands minimal 
investment in artistic materials and maximum profit after producing each of their works. 
Salpinlcidi's students learned first to sell and then to exhibit their work:. This progression of 
activities meant that what made them painters was not how skillful or ideologically aware 
they were, but how good they were as sellers. 
In the next section I will assess in detail who Salpinkidi's students were, and 
demonstrate what the students were able to learn in the Salpinkidi art studio. 
4.2.3. Salpinkidi studio: the students 
Those 12 of Salpinlcidi's students who remained in Tashkent were a diverse ethnic mix. 
They were a bright group of young artists whose dates of birth fall between the mid 1960s 
and the mid 1970s, so at the time of my research their ages ranged from 25 to 36 years old. 
The date of birth is important because it helps to indicate which type of education (Soviet, 
mixed Soviet and Post-Soviet) shaped the identities of Salpinkidi's students. Five of the 
students had finished Arts College and seven had graduated from the Pedagogical Institute. 
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The young artists from Salpinlcidi's studio openly stated in their interviews that 
none of them had graduated from the Arts Institute: by Soviet standards, their arts 
education was incomplete or even nonexistent. As graduates of the Arts College, most 
Salpinlcidi disciples had been taught oil painting for only one and a half years of the four-
year course. During this short time, students learned to produce some elements of sti11life, 
landscape and a face-to-shoulder portrait. The graduates of the Pedagogical Institute had 
not been taught even half of what was taught at the Arts College, because graduates were 
expected to become secondary school teachers specialising in technical drawing. The artists 
stressed that for them, being in Salpinlcidi's art studio was a replacement for a traditional 
two-tier arts education. 
I found such a statement very strong. Could Salpinlcidi' s teaching methods really 
replace the two-tier education system? Salpinlcidi's highly informal teaching was based on 
pleine aire painting within the vicinity of Tashkent and discussing arts issues with an aim 
one day to organise a joint exhibition with participation of the whole studio. Such teaching 
methods helped bring an end to students' isolation after leaving educational institutions, but 
it could not replace the Arts Institute's teaching of art theory and technique. They could not 
advance in learning how to paint anatomically correct full-height portraits, or how to 
correctly paint in the architectural landscape genre with all its complexities of rules of 
perspectives and history of architecture. Overall, a Salpinlcidi studio education taught 
students to be articulate in describing the potential of their painting but hardly to improve 
their technical skills. 
The Salpinlcidi/Shelests exhibition demonstrated that the group lacked the capacity 
to conceptualise the context of the exhibit. Only one of the students, Dilya Kaipova, dared 
to discuss why individually some works could be regarded as promising whereas as an 
ensemble they had no appeal.60 She explained to me that Salpinlcidi, from the beginning of 
his studio, was not inclined to unite his group around any specific ideas. She suggested 
various reasons behind Salpinlcidi' s decision. She thought that perhaps his main caution 
was due to the possibility of incriminating his studio as having some perceived political 
60 Dilya Kaipova, interview, 21 May 2000. Kaipova was born in 1967 and graduated from Tashkent Arts 
College. She was employed by a theatrical company and regularly participated in productions for state 
holidays until 2001, when she moved to Russia. Although she was glad the catalogue was published, she was 
openly critical that missing in the content was why young artists appreciate being a part of the studio. 
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agenda. It was indeed dangerous in the new state for any group to have an ideological 
content apart from Mustakilik. Any expression of unified ideas, political or otherwise, could 
attract the attention of the National Security Services. As a sensible man, Salpinlcidi would 
not jeopardise the well-being of himself or his students. Another possible reason, according 
to Kaipova, was that Salpinlcidi did not want to tum his group into a clique like those in the 
Academy of Fine Arts, which like many creative institutions is infumous for such 
factionalism. She also stressed that there was a practical reason: Salpinlcidi preferred to step 
back and observe his students' growth as artists, leaving students themselves to be 
responsible for conceptualising their creative practices. 
Kim told me that as the studio's students progressed artistically, some felt that they 
at a certain point had reached a level of maturity allowing them to exhibit their works in 
separate subgroups or alone.61 Among those subdivided into a separate group for exhibiting 
were three female artists, Inna Kulagina, Elena Lee and Elena Kambina. Kulagina was an 
ethnic Russian born in 1972; Kambina was of mixed origin, Russian and Uzbek, born in 
1970; and Lee was an ethnic Korean also born in 1970. Kulagina and Lee were graduates of 
the Arts College, and Kambina was a drawing teacher who graduated from the Pedagogical 
Institute. None of them indicated that they had had any intention of going for a two-tier arts 
education. 
Interviews with these three women demonstrated how the Salpinkidi studio 
influenced them. They insisted that for them, it was more important to sell than to exhibit 
their paintings: artists have to support themselves by selling their works to pay for life 
necessities and enable them to continue their artistic practice. They confirmed that they 
capable of mounting a collective exhibition once every two to five years, whereas the rest 
of the time they had to participate at least in one seasonal exhibition together with the rest 
of artists from the Academy. But these exhibitions, they concluded, were a marginal part of 
their creative practice. Speaking frankly, the women stated that they had to cooperate with 
each other as a group not because of their belief in collective good but for two reasons. 
First, group exhibitions tended to be better accepted than solo exhibitions in both state and 
non-state sites. Secondly, they felt that their exhibiting practices were a direct result of their 
61 Vladimir Kim, interview, 23 March, 2000. 
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trading practices, so they took their inspiration from general consumption practices. Owing 
to that affinity in searches of post-Soviet consumption influences, they decided to work 
cooperatively on exhibitions. They devoted the most of their time to earning a living by 
selling their etudes. In the next section I discuss production of etudes by a female artist. 
4.3.1. How women painters introduced etudes to the art tradelInna Kulagina 
This section is based on the observation of Inna Kulagina's production and selling of 
painting. Kulagina volunteered to help me explore Salpinkidi's doctrine of the importance 
of selling. For her, this theory stood on finn ground because for a post-Soviet artist to 
produce, market and sell an etude could take as much time and effort as would have taken a 
Soviet artist to complete a commission of a finished painting. In the post-Soviet period 
there was no institution which supplied artists with the necessary materials for painting 
production. Materials such as brushes, canvases, oils and turpentine were produced in 
Russia; therefore, artists outside Russia had to be highly inventive in obtaining these 
materials or working without them. Kulagina stated her point of view: 'This individual 
inventiveness was a sign of the moral value ofan artist's labour.'62 
Kulagina generously offered me four months' observation to see how difficult it 
was for an artist to produce and sell etudes, something the other two artists could not offer 
me. Kambina, at the time, was involved in the production of ephemeral arts such as sand 
sculptures and she was too busy to spare her time for etudes. Lee was less available than 
Kulagina because during those four months, she was busy with the creation of a 
commercial website. Kulagina's own experience was enlightening for me because her 
situation was emblematic for most Tashkenty artists; the change in economic policies of the 
current arts institution, and the shortage of artistic materials, pressed artists into etude 
production and selling. 
On the first day of our first week I was observing two artists, Kulagina and Lee, 
buying sugar bags in the Rice Market. The Rice Market was located in the downtown 
working-class section of Tashkent built under the 1924 regeneration scheme. This market 
was not a stereotypical bustling market of fruit and vegetable stalls, but an unattractive 
wholesale market. Nobody came here for a leisurely stroll; they were all here for purely 
62 Kulagina interviwed 23 January 1999. 
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business purposes. On this day, the two artists were among those who came to the market 
for a trade. Lee was holding empty sacks in her hands and scrupulously examining them for 
holes and other damage. Meanwhile, Kulagina was haggling over the wholesale price of 
those bags with a sugar vendor. Attempting not to distract from the trading procedure, I 
asked Lee, 'What about the stamps?' Each of the sacks was stamped '100 kg of Sugar' or 
'Product of China'. Shaking one of the dusty bags in the air, Lee responded, 'It does not 
matter. Art buyers always look on the front of the work and not on the back.' 
During the following three weeks, I observed that the production of etudes was a 
well-planned process. In the Soviet period, etudes were highly spontaneous; artists painted 
on something available that they fancied, or produced etudes for developing a theme into a 
future finished painting. However, since artists now had to deal with turning bags into 
canvases, they were required to plan everything ahead such as quantity of gesso, time of 
drying surfaces and the cost of the wooden frames needed. Lee took the bags to her fifth 
floor flat in a remote suburb. She shared the flat with her mother and married brother with 
children. That day, after we climbed the stairs with our hands full of empty bags, her 
mother opened the door to us pleading, 'Lena, I need to wash Marishku, do not mess with 
your bags in the bathroom, please!' Lee washed the dirt off the bags, dried them, cut them 
into pieces and stretched them on wooden frames. The frames had been ordered from a 
local carpenter in advance; because the size of bags was standard, no measurement for 
frames was necessary. Meanwhile gelatin and chalk were mixed, boiled and cooled, for 
covering the stretched sutface. After applying this domestically made gesso to the porous 
surface of the stretched bags, they were left to dry in the cool shade until they finally 
became ready for painting. 
In the fifth week, to my surprise I observed that the etude had become an expensive 
genre to produce. Due to the cost of paints, the artist was limited to the use of only a few 
plastic containers. Previously, the Union of Artists had supplied artists with all necessary 
materials, and it was never questioned how much paint was needed to finish a painting, 
how many different colours were required, or how expensive certain colours were.63 But 
63 The correlation between the paint's cost and artistic skill affecting the economic estimate of a finished 
painting was discussed by Baxandall (1985) on Rennaisance artistic practices. According to Baxandall, at 
fIrst, comissiners valued the use of costly materials over painting itself. Only after there was a change towards 
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now, paints had to be purchased in Russia, transported and traded back in Uzbekistan. 
Artists went from Uzbekistan to Russia for special petty trading. Petty trading operations 
were risky because they required traveling by railways full of unpredictable passengers, 
including active criminal gangs and extortionists. An artist's safe return from Russia with a 
cargo of paints was an occasion for celebration with colleagues. There was a party thrown 
in 2000 by an ethnic Korean artist who had recently returned from Russia. Kulagina and 
Lee went for the party, and to buy paints. 
After returning from the party with loads of paints and depleted resources, the 
women artists needed to carefully plan the use of their new purchases, factoring in the cost 
of various colours. Different colours have different price tags depending on the cost of the 
pigment used in production of the paint: for example, Cobalt Blue costs five times higher 
than Zinc White. The cheapest colours were used in the production of etudes, and the 
amount of paint had to be limited even before painting started. Therefore the artist prepared 
in advance four to seven main colours. In this instance, I observed that Kulagina had 
Yellow Ochre, Chrome Green Deep Hue, Prussian Blue, Red Ochre and Zinc White, 
bottled in one-liter plastic pots. These etudes were not rich in colour palette because 
production of an etude became less dependent on the skill of artist and more on the cost of 
the paint. In fact, to make a finished painting in a couple of earthy pigment based tints and 
one mixing white became as expensive to produce as one etude with several different 
colours. In the post-Soviet era, the etude was no longer a cheap genre. 
In the eighth week, I observed that despite their higher cost, etudes were still easier 
and less time-consuming to produce than finished paintings. Kulagina's etudes were done 
by kitchen knife: thick paint layers were scratched into a flower still life rather than 
lovingly painted layer by layer. I popped into Kulagina's rented studio in the center of 
Tashkent. At the time, she was working as an arts teacher in the American school. Her 
salary was enough to rent a studio for herself: but the job limited her creative practice to 
evenings or weekends. Having a studio was a necessity for her: she could not work at home 
with her alcoholic father. At the beginning of the painting process, I observed the artist 
appreciation of painting did skill became more valued than cost of paint. The current women's trading 
practices allowed me to observe the same tendency: women pressed forward economic issues based on cost 
value because foreign art buyers were often uncertain of the criteria of good painting. 
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trying to find a better naturally-lit comer of the room for a jug containing calla lilies. Next 
to a wall was placed a wooden frame, four bottles of paint, white spirits, some precious 
linseed oil and a long kitchen knife instead of numerous brushes. Without the slightest 
preparation of putting the contours of the flower stems or the pot, Inna began straight away 
to mould, shape and scratch thick layers of paint with the blade of the kitchen knife. After 
several hours of intensely shaping blotches ofpaint over the treated surface of the flour bag, 
it turned into a still life with calla lilies. Owing to the thickness of the paint layers, it took 
several days for the canvas to dry out. 
For a month Inna disappeared. Later she told us that her father had suffered an 
attack of alcohol-related delirium. The hospital did not want to keep him so Inna, as an only 
child, had to deal with him until he regained consciousness. She invited me to attend a 
viewing of old Soviet Uzbek films. I came with Lee to the cinema. Lee told me that 
Kulagina had also invited the parent of a child from her school, and we had to be discreet 
because this could be a potential client. We sat in the cinema several rows behind Kulagina 
chatting in English about Uzbek arts. The meeting was a success for Kulagina: after that 
evening, the parent made several visits to her studio. 
In the fourth month of my observation, Kulagina managed to sell an etude to her 
student's parent. She sold it for a price of $700 - equal to the price of a finished painting by 
a 'Russian artist' prior to 1998. Kulagina was always open about technique, genre and cost 
to her buyers, and she handled all the Cultural Office paperwork single-handedly. When I 
inquired why foreigners would buy from her such a contradictory artefact, she explained to 
me that foreign art buyers appreciated the experience of seeing how an artefact was 
produced, more than the etude itself Seeing the artist at work, buyers were not so enticed to 
consider money - for example, how much they would save buying a cheaper etude in 
Tashkent compared to what they would pay for the same type of etude in New York or in 
London. In her turn, she felt that it was 'rewarding to teach individually each of her buyers 
how her paintings were produced.' In her words, buyers were investing in a first-hand 
cultural experience of arts in Uzbekistan. Kulagina brought back what the Uzbek male artist 
Kagarov craved in the post-Soviet period, the value of 'personality'. It was for Kulagina's 
unique personality that her etudes were purchased, not for her belonging to the Uzbek 
school of painting, generational division or affiliation to Soviet or Russian arts. 
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Such dealings made Kulagina far more morally content than the more distinguished 
Uzbek male painters who were marketed by art dealers as 'Russian artists.' While those 
artists tortured themselves over what type of artists they were, Kulagina clearly understood 
the results of her economic success in selling 'culturally unimportant' artefacts to 
foreigners for a high price. She told me, 
'1 knew that 1 remained an artist because my art was capable ofteaching people something about the 
time and place where the painting was created. 1 had no doubts that foreigners bought my etudes 
because 1 am an Uzbek artist of Russian descent working in Tashkent. By the way, what else apart 
from being an Uzbek artist could 1 be?' 64 
She stressed that her etudes were valued according to local conditions and not by some 
imagined Western market requirements. Kulagina had a clear sense that selling 'imperfect' 
work is moral, if the transaction was not based on the rules of the illegal market (attempting 
to outsmart the Cultural Office) or trying to adapt to the fluctuations of the Western art 
market. In following section I will go back in time, showing how consumption trends 
served as an inspiration for Kulagina and her friends in their art. 
4.3.2. Consumption instead ofideology 
In this section I connect anthropological issues concerning consumption to the women 
artists' themes. I explain why women choose these themes and not men, and demonstrate 
that women's exploration of consumption was in fact an overt critique of the new market 
economy in Uzbekistan. Consumption themes were chosen by the artists for educating an 
audience not limited to the artists themselves and to improve a stagnant arts field, not for 
making their works economically profitable. 
Explorations of how 'the powerless' resisted state power (Scott 1985; Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1993) show that resistance took various forms, not necessarily direct 
confrontation. In Soviet culture in particular (Yurchak 1997; Tupitsyn 2002) and socialist 
in general (Humphrey 1995), so-called 'decoded' language and 'decoded' images were 
invented. In visual anthropology, those 'decoded' messages were studied through the 
objects and subjects in late Soviet period paintings, which portrayed hidden political 
64 Kulagina, interview, 3 July2000. 
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messages as immediately understood by the whole Soviet population (Boym 1994, 1996).65 
This point of view is disputed by various art historians and writers, who stated that at the 
time of their introduction those messages were circulated and intetpreted only for and 
within artistic circles (Dyogot 1995; Golomshtok 1977). In other words, the senders and 
receivers of these messages were the same: male professional artists of an advanced age 
(Baigell & Baige1l200 1). Supporting that argument of a self-contained circle was that those 
male artists did not do any valuing of their paintings, including economic estimate of their 
creations (Efremov 1995). The fall of the oppressive USSR regime brought to life new 
regimes with various degrees of political oppression, which revived the necessity of 
'decoded images' in art as an artistic response to the new reality. 
In post-Soviet Uzbekistan women who came to the art field could not look for 
creative inspiration in the male artists opposed to the Soviet state, because they had very 
little awareness of the existence of Soviet Russian non-official artists' creative practices. 
The new women artists chose to conceptualize consumption themes in their art, exploring 
the dramatic changes from Soviet to post-Soviet consumption. These themes expressed 
what they thought about what was going on in Uzbekistan without saying it openly, and the 
implicitness was a shield covering them from accusations of political criticism of the 
Karimov regime. By discussing those three women, I am not implying that exploring issues 
of consumption was the prerogative of women only. On the contrary, in the following 
chapters I am going to show that artists of both gender and all generations were attracted to 
different aspects of consumption issues in their art. Nonetheless, what made those women's 
focus on consumption special was that they used this popular theme in a form of an oblique 
critique whereas other artists did not. 
In 1998, on behalf of the three women artists, Elena Kambina approached Natalya 
Musina to ask for help in opening an exhibition in the Russian drama theatre llkhom.66 The 
65 Boym (1994, 1996) provided a potent coded image in Soviet painting using the example of a domestic 
'rubber plant' or aspidistra. From an official interpretation, the depiction of a family moving to a new 
apartment including an aspidistra was a positive representation of the state providing people with a free 
accommodation and a 'novyi byt', or new life. But on the other hand, the aspidistra was reintroduced in the 
domestic interior in the 1960s and before that was a plant associated with the homes of the pre-Soviet petty 
bourgeoisie. The appearance of an aspidistra signified a hidden message of the return to some missing 
domestic values, or a revival of the bourgeoisie so despised during the earlier Stalinist period 
66 The Ilkhom theatre played an important part in the cultural life ofTashkenties, being the place where the 
former Soviet cultural elite socialised. In addition to drama, the theatre provided space for exhibiting arts. 
Being permitted to exhibit at the Ilkhom was considered highly prestigious by artists. 
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exhibition was titled The Thing, or in Russian Vetshch, and its thematic range was inspired 
by consumption issues of the post-Soviet period. Musina, who was in charge of the 
exhibition space, did not approve of the subject matter and blocked the exhibition. The 
relationship between her and the artists swiftly deteriorated. The women artists were forced 
to rent the space for the exhibition in a privately run health center. What was interesting 
was not the lack of understanding between the women art dealers and the women artists, 
but the differences in how those two parties valued art. 
These two generations had difficulties in communicating with each other because 
their ideas of moral value in arts were so opposed. Musina represented the generation of 
Uzbekistan's intelligentsia educated during the Soviet period. She had a clear 
understanding of Soviet art and was full of nostalgia for the Soviet past. Musina was used 
to professional artists being men. She was comfortable with arts representing political 
ideologies, either Marxist-Leninist or Mustakilik. She was also well educated and aware of 
non-official arts from Russian cities. Musina explained her rejection in an interview with 
me: she said she found it highly unacceptable to let the llkhom premises become accessible 
to non-professional women painters.67 As I explained before, unlike the Soviet generation, 
the independence-period generation of artists was mostly of working class origin with a 
one-tier education which classified them as working class and not as intelligentsia. For 
Musina, to accept women artists meant to accept the ascendance of a new type of artist who 
brought with them new values not fully supported by their skills. 
The young artists' themes covered social changes in independent Uzbekistan, such 
as the rise of capitalist consumption. The paintings explored social changes based on the 
quick rise of consumerism, when priorities became fixed on acquiring expensive goods 
whose symbolic values were only comprehensible to former Soviet citizens. Women artists 
wished to articulate their own experience of losing the naivete of their childish beliefs in 
the Soviet paradise under the harsh realities of excessive consumption in independent 
Uzbekistan, which had brought poverty to so many. 
The artists' analyses of the consumption issue were represented in their joint 
exhibition The Thing in 1998. Each of them interpreted the issue in their own way, 
67 Musina, interview, 23 August 2002. 
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allowing them to express their unique personalities. The women agreed among themselves 
that each would create a paintings of objects based on their personal life experiences. To 
understand their paintings, it is important to look at their own and their families' 
experiences as a result of the fall of the USSR and the economic reform of 1995. Their 
families came from non-elite, working class backgrounds, and their families' experiences 
were typical of what the impoverished suburbs of Tashkent went through during the first 
decade of independence. Therefore I start with what women did and what they meant to 
express in their works connected to their early inspirational sources. 
Kambina explored objects that had symbolic meanings relating to the Soviet and 
Independence epochs. For example, a trivial object such as a Lenin electric light bulb had 
different meanings. Kambina painted a big, bright electric bulb with gouache paints on a 
cardboard measuring 80 by 110 cm (see Fig.13, p.168). The bulb proudly occupies the 
whole surface of the painting. The bulb is painted in bright orange and yellow colours, 
whereas the background is a dark blue. In one way, the light bulb signifies the unfulfilled 
Soviet electrification project, a failed attempt to reach the goal of socialist progress. 
However, in the mid-1990s the light bulb came to be considered a luxury item. Kambina 
thus exposes how values signified by the same object might be changed through the lens of 
different eras. 
Kambina's representation of the electric light bulb is not accidental. For her, the 
failure of progress connected on a deeply personal level as a Slavic woman from an 
industrial town. Kambina's own life experiences were connected to the building up of 
industries based on modern technologies. 68 By bringing electricity allover the USSR, the 
Soviet state conquered new territories by building new industrial towns and moving Slavic 
technical specialists into those towns, a process sometimes called 'osvoenie' or conquering 
(Widdis 2003: 153). Kambina was an inhabitant ofChirchik, outside of Tashkent. Chirchik 
was the site of the first hydroelectric station in Uzbekistan, built as part of Stalin's 
industrialization of Central Asia. Around this hydroelectric station, the town of Chirchik 
was built in 1935 as a satellite town to the capital, and soon became the main industrial 
68 See Kreindler (1982) on Russian minorities in the USSR, and social, political and economic changes 
affecting them brought by the fall of the USSR (Kaizer 1998; Schlyter 1998; Juska 1999; Kolsto 1999; Hanks 
2000). 
167 
muscle of Uzbekistan. It contained 28 plants of such important industries as electrical, 
chemical and agricultural machinery. Unlike many industrial Soviet cities, which were dirty 
and polluted, Chirchik from its beginning meant to be an idealistic model of industrial town 
because it was well planned and had developed cultural institutions. Despite its small size 
the town had a large number of cultural and educational institutions such as clubs, theatres, 
cinemas, news agencies and even hosted some facilities of Tashkent University. Chirchik 
was built by a succession of prominent Soviet architects; the 1933-1936 architectural 
planning was done by famous Muscovite architects T M. Orlov, M.E. Tarasov and V.A. 
Lavrov, and the 1964 regeneration scheme was by Uzbek architect P.A. Duda-Dudinskii 
(Entsyclopedia Tashkenta 1983: 394). This architecture of the 1930s and 1960s introduced 
wide open streets on a grid system with an abundance of greenery, which made Chirchik a 
modem, clean and green city. 
The Kambins' family life personified the history of the rise and fall of Russian-
headed industries in Uzbekistan. Kambina's father was a skilled artisan working at the 
technical glass laboratory in the electric lamp production plant. Both her parents, apart from 
a short period of work in Algeria, worked most of their life in Uzbekistan. The Kambins 
had a flat provided by the plant. The Kambins' children attended first the kindergarten 
belonging to the plant, and later the school built by the plant. The cultural activities of the 
family were connected to the eight clubs belonging to the main industries of Chirchik's 
factories. These clubs provided workers and their families with leisure and entertainment 
activities by showing films, providing sporting activities, and teaching adults and children. 
In the chemical industry club, Kambina as a child learned to draw and there as an adult she 
found her vocation as a drawing teacher. The fall of the USSR brought down the plants 
with vital infrastructures based on local industries, by that dramatically affecting the life of 
the community of Chirchik which was so dependent on those industrial plants. Chirchik 
lost not only jobs when industries collapsed, but also its whole welfare system and social 
structure. All the Kambins lost their jobs with the collapse of industry. Sitting at home, 
Kambina felt an irreversible change from the Soviet period. For her, the brigh1ness of the 
electric light bulb symbolised women's emancipation, financial security and a sense of 
certainty. Thus, losing sight of the electric light bulb for her was not only a failure of Soviet 
ideals but also the reality of the "darkness' of post-Soviet urban life. 
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Fig.13 Elena Kambina's 1998 painting Lampochka II'icha (Lenin Electric Light Bulb), (80 
x 110 em, gouache on cardboard). Photo taken and given to me by Kambina. 
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Kulagina works with the idea of mobility, with its connotations of migration for the 
non-titular nation population, through the symbolic image of a wheel. She worked with oil 
paints on canvases sized 80 by 90 cm. One of Kulagina paintings' portrays a toddler's 
skateboard violently upright with a wheel pointed at the viewer (see Fig.14, p.170). On 
first sight, such an idyllic object connotes nothing more than childhood. But on the other 
hand that furiously posed little wheel and the absence of the toddler pointed at the 
helplessness and abandonment by the child of hislher favorite toy. She told to me that for 
her it was connected to her ideas of childhood and emigration. 
Kulagina came from a working class suburb which was sprawled out next to a 
military station. The area, like Chirchik, suffered as result of the breakup of the USSR and 
the decline of industry. During her adolescence, she saw most of the families of Russian 
descent losing their employment. Women headed households after male workers lost their 
jobs owing to the decline of the heavy industries which employed mainly Russians. A 
typical solution for many Russian families was the women's decision, 'for the sake of the 
children', to move to Russia (pilkigton 1997). Mothers were motivated by the chance to 
give their children better options in education and employment. Russian emigration from 
Uzbekistan totaled up to 200,000 in the last decade, draining the country of many well-
educated and well-trained Russian specialists (Sievers 2005). 
In Kulagina's case her mother did not make a decision to move out of Uzbekistan 
for the sake of her daughter, because she died while her daughter was studying at the Arts 
College. Her mother, who was a one-legged invalid, died of a heart attack as result of 
stress, overwork and an absence of adequate medical care. Still in her teens, Kulagina 
became the breadwinner for her alcoholic father. Kulagina, tied to her father with his 
addiction, could not move to Russia because that would mean abandoning him to 
destitution and death. The way out of the suburb for Inna was learning English, which 
helped her get a position as an arts teacher in the American schooL Nevertheless, she had 
high and low times with money, which meant that sometimes she was unable to rent a 
studio and had to bring her canvases home. At those times, she said, 'I was so worried for 
my paintings. Father, when he had an urge to drink, would trade any of my works for a 
bottle of vodka.' In her painting, Kulagina's notion of mobility was centered on the wheel, 
which can one day become mobile again. 
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Fig.14 Inna Kulagina's Samokat (Skateboard), (80 x 90 cm, oil on canvas, 1998). Kept by 
Kulagina. Photo taken by professional photographer and given to me by Kulagina. 
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Fig.15 Elena Lee's Telephone (80 x 90 em, oil on canvas, 1998). Kept by Lee. Photo taken 
by a family friend of Lee and given by Lee to me. 
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Lee preferred to explore aspects of the economic shortage and frustrated consumer 
dreams associated with the inaccessibility of specific goods - phones, money, electrical 
appliances and many other desirable items - using the example of an average inhabitant of 
Uzbekistan. Lee worked with oil painting on standard sized canvases measuring 80 by 90 
cm. Lee attempted to show to viewers the meaning of any ordinary household items. She 
used as one of her examples a telephone (see Fig.15, p.171). She painted a telephone and 
links to the actual phone numbers of her friends and relations. She told me: 
'It is like an anecdote. What before was taught to us about communism was untrue and what was 
taught to us about capitalism became true. In the Soviet past a telephone signified access to 
allocation of services. A phone would be installed according to the classification of citizens. 
Obviously we all hated that phones were installed first for those with connections among the elite. 
Yet, there were chances that families with large numbers of children, veterans of the Great Patriotic 
War and the disabled would get phones. Nowadays those needy disadvantaged have no chance to get 
a free installed phone. With regard to that, now the telephone changed its significance for its owners 
from status symbol to a vital necessity item. Transport fares have become so expensive that they 
almost cost one's whole salary. Seeing friends and relatives, going to such places as the theatre, 
cinema and exhibition halls, doing shopping, became unattainable owing to the rise in transport fees. 
The telephone became a crucial item of the household, because without a telephone people would be 
cut off from communicating with each other. Unlike the Soviet period, when friends and families 
were meeting and spending time talking in their small kitchenettes, communication is now one on 
one. Therefore I put all those phone numbers. Everybody was so excited to see their phone number 
on my painting on the exhibition's opening day' .69 
Lee wanted to make a statement about the two types of consumption in the Soviet and 
Independence periods. Soviet consumption was defined by 'allocation' (raspredelenie), of 
goods and services (Humphrey 1995). But in practice, Soviet consumption often deviated 
from socialist ideals (Masson 1985): the Soviet state channeled consumer items not to all 
citizens but mainly catered to its own high bureaucracy. Nonetheless there was still state-
provided care for the 'needy'. Post-Soviet consumption rapidly revealed an immense 
polarisation between the poor and the rich (llkhamov 1998,2001; Pomfret 1999). A few 
'New Rich' emerged, with the majority of population becoming the 'New Poor'. The New 
Rich could enjoy the dramatic rise in consumption choices, whereas the New Poor lost all 
access to the state's allocation of goods and services. And among those New Poor were 
69 Lee, interview, 18 May 2000. 
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those whose position was unlikely to improve without state support: invalids, orphans, the 
elderly and many others. Those 'needy' were abandoned by the state to struggle alone. 
Lee gave her own family as an example of the 'needy'. Her father was an invalid, 
who died leaving her mother with two youngsters. In the new era, families like hers had 
little chance of overcoming poverty on their own. They were no longer under the protection 
of the state. Sitting at home penniless and cut off from her friends, depending financially on 
her younger brother, Lee started rethinking the meaning of every object which surrounded 
her. In her paintings, the objects are portrayed from the perspective of the 'needy': what 
they could not afford compared to the Soviet period, and how the meaning of that object 
altered with the economic reform. 
The art dealers as well as art critics ignored the exhibition, but the artists thought it 
sufficient that the public reacted enthusiastically to their display of new, relevant themes. 
The artists achieved a widening audience from professional and non-professional artistic 
circles, as well as the general public, including the New Rich of Uzbekistan. One outcome 
of the exhibition was that Lee's painting The Wallet, or Koshelek, was bought immediately 
by a local ethnic Korean buyer.70 Although Kambina's and Kulagina's works went unsold, 
they too were pleased to meet this first local buyer who purchased a painting which was 
never intended to be produced for profit. 
4.4. Aftermath of the conflict between women dealers and women artists over how to 
value painting 
The Uzbek art field changed immensely with the rise of non-state controlled arts production 
and consumption. The previously Uzbek male dominated art world became led by women 
art dealers and artists of multiethnic origin. Interesting results came out of the fractious 
relationship between these art dealers and painters. The independent success of women 
painters forced art dealers to understand the importance of revaluing painting not just from 
the perspective of foreign currency prohibitions or the changing tastes of the Western art 
70 Despite her Korean ethnicity, Lee's circle of buyers was not limited only to Tashkenti Korean businessmen. 
Far from that, her works were sold to various ethnic groups and foreigners in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
She even managed to sell some works to Europe through a website. 
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market. The women artists revealed that economic value is not only based on the skill of 
artists and size of the work, as in the Soviet era, but also on the cost of materials invested in 
creation of painting. Moral values no longer meant ideological service to the state, but to 
make viewers aware of the existence of an individual artist. Most importantly, the dealers 
were forced to accept that paintings' value could be seen in non-economic terms. Further 
post-Soviet art valuers turned to local institutions instead of to international 
institutionalised validation of arts and arts producers. These debates over how to value arts 
paved the way for the formation of the local art market from 2000 onwards, when the art 
world braced itself to fuce the traditional values of the newly empowered mahalla, which I 
explore in the next chapter. 
175 
Chapter 5 
The Influence of the Mahalia on Painting and Artists (1999-2004) 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 continues from Chapter 4, assessing the production, consumption and valuing of 
painting in the non-state-controlled market in independent Uzbekistan. Chapter 4 concluded 
with an assessment of the dramatic 1999 decrease in foreign buyers' purchases of Uzbek 
painting, a development which forced female art dealers to face the mahalla institution71 
which held significant influence over the domestic sector in Tashkent. Chapter 5 examines 
the mahalla institution's shaping of women art dealers' domestication of painting in 
Tashkent between 1999 and 2004. 
To explain the complexity of the domestication of painting (the relocation of 
painting from public to private spaces), I tum to a post-socialist reassessment of Soviet 
public and private spaces. 'Public spaces' refers to spaces run by the state such as schools, 
streets, undergrounds, stadiums, factories, aitports, museums and many others. However, it 
is more difficult to define 'private spaces', and the terms were and are often more flexible 
than commonly assumed. For example, Katerina Gerasimova (2002) showed that Soviet 
and post-Soviet communal apartments (communalka) defied conventional definitions of 
public and private spaces and also pointed at the fluidity of these terms. 
The same fluidity of public and private existed in Uzbekistan, especially with regard 
to mahalla spaces. However, post-Soviet mahalia spatial practices were not taken into full 
account because of the lack of specification of the changes within the mahalia's 
components. Western researchers (Abramzon 1998; Geiss 2001; Mandell 2002: 290; 
Sievers 2003: 110; March 2004) have traditionally defined the mahalla institution as self-
governing associations with administrative powers over certain neighborhoods (,mahalia 
neighbourhoods '). But this broad definition does not take into account the specific 
components of the mahalia institution, nor how those components' roles hold together the 
institution. Here I specify six (sometimes overlapping) components of the mahalia 
71 See Chapter 1, section 1.6. 
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institution, in order of importance: area, administration, neighbourhood, elders' council, 
community and residents. 
MahalIa area: After Uzbekistan's 1995 market reforms, Tashkent's entire domestic 
sector underwent a privatization process. This including state-owned land and privately-
owned land leased from the state. This newly privatised domestic sector became defined as 
the mahalla area. 
Mahalla administration: Another result of the 1995 market reforms was the 
emergence of the mahalla as an administrative institution with state powers. The new 
mahalla administrations took over the role of the former Soviet Dom Upravlenie, or 
Housing Office - a state institution with a state payroll. Additional to all previous 
responsibilities, mahalla72 administrations now have to deal with property transactions and 
turning private properties into enterprises such as shops, eateries and workshops. Since the 
1999 terrorist attacks in Tashkent, the mahalla administration also became responsible for 
supplying information concerning residents' discontent with the Karimov regime to the 
police, the military, the Taxation Office and the National Security Office.73 
Mahalla neighbourhood: The Encyclopedia of Tashkent (1983) defined Soviet-era 
mahalla as private property on state-leased land. This included two types of mahalla: the 
remnants of the Tsarist-period Old City, and the 1970s suburbs allocated for private 
housing.74 The mahalla neighbourhoods within the Old City remained ethnically Uzbek, 
while the 1970s suburban mahalla neighbourhoods became highly multiethnic. But after 
the 1995 market reforms, which privatised the capital's domestic sector, post-Soviet 
mahalla neighbourhoods became demarcated on areas run previously by the Housing 
72 The Housing Office's Soviet-period responsibilities included payment of benefits and providing 1he 
population wi1h heating, water, gas and electricity. Additionally, 1he mahalla administration inherited a direct 
connection to 1he Police Office. Bo1h institutions dealt wi1h 1he documentation of domicile registration 
(propiska), and family member registry of each household (domovaia kniga). 
73 Information provided by 1he mahalla administration is vital because ofU zbekistan' s strict laws conceming 
movement wi1hin 1he country. Anyone who stays in a location more 1han 1hree days has to register at 1he local 
police station. The mahalla administrations also help find hiding military conscripts. But most importantly, 
1he mahalla administrations are required to inform on 1hose dissatisfied wi1h 1he Karimov regime, and to 
report any occurrences of religious proselytism by non-Muslim religious groups. 
74 The old Tsarist-era mahalla neighbourhoods have individual names, while 1he newer Soviet mahalla are 
usually nameless. 
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Office. In other words, all the post-Soviet mahalla neighbourhoods are areas managed by 
the state administrative institution, the mahalla administrations.75 
Mahalla elders: Each mahalla's council of elders is elected by the mahalla 
community, and voluntarily carry out their responsibilities. These responsibilities 
considerably broadened in the Independence period as the elders became directly connected 
to the post-Soviet mahalla administration. Through the council of elders' cooperation with 
the mahalla administration, the state channeled its help for the needy and the poor in the 
mahalla communities. Further, elders were allowed openly to promote Islamic belief and 
ways oflife.76 Instead of solving minor domestic quarrels or neighbourly disputes, as in the 
Soviet period, elders were newly empowered to force residents to confonn to the way of 
life they deemed appropriate, without considering the residents' wishes (Mandel 2002).77 
Also, the elders' involvement helped the mahalla become a uniquely Uzbek institution: the 
elders helped Uzbek residents and generally ignored the needs of non-Uzbeks 
(Micklewright and Mamie 2005: 445).78 
Mahalla community: As I mentioned above, current mahalla neighbourhoods are 
the areas controlled by the mahalla administration. But residing within a post-Soviet 
neighbourhood managed by a mahalla administration does not automatically create a 
mahalla community. Strong mahalla communities tend to be the older, more established 
ones in the Old City and to a lesser extent in the 1970s mahalla neighbourhoods. The 
appearance of mahalla communities in the rest of Tashkent depends on the condensation of 
the ethnic Uzbek population.79 
75 In order not to mix up between current and older mahalla neighbourhoods I either name the area or point at 
its historical period, Tsarist or Soviet. 
76 The promotion of the Islamic faith and way of life requires both men and women to follow religious 
practice by praying, fasting and celebrating Muslim life cycle rites. Additionally, Muslim men were expected 
to attend weekly mosque and to do almsgiving. Meanwhile Muslim women residents were expected to follow 
traditional ways of life and to be subservient to men and the elder members of their multigenerational 
families. 
77 See Mandel (2002: 190-91), who points out the elders' harassment of women. 
78 Micklewright and Marni (2005) suggested that post-Soviet mahallas were transformed from community 
institutions into state administrative institutions, becoming a state tool. The researchers emphasized that post-
Soviet mahalla dealt with outcomes of market reform by financially assisting disadvantaged mahalla 
residents: households with numerous children, households with the unemployed, households with pensioners, 
households with invalids and many others. Nevertheless, both researchers pointed that because the mahalla 
was an Uzbek institution, even though mahalla residents included some Slavic households, the mahalla 
administrations largely skipped over assisting impoverished Slavic residents. 
79 The condensation of the Uzbek population in such parts of Tashkent as the New City was limited because 
of antiterrorist measures between 1999 and 2004. As I was told by a police officer, on 28th July 1999, 
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Mahalia residents: mahalla residents are the whole of the multiethnic Tashkent 
population residing in the neighbourhoods nID by mahalla administrations. In the parts of 
the city of Tashkent where mahalla residents do not form a real mahalla community, 
residents were bound to experience more pressure from the state and the state-nID mahalla 
administration. 
Here I provide two diagrams (see Diagrams 3 and 4). Diagram 3 shows that before 
1991, there was a clearer ideological divide between public and private spaces: domestic 
spaces within mahalla neighbourhoods were seen as private spaces separate from the state-
controlled public spaces. Diagram 4 shows that after 1991, the definitions changed because 
the mahalla acquired administrative functions and a state payroll, which before was purely 
characteristic of public spaces. By becoming state-controlled institutions, mahalla merged 
with public space and were no longer considered private. Private/domestic homes now 
existed within the public space of the city's mahalla. Under private spaces I defined how 
and by whom spaces were controlled meanwhile under domestic spaces I refer to kin 
relationship. 
To gain access to private space in the mahalla neighbourhoods between 2000 and 
2004, women art dealers needed to find a space from which they could start negotiation 
between the mahalla institution (both administration and community) and the New Rich of 
Uzbekistan. They found this space in courtyards. To entice their New Rich clientele, 
women art dealers had to manage the themes and images in painting reflecting courtyard 
consumption within Uzbek homes. Under the women art dealers' guidance, artists of the 
Soviet and post-Soviet generations, male and female, decoded consumption themes taking 
place within domestic grounds of the courtyard. Following the art dealers, I focused on the 
courtyard space because of its changing functions and symbolic values. Neither public nor 
private, the in-between status of the Uzbek courtyard makes it an excellent example 
through which to explore the shifting local social relations, power structures, and ideas of 
kinship and community. More importantly, it also provides clues about how paintings have 
come to be valued, and I use courtyard consumption as a lens to allow me to see the 
domicile registration became restricted because there was genuine fear that it would be impossible to control 
the Uzbek population willing to relocate to the capital. Therefore condensation remained low during 1999-
2004 because it depended entirely on Russian migration out of Uzbekistan and an increase in the number of 
well off Tashkenty Uzbeks capable of buying the property of the outgoing Russians. 
Diagram 1. Tashkent Spatial Divisions (1980-1995) 
Private spaces: 
Mahalia neighbourhood spaces (blue) 
+ domestic spaces (yellow) 
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Public spaces (red): 
Schools, squares, streets, 
undergrounds, hospitals, stadiums 
and so on. 
Diagram 2. Tashkent Spatial divisions (during 1999-2004) 
Private Spaces 
Domestic spaces 
Public spaces 
The entire mahalla institution, 
administration and community 
spaces + schools, squares, streets, 
undergrounds, hospitals, stadiums 
and so on. 
180 
domestication of painting in Tashkent. By 'courtyard consumption', I mean what various 
researchers (Koroteyeva & Perepelkin 1990; Koroteyeva & Makarova 1998; Ilkhamov 
2001; Sievers 2003) have defined as traditional, communal, indigenous and mahalla 
spending on life cycle rituals and ceremonies such as circumcisions, weddings and funerals, 
involving the mahalla community. 
Chapter 5 asks why and how do moral, economic and social values in relation to 
painting correlate to social diversification in the previously economically homogeneous 
mahalla? In domestic anthropology, relocation is often a 'time when identities had to be 
reaffirmed' (Attfield 2002). Studies of post-Soviet relocation of the New Rich referred to 
the many limitations experienced by New Rich in their new luxury dwellings, caused by 
pressures exercised by neighbours, community, administration and so on (Humphrey 2002). 
The post-Soviet relocation of the New Rich Uzbeks illustrated a combination of difficulties 
raised by their attempt to affirm their new social group identity. Moving out of Soviet 
mahalla neighbourhoods to the New City demonstrated New Rich Uzbeks' difficulty to 
conform to mahalla identity, causing a strong sense of resentment towards them by 
ordinary mahalla community members. Within a particular section of Tashkent, the New 
City, the New Rich Uzbeks 80 demonstrated that they could not affirm their ethnic identity 
either to the historical identity of the locality (associated with the Russian bureaucracy and 
merchants, epitomising a colonial Russian past81), nor to the current residents, the ethnic 
Russian former Soviet intelligentsia82• Facing pressure from freshly installed mahalla 
administrations loyal to the Karimov regime, New Rich Uzbeks in their new locality had to 
prove their worth as a new social group. As a new group, the New Rich emerged under a 
80 There was no space to build luxury houses in the Tsarist and Soviet mahalla neighbourhoods, nor was there 
an availability ofluxury private houses where the New Rich families came from. Those families moved to the 
Russian part of the city, built during the Russian Tsarist period. Practically at the same period of time the 
mahalla administration was also introduced to the Russian part of the city. 
81 By moving to the New City, New Rich Uzbeks questioned their Uzbekness in the eyes of the mahalla 
community, because the New City was associated with poor treatment of the Muslim population by the 
Russian colonial administration under Tsarist rule. According to various local historians, in the colonial 
period there were various degrees of restrictions for Uzbeks entering the New City. Uzbeks were thought to 
wear tattered clothing and carry infection. The Russian bureaucracy and merchants were especially poignant, 
hanging plates with the inscription 'Entrance is not allowed for Sarts and dogs' outside areas of leisure and 
entertainment designated for Russians (Sarts was a prejorative name for Uzbeks). 
82 The bitter reaction of the ethnic Russian fonner Soviet intelligentsia towards the emergence of the New 
Rich echoed that of the Uzbek intelligentsia. However, for ethnic Russians in the New City those relationship 
with New Rich Uzbeks turned from disdain to a personal affair, because the New Rich and mahalla 
administration, lured by the costly property, were willing to take unlawful actions to squeeze old residents 
out. I will partially touch on this subject in Chapter 6. 
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high level of social distrust expressed by the state, administration and neighbouring 
residents, which made it out of question to display paintings as a mark of their status. 
Women art dealers, without discussing the display of paintings, began the domestication of 
painting in Tashkent with negotiations among the New Rich, the mahalla community and 
the mahalla administration. They used as a negotiating point the space of the courtyard 
which helped to affirm the new social group's identity. 
Chapter 5 stresses that a moralised framework was necessary to make post-Soviet 
Uzbek painting part of general consumption trends in Tashkent. Women art dealers had to 
balance the 'public' and 'private/domestic' spaces as well as the different values of the 
mahalla community and the New Rich. According to the women art dealers, consumption 
of painting by the New Rich was 'moralised' if the paintings dealt with courtyard life, a 
theme acceptable to the popular imagination of the mahalla community. The moralization 
of painting allowed painting to become socially accepted by the mahalla, both community 
members and administration. Accordingly, the economic valuing of painting by the New 
Rich consumers would be dependent on the virtues of mahalla morality, specifically 
multigenerational fumily values. This moralization of social and economic valuing became 
an essential goal of art dealers such as Musina and Akhmedova. Those art dealers who were 
unable to reconcile the contradictory values of the mahalla and the New Rich, through 
production of suitable themes and images acceptable to both sides, were squeezed out of 
the art trade during this period. 
In order to build up Chapter 5 around courtyard themes and images, I have divided 
the chapter into three parts. First, I explore which spaces within domestic compounds 
inspired new 'public' valuing of paintings not intended for display. Second, I discuss the 
moral, social and economic valuing of that space, which brought acceptance of art 
consumption through the mediation of art dealers. Third, I analyze the themes of the 
paintings. The first and second parts will clarify why certain courtyard consumption themes 
which were appreciated by the mahalla community were introduced by Musina. Therefore I 
assess the history and background of spatial patterns within domestic premises in mahalla. 
From that I explain why courtyard functions became a central focus of Mus ina's brokering 
activities in the mahalla neighbourhood. By Musina opening a gallery/restaurant in a 
mahalla, I explore why she attached economic pricing of paintings directly to the price of 
182 
property in desirable parts of Tashkent. To make the mutual dependence between property 
and painting pricing more obvious, I compare the cases of Moscow and Tashkent through 
prices attached to different period styles. In the last section, I explore the courtyard 
consumption themes that are expressed in paintings by two artists affiliated with Musina's 
gallery. Those artists are Bakhtiayr Umarov, a Tajik refugee from Dushanbe, Tajikistan, a 
painter and former graduate of the Arts Institute; and Lola Babayeva, a female Uzbek artist 
educated in the Russian Cineaste University. By examining these two artists' creative 
practices, I support my earlier statement that ethnicity, gender and religious affiliation did 
not affect their capacity to express mahalla values through the selection of themes and the 
technical complexity of painting production. 
5.2. What is the meaning of the courtyard within domestic spaces? 
The opening section of Chapter 5 concerns the assessment of a courtyard within domestic 
space and its role in mahalla consumption patterns. This assessment was necessitated by 
the fact that previous studies analysing types and significance of the collective mahalla 
consumption did not take into account the courtyard as the space within domestic premises 
where mahalla consumption actually took place (Koroteyeva & Perepelkin 1990; 
Koroteyeva & Makarova 1998; Ilkhamov 2001; Sievers 2003). In current post-Soviet 
consumption studies, Uzbek collective mahalla consumption was conceptualised by Deniz 
Kandiyoti and Nadira Azimova (2004) as an attempt to oppose the excessive consumption 
by the New Rich, stressing communal Uzbek mahalla values of consumption, led by the 
older women of the mahalla community. By stressing the role of older women in lieu of 
absent men83, these researchers of mahalla celebratory consumption posed two questions. 
First they asked, why mahalla consumption was led only by middle-aged women and, 
second, what was the meaning of 'excessive consumption by the New Rich' from the 
mahalla perspective: is it of the whole mahalla community or just those older women?84 I 
therefore begin this section by focusing on the work ofUzbek ethnographers (Faiziev 1965: 
100; Ismailov 1972: 138; Tashbulatov and Savurova 1989: 100) that is relevant to 
83 In traditional celebrations, men congregated in the local mosque, while women celebrated at home. 
84 An example of the excessive New Rich consumption so vilified by mahalla residents might be so trivial as 
owning an uneatable domestic pet such as a dog or cat, whose function is to give companionship rather than 
to guard or to catch vermin. Older mahalla women cynically said that instead of having more children, the 
New Rich spend their money on expensive dog food, pampering their pets and so on. 
183 
anthropological theory of domestic spaces. Their research covering the period 1960-1980 
broadens the article by Kandiyoti and Azimova (2004), which concerned the changing 
significance of post-Soviet mahalla consumption which took place within courtyard spaces. 
To justify the role of the physical courtyard space in courtyard consumption, I reconnect 
Kandiyoti's and Azimova's findings with background information provided by my own 
fieldwork (1999-2001) in Old City and New City mahalla neighborhoods. The section is 
summarised with a broad discussion of what the art dealers and artists could or could not do 
in the case of domestication of painting. 
In anthropological research, the house has always had the opposite meaning of 
public places (Cieraad 1991, 1993; Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995). Also discussed were 
divisions such as outside-inside and public-private (Miller 2001, 2002). With time, those 
divisions showed that within the house there existed many liminal spaces (Alexander 2002: 
868).85 These liminal spaces, for one reason or another, are understudied despite the 
possibility of playing an important role in the house. There was no relevant information 
within Western anthropology concerning Uzbek courtyards. So how does a courtyard 
became such an important public space? 
Originally, the Uzbek house was a Muslim house. The Muslim house was 
scrupulously described by Pierre Bourdieu (1970, 1990, 2003) using the example of a 
KabylelBerber house, with its spatial divisions of male-female, pUblic-private, and dark-
light. However those depictions cannot be directly applied to contemporary Uzbek houses 
because, as Uzbek ethnographers have always stressed, the Uzbek Muslim house drastically 
changed under the Soviet state (Faiziev 1965: 100; Ismailov 1972: 138; Tashbulatov and 
Savurova 1989: 100). These Soviet Uzbek ethnographers argued that under Soviet rule, 
policies of titular nation women's emancipation, which aimed to free women from 
domestic and gender subjugation, served to alter domestic spaces symbolically and 
functionally. The pre-Soviet home was Muslim and was indeed based on gender division 
principles; Soviet policies altered a private female zone of the house, the courtyard, into a 
communal space visible and accessible to any local member of the mahalla. 
To support their claim, these ethnographers provided architectural plans which 
clearly demonstrated that despite the survival of dwellings' spatial divisions, the special 
85 Alexander in her article (2002) discussed liminal spaces as gardens. 
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significance of those spaces was utterly changed by the new type of relationship between 
the multigenerational family of a household and the mahalla neighbourhood community. 
All architectural plans drawn by T. Faiziev (1965) and S. Tashbulatov & P. 
Savurova (1989) demonstrated that the typical Soviet Uzbek house was of a walled 
rectangular shape with two courtyards: an outside-looking tashkari or male space, an 
inward ichkari or female space. Tashkari consisted of two chambered guestrooms or 
mehmonhona, with a veranda called an aivan next to which was erected the storage space 
or ambarhona and a lavatory or hidzhat. Between the guestrooms and the storage was a 
gate leading through a narrow passage leading towards the ichkari. Ethnographers pointed 
out that the female space was the largest part of the house, a large courtyard which 
contained living and working compartments. Along the walls encircling the courtyard itself 
were located storage rooms, a kitchen (oshhona), the oven for bread making (tandoor), the 
winter kitchen, laundry, lavatory, and a poultry shed (katak) and cow shed (molhona). 
Meanwhile within the open space of the courtyard were a water storage pool (hauz), a 
summer gazebo, vegetable plot and vineyard. Within all those functional rooms and 
buildings, there were incorporated numerous chambers called hona, each of which was 
intended to accommodate a married son and his family. Hona had windows looking out 
onto the courtyard. The researchers summarised that those layouts illustrated a gate 
between male and female spaces, the male spaces public and the female domains private, 
keeping any stranger away from the ichkari. 
After explaining these symbolic and functional divisions of the pre-Soviet Uzbek 
home, researchers elaborated on how Soviet policies of education and employment for 
women outside of the home changed the meaning of the ichkari by turning it into a public 
courtyard. Instead of being a private family domain, the courtyard became a public space 
open to the whole mahalla community. Researchers emphasised that that openness of that 
courtyard helped to strengthen traditionalism in the multigenerational family, reinforcing 
the extremely rigid hierarchy of gender, age and social status. The position of women in the 
family depended on maintenance of the functional parts of the courtyard, providing the 
family with food, and not on the salary earned outside which meant that older women 
would get an upper hand over younger women and unmarried men in the family. Preserving 
that age and gender hierarchy has long been a collective preoccupation of the whole 
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mahalla community instead of a private family matter. Mahalia's preoccupation with peace 
and quiet in multigenerational families within mahalla culminated in the 1980s with the 
emergence of mahalla neighbourhood committees whose primary function was sorting out 
family disputes. 
The research of Faiziev (1965), Ismailov (1972) and Tashbulatov & Savurova 
(1989) showed that the use of courtyards to promote 'old traditions' expressing communal 
mahalla values actually originated in the recent Soviet past. These Uzbek researchers 
explained the recent origins of such valuing by clarifying where exactly that consumption 
takes place and how this enclosed domestic space influenced the meaning of courtyard 
consumption. Their explanation was crucial for three reasons. 
First, it allows us to understand that what was called 'traditional' consumption did 
not indicate the strength of the collective mahalla values hidden in domestic spaces during 
the Soviet period, but was instead a direct result of alteration of the domestic spaces by 
Soviet rule. This Soviet alteration of Uzbek Muslim domestic space continued to playa 
strong role in post-Soviet consumption because the public space within the domestic setting 
was not the interior of the home but the courtyard space.86 
Secondly, the researchers' investigations helps us understated why the reinvention 
of courtyard space during the post-Soviet relocation of the New Rich Uzbeks in the New 
City was used to bind them to the mahalla. 
Thirdly, this complex and uneasy relationship between the New Rich and the 
mahalla administration and community reveals the role of the arts during this time of social 
distrust. 
Thus Uzbek researchers' discussion helps to justify the link between Soviet and 
post-Soviet consumption patterns, based not so much on how different patterns of 
consumption are opposed to each other by different social groups but how those types of 
consumption were shared by each other. In the following section I stipulate the above 
points on my fieldwork in Tashkent. 
86 Concerning post-Soviet domestic spaces, there is a huge variability among them in a regional context, so 
what I mean by U zbek Muslim domestic spaces has nothing to do with their Kazakh or Kyrgyz counterparts. 
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5.3. Post-Soviet consumption patterns 
My Tashkent fieldwork (1999-2001) allowed me to witness firsthand what happened after 
the ichkari was turned from a private female space into a public courtyard space. I provide 
two examples as typifying post-Soviet consumption patterns, one in the Old City and the 
other in the New City. The first example shows traditional patterns of consumption in a 
Tashkent mahalla, leading some members of a multigenerational family to feel resentment 
against mahalla intrusion. The other illustrates the emerging patterns of consumption by the 
New Rich and their nuclear families. A look at the use of the spaces within which those 
types of consumption take place shows more resemblance than opposition. 
In October 1999, I was invited to a circumcision ceremony in the Sebzar mahalla, 
of the Old City (see Map 4, p.187 and Fig.16, p.188). Negora87, who invited me, was the 
wife of the fourth of five married brothers living under the same roof (Fig. 17, p.189) and 
the mother of the baby. I made my way to the house in Sebzar mahalla through a short and 
very narrow, dead-end street, no more than 80 centimeters in width (see Fig. 18, p.190). 
When I entered through the wooden gate, I was led to the mehmonhona where everybody 
viewed and congratulated the circumsised child, who was laid in an austere empty 
whitewashed room. After leaving the mehmonhona, I noted that there was no division 
between male and female spaces. The gate had been removed and the passage was enlarged 
as much as possible so that whole mahalla community could easily enter the ichkari. The 
existing hona or chambers within the courtyard became accessible to anybody regardless of 
gender, age or status, thereby depriving the homeowner family of privacy. The residents 
were entering all the hona during their visit. The hona all look alike, with carpeted walls 
and floor and simple beddings piled in the corner of the room. Looking through those low 
curtainless windows into the various hona allowed me to find the one where older women 
were receiving guests at the head of a tablecloth with fruits, crockery and food spread out 
on the floor. The guests were expected to taste a few sips of tea with a piece of bread and 
sweets, then move on to allow the next group of guests to enter. 
87 Negora is the first name of the respondent, an Uzbek woman in her late twenties. 
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Map 4. Map of Central Tashkent showing Tsarist-period mahallas, among which we can 
see Sebzar mahalla, research site. 
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Fig. 16 Sebzar mahalla in 1999, before it was demolished. Sebzar typified the older, pre-
Russian sections of Tashkent. 
Fig. 15 Plan of Neg ora's house in Sebzar mahalia, 1999. 
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Fig. 16 The view of Neg ora's house from the dead-end street. 
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1 was intrigued by the apparent insignificance of the couple who were celebrating 
their only son's circumcision: since neither parent was receiving attention from the 
guests.88 As 1 mentioned before, the older women from the mahalla managed the guests, 
leaving the young mother, Negora, to pour tea while the father went to the mosque with the 
rest of mahalla men. Visiting Negora several weeks later, 1 asked her (trying not to offend) 
what she thought of being so sidelined by those older women, women from the mahalla 
mainly and not even her kin, and at the same time being so publicly exposed to the 
mahalla? Negora told me, 'I became engaged because my fiance promised that we will 
move from his parents' into a separate flat due to residing in demolition area 1 am still 
waiting. Obviously 1 envy New Rich couples who live by themselves. ,89 She implied that 
both her and her husband had a genuine desire to get out of the mahalla community, but 
that they were simply not wealthy enough. With regard to being so exposed to the mahalla, 
she pointed at the miniature plastic tree standing on the floor with paper flowers, 'This is 
one of the examples of what the mahalla calls a wasteful thing to have in the house. 1 
should not be keeping it in our hona even though 1 like it so much, because our entire 
family would become a laughing stock in the mahalla because the junior daughter-in-law 
could have fanciful stuff at home. But they [the other mahalla residents] cannot do such 
openly to us because by making those flowers, 1 earn money which 1 give to my fumily.' 
Negora's responses illustrated that not all residents were satisfied with the older women's 
dominant position, and that the mahalla community's definitions of 'excessive' 
consumption were not necessarily consistent. Further interviews with Sebzar residents 
indicated that anything could be seen as 'excessive consumption' apart from objects which 
could be turned into cash money for family needs. With such a vague definition, the term 
'excessive' was often simply used by the community to express disapproval of a particular 
family residing within the neighbourhood. 
88 Since circumcision is an important religious rite for Muslims concerning their male offspring, I was more 
accustomed that both parents actively manage and receive attention of the guests in Kyrgyz families in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
89 Sebzar was demolished in 2000, and when I returned to Tashkent in 2001, I did not see Negora I learned 
that she had moved into a multi-floored apartment block, which allowed her and her husband to have at last 
control over their modest possessions in a flat, something they lacked in their hona. 
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I was introduced to the aspirationallifestyle90 of the New Rich Uzbeks in the New 
City by my parents' friend Renat Nazarov. Nazarov, a prominent botanist and a former 
director of the Tashkent Botanical Garden in his mid seventies, became a private gardening 
specialist in Tashkent specializing in turning the New Rich's courtyards into gardens in the 
New City. In this case the courtyard became reinvented by the New Rich as a result of their 
relocation. The New Rich did not need to provide themselves with food supplies by 
keeping livestock or growing vegetables in their courtyards, so the position of women who 
were previously were in charge of that aspect of the household declined. New Rich couples 
would often hire a professional horticulturalist to deal with the courtyard. 
Nazarov showed me his photographs of the redone courtyard gardens of the New 
Rich. As we looked at the photos, Nazarov explained to me the complex function of a 
courtyard as a liminal space. Courtyard gardens served to bind together members of the 
new social group of New Rich Uzbeks, and were therefore created as places where they 
could came for socialising. By maintaining their gardens, they were able to show their piety 
as educated Muslims, citing the Koran's 13th Sura which describes heaven as a garden 
(Dickie: 1976). By providing additional income for extra work by residents coming from 
their original mahalla, the New Rich were able to stay true to their mahalla roots. And by 
giving donations to their new mahalla administration, additional to payments for extra 
water and many other services spent for their gardens, they showed themselves to be an 
emerging new social group capable of understanding the of new local administration. 
Nazarov and many other people involved in courtyard reinvention emphasised 
courtyard consumption's current importance for the New Rich. But at the same time, all my 
respondents who were involved in improvement in the private dwellings of the New Rich 
told me that there was still a strong sense of social distrust which led to a desire for privacy 
in the interior of a home. For a New Rich homeowner, their house's interior was off limits 
not only to mahalla personnel and workers, but also to other New Rich. Socialising by the 
New Rich was limited to the warm period of the year, allowing guests to be firmly kept in 
the courtyard garden. In a climate of distrust, nobody apart from the couple owning the 
90 I suggest the use of the adjective 'aspirational' as a positive alternative to 'excessive'. The reason for not 
using the term 'excessive' is based on the fuct that Sebzar mahalla community members, regardless of their 
gender and age, asp ired to be as wealthy as the New Rich, but at the same time they were certain that they 
would not indulge themselves as the New Rich did. 
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property was allowed to glimpse the inside of the house. Many owners feared the mahalla 
administration would denounce them for spending more than they declared in their annual 
taxation. For the New Rich, the display of their interiors could only come after establishing 
themselves as a special social group above threats from the mahalla administration, the 
community or the government regime. In other words, post-Soviet consumption trends 
continued to keep the courtyard open to all, but the interior of a home was finally turned 
into a private exclusive space. 
So what was the function of arts if social distrust did not allow an art buyer to 
display a painting within the house itself? As we can see, there was no place for painting 
display in the traditional Uzbek house. If in the Old City it was impossible to hide anything 
from mahalla interference, while in the New City the desire for privacy led to the interior 
of a domestic space being completely hidden from public view. But impossibility of the 
display of painting does not necessarily imply uselessness of painting. In the following 
section I demonstrate that arts still could help buyers express themselves in their choice of 
themes, in this case themes concerning courtyard consumption, and by that making art 
buyers and their purchases more acceptable from a social and economic standpoint. 
5.4. Musina, her courtyard, and the mahalla 
In this section I am going to explain how and why the art dealer Natalya Musina negotiated 
courtyard space. I first explain the reasons behind her move to the mahalla. In the early 
winter of 2001, Musina found herself laid off by the Businesswomen Association after 
returning from an exhibition ofUzbek crafts and paintings which she had arranged in Paris. 
In Tashkent there were already three dozen art boutiques, which belonged to state 
organizations such as the Academy of Fine Arts, Uzbek Airlines, the Businesswomen 
Association and private individuals. All those galleries were located in the Russian-built 
section of the city and were aimed at foreign buyers. Contrary to the rest, Musina opened a 
new art gallery, Karavan, deep inside a 1970s-era mahalla neighbourhood on Kahhar Street 
(see Fig. 19, p.195). From there she intended to entice the Uzbek New Rich as her new arts 
clientele. Musina's move was symbolic because she wanted to value painting from a 
mahalla perspective. Painting production and consumption seemed contradictory to moral, 
social and economic mahalla values. Painting was a highly individualized achievement 
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based on education and completion of prestigious state commissions, which contradicted 
moral mahalla values based on preservation of the multigenerational fumily, within which 
the status of an individual is defined by gender and age. Socially, painting consumption 
often involved foreigners, situating painting beyond the reach of the mahalla community. 
And consumption of painting, with the average cost of a painting $700 and average 
monthly wages $25, was against mahalla values of communal well-being. So Musina set 
her goals which became: 1) to gain acceptance in the mahalia, both for herself and for the 
art trade; 2) to convince the country's New Rich to come to her art trading place in the 
mahalla; 3) to make typical mahalla residents more accepting of the New Rich. She moved 
to the mahalia, she attempted to entice New Rich Uzbeks and she single handedly tried to 
introduce themes of courtyard consumption in paintings. 
Previously, her position as an art dealer of Russian descent and :female gender who 
had freely engaged in a series of marriages and extramarital liaisons had not been a 
significant issue. But to open a business in the mahalla required her to rethink her self-
presentation. She faced two difficulties: her ethnic origin and her gender. Musina had no 
illusion about what it meant for a Russian-descended female to open business in an Uzbek 
male-dominated business world. To be accepted she needed to create a positive image of 
herself and her business for the mahalia's perception. 
Musina made an initial positive (moral) impression on the mahalla community and 
administration by introducing herself as an older woman or mother of a successful 
businessman, instead of as an independent Russian businesswoman. She calculated that her 
age allowed her to present herself as a mother working with her son for the family business. 
From the mahalla perspective, an older women contributing to a family business would be 
more appreciated than a married woman running her own individual business. Musina 
approached the mahalla administration for permission to convert a house into a restaurant 
and gallery. Formally, the whole business was shouldered by her son, Timur, a recent 
graduate of Moscow State University. Timur took the role of restaurateur while his mother 
was in charge of the art gallery. 
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Fig. 19 Karavan gallery/restaurant, 2001. Karavan is situated on Kahhar Street 
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Musina attempted to introduce the art trade as one of the businesses acceptable 
within the mahalla by combining the art trade with the food trade. Food is one of the most 
common businesses in a mahalla. Snack vendors, small family eateries selling kebabs, 
bakeries and many others exist in every mahalla. No mahalla administration would stand in 
the way of a resident family who wished to open such a business in the mahalla. But to 
open an unusual business such as an art gallery would be resented. The mahalla 
administration willingly accepted one more family of Russian descent turning a living 
house into a restaurant, and in this case also a gallery. The mahalla community could not 
ostracise an enterprise led by one more domineering older woman trying to improve her 
courtyard, as there had been plenty of other women in the mahalla doing the same thing for 
years. 
Musina made use of the courtyard of her house for a gallery/restaurant named 
Karavan. Using a courtyard as a public space was common in mahalla homes. She dealt 
with the improvement of her courtyard as any New Rich would, by inviting specialists 
amongst whom was the botanist Nazarov. The courtyard became a place with plants and 
small tables, with walls covered with textiles and covers from the sun spread over the top of 
the courtyard walls. Musina was aware that the New Rich were not intelligentsia: they were 
a mixed group of business people of various social origin, and therefore the place where 
they came to lunch and dine should not be too sophisticated. Musina intended to make the 
courtyard a place where the New Rich could come without feeling pressured to expose their 
lack of knowledge of arts, or even to purchase artworks. In fact, there was an atmosphere in 
Karavan which they aspired to have in their own courtyards. 
It was logical that if in the courtyard Musina marketed a lifestyle, then she would 
continue to do so inside her gallery. There, the same lifestyle marketing was manifested in 
paintings, which the New Rich could view, learn about, and ultimately affrrm their social 
identity by choosing and buying paintings which depicted typically Uzbek courtyard 
consumption. But her main achievement was making the courtyard a place where ordinary 
Tashkenties from the mahalla could see other lifestyles and open new possibilities for 
painting within the interior of homes. In this regard Musina's venture was a success: there 
was no attempt by the mahalla administration to condemn her for promoting 'excessive 
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consumption', nor were there any attempts to denounce Musina's illegal art trade based on 
foreign currency. 
5.5. Why an economic value of painting depends on property prices 
Art traders' professionalism is based on their capacity to price art objects correctly. 
Correctness might be expressed only through mutual agreement between dealer and art 
buyer based on understanding of how an economic estimate is made. In this section I 
explain the uniqueness of the Uzbek art market. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Tashkent's 
foreigner-orientated market is similar to that in any big post-Soviet city with a sizable 
artistic community. Meanwhile, local markets had differences based on the property 
movements of the New Rich. To show this, I explain Musina's early attempts to adapt to 
Muscovite New Rich relocations dictating tastes based on simple acceptance of economic 
price value of property. 
As I wrote in Chapter 4, women art dealers like Musina dealt primarily with 
foreigners. She knew both Western market pricing of Soviet painting and local pricing 
depending on export requirements. There was a fixed price for paintings at 700 US dollars. 
As she explained to me, 'you could not charge more than the buyer could afford. ,91 But 
when it came to trading with the Tashkenty New Rich, she realised that foreigners' pricing 
need not be applied because these were people who did not depend on their monthly 
salaries and who had untapped resources hidden from taxation. Musina thought at first that 
she could rely on the example of the Moscow art trade92 which was much affected by 
property pricing. Her attempt to reconnect property and arts was not entirely new: she had 
learned some of these economic aspects of the art trade during her time in France. 
Sharon Zukin (1988) and Xavier Greffe (2002), among others, point to the close 
relationship between fluctuations in property prices and the price of arts, arguing that the 
gentrification of urban areas is connected to artists and art galleries who move to previously 
dilapidated areas, attracting property developers. What I want to draw attention to here is 
that property, far from being the passive pawn of the art world and developers, also 
91 NatalyaMusina, interview, 26 July 2001. 
92 Musina tried to apply Russian display trends to the Uzbek domestic art market because in Uzbekistan there 
was no interior place for oil paintings in the past, so it was necessary to create a place for oil paintings in the 
new interiors. 
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generates artistic trends by affecting the rise or fall in cost of different types of artworks. 
Therefore I continue with an examination of Moscow property prices, the connection in 
Russia between property type and choice of artworks, and how that was inapplicable to the 
Uzbekcase. 
Any firsthand examination of property prices in Moscow indicates that the most 
expensive prices are within the circular line of the city's underground.93 Within that 
encircled space are located all historical parts of Moscow, with buildings ranging from the 
16th century to Stalin's skyscrapers. The median cost of property by square meter within 
that space, according to various property agencies, is over $3000 (2002). Such a high cost 
for domestic property motivated Moscow's New Rich to look for exceptional buildings 
associated with a distinctive historical past which would tum domestic property into a 
sound investment. From my firsthand observation in Moscow in 2002, variations in price 
can differentiate even more between a typical flat in central Moscow and a flat with a 
historical past: a typical central Moscow flat starts at $350,000, whereas the price of a flat 
in a historical building rises up to several million US dollars. 
The Russian New Rich's relocation to historical apartment buildings boosted a 
boom in the antiques market, mostly in artefacts from the first half of the 19th century 
(Flamini 1999; Moline 1999; Simpson 2001). The tastes of the New Rich began to follow 
the palatial styles of St. Peterburg, the Hermitage and other palaces of the Romanov 
dynasty. The New Rich's taste for the palatial Tsarist past affected Russian museums, 
which popularised displays in both Russia and Western Europe on how the Russian royalty 
and aristocracy lived in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
But back in Uzbekistan, Musina could not blindly apply Russian tastes regarding 
these earlier periods, nor did she have a choice of period buildings in Tashkent. Her Uzbeks 
were reluctant to have any associations with the nation's Russian colonial past, but they 
were aware of the price value of each square meter of their property. The price of one 
square meter in the New City fell roughly to $600 US. This solved the difficulty of 
determining a price at which to start negotiations. Pricing should have been dependent on 
how much clients agreed to pay for artworks expressing an intentionally positive portrayal 
of their new social group. However, art dealers were unable to explain to artists how this 
93 Based mainly on my three-week stay in Moscow and st. Petersburg in February 2002. 
199 
economic valuing functioned, which meant that artists began testing their creative practices 
without the help of dealers. Artists' own search for economically profitable themes left art 
dealers helpless. Therefore it became the tum for the dealers to start leaming from artists 
which themes were most valued by the New Rich and mahalla, and why. In the following 
section I provide an example of a genre which became a favourite of both the mahalla and 
the New Rich. 
5.6. Economic valuing of the still life genre 
To demonstrate how even the most experienced art dealers were humbled by an incapacity 
to comprehend new economic valuing of painting, I start this section with an anecdote. The 
anecdote shows us how the Soviet-era viewpoint had become outdated by dramatic post-
Soviet social changes. As Laura Lee Adams (1998: 37) stressed,94 local specialists have 
their own way of knowing their subject and for anthropologists is important to be aware of 
it; therefore I found that it was necessary here to illustrate on the example of the still life 
genre assessed by Akhmedova. 
In 2001, Akhmedova told me she was surprised by the high demand for the costly 
still life genre. She was approached by a New Rich Uzbek who wanted a still life in the 
Flemish style by Ikramdjonov (see Chapter 3, p.115). 'Flemish-style' stilllifes, reminiscent 
of 17th century Dutch still lifes, were done in a meticulously realist style of painting 
combined with a smooth, mirror-like finish of the canvas surface. The objects depicted 
were usually a varied combination of crockery, textile, fruits, food and occasionally flowers 
or birds. Akhmedova was on friendly terms with Ikramdjonov for a personal reason: earlier 
she had lent him her German-made china for a time to incorporate it into his stilllifes.95 In 
the Soviet period, Ikramdjonov did not have access to such goods, and in the post-Soviet 
period ironically there was no quality porcelain services available.96 His clever 
94 Adams (1998) stressed this point in her Uzbekistan fieldwork research in relation to local specialists in the 
cultural field. I think it is important here, while discussing Akhmedova and male painters' conceptualisation 
of the Flemish still life genre, to demonstrate how local knowledge might be built up by various specialists 
such as art historians and painters. 
95 NegoraAkhmedova, interview, 17 August 2001. 
96 Porcelain available in the post-Soviet market was limited to inferior quality Iranian and Chinese imports. In 
the Soviet period, imports were from original factories established in the 18th century in East Germany and 
Hungary. Regardless of the communist regimes, these imports still had a very high economic and aesthetic 
value. 
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incorporation of expensive china in his still lifes made the paintings attractive to his New 
Rich clientele. Prices for his still1ifes were increasing steadily, and Akhmedova joked that 
she deserved a percentage for providing him with suitable items for his sti11lifes - until she 
learned from Ikramdjonov in person how much he was charging for the paintings. The price 
per still life was $3,500 US, which she found extortionate.97 For the sake of her client, and 
reminding Ikramdjonov whose china he was actually using, she asked him to reduce the 
price but the painter firmly declined to do so. In disbelief: she returned to her client and 
reluctantly infonned him of the artist's price. To her astonishment, the client, instead of 
objecting to the high price, was proud that he could pay for such a wonderful work which 
he said was 'worth the amount of money requested' . 
Akhmedova told me that she felt humiliated as an art historian and dealer because 
none of her education and experiences could provide a clue about why still lifes were 
economically, ethically and aesthetically valued by New Rich Uzbeks. She tried earnestly 
to explore what made Flemish-style stilllifes so desirable to the New Rich. She detennined 
that there were no similarities between Dutch burghers and New Rich Uzbeks in aspects of 
domestication of painting, similarities that Ikramdjonov and the other artists, by choosing 
the Flemish style, were implying. More to the point, her own perspective was shaped by the 
genre hierarchy of the Soviet system, and therefore she became convinced that the taste for 
Flemish-style stilllifes was a simple whim of the New Rich clients. 
Akhmedova, who read art history at the Leningrad Academy of Fine Arts, had a 
good knowledge of Dutch painting. Russian Soviet art history taught the history of Dutch 
painting through teaching of the variety of genres, authorship and various artistic studios' 
activities within the many flourishing cities located in the territories of contemporary 
Holland and Belgium. However, due to the lack of access to Dutch arts collections in the 
West, this knowledge was perceived only through collections in Russian museums. 
Museum collections in Moscow and St. Petersburg were based on purchases of Dutch 
paintings by the Russian royal family and nobility in the 18th and 19th centuries. These 
purchases reflected the Russian infatuation with the West and discoveries of West em art, 
rather than a specific Russian interest in Dutch art itself Russian selection of Dutch still 
97 $3,500 is an extremely large sum in Tashkent. For this amount of money it was possible to purchase two 
flats in the Sergey Lee suburb. Such a price would be considered more appropriate for the London Art Fair, 
recognised by arts specialists as a middle-price art market. 
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lifes in those museums was limited to a certain type of stilllifes which depicted rare items 
of tableware, fruits, plants and hunting game, indicating the distinction of the Russian 
aristocracy as a landowning governing class. 98 Soviet Russian art historians missed an 
opportunity to study how Dutch painting turned from purely religious themes to secular 
themes as result of domestication, and what kind of requirements were needed of painting 
as a result of the move from public to domestic spaces. 
Russian Soviet art history did not take into account the entirely mundane 
requirements to the medium of painting caused by domestication of painting in the 17th 
century. There was a difference in maintenance of painting in public compared to domestic 
spaces. In public spaces like churches or guilds, paintings were kept practically without 
upkeep whereas in domestic spaces paintings were looked after as any ordinary domestic 
object. Dutch painters produced durable paintings from which dust could be literally wiped. 
Paintings were also washed with clean water, to clear the surfuce of grime and blackness 
caused by burning tallow candles. To be able to withstand such cleaning procedures, the 
surface needed to be perfectly smooth and solid. A solid surface combined with a highly 
realist style of painting made Dutch burghers certain that what they were buying was both 
durable and naturalistic. The fact that these requirements were overlooked explains why 
Akhmedova could not take artists' allusions to Dutch still lifes seriously from an art 
historian's perspective. From the artists' perspective, they were exploring different painting 
techniques required by the different environment in which paintings were to be displayed. 
Akhmedova, as an art historian, had a clear understanding of the complexity of the 
genre hierarchy in Soviet arts, and she was adamant that there were much greater variations 
than were earlier assumed. She was taught, like any Soviet-educated art historian, to 
validate the still life genre within the institutional genre hierarchy. According to the 
hierarchy of genres, the still life was the lowest genre in the Soviet period for two reasons: 
the apolitical nature of the genre (prokhorov 1995), and a perceived lack of skill required in 
production (Reid 1998). However, as an Uzbek art critic she was aware that up until the 
98 In other words, the collections did not help Russian art historians typifY the true range of Dutch painting. 
Dutch stilllifes had a plethora of sub genres indicating various ideas of the society's interests. There was a 
moralising genre called vanitas, implying the futility of life. There were genres celebrating Dutch maritime 
supremacy and control of international trade. Those still lifes showed Dutch fascination with all the items 
which foreign trade brought to Dutch cities: Turkish tulips, Chinese porcelain, German silverware, Turkmen 
carpets and so on. There were also stilllifes illustrating plentiful life of Dutch cities, depicting stalls of meat, 
poultry, fish, and vegetables in naturalistic ways. 
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mid-1980s, the still life remained 'a peripheral genre' in Central Asia (Shostko 1979) and 
she attempted to explain what caused the genre's peripheral position. 
Between 1980 and 1991, Soviet Uzbek artists created stilllifes incorporating objects 
glorifying the craftsmanship of Uzbeks residing within mahalla neighbourhoods, such as 
national ceramic ware from Khoresm and Rishtan and embroidered dowry hangings and 
carpets. Yet those stilllifes implying the 'goodness' of the mahalla people were limited to 
the studios of artists; artists artificially created staged tables with handmade textiles and 
ceramics for receiving guests from similar intelligentsia backgrounds. But these 'national 
crafts' were no longer in daily use by ordinary mahalla inhabitants, who were already 
secure enough in their Uzbekness. Uzbek mahalla residents dined on plastic tablecloths, 
and ate and drank from cheap, factory-made china plates and cups without pangs of guilt 
about 'national crafts', a preoccupation of artists. Akhmedova's research missed that those 
Soviet still lifes had the agenda of showing what mahalla residents ought to be - but not 
what mahalla residents, through possession of valuables, wanted to be. 
Here I point out that Ikramdjonov selected objects for his still lifes through the 
mahalla's perspective of 'moral' and 'aesthetic' values. Ikramdjonov understood that in 
order to make his still lifes acceptable to the mahalla, his paintings had to stick to the 
mahalla's accepted communal values. Indeed, mahalla residents, regardless of income, 
often invested in some expensive crockery because this china was displayed and used 
during courtyard communal gatherings. The possession of good quality porcelain was 
considered 'moral' by the mahalla because this china was used not just for daily family use 
but for communal use, and therefore such items were not considered excessive or wastefuL 
And aesthetically, Ikramdjonov demonstrated his awareness that New Rich and mahalla 
residents both wished to see a painting resemble the original valuable as precisely as 
possible, because this was their definition of a good painting. 
For me it was important to have a definition of 'a good painting' from Sebzar 
mahalla residents who have no arts education or connections in the arts field. I found it 
surprising to have such responses concerning painting because those people could 
previously have seen paintings only in public spaces - paintings which are not so 
immaculate in showing detail. I asked them why they made such responses, and my 
respondents gave me two criteria based on moral principles: first, that all jobs had to be 
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done 'honestly' and an 'honest' job for an artist is to do a good finish of the surface of the 
painting, and secondly a 'good painting' had to contain visualised depictions of a healthy, 
moral life. 
Further, Ikramdjonov's works created according to mahalla 'moral' and 'aesthetic' 
requirements also needed to be done in a specific medium befitting the New Rich's 
perception of painting as a valuable, durable product. All this demonstrates that as an artist, 
Ikramdjonov had more foresight than Akhmedova did as an art historian, because he 
realised that in the same ways as 17th-century Dutch burghers, the Uzbek New Rich 
between 1999 and 2004 wanted be sure what they were buying was a perfect representation 
of nature, extremely durable, convincingly realistic and morally instructive. 
The choice of items depicted in the paintings suggested that the taste for Flemish-
style still lifes was not a mere whim of the New Rich. The New Rich were never easily 
manipulated by artists or art dealers because they wanted stilllifes in an atypical skill of 
painting. Normally stilllifes were done by less skillful artists, even by women without any 
arts education. I previously explored the roughness of those still lifes (see Chapter 4, 
p.162). But since the still life became a favourite genre, the requirement for technical 
accomplishment and artistic materials completely altered. These still lifes needed a 
sophisticated finish, like the classical realism of the early 19th century and not of Socialist 
Realism. An almost photographic portrayal of objects was achieved with endless thin layers 
of paint applied one after another, and done mostly on the best linen canvas using high 
quality paints imported from the West. How those requirements were fulfilled will be 
assessed in the following section concerning Umarov's creative practice. 
5.7. The invention ofthemes connoting New Rich understanding of mahalla values 
In this section I use the example of Bakhtyar Umarov (b. 1963). An examination of his 
creative practices demonstrates what kind of artists produced still lifes for the New Rich 
and how artists responded to the demands of the market. Additionally, I assess how male 
artists trained to express national identity become preoccupied with expressing social 
identities. Umarov's own identity, that of a refugee educated in Tashkent who carved 
himself a niche in the local art market by working for different art galleries, supports my 
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previous statement that for the New Rich, an artist's technical skills and understanding of 
mahalla values were more important than their ethnicity. 
Before meeting Umarov in person, I saw his works in National Bank of Uzbekistan 
publications as well as in several galleries (including Musina's). To meet Umarov in person 
and ask to view his still lifes was difficult because of his status as a Tajik refugee. After 
graduating from the Tashkent Arts Institute, he had returned to his home in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan. During this time Tajikistan went through a decade of brutal civil war, in which 
various warring fractions tortured and killed many residents of Dushanbe. Umarov finally 
decided to return to Tashkent, where he started an art trade in a street market and then 
slowly improved his artistic credentials by moving to more respectable trading sites such as 
galleries. But as a Tajik refugee, his situation turned worse with the 1999 introduction of 
antiterrorist measures, under which people without domestic registration in Tashkent or 
Uzbek passports could be detained by police for up to three days. Umarov had neither an 
Uzbek passport nor a domestic residency stamp. His safety was dependent only on a piece 
of Musina's stationery, on which she wrote that she was his employer. On several 
occasions, Musina's paper saved Umarov from being incarcerated or deported. He was 
therefore reluctant to speak to me, but after Musina asked on my behalf, he agreed to meet 
withme.99 
It turned out that Umarov lived with two other Tajik refugees, a painter and a film 
cameraman. The men shared a small apartment, sleeping in one room and working in the 
other. The working room was tiny, dirty and smelly, with cockroaches running over the 
floor with crowded paint jars, oils, turpentine and brushes. The only pieces of furniture 
were the chairs on which the artists sat while painting. The men wore only pajama trousers 
because it was a hot summer day and because pajamas were their working clothes. They 
were unhappy that I had to see them in such undignified attire and messy conditions. The 
boiling point came when I asked about prices. One of them screamed, 'How dare you ask 
such questions? My sister was carrying bloody dollars from me to my parents in Dushanbe 
and she was caught. Do you understand she got eight years' imprisonment?' After 
apologising and leaving the unhappy and angry artists, Umarov and I went out. Umarov 
was more relaxed outdoors than in the apartment with his friends. 
99 Bakhtyar Umarov, interview, 16 May 2000. 
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Fig. 20 Flemish-style still life by Bakhtyar Umarov (oil on canvas, 2001). Photo was given 
to me by Umarov after the painting was sold to an unlalOWll foreign buyer. 
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Umarov explained to me that he loved to work in multifigured compositions. He 
stressed that this did not include thematic compositions of the Soviet period and that he 
called his genre 'folk painting'. 'Folk' implied humorous situation with mahalla inhabitants 
wearing non-European clothing and local textiles. IOO The scenes were far from those 
depicting dignified, stem matrons or old glorious men with medals on their chests. His 
characters were portrayed in teasing ways: tipsy elderly couples returning home from a 
night out, virile old men attempting to kidnap yawning beauties, or a poetic young mother 
and son hanging washed linen. Those characters, however, were not highly appreciated by 
Uzbek art buyers. Instead, they were bought by foreigners. But at the time of my interview, 
foreigners' interest had waned and Umarov was now relying on the Uzbek New Rich. 
The New Rich wanted Flemish style stilllifes, which Umarov disliked (see Fig. 20, 
p205). He enjoyed painting in his folk genre and he complained to me, 'the Flemish still 
lifes make me sick'. I asked him what made him respond like that if during the Soviet 
period the still life was considered an easy, uncomplicated and unmanly genre. 
What Umarov told me contradicted all Soviet art history. He stressed that those 
Flemish-style stilllifes are even more difficult to produce than multifigured compositions. I 
argued that the human figure is more difficult to paint than scattered peaches on a table 
cloth. Patiently listening to me, he disagreed: a different type of technical skill is required 
to work in this style, he said. Normally in the Soviet two-tier education system, artists were 
taught to work in different styles of painting appropriate for different historical periods. 
During his studies in the Arts College and Arts Institute, which had the compulsory practice 
of copying in Russian museums, he had gained an interest in 17th century Spanish stilllifes 
by Francisco de Zurbaran. Umarov stated that the copying technique required patient, slow 
and precise work with semitransparent layers going one on top of the other. The production 
of a still life is also highly time consuming: one still life can take over one and a half 
months to paint, often putting strain on the painter's eyes. He told me that larger finished 
works in the conventional broad brushstrokes of the late 20th century require less layers of 
paint and in fact could be finished much quicker than a still life. His folk genre paintings 
were two to three times bigger than Flemish stilllifes but he was able to finish them in half 
a week. Umarov stressed, 'In fact, there are more New Rich desiring my stililifes than I am 
100 I will give a full assessment of national textiles in the following section. 
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able to satisfy, therefore I have only photos of my stilllifes in the Flemish style, not any of 
the paintings themselves.' Later he showed me a photo of a Flemish still life which 
portrayed fruit and birds on a dark table with a blue background. He further stressed that 
Uzbek New Rich buyers are not only attracted to this combination of visual image and 
investment in high artistic labour, but also to the artist's employment of expensive artistic 
materials such as real linen canvases and high quality foreign oil paints. 
I asked him if he thought that artists without a two-tier education (I was implying 
women) could master this old-fashioned technique.lOl Umarov was doubtful that even 
current Arts Institute students, deprived of the practice of copying from Russian museum 
collections, would be capable of emulating the Flemish style; unless, he suggested, the 
students were lucky enough to be taught the technique manually by artists skilled in the 
style. That, he emphasised, was one of the reasons that there were few artists available to 
meet the demand for this particular type of still life. Due to the lack of artists with the 
necessary skills, the price of the paintings would remain high. 
My interview with Umarov portrayed a familiar picture of the male-dominated 
Soviet art world. Male art buyers commissioned male artists, and both parties were ethnic 
Uzbeks. Hopefully, the local Arts Institute would have enough two-tier Uzbek male artists 
capable of teaching Uzbek male art students the necessary skills to satisfy the demand for 
stilllifes. But I felt that in this exciting new local-oriented art market there was little margin 
left for women artists. In the next section I provide an example of how some women 
succeed to thrive with the new domestication of arts. 
5.S.1. Lola Babayeva and ikat cloth 
In this section I assess a female Uzbek artist, Lola Babayeva (b. 1962) and her ways of 
adapting to the domestication of artS.102 By her move from the state sector to the non-state 
sector, she completely altered ideas of what woman could or could not do. Like Umarov, 
Babayeva was connected to Musina's gallery and actively helped Musina attract the desired 
Uzbek New Rich clientele. Babayeva entered the art market after the decline of the state-
101 Bakhtyar Umarov, interview, 12 July2001. 
102 Lola Babayeva, interview, 10 June 2000. 
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funded film industry in the 1990s; she had previously been a film production designer. 103 In 
her case, I will show that she was able to depoliticise national costume by making it 
commercially attractive. She traded in photo calendars containing models wearing her 
costumes, exhibiting costumes in various venues, and painting images of so-called 
'beauties'. Before examining Babayeva's creative practices in detail, I connect relevant 
anthropological theoretical aspects in relation to costume. 
Costume, in anthropological theory, is perceived through its capacity to embody 
national identity in a particular garment made of a specific type of textile; for example, a 
kilt made of Scottish tartan. The Scottish kilt represents not only Scottish identity but also 
variable colouring and patterns indicating different Scottish clans (Hobsbawm & Ranger 
1983). More broadly, clothing and costume are often markers of status in relation to gender, 
wealth or marital status (Tarlo 1996; King 1999; Eicher 1999). In the same way, Uzbek 
costume became closely associated with a textile called abr, translated from the Arabic as 
'cloudy' and better known in the West as ikat. I am going to show that through the efforts 
ofBabayeva (under the roof of Musina's Karavan), the cut and colouring ofikat came to 
connote for New Rich women not only their Uzbekness but also their marital position and 
their membership in the new social group. Those costumes were specially made for 
mahalla celebrations and garden parties in the courtyards of the New Rich. 
Returning to ikat as a national textile representing Uzbekness, I have to stress that 
the cloth's 'Uzbekness' (territorially defined within the contemporary frontiers of 
Uzbekistan) is a recent development. Ikat weaving has been done since the 8th century and 
is spread as far as northeastern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the western 
autonomous region of Xinjiang in China, Gujarat in India, Japan and Indonesia. But only in 
Uzbekistan did ikat achieve identification with national identity, and become venerated by 
Western auction houses dealing with non-western textiles. I have to explain in stages how 
exactly Uzbek ikat came to the surface in the Soviet period as part of the military complex, 
how ikat reached Western auction houses and later how it became part of Musina and 
Babayeva's post-Soviet marketing strategy. To make it clearer, this section concerns 
103 The Russian Cinematic Institute has a faculty of film production designers, which gives a very broad 
specialization for artists from planning sites of film location to designing costumes. 
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primarily the costume and textile history intertwined with Babayeva's experience as a film 
designer, and the following section assesses her work with Musina. 
Under Soviet rule, republican authorities attempted to preserve handmade textiles104 
as early as the civil war in which Uzbekistan was subdued (Skallerup 1990).105 Despite the 
opening of artel, or united enterprises by craftsmen, ikat slowly started disappearing from 
major Uzbek cities (Mahkamova 1970: 12; 1983: 86).106 In the 1970s, local Communist 
Party leader Sharaf Rashidov107, under the pretext of enlarging parachute silk factories in 
Margelan, opened two factories: Atlas, aimed at producing machine-made ikat, and an 
experimental factory, Yadgorlik, where ikat was handmade (Mahkamova 1963; Akilova 
1999). Soviet industrial production not only saved the craft (Koroleva 1972: 29; Suprun 
1982:4), but also improved the quality of production, because workers along the lengthy 
silk production chain underwent as many as thirty-seven processes of specialised 
qualification. The demand for the local mills' production evidenced a very steady local 
market which provided the titular nation population with traditional textiles for special 
occasions (Sorkin 2000: 8). But all that does not explain why such expensive non-utilitarian 
clothing which required costly, or in rural areas unavailable, dry cleaning (ikat is spoilt by 
washing), was kept by titular nation women for courtyard communal occasions. The 
transformation of ikat from smelly garb in sacks to festive clothing worn in mahalla 
gatherings to a national symbol in the late 1980s, I suggest in the following paragraph was 
owed to an appreciation ofUzbek ikat from abroad. 
According to various written sources and my firsthand fieldwork encounters, ikat 
was first brought to the West by Jewish emigres from Uzbekistan in the early 1980s (Sorkin 
2000; Frankl 1998). Since then, ikat cloth became highly commercially valued in the West. 
Due to the emigres bringing ikat from the Uzbek cities where it was produced, ikat became 
defined as Uzbek (Marechal 1985; Markuson 1988; Fitz Gibbon and Hale 1997; Ledes 
104 The favouring of silk by the communists is quite curious because silk was traditionally a luxury item even 
condemned by Islamic clerics. True believers are never supposed to wear clothing made of pure silk, therefore 
craftsmen were obliged to make clothing of mixed cotton and silk. Nomads, though, were known to purchase 
Pcure silk owing to its capacity to keep parasites away. 
05 Mark Skallerup (1990) stresses that the Soviet state protected craftsmen even in the 1930s, after the end of 
the Civil War in Uzbekistan. 
106 According to Saira Mahkamova (1970: 12; 1983: 86), individual craftsmen became united in 1935 by 
working at the state factory in Margelan in the F erghana Valley. 
107 SharafRashidov was First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party from 1959 until 1982. 
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1997; Watkins 1998; Carlano 1999). Because of its huge acclaim in the West as a type of 
textile which looks like a painting, ikat became a high art status symbol.108 As a result of 
that, after 1991 when Uzbekistan became widely accessible to foreigners, ikat came to be 
considered a national symbol of Uzbekistan (Mahkamova 1963, 1970, 1983; Avedova 
1986; Musina 1995; Akilova 1999). 
Babayeva graduated from the Cinematic Institute of Moscow (Tashpulatova 2001: 
44)109 and, unlike other artists who were solely painters, had a direct experience with 
national textiles from the very beginning of her artistic career. Her career fell into the 
period when Uzbek cinema incorporated two genres: historical period pieces and 
contemporary propaganda films. Babayeva's films were contemporary dramas inspired by 
the luxuriant medieval past or the adventurous early Soviet past. In her films, she depicts 
the uninspiring costumes of the Soviet Brezhnev period in semi-rural areas. In her film The 
Bride From Vuadil, the protagonists range from a new bride from an unrefined rural area to 
a more sophisticated family in an urban location, so the costumes had to demonstrate social 
and gender differentiation. These types of films honed Babayeva's ethnographic precision 
in reflecting the state order and propaganda of progress and the enlightenment of Soviet 
life. 
At the beginning of the post-Soviet period, Babayeva as a film production designer 
did not start too badly. But she was a divorcee with a growing boy, and she was the 
breadwinner for two retired and impoverished parents, both painters. Babayeva managed to 
participate in exciting ventures such as the British production Orlando, shot on location in 
Khiva, Uzbekistan; and the Uzbek blockbuster Tamerlane, filmed in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Those films provided her with experiences missed in the Soviet period: 
conceptualising historical costume dramas and utilising expensive textiles. But after those 
films, the work dried out because the Cinema Union suffered the same sad fragmentation 
process as the Union of Artists of the USSR. Witnessing the fall of two creative unions, she 
was not as hopeful as the majority of male artists but not entirely disappointed with the new 
institution, the Academy of Fine Arts. She was a film production designer who without a 
108 The head of the oriental textiles division at Christie's told me that even ikat gannents were defined as flat 
art, implying that flattened ikat robes could hang on walls like paintings. 
109 Tashpulatova (2001: 44) pointed out that Babayeva was among very few in Central Asia to gain this type 
of education, and the only Uzbek female to do so. 
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film industty could only do painting. She also understood that she could not rely on the 
state sector, only on what she was able to accomplish herself In the following section I 
discuss Babayeva's popularisation ofUzbek costume under the roof ofKaravan. 
5.8.2. Babayeva and the invention of themes connecting New Rich identity to mahalla 
identity 
As I previously mentioned, Babayeva as a cinematic artist had a wider experience, and 
broader and more market-oriented artistic vision than contemporary male painters. When 
we first discussed how she adapted to the new situation, she told me that she was inspired 
by the early 20th century Russian arts, which involved close cooperation between various 
arts such as photography, dance and painting. One such famous collaboration was the 
Ballet Russe under impresario Sergei Dyagilev. For those Paris productions, highly 
acclaimed costumes were created by Leon Bakst, the artists were photographed and the 
ballet performances studied in detail by choreographers. One of the most interesting Bakst 
works was devoted to the 1001 Arabian Nights fairy tales. Babayeva decided to paint 
images of 'beauties' dressed in so-called 'oriental' costumes in the Bakst style (see Fig.21, 
p.212). She produced photo shoots reminiscent of those Bakst odalisques, and she decided 
to streamline and modernise those ikat costumes, hoping it could go well in Karavan. 110 
I met her during one of those photo shoots in the courtyard of Karavan. Babayeva 
was carrying a painting of a 'beauty'. Musina was there, lending models her antique silver 
jewelry in preparation for the shoot. Some wealthy young men were also hanging around, 
friends of Musina's son Timur. They teased Babayeva, pointing at the picture portraying 
the belly-exposing languid 'beauty' and asking her, 'What about the model in your picture, 
could you introduce her to us?' Babayeva politely answered, 'Sorry boys, she's married.' 
Babayeva was aware that in New Rich families, men controlled spending on luxury items, 
but ikat clothing was not part of the male wardrobe. lkat clothing was always intended for 
women. To be suitable for both audiences, male and female, and of all age groups, 
Babayeva needed to clearly state her messages through the dissemination of various images 
using ikat cloth. 
110 Lola Babayeva, interview, 12 July 2001. 
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Fig. 21 Lola Babayeva's Krasavitsa (Beauty), (paper, gouache and watercolour, 2001). 
Photo taken by myself 
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Fig. 22 A model dressed in Lola Babayeva's design, which followed mahalla traditions of 
modesty in clothing. Photo from San 'at magazine, 2001. 
Fig.23 Lola Babayeva, Western-influenced clothing made from ikat cloth. Photo from 
San' at magazine, 2001. 
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She introduced drawings of delicately exposed 'beauties' dressed in Uzbek ikat, 
which titillated male audiences. Men, especially of a younger age, stopped associating ikat 
with their grandmothers' outfits. For those wealthy young men, to have Babayeva's 
painting on the wall was considered more appropriate to their social standing than a mere 
sexually explicit poster suitable for teenagers and purchased at a street market. 
She also arranged photo shoots of models dressed according to 'mahalla aesthetics' 
connoting modesty, propriety and respectfulness (long clothing with covered ankles and 
wrists) for annual calendars (Fig. 22, p. 213). Buying images of models in Uzbek ikat cloth 
was something which affirmed the buyer as 'moral' and Uzbek. Those tasteful calendars 
did not cause embarrassment or annoyance in the older generation. This type of calendar 
was aimed by Babayeva at families aspiring to one day become New Rich. 
She produced a line of clothing made of ikat for various social occasions for women 
from New Rich families. Rich women often had to participate in cultural events at which 
they were expected to show up dressed up in ikat clothing, but they wanted to have 
Western-cut clothes showing body line rather than traditionally shapeless Uzbek garments. 
For these Western-cut dresses, she used only handmade ikat produced by craftsmen \\!ho 
had left the Margelan factory and opened their own enterprises (Fig. 23, p.213). Those 
craftsmen's ikat was exported to London and Paris and sold for £80 per meter, mainly used 
by designers in Europe. Babayeva's clients wearing her dresses were not so much affirming 
'Uzbek' identity, following the mahalla-controlling older women, but affirming themselves 
as a new social group: the post-Soviet New Rich, proud of wearing their internationally 
fashionable attire. 
By reaching out to the traditional,the aspirational and also the New Rich, Babayeva 
managed to domesticated her paintings in a new context. Although those paintings were not 
the main part of her activities, she clearly illustrated to everybody the ways how women 
could broaden their activities in the local market. She proved that the inability to produce a 
Flemish still life did not bar an artist from success in the local art market. The most 
important capacity for an artist was to have a vision of whom they were targeting as clients, 
and why. 
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5.9. What does domestication of post-Soviet painting in the non-state market show? 
The domestication of painting in Tashkent revealed the complexities of the relationship 
between mahalla communal and domestic spaces and the values attached to those spaces. 
The relationship was negotiated through the choice of artistic themes selected by New Rich 
Uzbeks and mahalla residents and administration. Economic valuing of arts is not 
measured by the simple yardstick of money, but high cost does express affirmation to the 
new social group identity negotiated through courtyard themes. Molding such group 
identity is not as hennetic a process as it was in relation to Soviet Uzbek identity, 
imagining its own glorious Uzbek past. Borrowing from and relating to various cultures' 
locations and historical periods is broad, thoughtful and never lacks imagination. 
Domestication of painting made its own stars among artists and art dealers, some of 
whom became far more financially secure at home than they would have attempting to sell 
their works abroad. Looking at those who succeeded in the local art market, we can see that 
there were mature artists of both genders, not necessarily Uzbek, but well-educated and 
capable of conceptualising the necessities of the new social group within domestic space. 
Perhaps residents of Moscow, St. Petersburg and Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan, lacking 
courtyards and meaningful courtyard consumption, would never pay exorbitant prices for 
Flemish-style stilllifes nor purchase images of exotic beauties wearing ikat textiles. Those 
places have their own, different domestic spaces and their own New Rich who do not so 
dramatically struggle with their amassed wealth as their Uzbek counterparts. New Rich 
Uzbeks achieved what the Soviet system always made doubtful: whether local painting was 
Uzbek or Russian. From now on painting became truly Uzbek, by moving from 'public' 
state-controlled spaces to 'domestic/private' spaces via 'mahalIa/public' spaces. 
Domestication also revealed that increasingly, social and economic validation of 
artistic practices directly became attached to the moral values of artists, sellers and buyers. 
Those moral values were based on mahalla institutional values, which were different from 
those of the arts institutions. In the following chapter concerning the Russian Orthodox 
Church, I am going to show that the Church mirrors the mahalla institution in that it 
prioritises moral valuation over social and economic valuing in its assessments of religious 
artworks and their producers. 
Chapter 6 
The Russian Orthodox Church: Renewing Church Arts 
Commissioning in Tashkent (1998-2004) 
6.1. Introduction 
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Chapter 6 discusses a newly revived commissioner of painting, the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the ROC has become the second biggest 
commissioner of art after the state in terms of the scale and substance of commissions. 
Chapter 6 explores the sacred religious validation of arts, which is different from secular 
arts validation, using the example of the Church's moral valuing of religious painting 
and its producers from 1998-2004. The Church has distinct moral parameters regarding 
arts, and claims sole moral authority to religious validation of art through sanctification 
of artworks and approval of artists. Only priests can sanctify (osvyatit ') a work of art, 
transforming it from a simple secular works into a holy religious object. The essential 
purpose of a religious art object is to connect a praying believer to God. This is 
particularly true regarding the Orthodox Church's tradition of icons, which will be 
discussed in this chapter. Owing to the role of the religious art object as transmitter 
between God and believer, an icon painter's strength of belief, personal religious 
practice, conduct and comportment affect, in the eyes of the Church, the religious 
efficacy of his product. The ROC is responsible for the production and consumption of 
religious paintings, which are an integral part of Orthodox Christian worship, and 
conducts its valuing practices from a purely moral framework. 
In this chapter, I argue that the ROC's valuing of religious arts is adaptable to 
institutional changes caused by the schism between the Church and the Soviet state, the 
fall of Communism and the emergence of independent Uzbekistan. These changes, and 
their effects on the Church's arts-valuing system, were not discussed in either art 
historical or theological literature (see art history in Chapter 1, p.3I). An assessment of 
current ROC valuing of religious art, based on a study of reintroduced religious 
practices, could demonstrate the fluidity of the Church's valuing principles. 
The Russian Orthodox Church lacks significant social influence in Uzbekistan. 
Independent Uzbekistan is a secular state in which all religious institutions, including 
the ROC, are tightly controlled by various state offices responsible for the censorship of 
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published religious literature, oversight of funds used by the Church and release of land 
for the construction of new Church buildings. In addition, the ROC also has little 
economic power in Uzbekistan, owing to the local dioceses' economic dependence on 
the main office in Russia. The continuous decrease of the number of believers and 
potential believers, through Slavic emigration to Russia, further weakens the social and 
economic standing of the ROC in Uzbekistan. 
My main argument is that the Church is rapidly reshaping its valuing practices in 
response to post-1991 institutional changes. To find out how the ROC values religious 
painting and its producers, we have to start with the valuers and producers. Traditional 
valuers and producers were monks (Florensky 2002; Ouspensky 1982).111 The newly 
emerged valuers of religious painting were not monks but parish priests and nuns. 
Priests and nuns are not expected by the Church to have sound theological knowledge 
for valuing religious painting. Parish clerics are responsible for supervision of the laity'S 
religious practice and conducting religious services at local churches. Meanwhile, nuns' 
main vocation is limited to charitable works for the sick and poor. The renewed 
institutional practices of valuing religious painting can be assessed through participation 
and observation of daily religious practice, interviewing religious practitioners and 
observation of their interactions with the producers of religious arts. 
It becomes equally important to fmd out who was allowed to produce icons by 
these religious valuers. The new producers were professional artists, not monks. Monks 
give their vows to the Church, live within a monastery compound, and are celibate. 
Their lives revolve around prayer, abstinence and serving within the single realm of the 
ROC. Professional artists are both men and women, of diverse ethnicities, family 
situations, types of secular education and incomes. 
Professional artists working for the Church live in overlapping social domains: 
the Church through commissioning, the mahalla due to their domestic residence and the 
Union of Artists and later the Academy of Fine Arts through their membership. As I 
discussed in previous chapters, all those institutions had a strong moral emphasis. But 
111 Pavel Florensky and Leonid Ouspensky were two luminaries of Russian theology who discussed the 
valuing of Russian icon painting from a purely theological perspective. Both of them viewed icon 
painting as an integral part of the monastic tradition. Their literary heritage is inaccessible in Uzbekistan 
for ideological and linguistic reasons. The Uzbek state limits circulation of any theological literature 
which does not openly support the current regime of president Karimov, and Florensky's and 
Ouspensky's works were written well before the independent Uzbek state emerged. Florensky was 
executed by the Soviet state in 1924, whereas Ouspensky died in 1982. Ouspensky was a Russian emigre 
who lived in France; his books were written in French and English and never translated into Russian. 
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the moral values of each of those institutions are not the same, and it is necessary to 
examine how the artists cope with conflicting moral values. 
Bearing in mind this question, I have divided Chapter 4 into three parts: the first 
section discusses the historical background and the following sections introduce two 
artists, one working with religious painting and one using religious themes in secular 
painting. The historical background section explains the Church's efforts since 1991 to 
revive the monastic tradition in Tashkent, one of the aims of which was to promote the 
Orthodox Christian faith through production by a convent of religious art objects for 
worship. 
Table NA. The number of artists working with Christian themes 
Artists working with Christian themes 116 
Artists sanctifying religious artworks at 83 
various times in all Tashkent churches 
Artists sanctifying icons at the same 21 
church with the same priest 
Artists involved in the Holy Trinity 12 
Church 
During my fieldwork (1999-2001) I questioned 452 artists and found 116 who worked 
with religious themes. After that, I determined who of these artists had undergone 
Church valuing (see Table 4). Finally, to make reliable and consistent data I needed to 
focus on artists who worked consistently at the same location and who dealt with the 
same ecclesiastical valuers over an extended period. For this reason, I chose two very 
different artists working in the same site, the Holy Trinity Church convent, in the period 
of 1998-2001. These two artists present different characteristics. One, Alexei Rassol, 
was a Russian male, a devout Christian, a professional artist by education and by 
vocation an ikonopisets (icon painter). The other, Olga Kharitonova, was not considered 
fit to be an ikonopisets according to the Church's parameters for a religious artefact 
producer. Kharitonova was Orthodox Christian, but female, of mixed ethnic origin, a 
professional painter and volunteer icon painter. 
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6.2. The Russian Orthodox Church in Tashkent 
In the fITst three sections I explore the institutional differences between parish priests 
and monks, and nuns and monks, in order to demonstrate how the institutional positions 
of these religious functionaries affect their perceptions of how religious art and its 
producers should be valued. 
I begin with the parish clergy, a category different from monks. In Russian 
society, the parish clergy have represented a special class since the medieval period, in 
which the priesthood was a family occupation.112 Parish clergy have never played an 
important administrative role for various reasons: the parish clergy is made up of 
married priests who were often unable to engage in demanding Church appointments. 
The parish clergy dealt with mundane aspects of secular life which did not require deep 
theological knowledge. Unlike parish clerics, monks came from all sways of society and 
various ethnic groups. All administrative positions within the Church structure were 
recruited only from the ranks ofmonksl13 who, as a rule for getting promoted, needed to 
be broadly educated in secular and theological disciplines. 
According to Christel Lane (1981) and Nathaniel Davis (1988), the status of the 
two types of clergy was affected by the schism between the Church and the Soviet state. 
Lane (1981) suggested that under Soviet rule, parish clergy wielded more authority 
because of the Soviet suppression of monasteries. However, parish clerics' acquisition 
of new administrative responsibilities coincided with a loss of their traditional parish 
work. Lane connected the decline of the parish work to the poor intellectual level of 
parish clerics. She especially pointed at the Central Asian dioceses; in Central Asia, 
large numbers of ordained priests not only lacked religious education but also had not 
even completed secondary school. Davis (1998) summarised that after the fall of the 
Soviet state, the Church attempted to reform its parish clergy through improvements in 
education and bettering their skills for parish work, as well as to revive the monastic 
tradition. 
Owing to the fact that in Uzbekistan the ROC was represented only by parish 
clergy,114 the Church's attempts to recuperate from the effects of the Soviet period on its 
institutional structure led to the reinforcement of the parish clergy in independent 
112 See Hosking (1997: 235). 
113 Parish clergy could become promoted to positions occupied by monastic clerics only if the parish 
priest was widowed and became a monk. 
114 The only exception was the archbishop, who came from monks' ranks and was appointed by the main 
Russian office. 
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Uzbekistan. The ROC opened a religious educational institution called the Academia in 
1998 in Tashkent, in order to improve the education of local priests. However, making 
formal religious education necessary for priests' ordainment reduced access to the 
priesthood for other social groups. All 29 places for the Academia's four-year courses 
were filled by the sons of parish clergy. The students were required to be married by the 
time of their graduation, and they looked for brides with similar family backgrounds. lI5 
The Tashkent parish clergy became an increasingly tight, insular and family-related 
community. In further sections I am going to demonstrate that the parish clergy's 
insularity affected the formation of the monastic tradition between 1998 and 2004, and 
influenced parish clerics' valuing of artists. 
6.3. The monastic tradition in Uzbekistan 
Russian Orthodox religious arts were developed within the monastic tradition, but in 
Uzbekistan the Church did not attempt to re-establish that tradition until 1998. My 
following assessment of the current ROC explains why it was easier for the Church to 
open new convents than monasteries. This leads to an explanation why in convents, 
religious art valuers were not only nuns but parish priests. Then I specify why the 
subsequent revival of icon painting took place in a female convent. 
Although convents and monasteries belong to the same monastic tradition, nuns 
have a status far below that of monks. Nuns play no role within the ROC's institutional 
structure. Nor are they similar to parish priests: nuns participate in, but can not officiate, 
religious practices. The conduct of religious services in a convent required the daytime 
presence of a parish priest. In order to function, convents needed both priests and nuns. 
Opening monasteries was difficult in Tashkent because there were more women 
wishing to take the veil than men wishing to take monastic vows. The strong presence 
of women in the Orthodox Christian faith has been discussed by various anthropologists 
since the 1970s (Lane 1981: 42; Dragadze 1993). These scholars stressed women 
believers' predominant numbers in church attendance, and women's attempt to 
influence religious practice in the cases of the absence of male religious functionaries 
during the Soviet period. 
115 Divorce is practically unacceptable by the ROC, and is completely impermissible for priests: if a 
priest were to divorce through a secular court, he would be immediately defrocked. Priests needed brides 
who understood that divorce was an impossibility. 
221 
The scarcity of men willing to become monks was due to two factors. The first 
was the continuous emigration of Uzbekistan's ethnic Russians to Russia. The second 
was the preference among clerics' sons for the secure option of parish priesthood, 
entitling them to a family, free education and a lifelong stable income. 
So it was not surprising then that in Tashkent, the Church attempted to revive the 
monastic tradition by opening not a monastery but a female convent. A convent, in 
addition to its direct religious function and charitable work, was supposed to become 
engaged in the production of religious art objects. Therefore the opening of a convent 
required the commissioning of artists, first to decorate the building and then to teach 
nuns to produce religious art objects. 
The opening of any new Church establishment presented difficulties. Under 
Uzbek law, the ROC can reclaim any property it owned prior to 1922, whether land or 
religious buildings. But in practical terms it is not easy for the Church to recover 
property, because those buildings have been appropriated by state institutions or 
because the old Church-owned buildings were levelled and the land rebuilt. The Church 
needed plots of land in urban areas with a high concentration of potential believers. In 
Uzbekistan, the Slavic population is clustered only in three densely populated cities: 
Tashkent, Fergana and Samarkand. In the post-Soviet period, Samarkand and Fergana 
have become overwhelmingly populated either by Uzbeks or Tajiks, leaving only 
Tashkent, in which there is an even split between Uzbeks and Slavs. To build a convent 
in a public space in Tashkent was a symbolic challenge to the majority-Muslim Uzbek 
state, and to build it in a residential area of Tashkent would mean antagonising the 
mahalla. Therefore, for the ROC each case of opening a religious establishment is a 
special case, and the case of the convent in which I did my research is worthy of an 
introduction. 
6.4. The Holy Trinity convent 
In this section I discuss the history of the opening ofthe Holy Trinity convent in 1998 in 
the area near the Rice Market. Then I explore how its reopening changed the 
relationship between the ROC and the laity. 
On the contemporary site of the Holy Trinity convent, there was a short-lived 
convent which was opened and closed down during the First World War. The closure of 
the convent was followed by the introduction of the first Soviet city regeneration 
scheme in Tashkent. The 1924 regeneration scheme aimed to give leased land for 
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building private property to the Russian working class population in the Rice Market 
area, and the remains of the convent were levelled. However, the regeneration scheme 
provided residents with much smaller land plots compared with the New City houses, 
Old City mahalla or mahalla of the 1970s-1980s, allowing only the construction of 
houses consisting of a kitchen and one living room with facilities in a tiny courtyard 
with no space for a vegetable plot, garden, poultry, cowshed or water tank.116 Yet the 
smallness of these new houses ensured that this mainly Slavic-populated area kept its 
Russianness in the post-Soviet period, due to Uzbeks' unwillingness to move here from 
other Tashkent areas. This limited the creation of the local mahalla community and 
made the local mahalla administration ineffective. The U zbek state, motivated by the 
weakness of the mahalla, permitted the ROC to clear out Russians' houses built over 
former ROC land for the rebuilding of the Holy Trinity Church and convent. The 
clearing of houses for building the convent was welcomed by local Russians, and did 
not provoke a sense of resentment by residents towards the state or the Church. 
The Holy Trinity church with its walled convent was built deep in the Rice 
Market area, providing the possibility for a renewed relationship between the ROC and 
the laity. The building and decorating of the Holy Trinity Church took place between 
1998 and 2001, after which there was at last a parish, with actively practicing 
parishioners and parish clerics overseeing religious services. There were three priests: 
two fathers named Vladimir and father Genadiy, all of whom churchgoers knew by 
name and who knew parishioners by name as well. The number of churchgoers 
averaged 80 for daily services, and on Sundays and holidays numbered over 200. Daily 
services were attended mainly by old retired women, while Sunday service was attended 
by men and women of various age, who brought their children with them. Apart from 
conducting services from six a.m. until six p.rn., priests performed all Christian rites and 
rituals such as baptisms, weddings, funerals, taking confessions and the blessing of 
workplaces and objects (purchases of great material value such as cars, or as small as 
food) for their parishioners. There were also nuns, busy with singing during church 
services, praying, helping priests and arranging choirs around the administrative office 
and workshops. The creation of the convent required the services of artists, whom 
116 The small size of the Russian families' houses in the Rice Market area made the area extremely poor, 
because residents depended entirely on their salaries earned from factories, without the possibility of 
having supplies provided by vegetable plots, orchards and livestock. Despite the surviving cultural 
homogeneity in the post-Soviet period, nobody wishes to stay on in such areas because they are ridden 
with alcoholism and violent crime. 
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parish clerics and nuns expected to become devoted parishioners. Their artistic worth 
was based more on their status as obedient parishioners than on their skills as religious 
artefact producers. As parishioners, artists were requested to regularly attend church 
services, take communion, celebrate Church holidays, fast and pray at home - activities 
not requested of them before 1998. In the following section I concentrate on an artist 
who worked at the Holy Trinity Church, Alexei Rassol. 
6.5. Alexei RassoI 
I start with the icon painter Alexei Rassol because I first met him in the Holy Trinity 
church. In fact, the local ROC commissioning started with Rassol, and after him there 
were set requirements clarifying who could work as an icon painter in Tashkent. 
Rassol's practice revealed the local ROC's capacity to assess icon painting during the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods. 
Alexei Rassol,117 who was 78 years old at the time of our interviews in 1999, 
was a local ethnic Russian. His parents were from Russia. He had been raised by his 
mother, a secretly practising Christian, and knew very little about his father. However, 
he was aware that since he had belonged to the gentry and served in the Russian Tsarist 
army, he should avoid advertising his family past. Before the Great Patriotic War, 
Rassol graduated from the Samarkand Arts College. After the war he was falsely 
denounced and sentenced to ten years in a prison camp. After his release, Rassol 
returned to being a creative artist, working on Church commissions for the oldest 
monastery in Moscow, Donskoi Monastery. He was also known within non-conformist 
art circles after his participation with other non-conformist Russian artists in the famous 
1962 'Bulldozer Exhibition' banned by Nikita Khrushchev. Rassol's rich creative 
experience made him aware of the difference in valuing art works within secular and 
religious commissioning systems. Rassol was commissioned by the ROC in 1954 to 
carry out church decoration throughout the former Soviet Union, and he worked on 58 
churches in total. In the following section I focus on the ROC's valuing of artists. 
117 Interviews took place after permission was gained from Mother Superior Lubov, the head of the 
convent, and after Father Vladimir, who leads services there, had given his blessing for questioning the 
employed icon painter. 
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6.6. Church valuing of religious art producers before the Soviet period 
In this section I explore the Church's valuing prior to the Soviet period, a subject which 
was not examined by art historians (Tarasov 2002; Sarabianov 1981, 1989, 1990). 
These historians' works on religious art in Russia are important for two reasons. First, 
they did not limit their research of religious arts to the monastic tradition, as theologians 
like Florensky and Ouspensky did. Secondly, they argued that the changing status of 
religious art producers depended on the position of the Church in the Russian state. 
According to art historians, during the medieval period, when the Church 
achieved its highest position in the feuding states, the Church had its choice of icon-
painters from the large ranks of monks. After Peter the Great's reforms, the Church was 
downgraded to the bureaucratic institution of the Synod. During the second half of the 
18th century, professional artists emerged along with the introduction of secular 
educational institutions such as the Fine Arts Academy in Russia. Artists were 
commissioned by the Church to decorate religious buildings as monks had previously 
been. At the same time there emerged craftsmen working for Church commissions, 
concentrated in three villages: Kholuy, Mstyora and Palekh. These artisans were not 
required to have extensive religious training or secular painting education. The decrease 
of the church's status at the later period of Russian history resulted in an increase of 
professional artists and craftsmen in Church commissions. However, artists' and 
craftsmen's prestige was lower than monks, and the Church was able to tum down a 
commission if the work did not follow the religious canon.lI8 
Nevertheless, art historians' research never directly focused on how the lowering 
of the ROC's status in the Russian state from the 17th century through 1917 affected its 
valuing of non-monastic religious art producers and their works. The absence of any 
concise study of the Church's institutional valuing of non-monastic religious artists 
contributed to the current perception in post-Soviet artistic and religious circles that 
Church valuing remains intransigent. In the following section, I demonstrate that the 
lowering of the Church's status under the Soviet state shaped its valuing of the non-
monastic arts producers and their arts, influenced by Soviet arts institutional practices. 
118 Failing to adhere to the religious canon was nothing unusual: sometimes even such outstanding artists 
as Mikhail Vrubel had their commissions rejected on these grounds. 
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6.7. ROC valuing of religious art producers during the Soviet period 
To understand Soviet-era Church valuing I look at Oleg Kharhordin (1999), who 
questioned the extent of the schism between the Church and state under Soviet rule. 
Providing examples of the striking similarities in practices conducted by the Church and 
state (for example, confession of sins in the Church and the Soviet practice of self-
criticism), he argued that the Soviet state in fact borrowed many traits from the ROC. I 
am going to show that such borrowing could go both ways: that the Church also took on 
elements and practices from the state. The further examples demonstrate how the 
Church chose its religious art producers. 
One example of the Church borrowing from the state was the selection of 
religious arts producers from the ranks of professional artists based on Soviet arts 
institutional practices. The Church had lost its monastic icon painters with the closure of 
monasteries, and it was left to cope with the institutionalization of arts and crafts, which 
enrolled artists into the Union of Artists and employed craftsmen in state enterprises (I 
will discuss an example of this, the Palekh factory, in the following chapter concerning 
miniature painting). Artists and craftsmen affiliated with the state commission system 
were retrained in the secular style of Socialist Realism. But the selection of those artists 
by the Soviet arts institution depended on their parents' class origin and ethnicity.119 
Having to commission art works from professionals educated or having work 
experience in the atheist state sector made the Church borrow the blueprint of the state's 
own selection system, rather than invent new practices. In the following section 
concerning Rassol's commission, I discuss what type of artist the ROC targeted 
according to class and ethnicity. 
6.S. The ROC's choice of religious art works producers 
My interviews with Rassol's interviews between 1999 and 2001 illustrated the typical 
situation under which ROC commissions had been restarted. In the 1950s, the Church 
commissioned him to redecorate the Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral. This early commission 
119 Parental class origin played a crucial role during Stalin's regime. The class issue became less relevant 
only during the last decade of the existence of the Soviet state. Ethnicity also played an important role 
with the creation of the USSR Professionals of the titular nation ethnicity were given preferential 
treatment for entering associated Unions in their Soviet repUblics. For example, Uzbek artists had better 
chances of joining the Union of Artists in Uzbekistan, but would have less chances of entering the Union 
in neigbouring Kazakhstan. The same rules were applied to Russian artists. 
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indicates that the ROC's criteria for artists were set during the early years of the 
legalisation of the Church. 
Earlier Soviet policies persecuting the Church changed during the Great Patriotic 
War. In 1942, the Soviet state accepted all types of support, even from the previously 
antagonised Russian Orthodox Church (Gordienko & Novikov 1988: 317). The Church 
donated a considerable amount of money to the state to fund the army. This 
collaboration with the communist state gained the ROC a humble position in the 
Religious Office of the Soviet state, as well as legalised status. During the 1950s, 
Church buildings that had been confiscated and converted for utilitarian purposes were 
returned to the Church. However, the ROC could not use them for religious practices 
until these facilities had restored their traditional decorations and were reconsecrated. 
During the 1950s, the clergy took on an ambitious project to revive the most prominent 
of Central Asian diocese churches, the Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral on Gospitalnaya 
Street. 
The newer Central Asian dioceses had always either invited Russian craftsmen 
and artists to decorate their churches, or simply imported religious art objects from 
Russia, but by the 1950s there were no possibilities available. By that time in 
Uzbekistan several Art Colleges had been established, producing up to 20 artists 
annually, and there were already over 20 artists affiliated with the local Union of 
Artists. Tashkenty clerics conceded that they had no choice but to commission a local 
professional artist with an atheist education. 
There was also a gender issue: an icon-painter's redecoration of an entire church 
building would include work over the iconostasis, a sacred wall of icons separating the 
nave from the altar, and according to Church law, this work had to be done by men. In 
the Orthodox Christian faith women were forbidden to enter certain parts of the church, 
and therefore female artists could not participate in large-scale interior church 
decoration. But in the 1950s there were few women artists in Uzbekistan anyway; it was 
highly unlikely that clerics ever approached them. 
Most local artists were linked to the state through their work under the existing 
state commission system. But for the decoration of the Cathedral, the Church preferred 
an artist unattached to the commission system of the atheist state. There was only one 
reason for an artist to be disqualified by the Union of Artists: on political grounds. 
These artists unattached to the state commission system became social outcasts. 
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The Church clerics specifically targeted these Soviet arts institutional outcasts. 
The choice of outcast was guided by his ethnicity, which marked a potential believer. 
Even if the artist was not baptised or practising, he should at least by origin be from an 
Orthodox Christian family which had practised the faith prior to 1922. For the ROC, an 
artist's ethnicity has always been an indicator of the depth of religious practice within 
his family. The Russian empire consisted of different ethnic groups, and there believers 
were treated differently of depending on when conversion had taken place. Those who 
counted centuries of established religious practice were Russians, Eastern Ukrainians 
and Greeks. There were also more recent converts, consisting of whole ethnic groups or 
individuals. For an entire ethnic group, mass conversion was usually a means of 
becoming Russian subjects. One such ethnic group was the Koreans. During the Tsarist 
era, Koreans, in order to obtain the right to settle in the Russian Far East, underwent 
conversion from Buddhism to Orthodox Christianity. Under Stalin they were forcibly 
relocated to Central Asian Soviet republics. Koreans in Uzbekistan rarely kept up their 
practice of the Orthodox faith during the Soviet period. During both the Tsarist and 
Soviet periods there were also few individual converts from other religious 
denominations who were always called by pejorative names, such as the converted Jews 
referred to as vykrest. There were obvious reasons to convert from Judaism during both 
the Tsarist and Soviet periods. But for all converts in the Tsarist period, conversion 
provided such benefits as right to live and work in Moscow and St. Petersburg and to be 
able to study in university. In the Soviet period, conversion was an affIrmation of 
Russian cultural identity (Kornblatt Deutsch 2004). 
Rassol is characteristic of a Soviet-period icon painter: a professional male artist 
of Russian ethnicity, educated within Soviet institutions, who through his church 
employment became an active religious practitioner. The parish clergy's choice of artist 
is a mirror image of the Soviet commission system. The Soviet system expected male 
painters to be ideologically fit to produce a masterpiece in the genre of thematic 
composition. Additionally, the artists' parents' origin was always taken into account by 
the Union of Artists of the USSR; parents had to be of the politically loyal classes of 
workers and peasants. The parish clergy's selection of Rassol can be explained not only 
by his social position (a skilled worker outcast from society following imprisonment), 
but also by his parents' social class (gentry) and familyethnicity (Russian). 
After clarifying the characteristics of the typical Soviet-period religious art 
producer, in the following section I examine the Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral 
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commission. An exploration of a ROC commission of the 1950s indicates that for parish 
clerics, it was easier to select the artist than to provide the necessary guidance for that 
novice religious artefact producer to achieve canonic correctness in his commission. 
6.9. Soviet period: the Svyatonspenskiy Cathedral commission 
Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral on Gospitalnaya Street was Rassol's fIrst experience in 
church painting, and he was not proud of the end result. Rassol put all the blame on 
himself Coming from state-run art, he unconsciously compared religious painting 
commissioning to its secular counterpart. 
According to him, his main problem was a naive assumption that within 
religious arts there should be a single existing style of religious painting, as there was 
the single style of Socialist Realism within the state's commission system. However, 
Rassol found that in religious arts there were in fact several styles that had been used 
during different historical periods: 
1) the Russian iconic style inherited from the Greek Orthodox Church and developed into 
distinct local versions all over Russia; 
2) the secular Western-oriented style of the Russian Fine Arts Academy that emerged after 
Peter the Great's reformation, when iconic images were replaced by non-canonic 
images; and 
3) the style used in the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century, when artists tried to reassess Orthodox Christianity spirituality with regard to 
contemporary events. 
For Rassol, another inheritance from the secular system was his desire to make 
everything 'beautiful'. He reasoned that his craving for beauty was understandable after 
a decade of labour in prison. However, he believed it was an ignorant, impulsive 
craving that he now describes as deeply sinful. After practising for many years under 
the Church commission system, he came to understand that a church was not a place for 
aesthetic admiration, but for the saving of souls. In following section I discuss Rassol's 
decoration of the Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral commission. 
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6.10. An assessment of Rassol's commission 
My observation of the Svyatouspenskiy Cathedral as a religious site is necessary 
because it helps to understand why Rassol worried that his workmanship could affect 
the believers worshipping within his creation. 
The Cathedral was rebuilt in the late 19th century style, characterised by the use 
of luxurious gilded surfaces and Corinthian columns, and was light blue in colour. The 
interior decoration includes frescoes, an iconostasis, a cross and icons. Decoration 
follows a canonic composition with vertically structured divine figures: Christ 
positioned on the dome, the four Apostles under the dome, the iconostasis dividing the 
altar from the main prayer area and the walls covered with icons. Rassol's paintings (in 
fresco and tempera) are easily recognisable as the work of an artist well-trained in 
socialist realism. The holy images are portrayed as fleshy and glorious, and are executed 
in the most baroque style. The baroque look is achieved by introducing dramatic clouds 
in each small scene. Apart from Rassol's frescoes, iconostasis and cross, all the interior 
walls of the church are densely covered with icons donated by believers. These 
abundant icons are made in different styles and techniques: they are painted in Russian 
and secular Western European styles, and some are even embroidered. 
Inexperienced worshippers returning to religious practice after 72 years under an 
atheist state interpreted the church decorations in an entirely different way from Rassol. 
With his religious perspective gained over time, he now :finds the decorations 
theologically unacceptable. Referring to them bitterly as 'sinful images', he said he 
would have preferred to destroy them. But for new believers, his decorations served to 
reconnect them to their own Russian Christian past. 120 Rassol's 'sinful holy images'-
combining flying holy images on clouds with the robust working-class Apostles in the 
Socialist Realist style - did not perturb members of the new congregation, who attended 
church services irregularly. Rassol's frescoes were on the upper level of the walls and 
the iconostasis was far from the reach of believers. Worshippers mainly addressed the 
icons that were situated on the lower level of the church building, following from one 
icon to another. They were unaffected by theological considerations about how images 
should look according to the canon. 
In the following sections, I move to the post-Soviet period, assessing a current 
ROC commission: the decoration with religious art objects of the Holy Trinity convent. 
120 Alexei Rassol, interview, 19 November 1999. 
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6.11. Post-Soviet period: the Holy Trinity Church commission 
Despite Rassol's awareness of the religious canon, which grew from his lengthy 
experiences working within the ROC commission system, he had trouble accepting the 
moral superiority of religious functionaries such as nuns. In this case, Rasso I' s disputes 
with Mother Superior Lubov demonstrate that the actual choice of colour of the church 
building was dictated by the individual choice of his supervisor, the Mother Superior, 
rather than following theological principles or secular traditions. 
One morning when I entered the church shop, the nuns were complaining that 
although the Mother Superior had chosen an umber shade that would have looked 
particularly stunning at sunset, the 'icon painter' (as they called Rassol) had 
insensitively opposed the Mother Superior's wish and had insisted on using a pale white 
paint. I asked the nuns why they thought the choice of colour mattered at all. The nuns 
explained that all decision-making over commissions was done by the convent's three 
priests, because they had to sanctify every single object within the building. The nuns, 
including the Mother Superior, have no say in the convent's decoration because they 
could not sanctify art works. The choice of colour is one of the few areas within ROC 
commissions in which nuns' opinion could matter. Therefore they felt that it was 
insensitive for the icon painter to oppose the Mother Superior. 
After leaving the shop and waiting until the end of the church service, I met with 
Rassol. He explained to me the historical symbolism of the paint colours that lay behind 
his difficult decision to oppose the Mother Superior. 121 White, he said, was typical of 
medieval Russian churches. The widespread use of other colours started at the advent of 
Peter the Great's rule in the 17th century (Nikolskii 1985: 190). It had been introduced 
under Peter the Great's father, Tsar Alexis, and was called the Naryshkin style after 
Peter's mother's family name. Naryshkin-style churches were easily recognisable with 
their red-painted walls, white architectural details, and the introduction of elongated 
columns. It was regarded as an attempt to incorporate Western influences, which had 
appeared at the time of the second marriage of Tsar Alexis with Natalya Naryshkina. 
The choice of colour changed with each succeeding Russian monarch. 
According to Rassol, white symbolised the era prior to Peter the Great's rule. He 
suggested that the latter period was associated with the Church becoming a repressive 
121 Alexei Rassol, interview, 12 March 2000. 
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bureaucratic institution, instead of an equal to the state (particularly with the degrading 
of the sanctity of confession through Soviet-era priests denouncing their confessing 
parishes). The image of the Holy Church, whose reputation was pure and high for 
Rassol, was associated with the time before the introduction of secular painting 
tradition. His ideal image was of green Russian plains with a modest white church 
surmounted by a gilded dome that could be seen from the opposite bank of a river. This 
idyllic image ofa Russian church is found in a range of literature from children's books 
to tourist brochures. 
Fig. 24 The Holy Trinity Church in Tashkent, painted in the colour requested by the 
Mother Superior. Photo taken by myself in 2000. 
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This odd dispute over colour between the Mother Superior and the artist was 
mainly about how artistic practices should be conducted in post-Soviet church 
commissions (see Fig. 24, p. 231). The disagreement was settled in favour of the 
Mother Superior, whose idea was based on her individual liking rather than her 
theological sophistication or cultural and historical knowledge. Yet she was very keen 
to show Rassol that although her status was modest within the ROC's institutional 
hierarchy, she still possessed moral authority as a religious functionary. In the following 
section, I assess Rassol's thoughts concerning his post-Soviet commission. I illustrate 
the artist's attempts to reconcile the importance of correct theological requirements with 
the actual production of religious artworks. 
6.12. Post-Soviet icon-painter and icons 
Within religious arts, icons occupy a special role because believers communicate with 
divine powers through the worship of icons. Icons are represented by both individual 
icons and iconostases. An iconostasis is the partition between the altar and the nave, or 
praying area. However, in the Orthodox Christian faith an iconostasis represents more 
than a functional partition. An iconostasis is a monumental wall of assembled icons, as 
wide and as tall as the whole building of the church. From a theological perspective, an 
iconostasis is the manifestation of the Russian Orthodox Church based on Greek ritual 
(Florensky 2002; Ouspensky 1989; Tarasov 2002: 8). 
The top of an iconostasis contains a cross, followed beneath by the ftrst row of 
icons containing images of the Old Testament prophets. Below that is a second row with 
icons containing images of the prophets of the New Testament. The third row depicts 
the Apostles, and the fourth contains icons depicting Church holidays. The lower part of 
the iconostasis is divided into three parts. The left side consists of the left 'deacon's 
gate' in between a miscellaneous icon and an Our Lady icon. The right side consists of 
the right deacon's gate in between the Church's icon (in the case of the Holy Trinity 
Church, there was the Holy Trinity icon), and the Savior icon. In the centre are located a 
wide narrow icon depicting the Last Supper and the 'royal gate'. A royal gate consists 
of the icon depicting the Annunciation, below which are placed four icons depicting the 
four Evangelists. The skill needed by the icon painter is varied, starting from a simple 
individual icon to a complex iconostasis holding together many icons. 
233 
Rassol, as an icon-painter repeatedly commissioned by the ROC, stressed 
throughout the important role of priests during the creation of the iconostasis. Rassol 
believed that a painter had to be personally blessed by a priest before starting his work, 
and that during the time of his work, the artist also had to fast and pray intensively in 
order to remove himself from mundane everyday life. The artist, according to Rassol, 
also had to regularly confess to a priest and take Holy Communion. Otherwise, he said, 
negative energy could flow from the icon to the believer. He also affirmed that after 
completion of the work, the artist must ask a priest to sanctify it in order that it becomes 
a sacred object. In other words, the supervision of priests, regardless of their theological 
knowledge, is essential for religious artefact producers from the beginning until the end 
of a project. 
Using the example of the Holy Trinity Church icon, Rassol attempted to specify 
the meaning of the iconic 'prototype'. His defmition of an icon was similar to Pavel 
Florensky's, which was that 'each icon has its prototype and the icon painter's goal is to 
produce exactly from the prototype, not showing his individuality or style' (Florensky 
2002: 87). Rassol explained to me that when he was a beginner, he was not aware of the 
prototype rule, so interpretation of religious works had been a painful issue for him. He 
referred to the pictorial representation of the composition of the Holy Trinity. 
According to him, the composition of the Holy Trinity is the most common case in 
which icon painters mixed up different religious traditions, Western Catholic and 
Russian Orthodox. The Western tradition was much freer in allowing artists to interpret 
religious themes. Western versions interpreted the Trinity with Jesus as handsome and 
dark-haired, the Holy Spirit as a white dove, and God the Father as a white-haired, 
bearded grandfather. The ideal Russian 'prototype' of the Holy Trinity was elaborated 
by the 15th century icon painter Andrei Rublev. Rublev represented the Trinity as three 
equally youthful angels. Rassol was angered by the idea that the Holy Spirit might be 
presented as an unintelligent dove, even metaphorically. Therefore, he insisted that 
artists had to follow Rublev's prototype in their creative work. 
Rassol showed me his Holy Trinity icon within the church's iconostasis, which 
looked very different from his work in the Gospitalnaya Street cathedral. Rassol's 
images in the Holy Trinity icon were flat and decorative, the colours were restrained, 
and the deep shades had disappeared. Although Rassol had followed Andrei Rublev's 
composition, he had not used Rublev's palette of radiant colours; Rassol's own colours 
were pale and washed out. I tried to politely ask him why it looked so pale. Rassol 
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explained that an icon should be light, as clear as God's message. He turned to one of 
the small icons on the wall and apologetically commented: 'They are dark, aren't they? 
This is by a friend of mine. He's a young artist who tries to work in icon-painting but 
the dark side of his character comes out in his icons.' Rassol was highly resentful of the 
separate icons within the church buildings produced by secular artists because they did 
not always follow 'prototype'. Rassol said that from a theological perspective, even 
reprinted icons from the church shop were superior to the original works by those 
artists. A reprint of the 'prototype', mechanically produced but blessed and sold by the 
Church, serves its purpose to connect a believer to God. The printed icon was 'produced 
purely for dogmatic purposes,' he said, 'whereas an icon produced by a secular artist 
was created purely out of artistic ambition.' 122 
The convent commissioned Rassol to create its frescoes, iconostasis and cross; 
supplied him with materials; provided him with a room in which he could work and 
sleep; allowed him to share meals with the clergy, in this case nuns; and even covered 
some of his expenses. The amount of work by Rassol was enormous (Fig. 25, p. 235). 
The painted interior surfaces in the case of a medium sized church like Holy Trinity 
would be from 125 to 175 square meters, plus the iconostasis which was about 18 
square meters, and even the cross which was about two meters long. The measurements 
are approximate because of the difficulty in measuring the building and leaving some 
spaces free of decoration. 
Only later did I understand that Rassol was in a better financial position than any 
secular artist of his age. This realisation came when, just prior to my departure, Mother 
Ekaterina from the convent told me that Rassol had left for Moscow for a brief visit to 
Donskoi Monastery. Being able to afford such travel signified a luxuriant lifestyle by 
local Tashkenty standards (the airfare from Moscow to Tahskent costs as much as from 
London to Tashkent). Nevertheless, despite an enormous amount of work appreciated in 
generous pay by the ROC, the Church expected from Rassol not to request full pay for 
commissions as recognition of his fmancial disinterest and purely moral motivation to 
serve God.123 In the following section I move from Rassol to a female artist working 
for the church. 
122 Alexei Rassol, interview, 17 April 2000. 
123 Only once did Rassol tell me that he does not charge for his work, when he kissed the big wooden 
cross painted by him. 
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Fig. 25 Rassol's religious artworks in the Holy Trinity Church. The photo shows 
Rassol's works incorporated within the church's decoration: the iconostasis in the back, 
frescoes all over the ceiling, and the cross on the left wall. In this photo we can also see 
the baptism ceremony of a newborn baby from the Rice Market area. The priest (Father 
Vladimir) is conducting the service, the godfather is holding the baby, the godmother is 
standing next to him, on the left side are the parents and on the right side friends of the 
family. Photo was taken by myself with the permission of the priest in 2000. 
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6.13. The Russian Orthodox Church and female artists 
This section concerns the appearance of female artists in the post-Soviet period, which 
led to difficulties for the ROC in defining the role of arts producers whose gender is not 
male, using the example of the female artist Olga Kharitonova. The appearance of 
female icon-painters led the Church to question women's status because as producers, 
women could not be engaged in the painting of a church's frescoes or iconostasis, and 
had to be limited to the production of individual icons. The change in the relationship 
between the Church and producers of religious arts that occurred after the fall of the 
Soviet state motivated me to focus on what had really changed in the Church's 
commissioning arts practices. 
Here I cite the following features and beliefs which emerged within society and the 
clergy with the appearance of female icon painters: 
1) Female icon-painters were supposed to offer the Church their voluntary services as 
selflessly as other women parishioners did by cleaning premises, bringing flowers, 
working in kiosks, and so on. 
2) Female icon-painters worked for no remuneration because they were not employees of 
the Church. 
3) Female icon-painters could only work on small-scale projects like individual icons, 
because they were believed to be less versatile and less technically accomplished than 
male icon-painters. 
4) It was believed that female professional artists who became icon-painters with no 
religious training would not be able to interpret the canon of icon painting correctly in 
such complex commissions as iconostases. 
Their gender, then, dictated that they could not be regular producers of sacred objects, 
because they were believed to be bound to the mundane world instead of being 
consistently immersed in the pure and devoted world of the Church. This mirrored the 
Soviet and post-Soviet arts institutions' valuing of women artists' creative practices, 
under which women were denied access to the departments teaching the genre of 
thematic compositions due to their perceived biological frailty and reproductive 
functions. The inability to produce large-scale thematic compositions resulted in 
women's production of economically and socially less valued genres such as the etude 
and sti11life, and were marginalised in the state-controlled arts world. 
It is interesting to compare how Alexei Rassol and Olga Kharitonova established 
different relationships with the convent and the Mother Superior. Here is a vivid 
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illustration of how the artists were treated very differently, owing to what types of icon 
painting they produced depending on their gender. Rassol covered the interiors of 
churches with frescoes, created iconostases and crosses, whereas Kharitonova taught 
nuns to produce individual icons for domestic use and supplied some small religious 
artefacts such as Easter eggs. In the following section, I introduce Kharitonova and her 
family. Her example illustrates the new types of relationship between artists and the 
Church established after the fall of the Soviet state and the emergence of independent 
Uzbekistan. 
6.14. Olga Kharitonova 
In this section I introduce the reasons behind Kharitonova and her extended family 
providing services to the Holy Trinity Church for a lengthy period oftirne. 
Olga Kharitonova, like most people of European descent born in Tashkent, is of 
mixed ethnic background. Her father was Russian, and her mother was half Armenian 
and half Russian. Her parents' social background was linked to the military: her father's 
side sympathised with the Red Army, whereas her mother's family was on the side of 
the White Army. The elderly Kharitonovs recognised both their peasant and gentry 
backgrounds with equal pride and fondness. They were both artists. Vladimir, 
Kharitonova's father, was an artist who taught at the Art College and her mother, 
Louisa, was an artist who specialised in embroidery. Vladimir helped his wife with the 
creation of a design scheme for embroidered wall coverings, which Louisa embroidered 
mainly under the state commission system. 
Olga Kharitonova completed her education at the Art College and the Arts 
Institute124 in Tashkent. After graduation, she earned money by producing huge portraits 
of local Communist Party leaders for the celebration of national holidays. As with the 
majority of artists who lived under the state commission system during the Soviet 
period, Kharitonova was used to the protection of the Union of Artists. After the Uzbek 
independence, the situation changed. She needed to pull her extended family through 
economic hardship. Kharitonova's parents had a very small pension, which was not 
enough to make ends meet. Her only sister, Nadezhda, a ceramic artist, lost her job 
when the local ceramics factory closed down. In addition, Olga was overburdened by 
124 Kharitonova graduated from the graphics department. 
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dividing her time between looking after other family members in Tashkent and her 
children who had moved to Moscow and Kazan, Russia. The Kharitonovs experienced 
the difficulty of many Tashkenty families of European descent who were tom apart by 
emigration of their children and grandchildren (Pilkington 1997, 1998). 
But Kharitonova's efforts to improve the financial state of her extended family 
were halted by her sister's husband falling gravely ill, and it turned out that there was 
little hope apart from divine intervention. One of the customary rituals in Russian 
Orthodoxy for asking help from divine powers is to make a donation to the Church. Her 
brother-in-Iaw's illness was one of the reasons that Kharitonova, who came from a 
moderately religious family, volunteered for service at the convent. A gift to the Church 
may come in any form, but the Kharitonovs had little to offer. After a family discussion, 
they decided that they would all participate in making a family donation. Thus, Olga 
volunteered to work for the convent. When I met the Kharitonovs, they were mourning 
Nadezhda's deceased husband. His death, however, had not embittered them. 
Kharitonova was blessed by the Mother Superior to teach nuns painting. It was 
quite hard for Kharitonova to deal with teaching teenage nuns. Olga Kharitonova tried 
to give her inexperienced pupils very basic lessons in drawing and painting once a 
week. The convent had nuns of various ages. The older nuns had moved to Tashkent 
from other convents in Russia, and the young nuns were local Russian girls. Apart from 
teaching at the convent, Kharitonova had to complete different types of work, usually 
on pressing deadlines. The amount and type of work was not always consistent, with the 
schedule depending on the church calendar. Kharitonova complained: 'I want to do 
beautiful things for the Church, but due to a shortage of time I can't do anything that I 
would do in a relaxed way. ,125 For example, at Easter, the convent might hand out three 
hundred wooden eggs that had to be thoroughly decorated in only a few days. 
Kharitonova would not be able to finish the order in time by herself, so she would ask 
her family and friends to help her. 
In the following section I assess the Kharitonovs' reaffirmation of their 
Orthodox Christian faith through their domestic premises. 
125 Olga Kharitonova, interview, 3 April 2000. 
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6.15. The Kharitonovs' domestic display of icons 
In this section I assess the changes in the contextualization of the domestic display of 
religious art objects from the Soviet to post-Soviet periods. Previously, scholars 
connected the limitation of the display of icons within contemporary dwellings purely to 
the separation of the Soviet state from the Church (Lane 1981: 69; Buchli 1996: 104; 
1999: 48). Separating the social domain from religion brought religious practice into 
private/domestic spaces. Hanging icons in such intimate places as the walls over the bed 
helped believers to continue their religious practice in discretion. However, with the 
Church's resurgence in the post-Soviet period, it became possible to reveal previously 
hidden religious art objects. In other words, the location of religious arts within 
domestic spaces had to be reassessed and recontextualised by their owners. My 
assessment of the Kharitonovs' dwelling and the display of icons within their main 
room demonstrates that the family'S display of religious art objects indicates their 
professional, social and ethnic belonging rather than simply stating their belief in the 
Orthodox faith. 
Olga Kharitonova invited me to her parents' house in April 2000. The old 
Kharitonovs lived in Chilanzar district's mahalla. The one-story house was a typical 
well off house, built in the 1970s. The Kharitonovs had running cold and hot water with 
contemporary plumbing facilities including a WC and bath in the house, a gas cooker in 
the kitchen and even a telephone. The house itself was of mixed Muslim and Russian 
construction. The Islamic structure was kept by building the house in the form of a 
'closed court', with windows looking inside to the courtyard. Russian influences were 
seen in the interior of the house. The interior had no resemblance to Russian working 
class houses, which typically had an entrance through the kitchen and a single 
multifunctional room. The Kharitonovs had a separate entrance which led to the main 
room, and everybody had to pass through each other's bedrooms to get to their own 
bedrooms (see Fig. 26, p. 240). Such construction was reminiscent of 19th century 
Russian officials' dwellings in colonial Tashkent's New City. 126 
126 Unlike their Uzbek neighbours, the Kharitonovs did not grow vegetables, have a vineyard or keep 
cattle and poultry in their courtyard. 
240 
Fig. 26 The interior of the Kharitonovs' house. We can see the great-granddaughter of 
Vladimir Kharitonov, Katya, in the bedroom cramped with artworks created by the 
family. To the right ofKatya, standing with back turned, is Olga Karitonova preparing 
paint; behind the girl we can see through an open door two following bedrooms. An the 
end of the third room we can see Nadezhda Kharitonova sitting. Photo taken by myself 
in 2001. 
I 
\ 
241 
Fig. 27 The Kharitonovs' gostinnaya (best room). In this comer of the room we can see 
a couple of icons among the paintings, embroideries and other artworks created by the 
Kharitonovs. This photo shows the changes in the context of the domestic display of 
religious artefacts. Religious artefacts moved to the best parts of the home, because 
there was no need to hide them, and it was newly important for Russians to distinguish 
themselves as Orthodox Christians from their Uzbek, Muslim mahalla neighbours. And 
in this case, the display of icons was intended to defme the professional identity of their 
owners. These icons were made by the Kharitonovs themselves and connote their close 
collaboration with the Holy Trinity Church as professional artists. Photo was taken in 
1999. 
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The most remarkable room in the house was the main room or gostinnaya (Fig 
27, p. 241). The decor of the main room returned to the old-fashioned pre-
Revolutionary way of openly displaying religious artS.127 The walls were bedecked with 
photographs of living and deceased family members, regardless of their social 
belonging. These framed photographs were joined by canvases and different types of 
icons, all made by the Kharitonovs. By showing off their self-painted icons, the family 
demonstrated not only their religious affiliation but also their professional belonging. 
The incorporation in the display of photos of ancestors who were of the wrong class 
during the Soviet period affirmed the Kharitonovs' identity according to the ROC's 
class and ethnicity standards for art producers. The admission of their family's uneasy 
Soviet past was needed for their acceptance by the Holy Trinity Church clerics' 
approval of their suitability as religious art producers and helpers. The importance of 
being suitable for such tasks will be discussed in the following two sections. 
6.16. Icons for domestic worship and private consumption 
In this section I discuss the reasons behind the Church's attempt to control production 
of individual icons. The ROC intended to improve its relationship with the laity since 
under the independent state there were no restrictions on religious belief. Non-
committal potential believers were now expected to become active religious 
practitioners, and active practice included the worship of icons. However, there emerged 
visible post-Soviet trends which had nothing to do with strength of belief Icons became 
profitable collectors' items valued from economic and aesthetic perspectives. Fearing 
the growth of commercial valuing of icons, the local ROC needed to increase control 
over current icon production and consumption. This was achieved in two ways: through 
instruction to religious practitioners and through management of the sanctification of 
religious art works. 
To better instruct religious practitioners, the Church disseminated varIOUS 
leaflets advising practitioners what kind of icons they were to have. In a leaflet for 
practitioners published by the Tashkent diocese (1999: 8), it is suggested that three 
icons always remain with the practitioner, helping him or her for daily prayers: the 
Savior, the Holy Virgin Mary and the believer's namesake saint (imennaya {kona}. 
127 The Kharitonovs did not place icons in their bedrooms. 
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My interviews with nuns and priests from the Holy Trinity Church conftrmed 
the importance of these three icons. All of the informants stressed that these three icons 
were necessary for every religious practitioner, because the believer addresses them to 
help endure the difficulties of daily life. They also pointed that the Savior and the Holy 
Virgin Mary icons were likely to be inherited within the family, so they had no need to 
be blessed by the priests. 
Father Vladimir Lapyn pointed out that namesake saint icons are unlikely to be 
the same even in the same family 128 • He complained that there was an additional 
difficulty with the names of current believers because many contemporary names are 
either invented or borrowed from other cultures. He supported the Church's decision to 
advise active religious practitioners to be rebaptised in order to take appropriate 
Orthodox Christian names. Father Vladimir reasoned that the possession of a non-
Orthodox Christian name excludes the believer from praying and being prayed for by 
priests in the case of illness, difficulties and death. 
The Church also controlled the trade in icons through priests' sanctiftcation of 
art objects. My interviews with female icon painters showed that the Church had the 
fmal word in everything that was produced by female artists, because a priest must bless 
an artwork in order to transform it into a sacred object. No artist could sell a painting as 
an icon until it had been blessed by a priest, and artists would honestly inform a client if 
a priest had not blessed an icon. In that case the client would have to go to the Church 
himself and ask for a priest to bless the purchased icon, covering the expenses of the 
priest's services. If artworks were not recognised as Orthodox Christian, a priest could 
refuse to bless them; the main criterion of an Orthodox Christian icon was that it 
followed the canonic prototype. Generally, the artists and priests were sufficiently 
knowledgeable of the canonic correctness of the main icons necessary for worship, the 
Saviour and the Holy Virgin Mary, but most lay believers were not. Artists thought that 
selling an unblessed icon to an inexperienced buyer would be dishonest, but also knew 
that a blessed icon was more valued by buyers. Giving a blessing for a produced art 
object was one form of control the Church had over its commissioned icon-painters, and 
the Church attempted the same control over icons produced for private worship. 
In following section I further explore what kind of conditions were put upon 
women artists to gain sanctification of the art works produced by them. It was generally 
128 Father Vladimir Lapyn, interview, 27 July 2001. 
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assumed by artists that the bond between artist and Church is based purely on faith and 
voluntary service to the Church. But despite that, artists who have given devoted service 
still have conflicts with the Church and the society within which they work. In the case 
of women artists, these conflicts became especially acute because of their gender. In the 
following section I connect the gender issue to the re-tradionalisation of the ROC. 
6.17. Female icon-painters: conduct and comportment 
In this section, I discuss how the Church's re-traditionalisation affected the economic 
aspects of religious arts in the case of female artists. As I showed in the section above 
and in Chapter 4, both institutions, the ROC and the mahalla, could control the 
economic sphere of artistic production. Priests controlled economic production through 
sanctification of artists' works. The mahalla, administering the privatised domestic 
sector, could control any transaction on domestic premises regardless of the type of 
artwork or the ethnic origin and religious affiliation of the producer. The re-
tradionalisation of both institutions was manifested through their attempts to control 
women's productive and reproductive capacities (Verkhovsky 2004; Knox 2005; 
Mandel 2002; Humphrey and Mandel 2002; Sievers 2003)129. These institutions view 
women not as individuals but as parts of households within extended families (Megoran 
1999; Kandiyoti 2000, 2004; Cartwright 2000).130 Therefore for these institutions, 
women's reproductive capacities are of paramount importance. The ROC's concern 
over the falling birthrate became a pressing issue due to the dramatic decline of the 
Russian population in Russia and within ethnic Russian enclaves in the former Soviet 
republics. 131 Both institutions showed marked disregard for female artists' professional 
achievements. By assessing the Church's and the mahalla's requirements for women 
artists' conduct and comportment, I demonstrate that traditionalist institutions bend 
women and their families to follow a more fundamentalist way of life. This comparison 
129 Verkhovsky, the main critic of the ROC in Russia, termed re-tradionalisation as fundamentalism. 
These fundamentalists stand for the restoration of autocracy, a state structure on the imperial model, 
restrictions on religions other than Orthodoxy, official state status for the ROC, rejection of the concepts 
of democracy and human rights and opposition to any forms of Western influence beyond Russia's 
borders. Knox (2005) provided a broad assessment of the ROC's traditionalist position leading to the rise 
of chauvinism, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. Sievers (2003), Mandel (2002) pointed out the re-
tradionalisation of the mahalla was expressed through the institution's treatment of women. 
130 Megoran (1999), Kandiyoti (1991, 2000) and Kandiyoti and Azimova (2004) discussed gender 
construction by Central Asian local institutions. Cartwright (2000) discussed the ROC's gendered 
perceptions with the Russian religious community. 
131 The Russian government specially relies on the ROC's promotion of family strengthening. In 2006, 
the falling birthrate in Russia reached such a point that Putin's government decided to return to the Soviet 
policy of providing maternity leave for women. 
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makes clear that these rigid parameters of decorum and appearance do not apply to male 
artists. 
Kharitonova is strikingly beautiful, and her ex-husband and son were jewellers, 
which allowed her a great choice in self-decoration. But this was combined with an 
overall austerity. She always dressed in something long and black, a colour that befitted 
a bohemian as well as an icon-painter. She styled her hair and braided it into one long 
braid that suited the rigid requirements of the convent. But she would not compromise 
when it came to toning down her make-up. It is well known that female believers are 
not allowed to enter a church with uncovered head or arms, or if they are wearing 
trousers, low-cut dresses, makeup, nail polish or perfume. 
The ROC disseminated publications highlighting the importance of the proper 
conduct and attire of female churchgoers. One of them, titled 'What Every Attendant of 
the Orthodox Christian Temple Must Know' (1999: 95), stated: 'Women must know 
that entering the church they should be with covered head, wearing gender-appropriate 
clothing (dresses or skirts, and never trousers), and without visible make-up. In the case 
of make-up already on the face it should be wiped off.' It irritated Kharitonova and her 
friends that the convent stipulated that she had to remove her make-up. As her sister 
Nadezhda said, 'There are few things we allow ourselves as a treat, so it is unfair to 
deprive us of the use of kosmetika (make-up). When we were young we used to be 
harassed for having make-up by Uzbek men in our mahalia, who assumed that if we 
wore make-up we were of flirtatious behaviour. Now we are middle aged women [her 
sister is a grandmother and she is a great-aunt] who are beyond accusations of attracting 
men's attention, but now we are reprimanded by the priests under the same pretext.' 132 
Fatinya Kirichenko, one of Kharitonova's artist friends, reported bitterly one of 
her encounters with Church attitudes towards female icon-painters. Recently she had 
attended the baptism of her friend's child, and the priest had refused to allow her to be a 
godmother because she was wearing bright nail polish. He called Kirichenko a whore 
and accused her of having had an abortion, a scandalous accusation since she is a 
childless spinster whose reproductive years are over. She was hurt that a priest had 
treated her in such an unacceptable way, and felt unable to go to the church where that 
priest served. Since there are only three Orthodox Christian churches and a limited 
number of closely interconnected clergy in Tashkent, the situation was further 
132 Nadezhda Kharitonova, interview, 23 July 2000. 
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aggravated. As a result of the conflict, Kirichenko was not directly commissioned by the 
Church to work, but she was able to continue working on Church commissions on 
behalf of Kharitonova. Having lost the possibility of voluntary service to the Church, 
Kirichenko was at least able to continue icon-painting, not for the church, but for herself 
and for those who wanted to buy her Christian-themed artworks directly from her 
without bothering for their sanctification. I thought about Kirichenko's story of her 
relationship with the priest; it was not an experience that one would expect a devoted 
Church volunteer to have. 
Kharitonova and Kirichenko were antagonised by clerics' reaction to their 
comportment. According to them, the attitude of the clerics was no different from what 
they experienced from male mahalla administrators. Knowing of Kharitonova's 
frequent visits to Kirichenko, who lived in the New City, the head of the nearby 
mahalla harassed her, implying a lesbian relationship between the two women. The 
same man had earlier arranged the fraudulent sale of Kirichenko's house, where she 
lived with her retired sister, from a fictitious homeowner to some New Rich Uzbeks for 
$78,000 US. A bitter legal suit between the new owners and Kirichenko ensued, and the 
local mahalla administration was not pressed to take responsibility over the deal. Not 
surprisingly, my own meeting with the head of the mahalla administration, who bought 
the house next to Kirichenko's and rebuilt it into a handsome three-floor mansion, was 
not a pleasant one. Looking for Kirichenko's house and knowing nothing of his conflict 
with her, I asked him on the street the whereabouts of Kirichenko's house. He spat in 
my face, and told me 'This whore is dead!' 
Since single females were treated so harshly by the mahalla administration, the 
older Kharitonov insisted that both his daughters, the widowed Nadezhda and divorced 
Olga, move back to their parental home. By my next visit in 2001, all the Kharitonovs 
were living together. Olga's daughter had also returned with her child from Russia, 
joining the older Kharitonovs. The Kharitonovs blamed her return on the unstable legal 
definitions of Russian citizenship. Becoming a Russian citizen immediately after the fall 
of the USSR was due to ethnicity, place of birth and place of residence, which was 
supposed to ease the position of 25,000,000 ethnic Russians scattered in non-Russian 
states. As the years went on, the rules changed. By 2001, to obtain Russian citizenship, 
ethnic Russians moving to Russia were required to show proof that at least one of their 
parents had domicile registration in Russia prior to the fall of the USSR. For the ethnic 
Russians whose families had lived for several generations in Tashkent, it meant that 
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they could not move to Russia permanently as Russian citizens. Olga's daughter's 
experience mirrored what many ethnic Russians moving to Russia after the fall of the 
USSR experienced: prejudiced treatment by Russian citizens and the Russian 
government, who saw in her not an ethnic Russian returning to the homeland of her 
forebears, but an Uzbek economic migrant competing with them for jobs and access to 
already-reduced state services. 133 
The inability to move their children to Russia motivated both Nadezhda and 
Olga to put their own properties on the market. They explained to me that for them it 
would be better to live in their father's local mahalia, where the local elders of the 
community have known their family for nearly forty years and the mahalla 
administration would treat then with respect. Ironically, the older Kharitonov moving 
his daughters, the granddaughter and the great-granddaughter back to his home 
conformed to the mahalla ideal of residence under the same roof of the 
multigenerational family. By following the Uzbek pattern of living together and helping 
each other, the Kharitonovs were more accepted by their Uzbek neighbours than they 
would have been living separately in their individual households. 
Rassol refuted the story of the bright nail polish. He confessed that in his past he 
had been a heavy drinker and a smoker and that he had been saved from these vices by 
the prayers of his friend Father Feodor. He was clearly in a stronger position than the 
female artists working as icon-painters. Despite his past, he was confident enough to 
challenge the Mother Superior in her knowledge of church decoration. His relationship 
with the Mother Superior was built on the fact that he was of the gentry, male, and an 
old man. He was humble in his service to God, but proudly defended the work he was 
doing. Rassol had no difficulties with the mahalla. The mahalla excused Rassol his 
solitary life on the ground of his being a victim of state persecutions, and respected his 
continuous service to the Church despite his advancing age. Unlike Rasso~ women 
artists could not oppose their commissioners; there was always the possibility of new 
and more suitable candidates. Women could not be socially accepted by the mahalla 
unless they were able to prove their worthiness by helping to sustain multigenerational 
families and raise good children who would not abandon them in their old age. Women 
could not be accepted by the Church unless they represented their entire household's 
133 The Kharitonov offspring's difficulties in moving to Russia undermines the idea of women-led 
migration assessed by Pilkington (1997, 1998). With restricted rules on Russian citizenship, the type of 
migration changed from permanent migrants (mostly young couples with their children) to ethnically 
varied young individuals of both sexes aged from early 20s to 40s. 
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affirmation of their Russian ethnicity (preferably their ancestral roots in the Russian 
gentry) by various means including the domestic displays of religious arts. 
In the following section I compare assessments of Karitonova's work by the Mother 
Superior and by local art critics. 
6.18. Professional artist or icon-painter? 
In this section I discuss Kharitonova's paintings and their assessment by the Mother 
Superior and by local art critics. I demonstrate that for art critics, her painting were too 
direct in their connotation of religious life in Tashkent whereas for the Mother Superior, 
the works were too personalised. 
Working in the convent influenced and inspired Kharitonova's secular art. Some 
of her paintings reflected her socialising with nuns, some were influenced by spiritual 
themes and some were inspired by icon paintings. Kharitonova told me about her 
exhibitions, and about how her new works with religious themes were banned. 
Karitonova exhibited her works in 1999 in the Ilkhom Theatre and in 2001 in the Indian 
Embassy in Tashkent. However, she was told in both cases that any works alluding to 
religion had to be omitted. I asked Kharitonova why works with religious content were 
forbidden, she told me simply, 'Well, they would not have anything that relates to 
religion.' However, owing to my acquaintance with Natalya Musina (see Chapters 4, 
section 4.1.2. and Chapter 5, section 5.4.), who supervised the Ilkhom exhibition site, I 
was able to discuss with her what Musina and other art historians thought about works 
containing religious content. Since 1999 there had been a significant change in religious 
policy in Uzbekistan. The acceptance of all religions by the modem Uzbek state 
dissipated after the April 1999 Islamic terrorist attack in the center of Tashkent, which 
caused many casualties. After that horrific event, the state publicly refrained from 
encouraging anything that related to religion in Uzbekistan. As a result, Kharitonova's 
religious-themed works, according to art historians, were not acceptable for public 
display. 
I asked Kharitonova to show me the paintings that were not accepted for display 
in 1999 and 2001. While showing me the works, she discussed the responses she had 
received from the Mother Superior and other clerics. One painting was a group portrait 
of nuns. The painting depicts aged nuns with gloomy expressions, dressed in black 
clothing that contrasts with a vivid bright-green background. The nuns appear bleak and 
provoke little else besides the fact that the nuns are from the Holy Trinity Church of the 
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convent in Tashkent. There is no interest expressed by the Mother Superior towards her 
subordinate nuns in the painting. 
Another painting was painted on a type of canvas that was common for secular 
painting, but followed the Russian Byzantine style of icon-painting (see Fig. 28, p. 250). 
It is a shoulder-length portrait of a sad-looking Virgin Mary adorned in a red scarf on a 
turquoise background. It was understandable why it had not been accepted for display in 
the theatre. Nevertheless, I was interested to know what the Church authorities thought 
about this type of work. Kharitonova recalled, 'Mother Superior was not happy about 
that work. She asked me, "Why is our Holy Lady Mary sad?" I responded: "Why should 
she be overjoyed? Personally, I think that Mary can have many different expressions 
and to be sad is no more unusual than any other.",134 
I was puzzled by Kharitonova's reaction, because it was unusual for her to have 
to defend something she had produced that was not for Church use. I understood the 
Mother Superior's adherence to the canonic perception of Mary, whose iconic images 
should not present a direct expression of emotion. Dramatic moments might be 
presented through composition or through specific symbolic gestures and postures, but 
not through personal characterisation. Kharitonova, as a professional artist who worked 
in the portrait genre, transferred her skills in portraying the emotions of ordinary people 
to enriching her holy images with those emotions. According to dogma, icons should 
not represent emotion because the holy people depicted should be serene and dignified. 
In other words, Kharitonova veered towards making a portrait of a sad, pretty woman in 
the Russian Byzantine style, instead of creating an abstract icon of the Holy Lady Mary. 
The last two works were not explicitly religious, but contained Christian 
elements. They are large-scale, vanitas-style still lifes and contain such objects as a 
white napkin with red folk cross-stitch, an icon of Christ, forget-me-not flowers (called 
in Russian 'Ann's eyes' or Anutiny Glazki), scales, a copper goblet and so on, all on a 
black background. The choice of objects is not part of an interior, imagined or 
otherwise. Each object is symbolic; for example, forget-me-not flowers are associated in 
Russian literature with the pristine Russian countryside that vanished beneath ugly 
collective farms. Kharitonova's still life creates an imagined Russia gleaned from 
vacations she'd taken. These works also provoked a negative reaction from the Mother 
Superior. Kharitonova's response was brusque as she defended her professional 
134 Olga Kharitonova, interview, 13 Jlllle 2000. 
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interests: 'I wanted to create something beautiful, but the Mother Superior does not 
understand that. In my opinion it's one thing when I work for them, but I can do as I 
wish when I work for myself' 
Fig. 28 Olga Kharitonova's Bogomater' (Holy Lady Mary), (50 x 60 em, oil on canvas, 
1999). Kept by Kharitonova. Photo taken by myself in 2000. 
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Thus there was a line that Olga Kharitonova drew between her voluntary service 
for the Church and the nun's patronising attitude towards her. Her work as an icon-
painter involved a constant negotiation between her role as a submissive woman artist in 
the realm of the Church, and a professional artist in the secular world. She was 
emotionally committed to her religious affiliation through which she tried to show her 
Russian cultural identity. But the Church only accepted her artistic practice as a 
volunteer from a Russian family and not as an individual icon painter, and for art critics 
she was unacceptable for her incapacity to distance herself from the local religious 
scene. 
6.19. Conclusion 
In conclusion I suggest that for all the previously discussed institutions (the Union of 
Artists, the local foreign-oriented market, the mahalla and the ROC), the person and 
attributes of an artist had a direct bearing on the worth of what he or she produced. The 
Church looked for moral probity within its moral framework, requiring artists to 
become active parishioners. The mahalla set different standards of conformity, 
requiring artists to be good family members in their multigenerational families. Despite 
the differences between the ROC and the mahalla in valuing artists, both institutions 
were in complete accord when it came to female artists. This accord was owed to the re-
tradionalisation of these two institutions in the post-Soviet period. Re-tradionalisation 
made explicit that women's artistic practices were valued based on their position as 
child bearers and nurturers of their families, rather than as professional artists. And the 
foreign market prized painters whose creative practice had in the past been highly 
valued by the Soviet institution. Arguably, the connection between the practices of the 
artists and their products can be linked to the Soviet period, where ideological 
conformity had not only to be depicted on the surface of the painting but manifested in 
the person of the artist. 
In the following chapter I shall explore the last type of painting which was 
rooted in the Soviet institution, the Union of Artists, miniature painting, which is also 
connected to the Russian Orthodox icon painting tradition. 
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Chapter 7 
Miniature Painting From Besh Agach Mosque (1987-2004) 
7.1.1. Introduction 
Within the body of the thesis, Chapter 7 is the last of five chapters connected to the Soviet 
institution, the Union of Artists. In these five chapters I examined how Soviet moral, 
economic and social valuing of painting have been changed by the fragmentation of the 
Soviet institutional art world into various institutions and fields such as the Academy of 
Fine Arts, the independent state's commission system, the parallel non-state art market, the 
mahalla and the Russian Orthodox Church. I came to the conclusion that each of these 
fields and institutional bodies elaborated their own set of criteria in shaping their own 
particular moral, economic and social valuing of painting and its producers. Many of these 
criteria were shaped by Soviet formulae, and further exploration shows extensive back and 
forth 'borrowing' between some of these entities and the Soviet state. 
Chapter 7 follows Chapter 6 because of the direct connection between miniature 
painting and icon painting. Miniature painting was the last of the Soviet arts to be 
introduced in Uzbekistan; miniature painting's Soviet institutional existence lasted only 
four years (1987-1991), after which it broke up into a small group of producers: 84 male 
Uzbek artists, grouped within a single site: the Besh Agach mosque in Tashkent. Current 
U zbek miniature painting can be defined as figurative, ornamental or calligraphic painting 
on lacquer boxes135 or individual sheets of paper. Like all Soviet arts, miniature painting 
borrowed from Russian arts - in this case it evolved from Russian icon painting. Between 
1922 and 1938, the Russian Palekh school of icon painting turned to secular lacquer work 
through Soviet institutionalisation. 
However, post-Soviet miniature painting presents a special case. Post-Soviet 
miniature painting's production and consumption encompassed all the problems related to 
the fragmentation process: the drying up of the state commission system, frantic 
readjustments to the restrictions on foreign currency, and the need for mahalla acceptance. 
In the previous Chapters 3-6, valuing was assessed through each of these aforementioned 
institutions and fields by various producers, valuers, sellers and buyers. Unlike the rest of 
135 The boxes themselves are made with papier-miiche. 
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the institutions and social fields, valuing of miniature painting had to be done mainly by the 
artists themselves, who function as producers, valuers and dealers at the same time. By 
being in direct charge of their art's production and circulation, the Besh Agach group 
established very different relationships with the state and the mahalla. These relationships 
demonstrated that the Besh Agach group on one hand helped in the legitimization of the 
state in and out of Uzbekistan, and on the other hand was involved in the dissemination of 
religious arts. Their practice reveals the fluidity of the perceptions of Islam by the state and 
the mahalla. The mahalla is a state-subsidised institution, but it has many links to the 
Islamic faith, for example in its promotion of lifecycle ceremonies (Bennigsen and 
Wimbush 1985: 58). The Besh Agach artists promote, through dissemination of their 
miniatures, what both the mahalla and the state understood as an acceptable, politically 
neutral Islam. An assessment of the change in the values and practices of the group of 
miniature painters allows me to build my argument in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 argues against the assertion by the American anthropologist Nazif 
Shahrani (1993: 125) - originally an Afghan Uzbek - concerning the impact of the Soviet 
legacy on traditional Islamic culture in Central Asia. According to Shahrani, the Soviets 
aimed to destroy Islamic culture and to replace it with an alien Soviet culture. 
In order to build my argument against this assertion made by Shahrani immediately 
after the fall of the USSR, I suggest that miniature painting offers a good example of how a 
linear view of the replacement of traditional Islamic culture with Soviet culture might be 
deceptive. Shahrani's statement of the forceful Soviet replacement of Islamic culture 
underestimated Soviet utilisation of other cultures, including religious ones, for ideological 
purposes as well as the reusing of Soviet cultural concepts by the independent Uzbek state. 
Therefore my argument is twofold. 
My first argument is that the assertion of Soviet destruction of Central Asian 
religious culture is highly controversial. Soviet culture indeed secularised, through 
institutionalisation, the production and consumption of religious artefacts. The ideological 
remolding of religious arts was managed for Soviet state interests. Soviet miniature 
painting, like all Soviet arts, had to serve its ideological purpose. The presence of 
secularized instituionalised arts like miniature painting helped to justifY the territorial, 
historical and cultural claims of titular nation elites (Tajik and Uzbek). 
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My second argument is that miniature painting's roots in religious traditions, both 
Christian and Islamic, only enhanced its importance with the emergence of the independent 
Uzbek state. The Uzbek state's attempts to reconnect with the pre-Soviet traditions, through 
the revival of national holidays and national institutions such as the mahalla, allowed 
miniature painting to survive the decline of the Soviet arts institutions and be renewed in 
both secular and religious forms. 
To support my arguments, I subdivide this chapter into four sections. The first 
section introduces the Besh Agach mosque, a site used by miniature painters as the 
showpiece ofan Islamic tradition which came out of the Soviet period absolutely intact and 
whose production justifies a direct connection between the independent Uzbek state and its 
pre-Soviet past. 
The second section goes back to the time of my fieldwork in 1985-1995 carried out 
in Tashkent, Dushanbe and Moscow. The second section focuses on the rivalry of Uzbek 
and Tajik art historians over a shared historical past represented by medieval miniature 
painting. This section additionally highlights why the revival of miniature painting survived 
only in Uzbekistan after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Subsequent sections are devoted to artists who work in miniature painting. I focus 
my attention on two particular aspects, the ethnicity of artists (Uzbek or non-Uzbek) and 
artists' qualifications (one-tier Arts College education). These aspects are relevant because 
valuing of artists in the state sector during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods was built 
upon these factors. 
The third section is devoted to the founder of miniature painting in Uzbekistan, 
Vladimir Ann (b.1932). Ann, an ethnic Korean and graduate of the Palekh Arts College and 
Moscow Art Institute, set up the department of miniature painting at Tashkent Arts College 
and formulated the curriculum for students that is still in use. An investigation of Ann's 
artistic practice in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods brings up aspects of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness in the state arts sector, depending on the artist's capacity to conform to the 
arts institutions' position towards religious arts. A second artist, Rasul Pulatov (b.1966), 
was chosen because of the fact that he has a qualification in miniature painting from 
Tashkent Art College, he was Ann's pupil, and he is Uzbek. Most importantly, he is a 
leading artist of the Besh Agach mosque. Pulatov's multiple practices as producer, valuer 
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and seller allow me to use them as a lens through which I can explore changes from Soviet 
to post-Soviet moral, social, economic valuing of miniature painting and its producers. 
7.1.2. The Besh Agach mosque site 
In this section I introduce Tashkent's Besh Agach mosque, where miniature 
painting artists have worked since 1989 (see Fig. 29, p.257). This section clarifies why 
artists chose the mosque as their creative and commercial site. 
Since independence, the Besh Agach mosque has become one of the top cultural 
attractions of Tashkent, where foreign tourist groups are taken by guides to purchase 
traditional Uzbek crafts. The mosque is presented in travel guides as a place that maintains 
the spirituality of modern Uzbekistan's Islamic heritage and a place where Uzbek craftsmen 
continue the ancient Uzbek tradition of miniature painting. 
However, Uzbek miniature painting is done by professional artists, not craftsmen, 
and the mosque is not a place that keeps Islamic heritage so much as a building that 
professional artists use to accommodate their studios, shops, and teaching rooms. Artists, 
by choosing the mosque as their headquarters, intended to create a perception of themselves 
to the outside world (tourists, spectators and buyers) not as contemporary artists, but as 
traditional craftsmen. After graduating from Tashkent Arts College, professional 
miniaturists struggled to gain membership in the Union of Artists, and those who 
successfully became members of the Union were supposed to be granted their own art 
studio. But by the end of the 1980s, the Union lacked funding to build new art studios. One 
of the few options for new members then was to find a dilapidated and unused building in 
the overpopulated city. The building they found was the 15th-century Besh Agach mosque 
in the rebuilt section of the Old City. 
The mosque has a large inner court and small rooms for religious students. Under 
the Soviet regime, like many religious buildings the mosque was classified as an important 
part ofUzbek historical heritage, but the city authorities were indecisive as to its utilisation. 
Miniature-painting artists, deprived of studios, slowly began to occupy the mosque, and by 
the beginning of the independent period in 1991 each of its rooms was used by two or three 
artists. Despite the post-Soviet rise of Islam, the Islamic clergy never expressed desire to 
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return the mosque to its religious purpose. There were many newer mosques built in the 
territory of the Old City by Uzbeks, who voluntarily donated and participated in building 
mosques in great numbers; therefore, there was no need to take the Besh Agach mosque 
back from the artists. Since there was no request from the clergy, the mosque was left for 
the artists to use on the basis that the artists would pay rent for their rooms to the state and 
that they would pay taxes on their commercial activities. 
The artists working at the Besh Agach mosque value the location for two reasons. 
First, they insist that only fonner members of the Union of Artists (now the Academy of 
Fine Arts) work in Besh Agach and that their production is the finest in Uzbekistan. The 
concentration of these highly qualified artists preserves the aesthetic and technical quality 
of their productions, helping to differentiate their work from the lower-quality art produced 
in other places. 
Secondly, it is a highly symbolic location: the mosque is located behind Friendship 
Square, -where the Uzbek state manifests its return to pre-Soviet tradition by celebrating the 
Navruz holiday. On the 22nd of March, the day of Navruz, the celebration is led by 
President Karimov in person. All high state officials and delegates from the country's 13 
regions join the president. During the celebrations, craft stalls exhibit and sell artefacts 
representing national arts. Amongst these stalls, the Besh Agach mosque's products occupy 
a prominent place. By exhibiting, selling and publicising miniature painting to the state 
officials and delegates from around the country, the Besh Agach artists affinn their 
connection to an ancient Uzbek heritage. 136 
All of these reasons make the mosque a real home for artists specialising in 
miniature painting. But the choice of location does not necessarily indicate the recent 
origins of the art of miniature painting. In the following section I explore the reasons 
behind attempts to reintroduce the art of miniature painting. To do that, I point at the 
Perestroika period when the completion of my diploma project intersected with the rebirth 
ofUzbek miniature painting. 
136 Security is remarkably tight at these events: even the officials from all 13 regions of Uzbekistan are 
screened by the Interior Office as a preventative action against suicide terrorist acts. 
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Fig. 29 The Besh Agach mosque. Photo taken by myself in 1999. 
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7.2.1. 1986: The beginning of miniature painting 
Benedict Anderson (1988) introduced the hypothesis that nations are invented. Under the 
Soviet state, the invention of nations was achieved by massive literacy campaigns which 
allowed large swathes of the population access to the material culture (Gellner 1980, 1983, 
1988). In Central Asia this led to linguistic-cultural congruity between people and 
territories (Alciner 1994; Birch 1996: 674). During the perestroika period, the 
conceptualisation of titular nation culture was done by titular nation scholars through their 
emphasis on the rediscovery of their national historical pasts (Paksoy 1994).137 I suggest 
that within this 1980s process of the invention of the titular nation by Uzbek and Tajik 
scholars in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the creation of contemporary miniature painting 
served to reclaim missing links with their pre-Soviet past. In this section I assess the 
creation of contemporary miniature painting, which I encountered during my student 
fieldwork in 1985.138 
I witnessed the first attempts to reintroduce miniature painting in Dushanbe in 
November 1985. Kamol Ayni - the head of the Dushanbe Medieval Manuscript Treasury 
and son of the founder of Tajik contemporary literature (Ayni senior), whose sister and 
wife (Mukadima Ashrafi) both specialised in art history - showed me the Treasury's 
collection. During our meeting, he showed me a small black lacquered box whose design 
was borrowed from Persian medieval miniatures and the technique of the Palekh school. He 
said to me 'This box is one of our first hopeful experimental attempts to revive miniature 
137 Titular nation invention is largely known as the creation of Soviet ethnographers during first decades of 
the Soviet state (Allworth 1973; Connor 1986; Hirsch 2005). Meanwhile, Central Asian scholars' own 
assessment of their titular nation invention during the 1980s, prior to the Independence period, was largely 
unknown. Recently, Paksoy's 1994 edition at last gave them a voice by providing a rare opportunity for 
Central Asian scholars to be published within Western academic publications. 
138 At that time I was completing my degree in the art history department at Moscow State University, 
specialising in Persian medieval miniature painting. My diploma project concerned Kamalladin Bekhzod's 
influence on the development of miniature painting from the 15th century. My supervisors, Boris Stavisky, an 
archaeologist, and Alexander Morozov, an art historian, both suggested that in order to broaden my approach 
to the chosen subject I should carry out my research in the places where miniature painting originated. 
Following their recommendation, I went to two capitals, Tashkent in Uzbekistan and Dushanbe in Tajikistan. 
My stays in the two cities were rewarding because I did not come as a mere student from Moscow State 
University, but was treated as a very welcome guest thanks to my parents. They asked their friends from 
Uzbek and Tajik cinematographic, artistic and academic circles to take care of me while I was carrying out 
my research in Tashkent and Dushanbe. My parents' friends enabled me for a short time to gain access, 
discuss theoretical aspects, and meet with the main specialists in Persian medieval miniature painting in these 
two republics. 
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painting'. Ayni explained to me that his institution not only aimed to preserve manuscripts, 
but also to revive miniature painting. He hoped that in a very short time miniature painting 
would be reintroduced into the contemporary arts field. Ayni's aim to revive miniature 
painting by borrowing the Palekh technique could be explained by the competition between 
Tajik and Uzbek intellectual and artistic elites over the same historical heritage. 
Both elites had some theoretical justification for their claims. The researchers in 
Tashkent were led by Elmira Ismailova, who referred to Persian medieval miniature 
painting as Mawarannahr miniature painting (Ismailova and Poliakova 1980; Ismailova 
1982, 2000), whereas in Dushanbe, researchers such as Mukadima Ashrafi defined the 
Persian medieval miniature as Bukharan miniature painting (Ashrafi 1974, 1987). Despite 
the fact that the content of both Mawarannahr and Bukharan miniature painting was the 
same, researchers such as Ismailova and Ashrafi resisted classifying miniature painting 
according to the patronage of the dynasty (Timurid), or to a language that was the state 
language (persian). For the Uzbek art historian, the definition as Mawarannahr was due to 
the name of the heartland of the Timurid realm, and they would not accept the supremacy 
of the Persian language (the Uzbek language belongs to the Turkic language group). In the 
eyes of Uzbek researchers, Timurid heritage was and is Uzbek. On the other hand, for the 
Tajik art historian Ashrafi, the definition of it as Bukharan miniature painting concerned the 
fact that the city of Bukhara was predominantly populated by the Persian-speaking 
population of ethnic Tajiks, so miniature painting belonged to Tajik heritage regardless of 
its location in Uzbekistan.139 
Both elites had very little documentary evidence to support their claims, because the 
Tashkent and Dushanbe collections were extremely poor. For example, Dushanbe's 
collection of medieval manuscripts did not contain any miniatures, although Tashkent's 
collection was a little better. Yet the miniatures from Tashkent's collection were dated to 
the late 18th century and were not by well-known artists. Moreover, Uzbek and Tajik art 
historians did not actually see the originals they were discussing and hence built up their 
knowledge from available English and French books. 
139 For Ashrafi, who was from a Tajik family from Uzbekistan and whose father was a prominent composer, 
the heartland ofTajik culture remained in Uzbekistan and she, along with many other Tajik intellectuals, 
resented the national delimitation (1924-35) that robbed Tajik culture of its traditional cultural centres such as 
Bukhara. For more on Uzbek-Tajik relations, see Folz (1996), Akbarzadeh (1996) and Djalili, Grare and 
Akiner (1998). 
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Both elites were certain that the absence of documentary evidence could be 
recompensated by the presence of a living tradition of miniature painting. However, any 
living tradition meant an institutionalised tradition. Therefore, the dried-out local tradition 
could be revived by borrowing from another source which proved to be more resistant to 
historical upheavals: Russian Palekh miniature painting. 
In the following section, I continue to explore how far these intellectual disputes 
were taken during the later years of the Soviet state. 
7.2.2. The rise ofUzbek miniature painting 
The Union of Artists of the USSR was the Soviet institution responsible for state 
commissioning, and included associated Unions from each Soviet republics. One of the 
tasks of the national Unions was the forging of each titular nations' identity through 
material culture. With this goal in mind, all associated Unions contributed to annual jubilee 
exhibitions commemorating the October Revolution. For these exhibits, each Soviet 
republic arranged displays featuring its arts and crafts, and introducing its best artists. In 
1987, the 70th anniversary jubilee arts exhibition was held at the Krymski Val Exhibiting 
Hall in Moscow. In this exhibition I encountered evidence of Ayni's intentions, but on a 
large scale that embraced all Central Asian republics (and one Caucasian republic, 
Azerbaijan). In that exhibition, all the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan showed their 
keen interest in reviving miniature painting. That last all-Soviet exhibition marked the apex 
of interest in miniature painting. 
The Uzbek Union of Artists was noted for its capacity to combine a solid 
educational and research base with efficient management. At the jubilee exhibit, 
Uzbekistan had one of the largest displays, which presented for the first time high-quality 
lacquered boxes with designs borrowed from miniature painting and samples with separate 
sheets of miniature painting. In addition, Uzbekistan's exhibit excelled in the quality of 
finish, variety of techniques, and aesthetic appearance, compared with the exhibits of other 
republics. It was obvious that Uzbekistan had done much better even than Tajikistan, its 
rival in miniature painting. It seemed likely that interest in miniature painting could easily 
spread and that other republics would repeat Uzbekistan's perfectionism, but in four years 
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the dramatic disintegration of the Soviet Union obliterated the vogue in miniature painting 
in the other republics. Even in Tajikistan, where miniature painting had been taken so 
seriously, all efforts were mmed by the onset of an eight-year civil war. Uzbekistan has 
thus become the only former Soviet republic where the complex process of reviving 
miniature painting by art historians, historians and artists has succeeded. 
It would be wrong to suggest that miniature painting failed in the other former 
Soviet Muslim-populated republics solely because of the end of the Soviet Union. This 
would mean that Shahrani's statement about the replacement of traditional Islamic culture 
by the alien Soviet culture was correct, because miniature painting was representative of 
Russian culture. On the contrary, I argue that there was no replacement by an alien culture, 
but rather the introduction of an invented national culture, and the rise of miniature painting 
was due to the rise of nationalism in the arts of Soviet Muslim republics. 
The rise of nationalism in Central Asia did not express itself only under the Islamic 
banner. All of those republics have other sources of inspiration besides their Islamic 
heritage. For example, Kyrgyzstan, apart from a weak Islamic heritage, had a great wealth 
of inspiration from many different sources, such as shamanism, epic oral literature, 
genealogy, funerary monuments, and applied arts related to the nomadic dwelling known as 
the yurt (Urmadova 1986: 11; Okada 1994: 78; Akhmedova 1999, 2000(b), 2004). 
Therefore, for national arts in Kyrgyzstan, reorientation from themes of a short-lived 
Islamic past towards its other pasts was relatively painless and an easy way to rejuvenate 
nationalism in the national arts. 
Secondly, only two Soviet Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were 
in permanent competition over their own historical pasts, due to the 1924 national territorial 
delimitation.140 Miniature painting was linked to the written sources of manuscripts that 
were a part of the most illustrious presentation of that competing past and, as result of that, 
miniature painting has become an indicator of that past. Neither republic could claim a 
continuous tradition of miniature painting, because the tradition had already been lost. In 
other words, it was essential to re-create miniature painting in order to continue that 
140 After the 1924 national territorial delimitation, the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, predominantly 
popultated with and symbolising the titular national heritage of both Uzbeks and Tajiks, both fell within the 
borders of Uzbekistan. This led to a constant rivalry between the elites of both republics during the whole of 
the Soviet period. For more on national delimitation, see Sengupta (2000). 
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tradition. The justification for the right to reclaim that glorious medieval past depended on 
the successful revival of miniature painting. That competition was one of the most 
important factors leading to the establishment of contemporary miniature painting in the 
Soviet period. 
7.3.1. Vladimir Ann 
1 begin with Vladimir Ann, the artist who introduced miniature painting to Uzbekistan from 
the Palekh Arts College. Through his creative practices, 1 can explain why local miniature 
painting dried out, why Ann was able to connect Palekh to Uzbek tradition and why Ann's 
contribution made him unfit for the post-Soviet arts scene. 
1 decided to meet with Ann because all his former students from Tashkent Arts 
College working in the Besh Agach mosque insisted that 1 talk with their old teacher. 1 met 
Ann in his art studio one week after the 10th jubilee of Independence in 2001.141 The 
artist's studio was in a dilapidated flat in an unimpressive 1980s apartment block in 
Tashkent's Chilanzar district. Ann was in high spirits and told me, '1 got a medal for my 
contribution to Uzbek culture.' 1 asked him what for, specifically? He seemed suddenly 
distressed and asked me, 'Who sent you?' 1 told him that 1 had met his pupils, who had 
asked me to interview him. He commented bitterly, '1 restored the lost tradition of 
miniature painting in Uzbekistan, and then what? Do they [Uzbek art historians] recognise 
that they would never do such a thing? As for the medal, 1 deserved it, but could they have 
added what kind of contribution 1 was being honoured for? All my craftsmanship with my 
golden hands was wasted and taken for granted during the Soviet period!' Ann's bitterness 
was understandable: his contribution in establishing the miniature-painting department was 
never acknowledged by art historians in the 1980s and 90s. 
To understand Ann's reaction, it is important to connect the history of the Korean 
diaspora in Uzbekistan to the creative careers of ethnic Korean artists. Unlike most of the 
younger generation of Korean artists who were born and taught in Uzbekistan (Vystavka 
Koreiskikh Khudozhnikov Uzbekistana, 'Exhibition of Korean Uzbek Artists' 1999: 5), Ann 
belongs to the first generation who experienced the horrors of exile and were driven to 
make a choice in their new homeland by their own will. The Koreans were listed as a 
141 Vladimir Ann, interview, 8 September 2001. 
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displaced ethnic minority, classified by the Soviet state as vyselennye pereselentsy (in 
Russian, 'forcefully relocated settler'). Under this category fell entire ethnic groups who 
had been accused of collective treason by the Stalin regime. Vyselennye pereselentsy had to 
regularly check in at the local police station in the places of their resettlement; they had no 
right to free movement; they did no access to higher education, and were employed as a 
rule in unskilled and hard labour. The easiest treatment was for those who were deported 
from the Russian Far East before the Great Patriotic War, and the worst was for those who 
arrived during the war. Koreans who arrived before the war were treated better compared to 
the other displaced minorities because they were not stigmatised as collaborators with the 
German Army. They were granted many concessions, such as the right to receive technical 
and higher education even before being cleared of treason, which took place mainly after 
Stalin's death in 1953. 
Ann had a relatively lucky life. He was born before the deportations from the 
Russian Far East; his family was deported to Kazakhstan, and he was fortunate to survive 
the horrible ::first years of starvation in the frozen Kazakh steppes. After leaving school, he 
embarked upon a trip to Moscow, an opportunity granted by his parents, and for the ::first 
time in his life Ann went to art museums and decided that he wanted to become an artist. 
Ann recognised that he had little chance of passing exams at the Palekh Arts College in 
Russia; his only prior education was from a school on a remote Kazakh collective farm. But 
Ann passed the exams thanks to the help of other boys who had just been demobilised from 
the army compulsory military service. The ex-soldiers decided to take lessons in art and 
built up his self-esteem with a sense of camaraderie and the idea that together they could 
get through the entrance exams. Ann was loyal to the Palekh Arts College for his entire life 
and maintains ties even today. 
After graduation from the Palekh Arts College and Moscow's Surikov Arts 
Institute, Ann settled in Tashkent instead of returning to Kazakhstan. His artistic career in 
Tashkent was successful; he became a member of the Union of Artists and was employed 
as a senior teacher at Tashkent Arts College during the Soviet period. He actively 
participated in the opening of the miniature-painting department at the Arts College in the 
mid-1980s. 
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His pupils were mainly Uzbeks who were grateful to him for his teaching and who 
always maintained loyal respect for him as an artist. Nevertheless, they would not discuss 
what Ann actually did for the restoration of miniature painting. All of them were bitterly 
disappointed and expressed their anger that Ann was removed from his teaching position at 
the Arts College in the early 1990s; methods that Ann introduced were neglected and the 
teaching deteriorated without his presence. After Independence, Ann retired but still 
occasionally participated in seasonal exhibitions. 
In the following section I shed some on light why miniature painting died out. 
73.2. Why miniature painting died out 
Since neither Uzbek nor Tajik scholars provided an explanation for the death of miniature 
painting, in this section I clarifY some facts on the subject. 
Since the medieval period miniature painting functioned under the guild system that 
belonged to the realm of 'court art'; as such, miniature painting depended on the ruling 
Bukharan court's commissions. Miniature painting had suffered a continuous decline since 
the 18th century in Bukhara. This decline is constantly debated by art historians who blame 
the rise of purist Islam, failing trade between Bukhara and its neighbouring countries, and 
continuous feudal warfare between neighbouring states ('Iskusstvo e Remesla Uzbekskikh 
Khanstv XVIII-Nachaia XX Vekov.:Upadok iii Vzlet? Arts and Crafts in Uzbek Khanats of 
the 18th _20th Centuries: Rise or Decline?' 1999: 32). Later, under the rule of the Russian 
Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship, book production was mechanised everywhere, 
including in the Bukhara emirate (Pugachenkova 1957: 49). Miniature painting came under 
pressure from technical progress, combined with reduced commissions from the Bukharan 
court. 
The reason for the final reduction in commissions was the Westernisation of the 
lifestyle of the Bukharan emirs under the Russian empire. This was especially true during 
the era 1910-1924 of the last Bukharan Emir, Alim Khan, who was educated in St. 
Petersburg. After returning to his homeland, he preferred to employ Russian artists from 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, and supported only the crafts that emphasised the grandeur of 
his rule. Crafts connected to costume and architecture particularly flourished. He built 
summer residencies all around Bukhara, which were designed by Russian architects and 
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artists, whereas local craftsmen were initially invited only to do some mmor work 
(Alpemeev 1999). Court art flourished, except for the art of miniature painting, which 
became less relevant because of its incapacity to reflect changes in the lifestyles of the 
ruling Manguit family. 
By the time of the establishment of Soviet rule in Bukhara in 1925, miniature 
painting had already vanished. During the following 55 years under the rise of titular nation 
awareness, the importance of reviving miniature painting was promoted by art historians 
and artists. Moreover, the 1980s was a period of 'romanticising the national past' by the 
local intelligentsia, regardless of ethnic origin, in Uzbekistan, and miniature painting 
became a symbol of that past. Therefore, it would be logical to expect that at last miniature 
painting would be revived by professional Uzbek artists, who by the 1980s had graduated 
in large numbers from the Russian arts institutes and the local Tashkent Arts Institute, and 
that the Union of Artists of Uzbekistan would support the effort to revive miniature 
painting. But as it happened, none of the Uzbek artists were interested in reviving miniature 
painting, and it was done thanks to the sole efforts of an ethnic Korean artist, Vladimir 
Ann. Therefore in the next section I explain why there were no Uzbek artists wishing to 
save miniature painting from oblivion. 
7.3.3. Why were no Uzbek artists available for reviving miniature painting? 
In this section I cite the reasons why ethnic Uzbek artists were not interested in reviving 
miniature painting. 
In the 1980s, miniature painting fascinated many Uzbek artists, but their 
appreciation for the miniature was arrested by creative challenges and by practical 
complications. As artists, they were interested in using the miniature style in their own oil 
paintings instead of the routine procedure of creating the miniature itself (Akhmedova 
2000(a); llkhamova 2000). 
There were practical reasons as to why the idea of reviving miniature painting did 
not inspire them. In that decade, many artists were employed on huge state commissions, 
including colossal architectural constructions such as railway stations, theatres, sporting 
arenas, and many others. Those commissions were creatively challenging because of their 
massive scale. They were also financially rewarding because a single large project would 
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provide an artist's family with financial support for several years. Moreover, those 
commissions were inspired by the Timurid past, which encouraged Uzbek artists to employ 
some technical or aesthetic aspects of medieval miniature painting. Since state commissions 
were more attractive to artists than a modest teaching salary, it became obvious that the best 
artists would try to win the biggest commissions while teaching positions would be left for 
the less fortunate. Furthermore, those Uzbek artists who were teaching at that time at the 
Arts College and Arts Institute preferred to continue to teach what they had learned 
themselves when they were students. Those Uzbek teachers would not attempt to develop 
new or different teaching methodologies for miniature paintings, especially if they were not 
specifically paid to do so. 
Under these circumstances it is understandable that rescuing miniature painting 
would require a professional artist who had little access to the best state commissions and 
who would voluntarily agree to take on extra work without putting a financial burden on 
the Arts College. There was no better candidate for that task than Ann, who already had a 
Palekh education. 
In the following section I discuss Palekh icon-painting's secularization and 
institutionalisation within the Soviet commission system. 
7.3.4. Why was Palekh chosen as an inspiration? 
To explain secularisation and institutionalisation under the Soviet state, I point out that 
Soviet cultural policy was based on Marxist-Leninist principles.142 These principles were 
based on class structure,143 in which artists were classified as a class of intelligentsia, 
whereas craftsmen were defined as working class; neither class was considered inherently 
antagonistic to the regime. So according to these class-conscious principles, craftsmen as 
workers had to be kept working although their product had to be changed. 
142 Early Soviet policies were mainly based on Marx and Engels's Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), 
which declares that historical progress is bound to the class struggle. 
143 Figes and Kolonitskii (1999: 6) argued that class categories were long taken for granted, while at the time 
of the October revolution all social groups needed to define their social existence. Following Figes and 
Kolonitskii's point on the linguistic application of class terms, I emphasise that those linguistic interpretations 
allowed different social groups to self-defme their class belonging during the frrst decades of the Soviet state 
(in order to be either treated favourably or to escape destruction by the state). It is understandable why artists 
classified themselves as 'intelligentsia' rather than bourgeoisie, and why craftsmen opted for terming 
themselves as working class 'rabochii' instead of 'kustar' odinochka' (lone handicraftsman or petty 
enterpreneur). 
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Palekh's icon painting has a controversial history. The village ofPalekh specialised 
in creating icon paintings for religious institutions, but in the atheist USSR, religion was 
completely banned between 1922 and 1942. It seems, from a logical standpoint, that 
traditional arts like icon painting would have the same fate as the institutions for which they 
were produced. Monasteries and churches were closed down, the clergy were repressed, 
religious practice was punishable by imprisonment, and objects of religious faith were 
appropriated by the state and either classified as arts objects or discarded. But icon painting 
was not suppressed; instead it was institutionalised within the Soviet state. 
The Palekh arts were under the state commission system and craftsmen were 
therefore state employees. Palekh arts had to change from clerical arts to state arts. To 
become state art, Palekh artefacts had to change their thematic content and practical 
purpose (Pirogova 2001: 3). Themes were no longer taken from the Bible and the 
Apocrypha, but now came from old Russian fairy tales; the product was no longer icons but 
lacquered boxes. In order to preserve Palekh as an embodiment of Russian culture, the 
village of craftsmen was turned into a factory, and the craftsmen became artists. In the 
factory, artists produced lacquered objects. Later the local Art College was established with 
a specialisation in lacquer techniques. Because Palekh art was capable of reinventing itself, 
it survived as a symbol ofRussianness in the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet periods. That 
Russian example provided a clue for the institutionalisation of Uzbek miniature painting. 
Ann, graduated from Palekh Arts College and applied his experience to his work in 
Uzbekistan. 
Returning to the subject of miniature painting in Uzbekistan, it could have been the 
same scenario. Miniature painting could have been preserved as a highly valued court art, 
miniaturists granted membership in Union of Artists might have been assembled in a 
factory, and technical aspects might have been taught at Arts College. But it did not happen 
that way because the tradition of miniature painting had already vanished by the emergence 
of the Soviet state. To revive Uzbek miniature painting it was necessary to borrow from 
already functioning Soviet instituionalised secularised arts, like in Palekh. 
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Fig. 30 A photo from a Palekh newspaper acquainting locals with Uzbek students' practice 
at the Palekh Arts College. In the photo we can see Vladimir Ann, third from left, looking 
at one of his students giving a Russian teacher a tea pot as a gift. 
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Ann's re-creation of miniature painting was based on his experience in Palekh, 
where he had studied for five years. Soon after his appoin1ment as head teacher for the 
miniature-painting group at Tashkent Arts College, he contacted his Palekh colleagues for 
assistance in conceptualising his teaching methodology. Ann organised his first miniature-
painting students group with 11 people in the 1980s; this group graduated in 1985, and in 
1987 his graduates were good enough to participate in the jubilee exhibition for the 70th 
anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow. After being released by the Arts 
College, Ann explained, 'It was a teaching position and they wanted to give my place to 
someone who would be their man.' Ann completely disappeared from the Arts College, and 
his work on reviving miniature painting was forgotten by everyone apart from Ann and his 
pupils. 
Ann's endeavour at the Arts College was mentioned only once in the Palekh 
newspaper (see Fig. 30, p. 268), and Ann keeps this as evidence of his role in reviving 
miniature painting. That article includes interviews with the head of the student group from 
Uzbekistan, a senior teacher from the Palekh Arts College, and the famous artist Vladimir 
Golikov. The article is important because it presents Ann's student-group photo, a 
description of the cooperation between the Tashkent and Palekh Arts Colleges, and the 
goals of this cooperation. The main goal of the relationship between the two art colleges 
was to preserve and rejuvenate the old miniature-painting tradition in Uzbekistan. 
But the relationship between the art colleges was broken with the full of the Soviet 
state and the fragmentation of the Union of Artists. Uzbek students lost the opportunity to 
continue their practice at the Palekh Arts College. During the post-Soviet period, Palekh 
went through its own agonising stages of fragmentation, dispersing into five bodies, none 
of which had the authority or resources to support artists. The main problem for Palekh 
artists was that without state-supported consumption, nobody needed lacquer boxes, 
however skill:fully made. The last thing Palekh artists wanted was to degrade their art into 
tourist souvenirs. The Palekh artists decided their only hope for salvation was a return to 
the Russian Orthodox Church commission system (pirogova 2001: 12). The Palekh artists, 
like any artists who moved within the ROC valuing system, became immediately involved 
in the processes of politic is at ion of the Church in the post-Soviet Russian state. This return 
to the bosom of the Church made Ann's Palekh connection a subject of contempt from all 
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sides, including the Korean community and local art critics. These conflicts clearly 
demonstrate that institutions and communities became highly politisised in the post-Soviet 
period. 
7.3.5. Ann's post-Soviet position 
In the previous chapters, I discussed Uzbek artists' need to conform to varying moral 
values, which could be very different in the cases of the Union of Artists, the Academy of 
Fine Arts, the mahalia, and the Orthodox Church. According to Ann, he was left in a 
difficult position: '1 feel that I have gone through a long path by the end of my artistic 
career, but I cannot understand why 1 am nowhere.' Those who cannot fit into at least one 
of these fragmented art fields tend to fall and disappear. In this section 1 explore why the 
Palekh group's return to the Church made Ann become perceived as a supporter of Russian 
national chauvinism by both the Korean community and the Uzbek artistic community. 
The ROC's return to the political arena in the current Russian state became 
connected with the boosting of Russian national identity (Carrere d'Encausse 1994). Zoe 
Knox (2005) argued that the ROC's conceptualising of Orthodoxy as synonymous to 
Russian national identity fanned Russian national chauvinism. The ROC's attempt to 
revitalize Russian national identity in the multiethnic state promoted the exclusion within 
the priesthood and laity of anybody who was not white and Slavic. Further, Knox stated 
that patriarch Alexei's rejection of denominational cooperation and interfaith dialogue was 
used by many of the priests as a pretext to instigate violence against representatives of other 
religious denominations and ethnic groups in the Russian Federation. Thus, she concluded 
that the ROC gave a silent seal of approval to the religious, social and economic exclusion 
of non-Russians in the Russian state. 
In independent Uzbekistan, Ann became unwelcome in the Korean community. The 
Korean community had long experienced Russian chauvinism through frequent work 
experiences in seasonal jobs in Russia as well as through being shunned in Russian 
churches.l44 In the Independence period, the whole Korean community, including artists, 
144 See on racialisation of non-Russians in Roman (2000, 2002). Roman assessed various aspects of racial 
predgudices on the example of treatment of non-Russians (Caucasusians and Central Asians) coming to 
Russian cities for work. Koreans, despite their belonging to Russian Orthodox faith, are often treated in the 
same way as these ethnic groups due to their racial difference to Russians .. 
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became heavily influenced by the proselytising of South Korean Protestant churches. Ann's 
closeness with Palekh, associated with Russian Orthodox religious painting, made him 
keenly disliked by Korean pastors and by Korean community who saw those pastors as 
saviors from the Soviet past. 
Similarly, Ann became unwelcome in Uzbek artistic circles because of the Palekh 
school's return to the ROC. Although he did much for arts in Uzbekistan, he did it as a non-
U zbek artist borrowing from Russian religious arts, which under the current political 
climate were considered by Uzbeks to be arts promoting anti-Muslim, anti-Central Asian 
sentiments in Russian society. San 'at issues 1 and 2, published in 2000, which concern 
miniature painting of the past and present in Uzbekistan, are dedicated to the celebration of 
the 545th jubilee of the miniaturist Kamalladin Bekhzod. Bekhzod is proclaimed as a 
founder of miniature painting during the Timurid period, and his legacy to contemporary art 
is extensively discussed. (The Arts College was renamed from Pavel Benkov in honour of 
Bekhzod in 1998.) Zakhid Pulatov wrote in the second issue, 'It is wonderful that the name 
of Kamaladdin Bekhzod and the traditions of his school are alive in Uzbekistan. Art 
historians recognised a long time ago that contemporary fine-arts miniature painting is 
revived and developing. It is possible to see masterpieces by Uzbek artists now in the 
biggest art collections of the world' (pulatov 2000: 17). 
Shomakhmud Mukhamedzhanov, a linguist, claimed in his interview with Elmira 
Guyl in the article Vozrozhdaya Rukopisnuyi Knigu (,The Rebirth of the Hand Illuminated 
Book') and later in his own article Iskusstvo Rukopisnoy Knigi: Traditsii e Sovremenost 
('The Art of Book Painting: Traditional and Contemporary'), that he alone revived 
miniature painting in Uzbekistan in the 1980s, while he was working at the Institute of 
Eastern Languages (Mukhamedzhanov 2000: 32; Gul 2000). Yet in private conversation 
with me, Negora Akhmedova recognised that Ann played a significant role in reviving 
miniature painting as a taught course, but within the Uzbek artistic community nobody 
would recognise his contributions because of the awkward fact that a traditional Uzbek art 
was revived by a representative of a displaced ethnic minority, as well as because of 
Palekh's return to its Christian roots. The local arts community preferred to give credit to 
the scholarly Uzbek linguist Mukhamedzhanov. And since Mukhamedzhanov was elected 
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as one of the 19 academics of the Fine Arts Academy of Uzbekistan, it was impossible to 
challenge his claims on reviving miniature painting. 
This conflict demonstrates that the artist's worth became defined not by his 
contribution in the recent Soviet past but by the current politico-economic dimension 
within which their artefacts' production, circulation and consumption took place. 
7.4.1. Rasu) Pulatov 
This section is concerned with what has happened to miniature painting with the decline of 
the state commission system and the emergence of the market economy. I will investigate 
this using the example of the artistic practice of Vladimir Ann's ex-pupil Rasul Pulatov. 
Pulatov's case shows the conditions in which miniature painting was reinvented as a new 
national art. Pulatov (b. 1966), was Ann's pupil from his first group (1980-85). Before our 
first interview, he provided me with Ann's phone number and insisted that I visit his former 
teacher, promising me that he would give me his own interview in time. In the subsequent 
interview sessions, Pulatov told me his thoughts concerning the Besh Agach artists coping 
with the decline of the state commission system, the market economy reforms and the rise 
of the mahalla. In the following section, using the example of Pulatov, I assess the social 
group from which miniature painters were drawn. 
7.4.2. Pulatov's mahalla background 
Pulatov's origins in the Old City mahalla played a crucial role in his ability to cope with 
Soviet and Independence period changes in institutional priorities. Like all the Besh Agach 
artists, Pulatov's family came from the demolished area of the Old City. And like many Old 
City families, the Pulatovs' lives revolved around the mahalla. His parents had seasonal 
work, obtained through their mahalla connections. The use of those connections meant that 
these jobs had to be later reciprocated in one form or another. For example, his mother was 
an embroiderer of skullcaps, and she often took her unfinished samples from the :factory to 
finish at home.145 Being able to complete some of her work at home meant that in addition 
to her :factory work, she had to take private commissions from the local mahalla families 
who needed embroidery for their daughters' dowries. The Pulatovs allowed themselves 
145 Pulatov's mother was classified as a nadomntsa (a person working from home). 
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few diversions from mahalla interests. Pulatov's father occasionally took his family to 
watch Uzbek plays at the Mukimy Theatre. Pulatov's mother encouraged their son to go the 
House of Pioneers (the Soviet institution for children's leisure activities), where he emolled 
himself in drawing classes. Pulatov's early (mahalla-oriented) ambition was to have a 
steady job as a chef in a restaurant. However, he succumbed to the temptation to apply for a 
theatre-related job after finishing school in 1980, and he applied to the Tashkent Arts 
College miniature-painting department, which had opened the same year. According to 
Pulatov, due to his limited knowledge of the Russian language he at first believed that 
'miniature' was a type of pantomime performance. Nevertheless he passed his entrance 
exams and proved to be a good student. 
He studied in the first of Ann's groups of students. There were twelve students, of 
whom only eleven graduated, as one student dropped out of the course. The group consisted 
only of boys; nine were from the Old City of Tashkent and three came from other regions 
of Uzbekistan. In their final year the group went with Ann for training at the Palekh Arts 
College in Russia. Ann praised his ex-pupil Pulatov for his high-quality work; Pulatov 
excelled in both ornamental and figurative styles. Lacquered boxes required from an artist 
patience, accuracy and good taste, as well as hours of back-breaking work and eyestrain. 
But it was obvious to Ann that his ex-pupil would not finish his artistic career as simply a 
box decorator (see Fig. 31, p.274). Pulatov, from a very early stage, had showed his 
capacity to work with the gilding technique. Pulatov explained how he was able to do that: 
'I have a dry-skinned, light hand and therefore 1 could work well with gold. 1 think that my 
capacity is mostly due to my physical specificity rather than anything; you know, 
something as special as the physical capacity required for a sportsman or a dancer.' Pulatov 
was capable of the highest specialisations in miniature painting: the production oflacquered 
boxes with figurative and ornamental designs, miniature painting based on illustrating 
traditional Oriental poetry, and illuminated miniature painting combined with calligraphy. 
To his parents' pride, Pulatov successfully graduated from the Arts College. After 
graduation, Pulatov gained better opportunities than his parents: he had regular work as a 
professional artist, and he earned at the outset of his career several times more than his 
parents. 
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Fig. 31 Rasul Pulatov, box (papier mache, lacquer and watercolour, 2000.) The scene 
depicts Uzbek musicians performing at a mahalla wedding. Photo was given to me by 
Pulatov. 
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Fig. 32 Rasul Pulatov in his studio in the Besh Agach mosque. Photo taken by myself in 
2001. 
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Fig. 33 Rasul Pulatov, illuminated sheet (gilding, mulberry paper and watercolour, 2001). 
Photo taken by me in 2001. 
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7.4.3. Pulatov's Soviet and post-Soviet working practices 
Pulatov's career can be divided into two periods, the Soviet period and the Independence 
period. I start with his Soviet-period working practices, through which can be seen the 
short history of miniature painting in 20th century Uzbekistan. 
The state commissioned miniature paintings for the purpose of exhibitions in 
Uzbekistan, the rest of the USSR and abroad. Those commissions were aimed towards the 
popularisation ofUzbek crafts. The beginning of Pula to v's working experiences coincided 
with his move from the mahalla to a suburban multifloor apartment building as the 
demolition of the Old City went ahead. Pulatov's professional artistic career started in a 
window sill of the apartment's minuscule kitchen. For two years he worked from home, and 
later moved with friends to the Besh Agach mosque where he has now worked for over a 
decade. 
He shares his room with a fellow artist (see Fig. 32, p.275). When they moved into 
the room, it was in the same condition as it had been since the 15th century. In their room, 
as in the others, there are no facilities. The artists manage to provide rooms with electricity 
but there is no heating yet. In time, the room achieved its present look. The room has tables 
covered with a black cloth on which are immaculately arranged rows of freshly made 
lacquered boxes; on the walls are hung framed miniature paintings with themes oflovers 
and dervishes, and separate sheets of illuminated manuscripts with complicated gilt 
ornamentation and Arabic calligraphy. Pulatov's work-table is placed in the middle of the 
room. In this room Pulatov and his friend started as Union of Artists members having state 
commissions during the Soviet period, and later they became Academy of Fine Arts 
members - without state commissions - in the Independence period. 
In the following section I discuss how Pulatov's career changed in the Independence 
period. 
7.4.4. The decline of state commissions 
In this section I assess the further decline of the state commission system in connection to 
miniature-painting artists. This section shows the dangers of the commission system's 
move from the Union of Artists to various state institutions including the Cultural Office. A 
result of this transfer of responsibility was that valuers were no longer fellow artists, but 
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now state bureaucrats. As I discussed in Chapter 3, artists' perceptions of their own worth 
from moral, economic and social perspectives were shaped through the ways the new 
valuers from state commission system conducted, assessed and delivered state 
commISSIons. 
The 13 years of the post-Soviet period have completely changed artists and their 
world. The Soviet state offered numerous state commissions, artists were provided with 
artistic materials, and they had good honoraria. The Independence period brought new 
challenges, as artists themselves had to cover the cost of rent, pay taxes, and buy the 
necessary supplies of artistic materials for their own work. After 1991, no artistic materials 
were available to artists in Uzbekistan because all materials were produced in Russia. In 
order to continue their work, artists covered the cost of their materials, and also went on 
petty trading expeditions to barter or buy Russian-produced materials. After all the growth 
in their artistic lives, their precious room could no longer remain solely an art studio. It had 
to slowly transform into a shop and also had to serve as a storage space. If, for the majority 
of artists, the decline of the state commission system was difficult, for miniature artists it 
was a complete disaster. The current conduct of state commissioners eroded artists' belief 
in the authority of the commission system and deeply ingrained seeds of distrust towards 
state policies in the art field. 
In independent Uzbekistan, state commissions were extremely rare. Those few 
commissions were mainly intended for sending Uzbek artworks to exhibitions abroad. One 
of these exhibitions was supposed to take place in spring 2002 in Hanover. Pulatov's works 
were chosen among others, but a high-ranking state official who decided whose works were 
to be sent wanted to 'appropriate' one of Pula to v's works for himself Under normal Soviet 
circumstances, with artists heading the Arts Council, this type of theft was rare: the valuers, 
being artists thelllSelves, would not steal from fellow artists. Under the contemporary state 
commission system it became possible for corrupt officials to abuse the rights of artists. But 
under market conditions, Pulatov was at least able to express his opinion. 
Pulatov began to doubt the meaningfulness of miniature painting within the state 
commission system. Pulatov rejected the idea of giving away his work as a bribe, and 
decided to withdraw from the Hanover exhibition to show his opposition to the corruption 
in the Cultural Office. He explained to me, 'It is a pity that my works were not seen abroad. 
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But my work is my work; I worked tirelessly to finish that sheet for two months, so why 
should I have to bribe that guy? I can sell my illuminated page for a price that it actually 
costs.,l46 Pulatov was no longer a state-employed artist who could passively wait and 
expect to be paid for his production, supplied with materials, and supported with life's 
necessities. Instead he became a self-employed artist who was completely independent 
from the state apart from being a good taxpayer. As a result he decided to make his own 
choices as to how, to whom, and for what kind of money or services he would sell his art 
works. 
In the following section I shall discuss Pulatov's adaptation to the emergence of the 
market economy in Uzbekistan. 
7.4.5. The market economy's effects on miniature-painters 
In this section I specify the reasons why the emergence of a market economy in Uzbekistan 
made miniature-painting artists' lives especially difficult owing to the absence of women 
art dealers. 
The main reason was that women art dealers, who came to the forefront of the new 
art economy, specialised in contemporary painting. Women art dealers did not know how to 
value miniature painting because the artists lacked the two-tier education that was so 
important to the dealers' appreciation of artists and their work (see Chapter 4, p.148). 
Women art dealers were equally unable to apply their knowledge of the foreign art 
market's valuing, because the foreign market had an economic valuing of Soviet 
professional arts but not crafts. In addition, women's skills in dealing with the Cultural 
Office for exporting artworks were, in the case of miniature painting, redundant: miniature 
painting objects were small enough to be easily smuggled out of the country, and were 
rarely declared to Customs. 
Women art dealers were unable to successfully market miniature painting to the 
local Uzbek New Rich, for two reasons. First, art historians specialising in miniature 
painting were medievalists from the Academy of Science, while the women art dealers, 
discussed in Chapter 5, mostly had art history backgrounds and specialised in contemporary 
arts. Secondly, miniature painting did not conveniently fall into the pattern of traditional 
146 Rasul Pulatov, interview, 11 September 200 1 
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mahalla life and courtyard consumption idealised by the New Rich (see Chapter 5, section 
5.3.). 
The absence of women art dealers willing to deal with miniature painting meant 
there were no professional art dealers in this field. Artists specialising in miniature painting 
had to conceptualise their art in order to market it themselves. Owing to the limits of their 
Old City mahalla connections, miniature-painters were unable to gain access to the 
exclusive circle of locally residing foreigners from diplomatic, NGO and business circles, 
and therefore had to focus on the tourist trade. For artists, tourists were foreigners traveling 
for leisure who could spare desirable foreign currency in poorer Uzbekistan (Turner and 
Ash 1976).147 Yet artists were unaware of any of the pitfalls awaiting them. 
7.4.6. Besh Agach distances itself from Palekh 
This section explores the reasons behind why tourism failed to influence the Besh Agach 
artists' trade. For this exploration, it is better to emphasise the particular reasons why 
tourism in Uzbekistan was insignificant,148 instead of going in depth into anthropological 
studies of tourism, which are based on locations and situations in which the tourist industry 
is strong. My discussion of the effects of tourism demonstrates that a climate of political 
instability makes reliance on tourism by local arts and crafts risky from an econOilllC 
perspective. 
Nelson Grabum, in 1976, described the tourist -oriented trade as a meeting of the 
West with the native people of the Fourth world; in such trading zones native people 
commoditise their rituals, customs, costumes, artefacts, music and many other aspects of 
147 Turner and Ash (1976) disscussed the pros and cons of the tourism industry. However, in the Besh Agach 
case, a..'1:ists weie not preoccupied by the compa..-ative wealth or high status of tourists. What was hllportant 
for them was that, as locals, they knew best how to run their trade. 
148 Airey and Shackley (1997) stipulated that with the beginning of the market economy there are appeared a 
chance to develop tourism in Uzbekistan. However, authors suggested that despite the presence of tourist 
attractions in form of impressive historical and architectural sites, creating a modern tourist industry would 
require enourmous effort and funds for vatrious tourism-connected bussinesses like airlines, infrastructure, 
hotels and services. These authors could not forsee that other obstacles, primarily the threat of terrorism, 
would prevent Uzbekistan from becoming a tourist destination. 
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their cultural and daily activities. Some anthropologists later came to view tourism as 
helping to authenticate native people's uniqueness (MacCanne11989; Sjoberg 1993i49• 
However, in Uzbekistan the tourist trade was not able to help distinguish Uzbek 
miniature painting from its Palekh counterpart, or to be seen as a purely Uzbek product 
rather than one borrowed from Russian arts. And the growth of domestic and global Islamic 
terrorism undermined the functioning of the commodified tourist zones (Dean 2002; 
Sloboda 2003; Dhariwal 2005). The tourist-oriented trade in miniature painting became a 
victim of the rise of militant Islam. Continuous instability led to a decline in the flow of 
tourists, and tourism practically came to a complete halt after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.150 
Pulatov admitted, 'That whole Besh Agach group committed mistakes together.' 151 
He explained to me that miniature artists clung to each other because they realised that they 
had to face the market together. The Besh Agach group's mistake was to attempt to expand 
their business because they badly needed cash. They thought it might be wise to send their 
work to be sold in cities with higher volumes of tourist traffic - Bukhara, Samarkand and 
Khiva. Unfortunately, this strategy had horrendous consequences. Tourist cities were soon 
flooded with cheap and poor-quality work done by amateurs. The prices of ready-made art 
objects fell below the cost of production and materials. The most painful result of 
miniature-painters' stubborn reliance on tourism between 1999 and 2004 was the economic 
degradation of their precious arts. 
In the following section I move to the restructuring of artistic practices from 
mahalla perspectives. 
7.4.7. Pulatov's use ofthe mahalla perspective 
In these two final sections, I explore how Pulatov attempted to reorient the Besh Agach 
artists away from the Fine Arts Academy and back to the mahalla. These sections will 
149 MacCannel (1989) suggested that tourist industry allows the staging of authenticity by cristalising a sense 
of ethnic Ufliqueness. Sjoberg (1993) disscussed the conceptualisation of ethnic identity through the tourist 
industry, using the case of the Japanese Ainu. 
150 My Uzbekistan fieldwork in 2001 coincided with the 9/11 attacks. ill September/October, the main months 
of the tourist season in Uzbekistan, out of a planned 108 tourist groups, only 3 came. Between 1999 and 2004, 
domestic terrorist attacks, as well as the wars in Afganistan and Iraq, helped to destroy the local tourist-
oriented art trade. 
151 Rasul Pulatov, interview, 15 September 200 1. 
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demonstrate that miniature painting revived its social and moral values through artists' 
contribution as mahalla community members. 
Pulatov's search for social recognition for artists within the mahalla community 
was due to the installment of mahalla institutions in the previously state-owned high rise 
apartment blocks. In the Soviet period, those areas with apartment blocks were never 
regarded as mahalla neighbourhoods. It was also highly questionable whether in 
Independent period those areas run by the former Housing Office could motivate 
multiethnic apartment block dwellers to become mahalla community members. However, 
Russian migration out of Uzbekistan led to the sale of significant number of flats within 
apartment blocks to Uzbek buyers, bringing a condensation of Uzbeks in the Soviet-built 
areas.152 Those new coming Uzbek families were not extended multigenerational families 
with parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles and children. They were simply couples with 
children who could separate themselves from their extended families and mahalla 
communities, able to afford a small apartment but not rich enough to move to a traditional 
house with a courtyard. The ages of those couples and their children was already beyond 
the celebration of weddings and circumcisions. To turn the newcomers into mahalla 
community members, there was a need to find new ways of reconnecting neighbours to 
each other apart from the collective lifecycle celebration consumption conducted in the 
courtyards of the traditional mahalla. 
The mahalla community is built around the preservation of multigenerational 
families (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.). Within those multigenerational families the main aim 
is to provide sons with a feasible option of employment, and the goal was the same for the 
smaller families in the new mahalla. Sons are the priority because they stay in the extended 
family whereas daughters leave the family after marriage. Access to education is one of the 
ways in which mahalla connections are vital. The marginalisation of miniature painting 
started with its declining prestige, and was exacerbated by lowered teaching standards at 
the Art College's department of miniature painting. Pulatov and the other artists who came 
from the Old City felt that they could be useful for the recreation of the mahalla in high rise 
buildings, and that their mahalla connections (mostly from teaching mahalla residents' 
152 Suburbs with high rise buildings are the cheapest in the domestic property market so it is not surprising 
that trade is fast and big in numbers. During my four-month stay in Sergey Lee 4, which counted over 30 
housing blocks, I observed many Russian families leaving for good after selling their homes to U zbeks. 
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male offspring at the Besh Agach site) could be advantageous for everybody. Pulatov and 
his colleagues believed that their economically selfless teaching of their mahalla 
neighbours' children would protect them from denunciation to the mahalla administration 
and to the various state offices by their neighbours. 
Pulatov told me, 'I take pupils privately, I do not charge them, and anyway we are 
turning more and more to the old-fashioned guild system of craftsmen, rather than 
contemporary educated artistS.'153 Pulatov's pupils came to study privately with him 
through his fonner mahalla neighbours from the Old City and his new neighbours in the 
high rise apartment blocks. These boys' parents made their choice not to send them to the 
Arts College to acquire meaningless papers for specialisation in miniature painting. These 
students decided that they would be better skilled than students with a fonnal state 
education and, as a result of better application of their skills, they would succeed 
professionally. Their appearance changed the image of the professional miniature artist. 
Miniature painting slowly redeveloped from a taught, theoretical discipline into the type of 
craft learned through mahalla connections it had been before its re-introduction in the 
1980s. 
7.4.S. Miniature painting as religious arts 
This section further explores Pulatov's following of mahalla values, specifically religion. 
One of the fonns of the reaffinnation of Islam promoted by the mahalla was following 
religious practice in public and at home. The possession of the Koran (in Arabic, or 
translated into Uzbek or Russian) became a must in Muslim Uzbek homes. Believers' 
reliance on Koranic scriptures for guidance prompted Pulatov and other artists to supply the 
local believers with miniature paintings containing individual Koranic suras. 
The mahalla elders considered it acceptable to display some scriptures from Koran 
to help guide people through the difficulties of their daily lives. Pulatov decided to 
incorporate his creative practices within the current resurgence of Islamic practice. He 
reasoned that if even the poor could afford prints with verses from the Koran in Arabic to 
stick on their front doors in the Old City, then the New Rich Uzbeks could allow 
themselves something more than a simple printed slip. 
153 Rasul Pulatov, interview, 9 September 2001. 
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Pulatov began to decorate individual pages with gilded ornamentation, calligraphy 
and painting, something which had been done by professional miniaturists from the 
medieval period up to the late 19th century. At the beginning, he attempted to re-establish 
the local production of paper from mulberry trees, even though the process was very 
intricate and slow (to produce decent-quality mulberry paper requires three years). He 
realised that he had to postpone his plan to produce mulberry paper himself, but he needed 
paper for his calligraphy and illuminated sheets (see Fig. 33, p. 276). He started searching 
for old manuscripts of the Russian Tsarist period. He protested when I asked him whether 
he destroyed manuscripts. 154 He explained to me: 
Filling manuscripts by hand was an awesome task. Miniaturists never knew how many pages they 
would decorate, so a bookmaker had to be aware of that. I found that all those books in Bukhara had 
extra plain pages so I decided to buy them for whatever price their owners would charge me. 
Decorating them with just ornamentation was quite boring, so I learned the Arabic alphabet myself 
in order to combine ornamentation and calligraphy. There is a great difference between decorating 
boxes and decorating illuminated sheets; decorating a box requires between three days and a week, 
whereas one sheet takes more than one month of work. It is rewarding when you know that what you 
create is real art. 
The pious Uzbek New Rich were the first to appreciate Pulatov's return to the traditional 
roots of miniature painting. The New Rich completely embraced the appearance of 
Pulatov's works because his artefacts responded to three requirements. First, they were 
religious arts, so placing Pulatov's verses from the Koran on a wall was not disturbing to 
even the most rigid traditionalists. The purchase of Koranic verses was considered a display 
of piety rather than a waste of money. Secondly, Pulatov's miniature paintings signified a 
certain status, achieved through the acquisition of an expensive piece of consumer art with 
its opulent gilded surface. Thirdly, Pulatov's work was marketed as traditional Uzbek art 
with all the credentials that that implies: hand-made, Islamic-influenced, and executed on 
pre-Soviet period materials.155 All of these features made Pulatov's case exceptional and 
enabled him to build up a stable local clientele. 
154 Rasul Pulatov, interview, 9 September 2001. 
155 Pulatov's marketing strategies are reminiscent of the trade in medieval sacred relics explored by Geary 
(1986:186). Geary's point was that as new objects, relics had to be validified through the myth of production' . 
Pulatov stressed the use of pre-Soviet materials of his illuminated pages. However, this claim could be seen as 
dubious, for two reasons. First, period materials were far from plentiful, and Pulatov worked prolifically. 
Secondly, I observed that many of his works were excuted on A4-sized paper. Obviously, in the past there 
was no such standartisation of paper size. Nevertheless, because of his 'myth of production', his private 
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Broadening international connections and the expansion of air routes into post-
Soviet republics led to numerous requests from Arab emirates.156 Many of these Arabs 
wanted not just a luxuriant sheet with verses from the Koran, but wished for far more 
expensive and complex masterpieces; for example, one buyer requested a complete Koran 
with illuminated miniature painting and calligraphy. Pulatov was surprised by this request 
and honestly admitted that such a project would be a lifelong undertaking that he would not 
dare take on alone, and would therefore require the involvement of the entire Besh Agach 
group. Apart from that, he was sure that it would cost a fortune and the artists would benefit 
ifboth sides came to an agreement on a contract. I left Tashkent in October 2001, before 
this issue was resolved, but nevertheless, I was surprised that both local and foreign 
Muslims appreciated miniature painting not only as art, but mainly as religious art. 
7.5. Conclusion 
The specifics of Uzbekistan's case reveal that what occurred in the Soviet period was 
opposite to what Shahrani thought, that is, the irreversible destruction of Islamic heritage. 
On the contrary, fonner Soviet arts such as miniature painting possessed an astonishing 
capacity to outlive the Soviet state. Miniature painting had the ability to survive the effects 
of the Soviet state's collapse, including the fragmentation of the Soviet arts institutional 
framework and the decline in state commissions. At the same time miniature painting went 
through a difficult period of readjustment to the market economy, which caused difficulties 
in finding local and foreign buyers. The rise of terrorism prevented the opportunity to 
market Uzbek miniature painting to the tourist industry. But the embrace of Islam by 
mahalla men brought a revival of miniature painting. By making economic estimation of 
miniature painting moralised, miniature painters intended to embody mahalla values. This 
was expressed through the content of their works, and through their daily life practices 
involving helping to disseminate knowledge of miniature painting within their residential 
comissioners believed that Pulatov's works on 'old paper' were more inspiring of religious piety than normal 
post-Soviet stationary materials. 
156 Pulatov was reluctant to elaborate on these Arab 'tourists' or what were they doing in the country apart 
from comissioning art works. However, other artists from Besh Agach explained to me that these Arabs could 
hardly be called 'tourists', because in fact they very often focused on religious proselytising. Owing to 
Uzbekistan's strict visa policies, they come to Uzbekistan as tourists or businessmen. 
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communities. By becoming the embodiment of the virtues of the mahalla, artists 
themselves were able to dictate the rules of social inclusion in the newly established 
mahalla neighbourhoods in former Soviet state-owned housing sector. This differed greatly 
from the older established mahalla neighbourhoods, in which privately owned housing had 
always existed, where the mahalla leaders were at liberty to bend artists to their own rules. 
By being a decisive force within the mahalla, which were state-supported institutions, 
miniature painters newly politisised their arts. If, during the Soviet period, miniature 
painting was introduced as a means for claiming the legitimacy of the Uzbek titular nation's 
territorial and cultural integrity, in the post-Soviet period miniature painters were able to 
use their arts to express loyalty to the regime. At the same time, miniature painters 
presented themselves and their arts as representations of the politically neutral version of 
Islam espoused by the Karimov regime. Miniature painting's economic, social and moral 
valuing demonstrated that valuing became shaped through politicisation of the economy. 
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Afterword 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all sense of certainty disappeared for the citizens 
of the new Uzbekistan. Issues such as ethnicity, citizenship and professional identity, 
which had been clearly demarcated in the Soviet system, now became unclear. In order 
to understand their new world and their positions in it, many people sought reassurance 
and justification from others who were experiencing the same loss and confusion. The 
uncertain new atmosphere also provoked an inevitable search for a 'deeper past' and its 
traditions, even if, as many studies of new nationalisms have shown us, those 
'traditions' were partly invented or, in this case, based partly on a particular Soviet view 
of material culture. However, the reassurance found in the certainty of a fabricated 
'deep past' failed to provide an understanding of the present. 
One of the consequences of such yearning for the 'deep past' can be seen in 
post-Soviet Russian arts. The Russian art historians Andrei Kovalev (1995) and 
Ekaterina Dyogot (1995) emphasised the continuity of Russian arts, regardless of Soviet 
past and post-Soviet present. Kovalev suggested that there had in fact been no 'Soviet 
arts' during the Soviet period, but that there had always been 'Russian arts', limited to 
the two cities of Moscow and Leningrad. 155 Dyogot tied 'Russian arts' to ethnicity, 
linking the idea to the Russian artists still working in non-Russian places. 156 Thus, in 
order to demonstrate an artistic connection to a pre-Soviet past, these historians reduced 
the whole notion of Russian arts either to location or ethnicity. Their glossing over the 
term 'Russian' undermined any conceptualisation of post-Soviet arts, because if there 
was no such thing as 'Soviet arts', there could not be 'post-Soviet arts' either. 
However, many Western cultural specialists (Kettering 1998; Widdis 2002; 
Kiaer 2005) argued that the influence of Soviet arts extended beyond the state 
institutions, and were an essential part of the Soviet utopian social model. Kovalev's 
and Dyogot's perceptions could be justified if Soviet arts had been indeed limited to the 
155 Kovalev did not mean location per se, but the location in which artistic millieux were clustered and 
within which they functioned. However, his point sounds hollow because a group of miscellaneous artists 
and art critics could hardly exist in isolation within the big urban megalopolises like Moscow and 
Leningrad, and because the fall of the Soviet institutional art world and its ensuing fragmentation made 
artistic conclaves in post-Soviet Russian capitals transient and unstable. 
156 In fact, Dyogot's claim of the ethnic (Slavic) purity of Russian arts contradicts the history of Russian 
arts. Opening any Russian art history book of the 18th century, one would see practically no Russian 
artists, but many French, German, Scottish and Italian artists who worked in (and were often naturalised 
in the Russian empire). 19th century Russian arts includes more Russian names, but was highly 
multiethnic. And in the Soviet art world, Jewish artists in Moscow and Leningrad were especially 
prominent. 
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Soviet institutional framework. They never considered that Soviet arts were an essential 
part of Soviet life. With the emergence of a new post-Soviet way of life, many people in 
the former Soviet Union are still deeply affected by Soviet ways. Because of the 
continuing connection of citizens to the Soviet way of life, the USSR's split into 
different states did not necessarily lead to the eradication of 'Russian' arts in non-
Russian places like Uzbekistan. 
My dissertation is concerned with the new social forms that filled the cracks and 
liminal places left after the system's collapse. In Uzbekistan, the emergence ofthe post-
Soviet mahalla brought an entirely new outlook on daily life. Suddenly everyone was 
preoccupied with relationships within the multigenerational family, between families, 
with their mahalla neighbours. Many of these relationships were shaped through new 
forms of consumption and access to goods and services, including art. Arts stopped 
being a mere backdrop to mahalla residents' public lives, which lay outside their 
immediate family and the mahalla community. The arts moved directly into the mahalla 
neighborhoods and became closely linked to mahalla society. Arts production (through 
arts educational institutions, art studios and sites like the Besh Agach mosque) and arts 
consumption (through purchase and possession of paintin&s, icons and miniature 
paintings) involved the whole of the mahalla. Arts guided mahalla residents and 
administrators in finding some kind of self-definition. Nevertheless, my mahalla 
ethnography demonstrated that nobody in the community could provide clear 
definitions of new identities, roles and social relations. My ethnography revealed people 
taking different roles and readjusting themselves to new challenges. 
In Chapter 4, I examined the internationalisation ofUzbek arts through a look at 
Soviet arts' place at the lowest rung of the Western art market, which pushed local 
women art dealers to market the Soviet generation ofUzbek artists as 'Russian artists'. 
Because of this, there was limited access to the Western art market for the majority of 
artists who emerged after the fall of the USSR. For post-Soviet artists, there was no 
alternative to marketing their work in the West as simply as one of many 'ethnic' arts. 
Uzbek artists knew that their arts would be struggle for a fully conceptualised place in 
the Western art world. Without a place in the Western arts institutional framework, 
Uzbek paintings were lower in prestige and several times cheaper than contemporary 
Russian paintings. As a result, there was little incentive for Uzbek painters or for art 
dealers to travel to the West for exhibiting and selling, which would include battles over 
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visas and travel permits, payments to Customs and other bureaucrats for permission to 
sell their works, and high transportation costs. 
Unlike Russia, the rest of the post-Soviet states were unable to hold international 
art fairs at home, so they brought their commercial-minded exhibitions to the West. One 
such exhibition took place in the autumn of2005 in Brussels, and was aimed at bringing 
the arts of Central Asia to the West. Among the Central Asian participants, there was an 
Uzbek delegation headed by Natalya Musina (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). In the Uzbek 
case, the 2005 Brussels exhibition was particularly exciting because the ban on private 
individuals handling foreign currency (in effect from 1995 to 2004) had finally been 
lifted. In my naivete, I assumed this legalisation would provide an easier path for Uzbek 
arts. I wanted to find out from Musina and the other Uzbek representatives how the 
lifting of the almost decade-long restrictions had changed the market. 
The Uzbek delegation arrived a few months after the killing of demonstrators by 
the Uzbek army in the eastern city of Andijan, an incident which became known in the 
Western media as the Andijan massacre (Powell 2006:72). The crowd of demonstrators, 
which had assembled in the central square of the city on 13 May, were fIred on by 
soldiers with automatic weapons. The death toll is still unknown, with fIgures ranging 
from 187 to 1000 people killed. The event was interpreted by the Uzbek state media as a 
foiled Islamic terror attack, and portrayed the demonstrators as terrorists attempting to 
create an Islamic state. But because of the secretiveness surrounding the event, it is 
unknown whether the demonstrators actually had Islamist goals. 
For the Uzbek group coming to Brussels, it was traumatic to represent such a 
brutal regime, but on the other hand the fear of an Islamist revolution was so great that 
they were unwilling to openly condemn the government's actions. Lola Boboeva (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.8.1.) was the rare person who dared to speak on the subject. As she 
put it, 'We all feel dispirited about what happened in Andijan. But there are none of us 
[artists] who would actually condemn the President's wrongdoing, because we are 
really frightened by the thought of what awaits us ahead without such a regime if 
fundamentalists take hold of the state.' 
I was surprised by the lack of paintings represented in the Uzbek delegation. 
Musina brought fewer painting than ceramics, textiles and jewellery this time. I inquired 
about this among my contacts in the Uzbek art community, who directed me to Ira 
Salahutdinova, an employee of Musina's Karavan gallery who had remained in 
Tashkent during the exhibition. She explained why Musina did not want to take painting 
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to Brussels. Salahutdinova explained that Musina's reluctance was caused by the rise in 
art prices locally. 
Uzbek artists and art dealers were able to sell works at home for much higher 
prices than in the West. In Chapters 5 and 7, I emphasise the fact that selling paintings 
at home for prices higher than in the West could explain artists' and art dealers' 
unwillingness to move paintings from Uzbekistan to the West. But that does not 
necessarily explain the Uzbek art world's apparent wish to endure an extremely 
suffocating life under the current repressive regime. Even the implicit critique of the 
regime in paintings on the theme of post-Soviet consumption by a younger generation 
of women artists (discussed in Chapter 4) did not inspire the local art world into 
resisting the regime. But there were reasons beyond economics, politics or simple 
survival for Uzbek artists to remain in Uzbekistan. 
Post-Soviet Uzbek arts reinforced the Soviet notion of the inseparability of art 
producers from their works. In Uzbekistan, arts continued to embody and reflect the 
moral and social person of their producers and their consumers (such as the local 
mahalla residents). A move out of Tashkent to Russia or to the West meant that what 
artists produced would become a mere consumer good, a good with no merit apart from 
its economic value, detached from social connection to other human beings. Regardless 
of the possible benefits, this change would lead to the destruction of an artist's 
personhood. The post-Soviet situation brought to light the fact that Uzbek arts are not 
just a field where career opportunities could be realised and social connections revealed. 
At a time when categories and identities were being blurred and re-forged, for artists in 
Uzbekistan the ability to produce artworks was profoundly connected to their ability to 
redefine their sense of person. 
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